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Introduction
Towards a Finally Subjectless Object
...[T]he effect of the empirical method in metaphysics is 
seriously and persistently to treat finite minds as one among 
many forms of finite existence, having no privilege above 
them except such as it derives from its greater perfection 
and development. Should inquiry prove that the cognitive 
relation is unique, improbable as such a result might seem, 
it would have to be accepted faithfully and harmonised 
with the remainder of the scheme. But prima facie there 
is no warrant for the assumption, still less for the dogma 
that, because all experience implies a mind, that which 
is experienced owes its being and its qualities to mind. 
Minds are but the most gifted members known to us in 
a democracy of things. In respect of being or reality all 
existences are on an equal footing. They vary in eminence; 
as in a democracy, where talent has an open career, the most 
gifted rise to influence and authority. 
— Samuel Alexander 1
Ordinarily, upon hearing the word “object”, the first thing we think is 
“subject”. Our second thought, perhaps, is that objects are fixed, stable and 
unchanging, and therefore to be contrasted with events and processes. The 
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object, we are told, is that which is opposed to a subject, and the question 
of the relation between the subject and the object is a question of how 
the subject is to relate to or represent the object. As such, the question of 
the object becomes a question of whether or not we adequately represent 
the object. Do we, the question runs, touch the object in its reality in our 
representations, or, rather, do our representations always “distort” the 
object such that there is no warrant in the claim that our representations 
actually represent a reality that is out there. It would thus seem that the 
moment we pose the question of objects we are no longer occupied with the 
question of objects, but rather with the question of the relationship between 
the subject and the object. And, of course, all sorts of insurmountable 
problems here emerge because we are after all—or allegedly—subjects, and, 
as subjects, cannot get outside of our own minds to determine whether our 
representations map on to any sort of external reality.
The basic schema both of anti-realisms and of what I will call 
epistemological realisms (for reasons that will become apparent in a 
moment) is that of a division between the world of nature and the world 
of the subject and culture. The debate then becomes one over the status of 
representation. 
subject/culture nature/object
representation
x
Within the schema of representation, object is treated as a pole opposed 
to subject. The entire debate between realism and anti-realism arises as a 
result of how these two circles overlap. While the overlap between these two 
domains seems to establish or guarantee their relation, this overlap also 
contains something of an antinomy or fundamental ambiguity. Because 
the representation lies in the intersection between the two domains, there's 
a deep ambiguity as to whether or not representation actually hooks on 
to the world as it really is. Epistemological realists seek a correspondence 
or adequation between subject and object, representations and states-of-
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affairs. They wish to distinguish between true representations and mere 
imaginings, arguing that true representations mirror the world as is, 
reflecting a world as it is regardless of whether any represents it. In short, 
epistemological realists argue that true representations represent a world 
that is in no way dependent on being represented by the subject or culture 
to exist as it does. Often epistemological realisms are closely connected 
with a project of Enlightenment critique, seeking to abolish superstition 
and obscurantism by discovering the true nature of the world and giving 
us the resources for distinguishing what is epistemologically justified and 
what is not.
Anti-realisms, by contrast, note that our relationship to the world still 
falls within the domain belonging to the subject, mind, and culture:
subject/culture nature/object
representation
x
Here the darkened space within the right-hand circle indicates that 
the domain of nature and the object has been foreclosed, that it's been 
blocked out, and that we are to restrict inquiry to what is given in the 
subject and culture circle. While the anti-realist generally does not deny 
that a world independent of subject, mind, and culture exists—i.e., he's 
not a Berkeleyian subjective idealist or a Hegelian absolute idealist—the 
anti-realist nonetheless argues that because representation falls entirely 
within the domain of the subject and culture we are unable to determine 
whether representations are merely our constructions, such that they do 
not reflect reality as it is at all, or whether these representations are true 
representations of reality as it is and would be regardless of whether it 
were represented. However, while the anti-realist argument generally bases 
itself on the indeterminability of whether representation is construction 
or a true representation of reality, it often slips into the thesis that 
representation is a construction and that reality is very likely entirely 
different from how we represent it. For the anti-realist, truth thus becomes 
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inter-subjective agreement, consensus, or shared representation, rather 
than a correspondence between representation and reality. Indeed, the very 
concept of reality is transformed into reality for-us or the manner in which 
we experience and represent the world. Like epistemological realisms, 
anti-realisms are often closely connected to a project of critique. In this 
regard, they might seek to demonstrate the limits of what we can know, 
or alternatively they might attempt to show how “pictures” of the world 
are socially constructed such that they vary according to history, culture, 
language, or economic class. In this way, the anti-realist is able to debunk 
universalist pretensions behind many “world-pictures” that function to 
guarantee privilege.
As a consequence of the two world schema, the question of the 
object, of what substances are, is subtly transformed into the question 
of how and whether we know objects. The question of objects becomes 
the question of a particular relation between humans and objects. This, 
in turn, becomes a question of whether or not our representations map 
onto reality. Such a question, revolving around epistemology, has been the 
obsession of philosophy since at least Descartes. Where prior philosophy 
engaged in vigorous debates as to the true nature of substance, with or 
around Descartes the primary question of philosophy became that of how 
subjects relate to or represent objects. Nor were the stakes of these debates 
about knowledge small. At issue was not the arid question of when and 
how we know, but rather the legitimacy of knowledge as a foundation for 
power. If questions of knowledge became so heated during the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment period in Western philosophy, then this is because 
Europe was simultaneously witnessing the birth of capitalism, the erosion 
of traditional authority in the form of monarchies and the Church, the 
Reformation, the rise of democracy, and the rise of the new sciences. 
Questions of knowledge were political questions, simultaneously targeting 
arguments from authority that served as a support or foundation for the 
monarchies and the Church—the two of which were deeply intertwined 
–and laying the groundwork for participatory democracy through a 
demonstration that all humans have the capacity to know (Descartes and 
perhaps Locke) or that knowledge is not possible at all, but consists of 
merely sentiment, custom, or opinion (Hume). 
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In any event, the two options that opened Modernity—Descartes and 
Hume—led to much the same consequences at the level of the political: 
that individual humans are entitled to define their own form of life and 
participate in the formation of the State because either a) all humans are 
capable of knowing and therefore are not in need of special authorities 
or revelation to govern them, or b) that because absolute knowledge is 
unobtainable for humans, any authority claiming to ground his or her 
authority on the basis of knowledge is an illegitimate huckster bent on 
controlling and manipulating the populace. In short, behind this debate 
was the issue of egalitarianism or the right of all persons to participate 
in governance. In one form or another this debate and these two options 
continue down to our own time and are every bit as heated and political 
as when the shift to epistemology first arose. On the one hand we have 
the pro-science crowd that vigorously argues that science gives us the 
true representation of reality. It is not difficult to detect, lurking in the 
background, a protracted battle against the role that superstition and 
religion play in the political sphere. Society, at all costs, must be protected 
from the superstitious and religious irrationalities that threaten to plunge us 
back into the Dark Ages. Here The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins comes 
to mind.2 On the other hand, there are the social constructivists and anti-
realists vigorously arguing that our conceptions of society, the human, race, 
gender, and even reality are constructed. Their worry seems to be that any 
positive claim to knowledge risks becoming an exclusionary and oppressive 
force of domination, and they arrive at this conclusion not without good 
reason or historical precedent. 
As always, the battles that swirl around epistemology are ultimately 
questions of ethics and politics. As Bacon noted, knowledge is power. And 
knowledge is not simply power in the sense that it allows us to control or 
master the world around us, but rather knowledge is also power in the sense 
that it determines who is authorized to speak, who is authorized to govern, 
and is the power to determine what place persons and other entities should, 
by right, occupy within the social order. No, questions of knowledge are 
not innocent questions. Rather, they are questions intimately related to life, 
governance, and freedom. A person's epistemology very much reflects their 
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idea of what the social order ought to be, even if this is not immediately 
apparent in the arid speculations of epistemology.
Yet in all of the heated debates surrounding epistemology that have cast 
nearly every discipline in turmoil, we nonetheless seem to miss the point 
that the question of the object is not an epistemological question, not a 
question of how we know the object, but a question of what objects are. 
The being of objects is an issue distinct from the question of our knowledge 
of objects. Here, of course, it seems obvious that in order to discuss the 
being of objects we must first know objects. And if this is the case, it follows 
as a matter of course that epistemology or questions of knowledge must 
precede ontology. However, I hope to show in what follows that questions 
of ontology are both irreducible to questions of epistemology and that 
questions of ontology must precede questions of epistemology or questions 
of our access to objects. What an object is cannot be reduced to our access 
to objects. And as we will see in what follows, that access is highly limited. 
Nonetheless, while our access to objects is highly limited, we can still say a 
great deal about the being of objects.
However, despite the limitations of access, we must avoid, at all costs, 
the thesis that objects are what our access to objects gives us. As Graham 
Harman has argued, objects are not the given. Not at all. As such, this 
book defends a robust realism. Yet, and this is crucial to everything that 
follows, the realism defended here is not an epistemological realism, but an 
ontological realism. Epistemological realism argues that our representations 
and language are accurate mirrors of the world as it actually is, regardless of 
whether or not we exist. It seeks to distinguish between true representations 
and phantasms. Ontological realism, by contrast, is not a thesis about our 
knowledge of objects, but about the being of objects themselves, whether or 
not we exist to represent them. It is the thesis that the world is composed 
of objects, that these objects are varied and include entities as diverse as 
mind, language, cultural and social entities, and objects independent of 
humans such as galaxies, stones, quarks, tardigrades and so on. Above all, 
ontological realisms refuse to treat objects as constructions of humans. 
While it is true, I will argue, that all objects translate one another, the 
objects that are translated are irreducible to their translations. As we will 
see, ontological realism thoroughly refutes epistemological realism or 
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what ordinarily goes by the pejorative title of “naïve realism”. Initially it 
might sound as if the distinction between ontological and epistemological 
realism is a difference that makes no difference but, as I hope to show, this 
distinction has far ranging consequences for how we pose a number of 
questions and theorize a variety of phenomena.
One of the problematic consequences that follows from the hegemony 
that epistemology currently enjoys in philosophy is that it condemns 
philosophy to a thoroughly anthropocentric reference. Because the 
ontological question of substance is elided into the epistemological question 
of our knowledge of substance, all discussions of substance necessarily 
contain a human reference. The subtext or fine print surrounding our 
discussions of substance always contain reference to an implicit “for-
us”. This is true even of the anti-humanist structuralists and post-
structuralists who purport to dispense with the subject in favor of various 
impersonal and anonymous social forces like language and structure that 
exceed the intentions of individuals. Here we still remain in the orbit of 
an anthropocentric universe insofar as society and culture are human 
phenomena, and all of being is subordinated to these forces. Being is 
thereby reduced to what being is for us. 
By contrast, this book strives to think a subjectless object, or an object 
that is for-itself rather than an object that is an opposing pole before or in 
front of a subject. Put differently, this essay attempts to think an object 
for-itself that isn't an object for the gaze of a subject, representation, or a 
cultural discourse. This, in short, is what the democracy of objects means. 
The democracy of objects is not a political thesis to the effect that all objects 
ought to be treated equally or that all objects ought to participate in human 
affairs. The democracy of objects is the ontological thesis that all objects, as 
Ian Bogost has so nicely put it, equally exist while they do not exist equally. 
The claim that all objects equally exist is the claim that no object can be 
treated as constructed by another object. The claim that objects do not exist 
equally is the claim that objects contribute to collectives or assemblages to a 
greater and lesser degree. In short, no object such as the subject or culture 
is the ground of all others. As such, The Democracy of Objects attempts to 
think the being of objects unshackled from the gaze of humans in their 
being for-themselves.
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Such a democracy, however, does not entail the exclusion of the human. 
Rather, what we get is a redrawing of distinctions and a decentering of the 
human. The point is not that we should think objects rather than humans. 
Such a formulation is based on the premise that humans constitute some 
special category that is other than objects, that objects are a pole opposed to 
humans, and therefore the formulation is based on the premise that objects 
are correlates or poles opposing or standing-before humans. No, within the 
framework of onticology—my name for the ontology that follows—there 
is only one type of being: objects. As a consequence, humans are not 
excluded, but are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist 
or populate the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities.
It is here that we encounter the redrawing of distinctions proposed by 
object-oriented philosophy and onticology. In his Laws of Form, George 
Spencer-Brown argued that in order to indicate anything we must first 
draw a distinction. Distinction, as it were, precedes indication. To indicate 
something is to interact with, represent, or point at something in the world 
(indication takes a variety of forms). Thus, for example, when I say the sun 
is shining, I have indicated a state-of-affairs, yet this indication is based on a 
prior distinction between, perhaps, darkness and light, gray days and sunny 
days, and so on. According to Spencer-Brown, every distinction contains a 
marked and an unmarked space. 
marked unmarked
The right-angle is what Spencer-Brown refers to as the mark of 
distinction. The marked space opens what can be indicated, whereas the 
unmarked space is everything else that is excluded. Thus, for example, I 
can draw a circle on a piece of paper (distinction), and can now indicate 
what is in that circle. Two key points follow from Spencer-Brown's calculus 
of distinctions. First, the unmarked space of a distinction is invisible to the 
person employing the distinction. While it is true that, in many instances, 
the boundary of a distinction can be crossed and the unmarked space 
can be indicated, in the use of a distinction the unmarked space of the 
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distinction becomes a blind-spot for the system deploying the distinction. 
That which exists in the unmarked space of the distinction might as well 
not exist for the system using the distinction. 
However, the unmarked space of the distinction is not the only blind-
spot generated by the distinction. In addition to the unmarked space of a 
distinction, the distinction itself is a blind-spot. In the use of a distinction, 
the distinction itself becomes invisible insofar as one passes “through” the 
distinction to make indications. The situation here is analogous to watching 
a bright red cardinal on a tree through one's window. Here the window 
becomes invisible and all our attention is drawn to the cardinal. One can 
either use their distinctions or observe their distinctions, but never use 
their distinctions and observe their distinctions. By virtue of the withdrawal 
of distinctions from view in the course of using them, distinctions thus 
create a reality effect where properties of the indicated seem to belong 
to the indicated itself rather than being effects of the distinction. As a 
consequence, we do not realize that other distinctions are possible. The 
result is thus that we end up surreptitiously unifying the world under a 
particular set of distinctions, failing to recognize that very different sorts of 
indications are possible.
Within the marked space of its distinctions, much contemporary 
philosophy and theory places the subject or culture. As a consequence, 
objects fall into the unmarked space and come to be treated as what is other 
than the subject.
content:
signs/signifiers/representations
subject/culture
Here one need only think of Fichte for a formalization of this logic. 
Within any distinction there can also be sub-distinctions that render their 
own indications possible. In the case of the culturalist schema, the subject/
culture distinction contains a sub-distinction marking content. The catch 
is that in treating the object as what is opposed to the subject or what is 
other than the subject, this frame of thought treats the object in terms of 
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the subject. The object is here not an object, not an autonomous substance 
that exists in its own right, but rather a representation. As a consequence 
of this, all other entities in the world are treated only as vehicles for human 
contents, meanings, signs, or projections. By analogy, we can compare the 
culturalist structure of distinction with cinema. Here the object would be 
the smooth cinema screen, the projector would be the subject or culture, 
and the images would be contents or representations. Within this schema, 
the screen is treated as contributing little or nothing and all inquiry is 
focused on representations or contents. To be sure, the screen exists, but it 
is merely a vehicle for human and cultural representations. 
Onticology and object-oriented philosophy, by contrast, propose to 
place objects in the marked space of distinction. 
objectsubject/culture/nonhumans
It will be noted that when objects are placed in the marked space of 
distinction, the sub-distinction does not contract what can be indicated, 
but rather expands what can be indicated. Here subjects and culture are not 
excluded, but rather are treated as particular types of objects. Additionally, it 
now becomes possible to indicate nonhuman objects without treating them 
as vehicles for human contents. As a consequence, this operation is not a 
simple inversion of the culturalist schema. It is not a call to pay attention 
to objects rather than subjects or to treat subjects as what are opposed to 
objects, rather than treating objects as being opposed to subjects. Rather, 
just as objects were reduced to representations when the subject or culture 
occupied the marked space of distinction, just as objects were effectively 
transformed into the subject and content, the placement of objects in the 
marked space of distinction within the framework of ontology transforms 
the subject into one object among many others, undermining its privileged, 
central, or foundational place within philosophy and ontology. Subjects are 
objects among objects, rather than constant points of reference related to 
all other objects. As a consequence, we get the beginnings of what anti-
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humanism and post-humanism ought to be, insofar as these theoretical 
orientations are no longer the thesis that the world is constructed through 
anonymous and impersonal social forces as opposed to an individual 
subject. Rather, we get a variety of nonhuman actors unleashed in the world 
as autonomous actors in their own right, irreducible to representations and 
freed from any constant reference to the human where they are reduced to 
our representations.
Thus, rather than thinking being in terms of two incommensurable 
worlds, nature and culture, we instead get various collectives of objects. 
As Latour has compellingly argued, within the Modernist schema that 
drives both epistemological realism and epistemological anti-realism, 
the world is bifurcated into two distinct domains: culture and nature.3 
The domain of the subject and culture is treated as the world of freedom, 
meaning, signs, representations, language, power, and so on. The domain 
of nature is treated as being composed of matter governed by mechanistic 
causality. Implicit within forms of theory and philosophy that work with this 
bifurcated model is the axiom that the two worlds are to be kept entirely 
separate, such that there is to be no inmixing of their distinct properties. 
Thus, for example, a good deal of cultural theory only refers to objects 
as vehicles for signs or representations, ignoring any non-semiotic or 
non-representational differences nonhuman objects might contribute to 
collectives. Society is only to have social properties, and never any sorts of 
qualities that pertain to the nonhuman world.
It is my view that the culturalist and modernist form of distinction is 
disastrous for social and political analysis and sound epistemology. Insofar 
as the form of distinction implicit in the culturalist mode of distinction 
indicates content and relegates nonhuman objects to the unmarked space 
of the distinction, all sorts of factors become invisible that are pertinent 
to why collectives involving humans take the form they do. Signifiers, 
meanings, signs, discourses, norms, and narratives are made to do all the 
heavy lifting to explain why social organization takes the form it does. While 
there can be no doubt that all of these agencies play a significant role in 
the formation of collectives involving humans, this mode of distinction 
leads us to ignore the role of the nonhuman and asignifying in the form 
of technologies, weather patterns, resources, diseases, animals, natural 
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disasters, the presence or absence of roads, the availability of water, 
animals, microbes, the presence or absence of electricity and high speed 
internet connections, modes of transportation, and so on. All of these 
things and many more besides play a crucial role in bringing humans 
together in particular ways and do so through contributing differences that 
while coming to be imbricated with signifying agencies, nonetheless are 
asignifying. An activist political theory that places all its apples in the basket 
of content is doomed to frustration insofar as it will continuously wonder 
why its critiques of ideology fail to produce their desired or intended social 
change. Moreover, in an age where we are faced with the looming threat of 
monumental climate change, it is irresponsible to draw our distinctions in 
such a way as to exclude nonhuman actors.
On the epistemological front, the subject/object distinction has the 
curious effect of leading the epistemologist to focus on propositions 
and representations alone, largely ignoring the role that practices and 
nonhuman actors play in knowledge-production. As a consequence, the 
central question becomes that of how and whether propositions correspond 
to reality. In the meantime, we ignore the laboratory setting, engagement 
with matters and instruments, and so on. It is as if experiment and the 
entities that populate the laboratory are treated as mere means to the end 
of knowledge such that they can be safely ignored as contributing nothing 
to propositional content, thereby playing no crucial role in the production 
of knowledge. Yet by ignoring the site, practices, and procedures by which 
knowledge is produced, the question of how propositions represent reality 
becomes thoroughly obscure because we are left without the means of 
discerning the birth of propositions and the common place where the world 
of the human and nonhuman meets.
In shifting from a dual ontology based on the nature/culture split to 
collectives, onticology and object-oriented philosophy place all entities on 
equal ontological footing. Rather than two distinct ontological domains, the 
domain of the subject and the domain of the object, we instead get a single 
plane of being populated by a variety of different types of objects including 
humans and societies:
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humans
nonhumans
collectives
The concept of collectives does not approach being in terms of two 
separate domains, but rather as a single plane in which, to use Karen 
Barad's apt term, objects are entangled with one another.4 In this regard, 
society and nature do not form two separate and entirely distinct domains 
that must never cross. Rather, collectives involving humans are always 
entangled with all sorts of nonhumans without which such collectives could 
not exist. To be sure, such collectives are populated by signs, signifiers, 
meanings, norms and a host of other sundry entities, but they are also 
populated by all sorts of asignifying entities such as animals, crops, weather 
events, geographies, rivers, microbes, technologies, and so on. Onticology 
and object-oriented ontology draw our attention to these entanglements by 
placing the human and nonhuman on equal footing.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that collectives necessarily 
involve humans. There are collectives that involve humans and other 
collectives of objects that have nothing to do with humans:
nonhumans
collectives
In short, not everything is related to the human, nor, as I will argue in 
what follows, is everything related to everything else. While we might be 
particularly interested in collectives involving humans because we happen 
to be human, from the standpoint of ontology we must avoid treating all 
collectives as involving the human.
From the foregoing it can be gathered that the ontology I am proposing 
is rather peculiar. Rather than treating objects as entities opposed to a 
subject, I treat all entities, including subjects, as objects. Moreover, in 
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order to overcome the dual world hypothesis of Modernity, I argue that it 
is necessary to staunchly defend the autonomy of objects or substances, 
refusing any reduction of objects to their relations, whether these relations 
be relations to humans or other objects. In my view, the root of the 
Modernist schema arises from relationism. If we are to escape the aporia 
that beset the Modernist schema this, above all, requires us to overcome 
relationism or the thesis that objects are constituted by their relations. 
Accordingly, following the ground-breaking work of Graham Harman's 
object-oriented philosophy, I argue that objects are withdrawn from all 
relation. The consequences of this strange thesis are, I believe, profound. 
On the one hand, in arguing that objects are withdrawn from their relations, 
we are able to preserve the autonomy and irreducibility of substance, 
thereby sidestepping the endless, and at this point rather stale, debate 
between the epistemological realists and anti-realists. On the other hand, 
where the anti-realists have obsessively focused on a single gap between 
humans and objects, endlessly revolving around the manner in which 
objects are inaccessible to representation, object-oriented philosophy allows 
us to pluralize this gap, treating it not as a unique or privileged peculiarity 
of humans, but as true of all relations between objects whether they involve 
humans or not. In short, the difference between humans and other objects 
is not a difference in kind, but a difference in degree. Put differently, all 
objects translate one another. Translation is not unique to how the mind 
relates to the world. And as a consequence of this, no object has direct 
access to any other object.
Onticology and object-oriented philosophy thus find themselves in a 
strange position with respect to speculative realism. Speculative realism is 
a loosely affiliated philosophical movement that arose out of a Goldsmith's 
College conference organized by Alberto Toscano in 2007. While the 
participants at this event—Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham 
Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux—share vastly different philosophical 
positions, they are all united in defending a variant of realism and in 
rejecting anti-realism or what they call “correlationism”. With the other 
speculative realists, onticology and object-oriented philosophy defend 
a realist ontology that refuses to treat objects as constructions or mere 
correlates of mind, subject, culture, or language. However, with the anti-
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realists, onticology and object-oriented philosophy argue that objects 
have no direct access to one another and that each object translates 
other objects with which it enters into non-relational relations. Object-
oriented philosophy and onticology thus reject the epistemological 
realism of other realist philosophies, taking leave of the project of policing 
representations and demystifying critique. The difference is that where the 
anti-realists focus on a single gap between humans and objects, object-
oriented philosophy and onticology treat this gap as a ubiquitous feature 
of all beings. One of the great strengths of object-oriented philosophy 
and onticology is thus, I believe, that it can integrate a number of the 
findings of anti-realist philosophy, and continental social and political 
theory, without falling into the deadlocks that currently plague anti-realist 
strains of thought.
For those not familiar with the basic claims of object-oriented 
philosophy and onticology, a list of object-oriented heroes might prove 
helpful for gaining orientation within onticology. Among the heroes of 
onticology are Graham Harman, Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, Timothy 
Morton, Ian Bogost, Niklas Luhmann, Jane Bennett, Manuel DeLanda, 
Marshall McLuhan, Friedrich Kittler, Karen Barad, John Protevi, Walter 
Ong, Deleuze and Guattari, developmental systems theorists such as 
Richard Lewontin and Susan Oyama, Alfred North Whitehead, Donna 
Haraway, Roy Bhaskar, Katherine Hayles, and a host of others. Some of 
these thinkers appear more than others in the pages that follow, and others 
appear scarcely or not at all, but all have deeply influenced my thought. 
The thread that runs throughout the work of these thinkers is a profound 
decentering of the human and the subject that nonetheless makes room for 
the human, representation, and content, and an accompanying attentiveness 
to all sorts of nonhuman objects or actors coupled with a refusal to reduce 
these agencies to vehicles of content and signs. In developing my argument, 
I have proceeded as a bricoleur, freely drawing from a variety of disciplines 
and thinkers whose works are not necessarily consistent with one another. 
Of the bricoleur, Lévi-Strauss writes that,
[t]he 'bricoleur' is adept at performing a large number 
of diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not 
subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials 
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and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the 
project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules 
of his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', 
that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always 
finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears 
no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular 
project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there 
have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with 
the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The 
set of the 'bricoleur's' means cannot therefore be defined in 
terms of a project (which would presuppose, besides, that, 
as in the case of the engineer, there were, at least in theory, 
as many sets of tools and materials or 'instrumental sets' as 
there are different kinds of projects). It is to be defined only 
by its potential use or, putting this another way and in the 
language of the 'bricoleur' himself, because the elements are 
collected and retained on the principle that 'they may always 
come in handy'. Such elements are specialized up to a point, 
sufficiently for the 'bricoleur' not to need the equipment and 
knowledge of all trades and professions, but not enough for 
each of them to have one definite and determinate use. They 
each represent a set of actual and possible relations; they 
are 'operators' but they can be used for any operations of 
the same type.5
For readers startled by some of the thinkers and lines of thought I forge 
together in the pages that follow, it is worthwhile to recall that this is the 
work of a bricoleur and that it very much reflects the idiosyncrasies of my 
own intellectual background and development. For example, Lacan makes 
a number of appearances in the pages that follow and this reflects my time 
in a previous incarnation as a practicing psychoanalyst. As I argue in what 
follows, every object is a crowd and this is above all true of books. Where 
the materials out of which a book is constructed might themselves be 
heterogeneous, what is important is not whether these other materials are 
in themselves consistent with one another, but rather whether the product 
formed from these parts manages to attain some degree of consistency in 
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the formation of a new object. Readers, for example, might be surprised to 
discover Harman's object-oriented ontology, the constructivism of Niklas 
Luhmann's autopoietic social theory, Deleuze and Guattari's ontology of 
the virtual, and the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan rubbing elbows 
with one another. Standing alone, these various theories are opposed on 
a number of fronts. However, the work of a bricoleur consists in forging 
together heterogeneous materials so as to produce something capable of 
standing on its own. I hope that I've done so, but I make no claim that this 
is the only way that object-oriented ontology can be formulated, nor am I 
particularly interested in policing others with a theory of reality.
It is unlikely that object-oriented ontologists are going to persuade 
epistemological realists or anti-realists that they have found a way of 
surmounting the epistemological problems that arise out of the two-world 
model of being any time soon. Quoting Max Planck, Marshall and Eric 
McLuhan write, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it”.6 This appears 
to be how it is in philosophy as well. New innovations in philosophy do 
not so much refute their opponents as simply cease being preoccupied by 
certain questions and problems. In many respects, object-oriented ontology, 
following the advice of Richard Rorty, simply tries to step out of the debate 
altogether. Object-oriented ontologists have grown weary of a debate that 
has gone on for over two centuries, believe that the possible variations of 
these positions have exhausted themselves, and want to move on to talking 
about other things. If this is not good enough for the epistemology police, 
we are more than happy to confess our guilt and embrace our alleged lack 
of rigor and continue in harboring our illusions that we can speak of a 
reality independent of humans. However, such a move of simply moving 
on is not unheard of in philosophy. No one has yet refuted the solipsist, nor 
the Berkeleyian subjective idealist, yet neither solipsism nor the extremes 
of Berkeleyian idealism have ever been central and ongoing debates in 
philosophy. Philosophers largely just ignore these positions or use them 
as cautionary examples to be avoided. Why not the same in the endless 
debates over access?
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Nonetheless, in the pages that follow I do try to formulate arguments 
that epistemically ground the ontological realism that I defend. The first 
chapter outlines the grounds for ontological realism, drawing heavily on 
the transcendental realism developed by Roy Bhaskar. The basic thrust of 
this argument is transcendental in character and argues that the world must 
be structured in a particular way for experimental activity to be intelligible 
and possible. Bhaskar's articulation of these transcendental, ontological 
conditions also provides me with the means of outlining the basic structure 
of objects, the relation between substance and qualities, the independence 
of objects from their relations, and the withdrawn structure of objects. Here 
I also uncover the root assumption that leads to the endless debates of anti-
realism and epistemological realism.
Having outlined the basic structure of objects, the second chapter 
explores Aristotle's concept of substance, carefully distinguishing it 
from that which is simple or indivisible, and outlining the relationship 
between substance and qualities. Here a problem emerges. On the one 
hand, substance is necessarily distinct from its qualities in that qualities 
can change, yet substance persists. On the other hand, the subtraction of 
all qualities from a substance seems to lead us to a bare substratum or 
a completely featureless substance that would therefore be identical to 
all other substances or objects. Additionally, while substance is the very 
being of an object, its individuality or singularity, substances only ever 
manifest themselves through their qualities. With respect to this third 
problem, I argue that the very being of substance consists in simultaneously 
withdrawing and in self-othering. The structure of substance is such that it 
others itself in its qualities. However, if such an account of substance is to 
be successful, it is necessary to provide an account of withdrawn substance 
that is structured without being qualitative. How are we to think such a 
non-qualitative structure?
Having encountered the problem of non-qualitative structure, the third 
chapter turns to Deleuze's ontology and the distinction between the virtual 
and the actual. There I critique Deleuze's tendency to treat the virtual as 
something other than the individual, arguing that the individual precedes 
the virtual such that virtuality is always the virtuality of a substance. I refer 
to this as “virtual proper being” and treat it as the powers or capacities of 
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an entity. Deleuze's concept of the virtual provides us with the means of 
thinking substance as structured without being qualitative. I refer to the 
qualities produced out of virtual structure as “local manifestations” and 
treat them as events, actions, or activities on the part of objects. 
If objects are withdrawn from one another, then how do they relate? 
This is the problem of what Harman refers to as “vicarious causation”. 
How do objects relate to one another when they are necessarily 
independent of all their relations? Chapter four picks up with this question 
and turns to the autopoietic theory of Niklas Luhmann to provide an 
account of interactions between withdrawn objects. There I argue that 
all objects are operationally closed such that they constitute their own 
relation and openness to their environment. Relations between objects are 
accounted for by the manner in which objects transform perturbations 
from other objects into information or events that select system-states. 
These information-events or events that select system-states are, in 
their turn, among the agencies that preside over the production of local 
manifestations in objects.
Chapter five turns to questions of constraint, relations between parts 
and wholes, and time and entropy. If objects are withdrawn from one 
another, how is it that they can constrain one another? Drawing on the 
resources of developmental systems theory in biology, I attempt to provide 
an account of how an object can simultaneously construct its environment 
and be constrained by its environment, leading local manifestations to 
take particular forms. The section on mereology develops an account of 
relations between larger-scale objects and smaller-scale objects, defending 
the autonomy of larger-scale objects from the smaller-scale objects out of 
which they are built and the autonomy of the smaller-scale objects that 
compose the larger-scale object. Here I argue that a number of problems 
that have haunted contemporary social and political theory arise from a 
failure to be properly attentive to these strange mereological relations. The 
chapter closes with a discussion of temporalized structure, the relation of 
objects to time and space, and how objects stave off entropy or destruction 
across time.
Finally, chapter six outlines the four theses of flat ontology advocated 
by onticology. The first of these theses is that all objects are withdrawn, 
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such that there are no objects characterized by full presence or actuality. 
Withdrawal is not an accidental feature of objects arising from our lack of 
direct access to them, but is a constitutive feature of all objects regardless 
of whether they relate to other objects. To develop this thesis I draw on 
Lacan's graphs of sexuation, treating them not as accounts of sex, but rather 
as two very different ontological discourses: ontologies of immanence and 
withdrawal and ontologies of presence and transcendence. The second 
thesis of flat ontology is that the world does not exist. Here I argue that 
there is no “super-object”, Whole, or totality that would gather all objects 
together in a harmonious unity. The third thesis is that humans occupy no 
privileged place within being and that between the human/object relation 
and any other object/object relation there is only a difference in degree, 
not kind. Finally, the fourth thesis is that objects of all sorts and at all 
scales are on equal ontological footing, such that subjects, groups, fictions, 
technologies, institutions, etc., are every bit as real as quarks, planets, trees, 
and tardigrades. The fourth thesis of flat ontology invites us to think in 
terms of collectives and entanglements between a variety of different types 
of actors, at a variety of different temporal and spatial scales, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the gap between humans and objects.
In the pages that follow I have, above all, pursued three aims. First, I 
have sought to provide an ontological framework capable of providing a 
synthesis of two very different research programs. Within cultural studies 
there is a sharp divide between those forms of inquiry that focus on 
signification and those forms of inquiry that focus on the material in the 
form of technologies, media, and material conditions. Likewise, the broader 
and dominant tendency of the humanities has been to focus on content, 
excluding the material. I have sought an ontological framework capable of 
integrating these diverse tendencies. However, second, such an integration 
requires an avoidance of reductivism. To the same degree that natural 
entities ought not be reduced to cultural constructions, social, semiotic, 
and cultural entities ought not be reduced to natural entities. This requires 
us to shift from thinking in terms of reduction or grounding one entity in 
another, to thinking in terms of entanglements. Entanglements allow us to 
maintain the irreducibility, heterogeneity, and autonomy of various types 
of entities while investigating how they influence one another. Finally, 
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third, I have above all sought to write a book that is both accessible to a 
wide audience and that can be put to work by others in a wide variety of 
disciplines and practices, generating new questions and projects. I hope I 
have been somewhat successful in accomplishing these aims. 
Chapter 1
Grounds For a Realist Ontology
Things-in-themselves? But they're fine, thank you very 
much. And how are you? You complain about things that 
have not been honored by your vision? You feel that these 
things are lacking the illumination of your consciousness? 
But if you missed the galloping freedom of the zebras in the 
savannah this morning, then so much the worse for you; the 
zebras will not be sorry that you were not there, and in any 
case you would have tamed, killed, photographed, or studied 
them. Things in themselves lack nothing, just as Africa did 
not lack whites before their arrival. 
— Bruno Latour 7
1.1. The Death of Ontology and the Rise of Correlationism
Our historical moment is characterized by a general distrust, even 
disdain, for the category of objects, ontology, and above all any variant 
of realism. Moreover, it is characterized by a primacy of epistemology 
over ontology. While it is indeed true that Heidegger, in Being and Time, 
attempted to resurrect ontology, this only took place through a profound 
transformation of the very meaning of ontology.8 Ontology would no 
longer be the investigation of being qua being in all its variety and diversity 
regardless of whether humans exist, but rather would instead become an 
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interrogation of Dasein's or human being's access to being. Ontology would 
become an investigation of being-for-Dasein, rather than an investigation 
of being as such. In conjunction with this transformation of ontology from 
an investigation of being as such into an investigation of being-for-humans, 
we have also everywhere witnessed a push to dissolve objects or primary 
substances in the acid of experience, intentionality, power, language, 
normativity, signs, events, relations, or processes. To defend the existence 
of objects is, within the framework of this line of thought, the height of 
naïveté for objects are held to be nothing more than surface-effects of 
something more fundamental such as the signifier, signs, power or activities 
of the mind. With Hume, for example, it is argued that objects are really 
nothing more than bundles of impressions or sensations linked together 
by associations and habits in the mind. Here there is no deeper fact of 
objects existing beyond these impressions and habits. Likewise, Lacan will 
tell us that “the universe is the flower of rhetoric”9, treating the beings that 
populate the world as an effect of the signifier. 
We can thus discern a shift in how ontology is understood and 
accompanying this shift the deployment of a universal acid that has come 
to dissolve the being of objects. The new ontology argues that we can 
only ever speak of being as it is for us. Depending on the philosophy in 
question, this “us” can be minds, lived bodies, language, signs, power, social 
structures, and so on. There are dozens of variations. The key point here is 
that it is argued that being can only be thought in terms of what Graham 
Harman has called our access to being.10 As such, ontology becomes not 
an interrogation of being as such, but rather an interrogation of our access 
to being. The answer to the question, “what is being?” now, everywhere 
and always, carries a footnote, colophon, or bit of fine print such that the 
question must be read as “what is being for us?” 
And if the question of ontology now becomes the question, “what is 
being for us?” it follows that there can be no question of what being might 
be as such, for we have resolved to treat being only in terms of our access 
to being such that what being might be apart from our access to being now 
becomes an entirely meaningless question. This for two reasons: First, were 
we capable of knowing being apart from our access to being, it is argued, it 
would follow that we therefore have access to this being, thereby converting 
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this being alleged to be beyond its givenness to us back into being-for-us. 
Second, to know something, the argument runs, we must have access to 
that thing. Yet being beyond our access to it is precisely a form of being 
to which we have no access. Therefore it follows that claims about such a 
being are, strictly speaking, meaningless. I hope to show later why there is 
good reason to doubt the soundness of both of these arguments, but for the 
moment it is enough simply to tarry with them to understand their logic, 
for these arguments constitute the basic schema of nearly every reigning 
philosophical position today. 
If, then, these arguments are granted, it follows that there can be no 
question of what being might be like apart from our access to being. For 
the condition under which it would be possible to speak of being apart 
from our access to being would require access to that being, yet we do not 
have such access. Consequently, it follows that philosophy must abandon 
the question of whether being as it is given to us is like being as it is in-
itself because we are unable to “get out of ourselves” to compare being as 
it manifests itself to us with being as it is in-itself apart from us. The best 
we can hope for, the most we can know, is being as it manifests itself to 
us, and philosophy shifts from being a discourse concerned with the being 
of beings, with what substance, as Meillassoux has put it, constitutes true 
substance (objects, God, nature, particles, processes, and so on?)11, to being 
a discourse about the mechanisms through which beings are manifested 
to us (mind, language, normativity, signs, power, for example). Ontology 
becomes transcendental anthropology and the world becomes a mirror in 
which we don't recognize our own reflection. 
Philosophy, of whatever stripe, thus comes to be characterized by what 
Meillassoux has aptly named correlationism. As Meillassoux puts it, “[b]y 
'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access 
to the correlation between thinking and being, and never either term 
considered apart from the other”.12 While I have reason to disagree with 
Meillassoux's proposal for escaping the correlationist circle (and with his 
ontology), I believe that his concept of correlationism nicely summarizes 
the episteme, in the Foucauldian sense, that governs contemporary 
philosophy. When, in The Order of Things13 and The Archeology of Knowledge14 
, Foucault introduces the concept of epistemes, he intends epistemes not as 
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determinate positions in some discipline that might be opposed to another 
position, but rather as a set of statements functioning as the historical a 
priori of a particular discursive space. An episteme would be precisely that 
set of statements that allow opposed theories of, for example, language, to 
be opposed. It is the common framework these opposed positions share 
that allows them to enter into antagonistic relations with one another. 
The claim that correlationism constitutes the episteme of contemporary 
philosophy is thus not a claim about any specific philosophical position, but 
rather about the common framework regulating philosophical discourse in 
our contemporary moment. This episteme is shared by thinkers as diverse 
and opposed, for example, as the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, the 
Merleau-Ponty of The Phenomenology of Perception, and the Derrida of Of 
Grammatology. Despite the vast differences and disagreements among these 
positions, their thought and disagreements nonetheless unfold within the 
horizon of the unspoken premise of a necessary correlation between being 
and thought. The object of these disputes is not whether correlationism is 
true, but rather how the primordial or most fundamental correlation is to 
be articulated. 
With correlationism we thus discover the root of contemporary 
theory's suspicion of both objects and realism. Realism must necessarily 
be anathema to all variants of correlationism by virtue of the fact that it 
claims knowledge of beings independent of the correlation between thinking 
and being. All realisms are committed to the thesis that it is possible to 
know something of beings independent of their being-for-thought, yet 
this is precisely what is precluded by the correlationist gesture. Here it 
is important to be precise. Correlationism is not the thesis of subjective 
idealisms whereby esse est percipi or where to be is to be perceived. 
Subjective and absolute idealism are only two variations of correlationism. 
The correlationist need not be committed to the thesis that there is no 
being apart from thought. Indeed, most correlationists are committed to 
the thesis that there is something other than thought. Kant, for example, 
held that in addition to phenomena (beings for-us) things-in-themselves 
exist. The correlationist merely argues that we have no access to these 
beings that are apart from thought and can therefore only speak of being as 
it is for-us. And here we find the categorical dividing line between realisms 
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and anti-realisms or correlationisms: for the anti-realist or correlationist, 
claims about beings are never claims about beings-in-themselves or 
beings apart from us, but are always and only claims about beings as they 
manifest themselves to us. For the realist, by contrast, claims about objects 
really are claims about objects and not objects as they are for-us or only in 
relation to us. 
As a consequence, it becomes clear that, for the correlationist, objects 
take on the status of fictions. Because objects can no longer be equated with 
things-in-themselves, because objects are only ever objects for-us and never 
things as they are independent of us, objects become phenomena or are 
reduced to actual or possible manifestations to us. Philosophy now shifts 
from being a debate about the nature of things-in-themselves or substance, 
to a debate about the mechanisms by which phenomena are produced or 
structured. Is it mind that structures phenomena? Language? Power? 
Intentionality? Embodied experience? Such are but a handful of the options 
that have been entertained by contemporary theory. 
At the heart of correlationism it is thus clear that there is a profound 
anthropocentrism, for where it is held that being can never be thought in its 
existence apart from thought, it becomes clear that any claims about being 
ultimately harbor the implicit colophon that claims about being are claims 
about being for humans. Moreover, despite declarations of anti-humanism 
on the part of both Heidegger and the structuralists and post-structuralists, 
it is clear that these anti-humanisms bring us no closer to realism. For, to 
put it crudely, what the anti-humanisms object to is not the correlationist 
thesis of a necessary relation between being and thought such that the 
two can never be thought apart from one another, but rather the manner 
in which humanisms situate the primordial correlation in the minds of 
individual knowers. Thus, for example, structuralist and post-structuralist 
anti-humanisms emphasize the autonomy and independence of language 
and social relations. Here the argument runs that it is not sovereign subjects 
that are calling the shots, but rather language and/or social relations. What 
the structuralist and post-structuralist anti-humanists wish to examine 
is the manner in which language and social relations are determinative 
of the actions of individuals and how, if Althusser is to be followed, the 
individual itself is an effect of these more primordial agencies. It now 
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follows that these impersonal and anonymous agencies are the condition 
for manifestation, not individual human minds. World, the story goes, is 
not a construction of the mind of human individuals or transcendental 
subjectivity, but of impersonal and anonymous social structures. 
However, while anti-humanisms rescue philosophy from its focus on 
individual minds, allowing us to discern the sway of far more impersonal 
and anonymous patterns and structures at work in the heart of thought and 
social relations, it by no means follows that anti-humanism has escaped 
anthropocentrism. For social relations, economic relations, and language 
are nonetheless human phenomena, even where the human is discursively 
constructed, and it therefore follows that we remain within the orbit of 
anthropocentrism; for just as we began humanistically with the premise 
that we cannot know what being might be independent of our thinking of 
being, we now conclude that our claims about being are claims about being 
in relation to or correlation with language, power, or social relations. The 
question of what the world might be like apart from humans is, for both the 
humanists and the anti-humanists, entirely foreclosed. 
1.2. Breaking the Correlationist Circle 
With correlationism, the question of ontology is no longer, “what is being 
qua being?” but rather, “what is being qua Dasein?” or, “what is being qua 
language?” or, “what is being qua power?” or, “what is being qua history?” 
or, “what is being qua the lived body?” and many other avatars besides. 
While disputes among these various formulations of the correlation 
are heated, we are nonetheless faced with a series of anthropomorphic 
determinations such that being is always to be thought in relation to 
some aspect of the human. Protagoras, in one form or another, rules the 
day. What we thus get is not a democracy of objects or actants where all 
objects are on equal ontological footing and the philosopher can be just as 
interested in questions of how, to evoke Harman's favorite example, cotton 
relates to fire as she is in questions of how humans relate to mangoes, but 
instead a monarchy of the human in relation to all other beings where some 
instance of the human is treated as that which overdetermines all other 
beings and where the primary order of the day is always to determine how 
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individual minds relate to other objects or how the social and cultural 
relates to being. If, as Žižek contends, metaphysics, in the pejorative sense 
of ontotheology, consists in elevating a part to the ground of the whole, 
then the anthropocentrism of correlationism is metaphysical through and 
through despite its protestations to the contrary or its characterizations of 
itself as a critique of metaphysics.15 Correlationism is ontotheology with the 
human in the place of God. 
Our question is two-fold: on the one hand, what are the philosophical 
premises that led correlationism to become such a persuasive position in 
contemporary philosophy? On the other hand, is there a way to twist free 
from the correlationist deadlock so as to convincingly defend a genuinely 
post-humanist, realist ontology? A post-humanist, realist ontology is not an 
anti-human ontology, but is rather, as we will later see, an ontology where 
humans are no longer monarchs of being but are instead among beings, 
entangled in beings, and implicated in other beings. In this section, I will 
address the second of these questions through a foray into the early thought 
of the philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar. This discussion will also set the 
stage for my later discussion of the ontology of objects. Ironically, it turns 
out that the way out of correlationism is to be found through transcendental 
argumentation. But here I am getting ahead of myself. 
Before outlining Bhaskar's defense of ontological realism, it is first 
necessary to express a note of caution. In his early work, and especially 
A Realist Theory of Science on which I will lean heavily here, Bhaskar is 
primarily interested in the ontology of science. Within the context of the 
present book, this poses special dangers as readers might arrive at the 
mistaken impression that I am arguing that the objects of the natural 
sciences are exhaustive of being as such. In short, one might conclude 
that I advocate the thesis that being and the objects of the natural world 
are synonymous. As I develop Bhaskar's argument for a realist theory of 
science, my aim is not to defend naturalism as the one true ontology, but 
rather to unfold the argument by which he arrives at a realist ontology. And 
here I am only interested in the ontological dimension of his argument. As 
Bhaskar writes, 
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of 
grappling with this central paradox of science: that men in 
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their social activity produce knowledge which is a social 
product much like any other, which is no more independent 
of its production and the men who produce it than motor 
cars, armchairs or books, which has its own craftsmen, 
technicians, publicists, standards and skills and which is no 
less subject to change than any other commodity. This is one 
side of 'knowledge'. The other is that knowledge is 'of' things 
which are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity of 
mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of light 
propagation. None of these 'objects of knowledge' depend on 
human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue 
to travel and heavy bodies fall to the earth in exactly the same 
way, though ex hypothesi there would be no one to know it.16
Bhaskar refers to these two dimensions of knowledge as the transitive 
and the intransitive respectively. The transitive refers to the dimension of 
the social in the production of knowledge, such as inherited discourses, 
scientific training, institutions, and so on. By contrast, the intransitive 
refers to the domain of being that would exist regardless of whether or not 
humans know of them. We can thus say that Bhaskar, in his philosophy of 
science, wishes to reconcile something like the insights of Kuhn's Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions17 or Foucault's Order of Things (the transitive or 
social dimension of knowledge production), with a realist ontology of 
science (the intransitive dimension). In the present context, my focus is 
on Bhaskar's arguments on behalf of realist ontology and therefore the 
intransitive, though readers should not conclude from this that the social 
dimension through which knowledge is produced is ignored. 
As subsequent chapters of this book will hopefully demonstrate, the 
domain of real being advocated by onticology is far broader than the 
domain of beings belonging to the natural world. Put differently, natural 
beings constitute a subset of the category of real beings. In addition to 
natural beings, onticology also counts technologies, symbolic entities, 
fictional entities, groups, nations, works of art, possible beings, artificial 
entities, and many other entities besides as belonging to the domain of real 
being. Bhaskar's arguments for the reality of natural entities thus functions 
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as a launching point for ontology, but is by no means exhaustive of the 
domain of real beings. 
Consequently, second, the ontology defended in these pages will expand 
significantly on the ontology Bhaskar proposes in A Realist Theory of Science, 
going, I believe, well beyond what he proposes in his own ontology. Thus, 
while I am deeply indebted to the ontology Bhaskar proposes in A Realist 
Theory of Science, it should not be assumed that the ontology presupposed 
by onticology is identical to the ontology proposed by Bhaskar's 
transcendental realism. In what follows, there will be many points of overlap 
between these ontologies, and many points of divergence as well. My aim 
in this book is not to provide a commentary on Bhaskar's ontology, nor to 
remain true to his ontology, but rather to develop a post-humanist, realist 
theory of being capable of breaking with correlationism, that is nonetheless 
capable of integrating the most important and significant findings of the 
correlationists. 
Bhaskar's defense of ontological realism begins with a very simple 
transcendental question: “...what must the world be like for science to be 
possible?”18 In asking what the world must be like for science to be possible, 
Bhaskar is asking a transcendental question and deploying a transcendental 
mode of argumentation. The question here is not, “how do we have access 
to the world?” or, “how do we know the world?” but rather what must be 
presupposed about the nature of the world in order for our scientific practices 
to be possible. As Deleuze reminds us, the transcendental is not to be 
confused with the transcendent.19 The transcendent refers to that which is 
above or beyond something else. For example, God, if it exists, is perhaps 
transcendent to the world. The transcendental, by contrast, refers to that 
which is a condition for some other practice, form of cognition, or activity. 
Thus, for example, perhaps speech requires language as its transcendental 
condition. If this is the case, then it would be because the condition under 
which it is possible for two people to communicate requires the existence 
of a shared code in the form of language. The conditions under which it 
is possible for me to speak to you would here lie in both of us sharing the 
same language, whether language be something minimal like gestures or 
something very complex like chains of signifiers capable of self-reflexively 
commenting on themselves. By contrast, the referent of speech would, 
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perhaps, be transcendent to both language and speech. If the referent of 
speech is transcendent to speech, then this is because 1) we can speak 
about fictional entities that have no physical referent or, 2) we can speak of 
entities in their absence, and 3) we can speak of speech itself, transforming 
speech into an object. Too often questions of the transcendental have been 
confused with questions of the transcendent. The point, however, is that 
transcendental questions are questions about what renders a particular 
practice or activity possible. Transcendental questions are questions of what 
a particular practice requires to take place and refer to what is immanent to 
these practices. 
Additionally it should be noted that transcendental questions are 
not foundationalist in character. Transcendental questions do not seek an 
absolutely secure and unassailable foundation for knowledge or practice, 
but merely ask, “given such and such a practice, what must be the case 
in order for this practice to be possible?” As such, transcendental inquiry 
sidesteps the epistemological project inaugurated by Descartes and so 
compellingly critiqued by Hume, by disavowing the project of seeking for 
an absolute foundation for knowledge. 
Yet already, with Bhaskar's question, we sense that the air or atmosphere 
is very different. Bhaskar does not ask what the mind must be like for 
science to be possible, but rather what the world must be like for science 
to be possible. In framing the question of science in this way, Bhaskar 
shifts the transcendental question from the domain of epistemology to the 
domain of ontology. The world itself must be a particular way for science to 
be possible, not the mind. And if Bhaskar's deployment of transcendental 
argument is ironic as a defense of realism, it is for precisely this reason. 
For beginning with Kant, who first explicitly invented the transcendental 
model of argument, all subsequent models of transcendental argument 
have either traced the conditions of certain forms of practice back to mind 
or some variant of the social. Yet with Bhaskar we here have a thorough 
inversion of this mode of argumentation. The question is no longer, “what 
must the mind be like for X to be possible?” nor, “what must the social 
be like for X to be possible?” but rather, “what must the world be like for 
X to be possible?” And in this way Bhaskar already shifts transcendental 
philosophy out of its constraint to some form of transcendental idealism or 
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anti-realism, and shifts it to the framework of transcendental realism. For in 
asking what the world must be like for science to be possible, we begin with 
the premise of a world apart from and independent of human beings. 
Thus, elsewhere, in a gloss on the nature of transcendental 
argumentation, Bhaskar will write, 
If philosophy is to be possible (and I want to contend 
that it is in practice indispensable) then it must follow 
the Kantian road. But in doing so it must both avoid any 
commitment to the content of specific theories and recognize 
the conditional nature of all its results. Moreover, it must 
reject two presuppositions which were central to Kant's own 
philosophical project, viz. that in any inquiry of the form 
'what must be the case for ϕ to be possible?' the conclusion, 
X, would be a fact about us and that ϕ must invariably stand 
for some universal operation of mind. That is to say, it must 
reject the idealist and individualist cast into which Kant 
pressed his own inquiries.20
To this I would add that we must avoid the conclusion that any answer 
to the question, “what must be the case for ϕ to be possible?” must refer 
to society, language, or power. In effect, Bhaskar thus proposes a de-
suturation of transcendental modes of argumentation from mind and the 
social. To suture is to tie, and in this respect all correlationism is a suture. 
The mark of any and every correlationism is a suture of being to the human 
in some form or another. Thus, a de-suturing would amount to an untying 
and systematic separation of the domains of being and thought, thereby 
undermining the reign of Protagoras in the modern era. Yet, nonetheless, as 
promising as this strategy of de-suturation sounds, we require compelling 
reasons to follow Bhaskar in this de-suturation of being and thought, or in 
this move directly from mind to world. 
Bhaskar argues that the condition under which science is possible is the 
existence of what he calls “intransitive objects” which are real structures 
that exist independently of our minds and that are often “out of phase” with 
actual patterns of events.21 As Bhaskar articulates it, 
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...the intransitive objects of knowledge are in general 
invariant to our knowledge of them: they are the real things 
and structures, mechanisms and processes, events and 
possibilities of the world; and for the most part they are quite 
independent of us. They are not unknowable, because as a 
matter of fact quite a bit is known about them... But neither 
are they in any way dependent upon our knowledge, let alone 
perception, of them.22
The claim that intransitive objects are invariant to our knowledge of them 
is not equivalent to the claim that intransitive objects are invariant. Rather, 
the point is that these objects would do what they do regardless of whether 
anyone knew about them or perceived them. The claim that intransitive 
objects can be “out of phase” with actual patterns of events is the claim 
that these intransitive objects can act or be dormant, thereby not producing 
certain events that they would produce in other settings or contexts. 
So far we know what Bhaskar claims are the transcendental conditions 
of scientific practice, but we do not know why Bhaskar claims these are 
the transcendental conditions of science. Indeed, as it stands, it sounds 
as if he is dogmatically affirming the existence of mind-independent 
objects without providing any grounds as to why these objects must be 
presupposed by scientific practice. Here everything turns on Bhaskar's 
thesis that intransitive objects can be “out of phase” with actual patterns of 
events and the nature of experiment in scientific practice. “The intelligibility 
of experimental activity presupposes not just the intransitivity but the 
structured character of the objects investigated under experimental 
conditions”.23 But why is this so? According to Bhaskar, 
...an experiment is necessary precisely to the extent that the 
pattern of events forthcoming under experimental conditions 
would not be forthcoming without it. Thus in an experiment 
we are a causal agent of the sequence of events, but not of 
the causal law which the sequence of events, because it has 
been produced under experimental conditions, enables us 
to identify.24
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To understand Bhaskar's point, it is necessary to compare his thesis 
here to that advocated by sense-data empiricism. “A causal law is analysed 
in empiricist ontology as a constant conjunction of events perceived (or 
perceptions)”.25 Borne out of foundationalist aspirations, the empiricist 
attempts to eradicate all unfounded ontological presuppositions by 
resolving to tarry with what is given in sensations alone. For example, for 
the empiricist there is no deeper fact independent of the sensations. I 
now regard a clementine with relish. This clementine just is, for the sense-
data empiricist, the sheen of orange and roundness I see before me, the 
fragrant citrus scent that fills my nostrils, the refreshing coolness I feel as 
I now touch it, and so on. What we call a clementine, for the empiricist, 
is a bundle of sensations that my mind has unified together through the 
operations of association. If, according to the empiricist, there is more 
to the clementine than these sensations afford me, if it has independent 
existence in its own right, then I can know nothing about it for I only 
ever have access to the object through these sensations. Therefore the 
empiricist, practicing a sort of critical vigilance, decides to cut the real 
independent object out of the discussion altogether as an unjustified 
metaphysical residue, restricting philosophical discussion to what is given in 
sensation alone. 
When the empiricist arrives at discussions of causality, she thus has no 
recourse but to discuss claims about causality as claims about constant 
conjunctions of events or impressions. For the empiricist, a causal claim is 
no more nor less than a constant conjunction of sensations in experience. 
Above all, causal claims are not claims about powers that reside in objects, 
precisely because we have no access to these hidden powers. As Hume 
puts it, “[t]he bread which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of 
such sensible qualities, was, at that time, endowed with such secret powers: 
But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, 
and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret 
powers?”26 What we are given is not the powers of the object—in this 
case bread—but rather a constant connection of sensations: the visual 
appearance of the bread followed by the sensations of our painful hunger 
being satiated. The causal relation is nothing but the mental association of 
these sensations in the order of time. 
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We are now in a position to better appreciate Bhaskar's point. Were 
the empiricist thesis correct, there would be no point to the activity 
of experiment, for causal knowledge would be nothing but constant 
conjunctions of events presented in sensations. For the empiricist 
experiment must be unintelligible precisely because the idea of hidden 
or disguised powers of objects is banished by the empiricist reduction 
that resolves to treat being only in terms of what is present or given in 
sensations. Accordingly, elsewhere, in a moment of humor, Bhaskar 
will write that 
...the Humean account depends upon a misidentification 
of causal laws with their empirical grounds. Notice that 
as human activity is in general necessary for constant 
conjunctions, if one identifies causal laws with them then one 
is logically committed to the absurdity that human beings, in 
their experimental activity, cause and even change the laws 
of nature!27
This absurdity would follow from the claim that causal relations are 
nothing more than constant conjunctions of events or sensation, forbidding 
any hidden powers in objects, thereby leaving the only site for the 
emergence of new sensations in the experimenter. 
1.3. The Onto-Transcendental Grounds of Experimental Activity 
Bhaskar thus concludes that the transcendental conditions under which 
experimental activity is intelligible are ontological in character. In order 
for experimental activity to be intelligible, it is the world, not our minds, 
that must be a certain way. And the world must be this way regardless of 
whether any science takes place or whether any sentient beings exist to 
engage in something approximating science. Above all it is necessary that 1) 
objects be intransitive to our knowledge, perception, or discourse about 
objects, and that 2) it be possible for objects to be out of phase with actual 
events. I will address the second of these points first. 
If we must draw an ontological distinction between objects and the events 
they generate to understand the intelligibility of scientific practice, then this 
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is precisely because objects do not ordinarily or regularly produce constant 
conjunctions of events. Constant conjunctions of events are the exception 
rather than the rule, and it is for this reason that we engage in experimental 
practice. In this connection, Bhaskar draws a distinction between open and 
closed systems. Closed systems are systems where constant conjunctions of 
events obtain. Open systems are, by contrast, systems where the powers of 
objects are either not acting or are rather disguised or hidden by virtue of 
the intervention of other causes. Open systems are the norm rather than 
the exception. And within open systems or entanglements of objects, the 
powers of discrete objects are often veiled or inactive. It is here that we 
encounter the rationale behind experimental activity. As Bhaskar puts it, 
Now once it is granted that mechanisms and structures may 
be said to be real, we can provide an interpretation of the 
independence of causal laws from patterns of events, and 
a fortiori of the rationale of experimental activity. For the 
real basis of this independence lies in the independence of 
the generative mechanisms of nature from the events they 
generate. Such mechanisms endure even when not acting; 
and act in their normal way even when the consequents of the 
law-like statements they ground are, owing to the operation of 
intervening mechanisms or countervailing causes, unrealized. 
It is the role of the experimental scientist to exclude such 
interventions, which are usual; and to trigger the mechanism 
so that it is active. The activity of the mechanism may then 
be studied without interference [...]. It is only under closed 
conditions that there will be a one-to-one relationship 
between the causal law and the sequence of events.28
We thus have an ontological distinction between objects or generative 
mechanisms on the one hand, and events, on the other. If experimental 
activity is necessary, then this is because generative mechanisms can be 
dormant, inactive, or veiled by the agency of other objects or generative 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, it is generative mechanisms or objects that are 
responsible for the production of events. As Bhaskar will remark further on, 
“[t]he world consists of things, not events. Most things are complex objects, 
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in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies, liabilities and 
powers. It is by reference to the exercise of their tendencies, liabilities and 
powers that the phenomena of the world are explained”.29
Because things, objects, or generative mechanisms can be out of 
phase with events, experimental activity is required to produce closed 
systems so that the relation between generative mechanisms and events 
might be discovered. To illustrate this point, Bhaskar provides a diagram 
distinguishing between the domains of the real, the actual, and the 
empirical:30
Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of Empirical
Mechanisms X
Events X X
Experiences X X X
The domain of the empirical reduces events to experiences and excludes 
mechanisms altogether. As we saw in the case of Hume's empiricism, only 
sensations are given. In the domain of the actual, some events may be 
experiencable, yet there can be many events that we are yet to experience 
and even other events that are beyond the possibility of any experience. 
Moreover, events or actualities can be out of phase with mechanisms, 
objects, or things. Finally, the domain of mechanisms or the real is inclusive 
of both mechanisms, events, and experiences without the requirement that 
these categories overlap or always occur together. Thus there can be the 
presence of mechanisms without the presence of events or experiences, and 
there can be the presence of events without anyone about to experience 
them or anyone even capable of experiencing them. Zebras run across the 
savannah just fine without the aid of our gaze. 
Bhaskar drives his point home rather dramatically by claiming 
the condition under which experimental practice is intelligible lies in 
the possibility of “a world without men”.31 Initially this thesis sounds 
paradoxical in that it is humans and perhaps other sentient beings that 
conduct experiments. However, Bhaskar's point lies elsewhere. He is not 
making the absurd claim that experiment requires no humans or sentient 
beings to conduct experiments—it does—but rather that because constant 
conjunctions of events ordinarily require humans or some other sentient 
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being to produce them, because constant conjunctions of events are not 
the rule but the exception, and because generative mechanisms or objects 
are ordinarily out of phase with events or actualities, the intelligibility of 
our experimental activity is premised on the possibility of a world without 
humans where objects reside in the world unrealized and unwitnessed, 
and without producing certain actualities such as those we find in the 
experimental setting. 
Consequently, Bhaskar's thesis is radically opposed to something like 
Lacan's claim that the universe is the flower of rhetoric. Such a thesis is 
misguided on two grounds: first, this thesis conflates propositions about 
the world with the world itself. Yet the world requires no propositions 
about the world to be the world. Second, and more importantly, this thesis 
renders experimental activity completely incoherent because science does 
not begin with true propositions, but seeks to create closed systems (where 
possible) so as to trigger generative mechanisms and thereby produce or 
uncover constant conjunctions of events. Were the world the totality of true 
propositions or constructed by language, this activity would be most peculiar 
indeed as there would be no unknown generative mechanisms to uncover in 
the experimental setting. In other words, the intelligibility of experimental 
practice is premised on the ontological supposition of generative mechanisms 
or objects independent of that activity. 
And it is for this reason also that the condition for the intelligibility 
of experimental activity is the existence of objects that are intransitive or 
independent of mind and perception. For if objects were dependent on 
mind, perception, or culture, then there would be nothing to discover in 
the closed systems produced in the experimental setting. Consequently, not 
only are intransitive objects the premise of experimental activity, but the 
generative mechanisms discovered in experimental activity are also treated 
as operative in open systems once they are discovered, despite the fact that 
they operate in open systems in a fashion where the events they are capable 
of producing go unrealized because the mechanism is either dormant or 
countervailed by other generative mechanisms. 
Bhaskar thus argues that claims about generative mechanisms are 
transfactual. Experimental activity does not show that constant conjunctions 
of events must always be operative in open systems, but rather that 
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where these generative mechanisms exist without producing actualities 
or events, they are nonetheless operative in these open systems. Bhaskar 
thus argues that generative mechanisms must be understood as tendencies 
or powers. “[T]endencies are potentialities which may be exercised or 
as it were 'in play' without being realized or manifest in any particular 
outcome”.32 Needless to say, a tendency or power is a real feature of 
objects themselves, a feature of the being of objects, and not the being of 
objects for-us. Moreover, the distinction between generative mechanisms 
or objects with their tendencies or powers and events or actualities is 
an ontological distinction, not a distinction pertaining to our knowledge. 
Events are real beings or occurrences produced by generative mechanisms, 
and generative mechanisms are real entities with the power to produce 
these events. Thus the transcendental conditions Bhaskar uncovers for the 
intelligibility of experimental practice are thoroughly ontological and realist 
in character. They are features of the world itself and not the mind that 
regards the world. 
Already we can sense just how far we are from Kant and Hume, both 
of whom have influenced contemporary theory so deeply, albeit in an often 
subterranean fashion. Where both Kant and Hume call for an investigation 
of mind when raising questions of knowledge, Bhaskar calls for a 
philosophical investigation of the world. For Bhaskar, it is ontology that is 
first philosophy, not epistemology. More importantly, where both Kant and 
Hume treat claims about causality as claims about constant conjunctions 
of events, Bhaskar vigorously rejects the thesis that claims about causality 
are claims about constant conjunctions of events on the grounds that 
constant conjunctions of events are the exception rather than the rule, 
and instead argues that claims about causality are claims about generative 
mechanisms that may or may not produce certain events depending on 
their entanglements with other objects. 
Additionally, it will be noted that the ontology proposed by Bhaskar 
is immune to the charge of being a naïve realism. The charge of naïve 
realism is a favorite lazy rejoinder of anti-realist and correlationist styles of 
argument whenever encountering a defense of realism. Now, naïve realism 
is the thesis that the world is exactly as we perceive or experience it. It is, 
in short, the thesis that the qualities we perceive in an object truly belong 
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to the object itself regardless of whether anyone perceives that object. 
However, it is clear that nothing could be further from Bhaskar's position. 
In distinguishing between generative mechanisms or objects and events 
or actualities, in noting the manner in which objects behave differently in 
open and closed systems, Bhaskar underlines the manner in which objects 
are withdrawn from any qualities they might happen to manifest. Put 
otherwise, a key feature of Bhaskar's argument is that objects or generative 
mechanisms cannot be equated with or reduced to their qualities. I shall 
have much more to say about this later when I deal with exo-relations or 
relations between generative mechanisms or objects, but for the moment it 
is sufficient to note that the ontology proposed by Bhaskar is anathema to 
any variant of naïve realism. 
1.4. Objections and Replies 
No doubt a number of objections will have arisen in the mind of the 
reader sympathetic to the correlationist line of argument. In particular, 
three lines of argument can be anticipated: First, that the realist ontology 
and transcendental line of argument proposed by Bhaskar purports to 
know objects a priori before knowing them; second, that it is impossible to 
imagine a world without men because we still imagine ourselves as being 
present to this world in our absence to this world; and third, in a closely 
related vein, that it is impossible to think anything without, as it were, 
including ourselves in the picture of what is to be thought. I will address 
each of these objections in their turn. 
The first of these arguments is the easiest to dispatch. What this 
argument purports is that realist ontology claims to know before we 
know. Through this line of attack it hopes to establish the primacy of 
epistemology over ontology, or that epistemology is, in fact, first philosophy. 
For, the argument runs, how can ontology make claims about the being of 
being without first knowing these beings? As Bhaskar formulates this line 
of argument, “ontology is dependent upon epistemology since what we 
can know to exist is merely a part of what we can know”.33 I suspect that 
this line of argument, more than any other, motivates the subordination 
of ontology to epistemology and the treatment of ontology as “onto-
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epistemology”. This seems to follow as obvious: to speak of being, we 
must know being and therefore an inquiry into knowledge or epistemology 
must precede any discussion of being. Heidegger, for example, argues that 
before we can even formulate the question of the meaning of being (it’s 
noteworthy that he formulates this question as a question of meaning rather 
than a question of what being is) we must first investigate Dasein's ontic-
ontological pre-comprehension of being.34 Nothing could be more obvious. 
However, as Bhaskar argues, 
this defense trades upon a tacit conflation of philosophical 
and scientific ontologies. For if 'what we can know to exist' 
refers to a possible content of a scientific theory then that it is 
merely a part of what we can know is an uninteresting truism. 
But a philosophical ontology is developed by reflection upon 
what must be the case for science to be possible; and this is 
independent of any actual scientific knowledge. Moreover, it 
is not true, even from the point of view of the immanent logic 
of a science, that what we can know to exist is just a part of 
what we can know. For a law may exist and be known to exist 
without our knowing the law. Much scientific research has 
in fact the same logical character as detection. In a piece of 
criminal detection, the detective knows that a crime has been 
committed and some facts about it but he does not know, or 
at least cannot yet prove, the identity of the criminal.35
Ontology does not tell us what objects exist, but that objects exist, 
that they are generative mechanisms, that they cannot be identified with 
events, actualities, or qualities, and that they behave differently in open 
and closed systems. These are ontological premises necessary to render our 
experimental activity intelligible. It is the job of actual inquiry to discover 
what objects exist. However, if inquiry is to be intelligible then it must 
begin with the premise that there are objects that act independently of 
this inquiry. 
A second line of argument holds that it is impossible to intelligibly think 
a world without men because, in the very act of thinking such a world, 
we are picturing ourselves as present to this world. The thesis here is that 
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every picturing of the world includes ourselves in that picture. However, 
as Quentin Meillassoux has convincingly argued, such a line of argument 
leads to the conclusion that the thought of our own death is unintelligible 
or that we are necessarily immortal. For if it is true that we cannot think the 
world without thinking our presence to the world, then it follows that even 
the thought of our own death requires the presence of our thinking, thereby 
undermining the possibility of dying. As Meillassoux formulates this line of 
argument, “I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I 
exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now”.36
Such is the argument of absolute idealists that 1) denies the existence of 
an in-itself apart from thought, and 2) argues that the correlation between 
being and thought is absolute or reality itself, i.e. that there is nothing apart 
from correlation (Berkeley and Hegel, though in very different ways). In 
response to this line of argument, Meillassoux cites the agnostic—the 
correlationist that concedes the possible existence of the in-itself apart from 
thought while maintaining the index of all thought to phenomena or being-
for-us—pointing out that, 
In order to counter the latter [the strong or absolute 
correlationist], the agnostic has no choice: she must maintain 
that my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether 
dazzled by God, or annhilated) is just as thinkable as my 
persisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I 
think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining 
as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason—of this 
facticity—which implies that the other three theses—those of 
the two realists and the idealist—are all equally possible. For 
even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated, 
neither can I think of any cause that would rule out this 
eventuality.37
While I do not follow Meillassoux in his inference from the contingency 
of our being to the contingency of being as such (I await a clearer 
formulation of this argument), I do believe his argument here hits the mark. 
If it is conceded that our annihilation is, in principle, thinkable, then we are 
also conceding that a world without humans is thinkable. For to think our 
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annihilation just is to think a world where we are absent. Yet if this is the 
case, then the correlationist argument that it is impossible to think a form 
of being apart from thought is severely challenged. 
Here it must be emphasized that Meillassoux's argument does not rest 
on establishing that we are annihilated with death or that we know that 
death entails the extinction of our being. As unlikely as it is given what 
we have come to know about the relationship between mind and brain, it 
could be that we persist after death. All that is required for Meillassoux's 
argument is that our extinction or annihilation be thinkable as a possibility. 
And if it is thinkable as a possibility—a point that seems amply supported 
by people's anxieties about death—then it also follows that it is possible to 
think a world without humans. 
A final, and closely related line of argument, revolves around the 
reflexivity of thought. Here the idea is that it is impossible to think anything 
without simultaneously thinking that I am thinking it. Like the second 
objection, this objection revolves around the thesis that the thinker is 
always included in the picture of what she thinks. Thus, for example, as 
I think about making myself a cup of coffee, it is held that I must also be 
aware of thinking that I am thinking about making myself a cup of coffee. 
All thought, therefore, must include the thought of the thought in the 
activity of the thinking. As such, all thought must necessarily be reflexive or 
must simultaneously be aware of the object that it thinks and the fact that 
it is thinking this thought. And if this is the case, then it follows that the 
thinker must be included in the thought of any being other than thought, 
and that therefore it is impossible to escape the correlation between 
thought and being. 
As Meillassoux amusingly puts it in his Goldsmith's talk, thought turns 
out to be like a bit of dual adhesive tape one attempts to remove from one’s 
finger.38 This talk was the occasion of a conference organized by Alberto 
Toscano, where Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, 
and Meillassoux each gave talks. It was here that the term “speculative 
realism” was used for the first time. In his talk, Meillassoux illustrated the 
correlationist argument through analogy to a dual adhesive bit of tape stuck 
to a person’s finger. Each time she attempts to remove the tape it ends 
up sticking to another finger, such that the tape is inescapable. Likewise, 
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if thought indeed has this character of reflexivity as a characteristic that 
always accompanies thought, then it follows that correlation or thought is 
inescapable. Such is the import of Descartes' famous analysis of the wax in 
the second meditation. As Descartes writes, 
What, I ask, am I who seem to perceive this wax so distinctly? 
Do I not know myself not only much more truly and 
with greater certainty, but also much more distinctly and 
evidently? For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that 
I see it, certainly from this same fact that I see the wax it 
follows much more evidently that I myself exist. For it could 
happen that what I see is not truly wax. It could happen that 
I have no eyes with which to see anything. But it is utterly 
impossible that, while I see or think I see […], I who think am 
not something. Likewise, if I judge that the wax exists from 
the fact that I touch it, the same outcome will again obtain, 
namely that I exist.39
Descartes' innocent little thesis here has been the source of much 
mischief in subsequent philosophy and is one of the root premises of 
correlationist thought. Whether we are speaking of Kant's transcendental 
unity of apperception which is treated as something that must accompany 
all thought40, or Hegel's dialectical gymnastics where it is shown that the 
thinker is always included in the thought41, the root of these claims traces 
back to Descartes' thesis that all thought is necessarily reflexive. It is 
this, for example, that will ultimately allow Hegel to assert the identity of 
substance and subject in The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
However, is this seemingly obvious thesis truly so obvious? Meillassoux 
believes that this is a powerful argument that must be addressed. I’m not 
so sure. Is it self-evident that any thought must include the thinker or that 
the thinker is thinking the thought? While I certainly concede the thesis 
that in many instances we are capable of self-reflexively thinking the thought 
that we are thinking a thought, I am much more circumspect about the 
claim that all thought is necessarily reflexive. Were this the case, then it 
would seem that thought is impossible, for we would fall into an infinite 
regress. Thus, as I sit here thinking that I would like to make myself a cup 
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of coffee, I would, if the reflexivity thesis were true, have to think that I 
am thinking that I would like to make myself a cup of coffee. But since it 
is asserted that all thought is reflexive, I would additionally have to think 
that I am thinking that I am thinking that I would like to make a cup of 
coffee, and so on to infinity. Yet if this were what truly takes place in the 
activity of thought, thought would be paralyzed. As Bhaskar puts it, “[i]t is 
possible for A to think ε and be aware of thinking ε without thinking about 
thinking ε; and unless this were so no-one could ever intelligently think”.42 
What we need here is something like Sartre's “pre-reflexive cogito” which 
thinks something without simultaneously thinking itself.43 Yet if such a cogito 
is possible, and indeed it appears necessary, then we have a thinking that 
doesn't simultaneously posit itself but which is completely absorbed in what 
we are thinking. 
1.5. Origins of Correlationism:
Actualism and the Epistemic Fallacy 
In 1.2 I raised the question of what philosophical premises render 
correlationism such an appealing and persuasive hypothesis. We are 
now in a position to answer this question. In A Realist Theory of Science, 
Bhaskar identifies “actualism” as the root premise that ultimately leads to 
correlationism. As articulated by Bhaskar, 
'actualism' [...] refer[s] to the doctrine of the actuality of 
causal laws; that is, to the idea that laws are relations between 
events or states of affairs (which are thought to constitute the 
objects of actual or possible experiences). Behind this idea of 
course lies the notion that only the actual (identified as the 
determinate object of the empirical) is real.44
Here it should be noted that actualism does not treat the actual as 
events that take place in the world regardless of whether or not anyone is 
about to witness them, but rather identifies the actual with what is given 
in sensations or impressions. Moreover, this hypothesis is not restricted 
to empiricists such as Hume, but is also carried over by Kant and his 
descendents. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between classical 
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empiricists, such as Hume, and empiricist ontology. Classical empiricists 
hold that knowledge arises from sensation alone. Empiricist ontology holds 
that only the actual, construed as what is given in atomistic sensations, is 
real; or, at any rate, is all that we can speak of. 
Kant does not question Hume's thesis that our knowledge is restricted 
to what is given in impressions or sensations, but rather embraces it 
wholesale. And because Kant carries over the actualist thesis of empiricist 
ontology, he is committed to the thesis that causal claims are claims about 
constant conjunctions of events given in sensation rather than about powers 
residing in objects or generative mechanisms that may go unactualized. 
Kant's innovation, therefore, does not reside in rejecting Hume's doctrine 
of impressions, but in recognizing that psychological operations of the 
mind such as the principles of association are insufficient to account for 
the necessity we attribute to causal relations. Sensation, Kant contends, 
requires supplementation by the mind, for relations are not themselves 
directly given in impressions. Consequently, Kant will argue that our 
judgments of necessity arise not from sensations or associations, but rather 
from the application of a priori categories of the understanding such as 
cause and effect to the manifold of sensations. 
Yet Kant and his heirs are only led to the conclusion that sensation 
requires supplementation by categories of mind (or culture, language, 
norms, or power) as a result of presupposing the actualist hypothesis 
of empiricist ontology. For where knowledge is restricted to the actual, 
and the actual is equated with sensation or impressions, relations among 
objects become thoroughly mysterious as these relations are not directly 
given in the actual. As Harman has persuasively argued, what we get is a 
secularized form of occasionalism.45 The occasionalist argues that all events 
are radically independent of one another. For the occasionalist there is no 
direct link between objects. In traditional occasionalisms, God is called 
upon to link objects to one another. Thus, when the paper burns it is not 
the flame that causes the paper to burn, but rather the intervention of God 
that brings the paper and the flame into relation with one another. 
If, with Hume and Kant, we get a secularized form of occasionalism, 
then this is because the thesis that events, in the form of sense impressions, 
are absolutely independent of one another and without relation. As such, 
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mind, rather than God, brings about the relation between events. For Kant, 
this linkage takes place through the a priori categories of the understanding 
and the a priori forms of intuition in the form of space, while for Hume 
this linkage is effected through the operations of association. The problem 
is that it is unclear how mind acquires this mysterious power to link that 
which is without linkage and why mind alone should have this privileged 
capacity. There is no more reason to think that mind should have this 
power than events themselves. However, this problem only emerges where 
the real is equated with the actual and the actual is treated as composed 
of atomistic sensations. Where claims about cause and effect relations are 
no longer treated as claims about constant conjunctions of events given in 
experience, but about generative mechanisms that may or may not produce 
certain events, the problem disappears. Causal claims are not claims about 
our experience of objects, but about objects themselves. And wherever we 
encounter arguments to the effect that sensations require supplementation 
by some other agency such as principles of association, categories of the 
understanding, language, signs, norms, and so on, we can be sure that 
actualism is lurking in the shadows and that the ontological conditions for 
the intelligibility of experimentation have been ignored. 
Yet how comes it that we fall into this sort of actualism? Bhaskar 
contends that actualism originates in what he calls the “epistemic fallacy”. 
As Bhaskar articulates it, 
This consists in the view that statements about being can 
be reduced to or analyzed in terms of statements about 
knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be 
transposed into epistemological terms. The idea that being 
can always be analysed in terms of our knowledge of being, 
that it is sufficient for philosophy to 'treat only of the 
network, and not what the network describes', results in the 
systematic dissolution of the idea of a world (which I shall 
here metaphorically characterize as an ontological realm) 
independent of but investigated by science.46
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Earlier Bhaskar remarks that, “[t]hese presumptions can [...] only be 
explained in terms of the need felt by philosophers for certain foundations 
of knowledge”.47
Here it is necessary to clarify what the epistemic fallacy is and is not 
about. A critique of the epistemic fallacy and how it operates in philosophy 
does not amount to the claim that epistemology or questions of the nature of 
inquiry and knowledge are a fallacy. What the epistemic fallacy identifies is 
the fallacy of reducing ontological questions to epistemological questions, 
or conflating questions of how we know with questions of what beings are. 
In short, the epistemic fallacy occurs wherever being is reduced to our 
access to being. Thus, for example, wherever beings are reduced to our 
impressions or sensations of being, wherever being is reduced to our talk 
about being, wherever being is reduced to discourses about being, wherever 
being is reduced to signs through which being is manifest, the epistemic 
fallacy has been committed. 
We have seen why this is so, for our experimental practice is only 
intelligible based on a series of ontological premises and these ontological 
premises cannot be reduced to our access to being. They are ontological 
in the robust sense. These ontological premises refer not to what is 
present or actual to us. Indeed, they refer, as we will see, to beings that are 
radically withdrawn from any presence or actuality. And as such, they are 
genuinely ontological premises, not epistemological premises pertaining to 
what is given. 
In recognizing that the epistemic fallacy emerges from foundationalist 
aspirations on the part of philosophers, Bhaskar hits the mark. It is the 
desire for a secure and certain foundation for knowledge that leads 
philosophy to adopt the actualist stance and fall into the epistemic fallacy. 
These decisions, in turn, ultimately lead to correlationism. In raising 
the question, “how do we know?” and seeking an argument that would 
thoroughly defeat the skeptic or sophist, the philosopher concludes that 
only what is present or given can defend against the incursions of the skeptic. 
But what is present or given turns out either to be mind or sensations. 
Therefore the philosopher finds himself in the position of restricting all 
being to what is given as actual in sensations. From here a whole cascade of 
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problematic consequences follow that increasingly lead to the dissolution of 
the world as a genuine ontological category. 
However, once these foundationalist aspirations are abandoned, the 
nature of the problem changes significantly and we no longer find ourselves 
tied to the actualist premise that generates all of these issues. And indeed, 
these aspirations should be abandoned, for foundationalism is premised 
on the possibility of absolute presence, absolute proximity, the absence of 
all absence, and we have now discovered that it is being itself that is split 
between generative mechanisms or objects and the actual. Difference, 
deferral, absence, and so on are not idiosyncracies of our being preventing 
us from ever reaching being, but are, rather, ontological characteristics of 
being as such. Moreover, this split at the heart of all beings is not simply 
characteristic of those objects that we would seek to know, but are also 
characteristics of the peculiar object that we are. We ourselves are split. 
If, then, this split is a general ontological feature of the world, then the 
dream of presence required for any form of foundationalism is a priori 
impossible. We are then left with two paths: to persist in the correlationist 
thesis that would reduce ontological questions to epistemological questions 
and which is itself implicitly premised on the ontotheological assumption 
of actualism, or to investigate the split in being in a post-humanist, realist 
fashion that is genuinely ontological. It is the second of these two paths that 
I here attempt. 
1.6. On the Alleged Primacy of Perception
In response to the preceding line of argument, one might argue that 
nonetheless we must identify objects in order to know the being of objects, 
and that the identification of an object requires some reference to a 
perceptual convention. To be an object is to possess a boundary or to be 
distinguished from other things, and in order to distinguish one object 
from another we must refer to perception. This, then, would be the first 
step in the argument, asserting the primacy of epistemology over ontology. 
The next step would then consist in pointing out that different creatures 
perceive or divide up the world in different ways. Thus, for example, while 
I very clearly see a tree, it is unlikely that the amoeba encounters this 
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tree as a tree. Likewise, flowing water encounters no difference between 
a frog jumping into its currents, a rock obstructing its path, or a gust of 
wind impacting it. The point, then, is not only that we must refer back to 
epistemology or perceptual conventions to distinguish objects, but that 
also, while there is something other than perception (Berkeleyian subjective 
idealism is mistaken), there is no reason to suggest that being-in-itself is 
composed of objects or that this something is anything like our perception 
of the world.
This line of argument underlines just why it is so important to 
distinguish between arguments advanced on ontological grounds and 
arguments advanced on epistemological grounds. Why is this distinction so 
important? The reigning assumption in philosophy since the 17th century 
is that questions of epistemology must precede questions of ontology. 
The idea here is that we must first know an object before we can begin 
talking about the being of objects. This hearkens back to common readings 
of Meno's paradox in Plato. In the Meno, Socrates asks, “how can we 
inquire into the nature of virtue without first knowing virtue?” And if this 
constitutes a paradox, then this is precisely because if we already know 
virtue, then we have no reason to inquire into the nature of virtue.
The question of perception is not a question about the being of objects, 
but a question about our access to the being of objects. The point of the 
question is two-fold: first, the claim is that in order to talk about the being 
of objects we must first have access to objects. Second, the claim is that 
perhaps our access to objects has nothing to do with what reality itself is 
like. This is the point of the amoeba and the tree. The amoeba doesn't 
encounter the tree as a tree, and thus we should be skeptical of the idea 
that entities like trees are independent or real entities at all. The thesis is 
thus that the being of an object arises not from the object's own independent 
structure, but rather from the distinctions the being perceiving it makes. 
This is the correlationist gesture par excellence. To be sure, the correlationist 
may concede that there is something other than the amoeba, but he wishes 
to argue that there's no reason to suppose that this something is anything 
like how the amoeba experiences it because the nature of the being that the 
amoeba perceives is a function of the amoeba's distinctions, not of the being 
of this other-being itself.
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Let us now return to the difference between arguments that are 
ontologically driven and arguments that are epistemologically driven. The 
first point to note with respect to the correlationist's argument is that it 
seems to ignore the fact that this argument already concedes the existence of 
at least one object. What object is that? Certainly not the existence of the 
tree. Rather, the correlationist concedes the existence of the amoeba. In 
order for the amoeba to grasp anything as anything at all, it must exist as 
an entity, substance, or object. In short, the correlationist's argument can 
only get off the ground through the presupposition of at least one entity. 
And this is a central reason that arguments about how observers constitute 
objects are unconvincing: these arguments always forget that the observer 
is an object. 
Let us return to the example of the water encountering a rock, frog, or 
gust of wind. Here the argument was made that these entities aren't distinct 
for the water but produce all the same qualitative effects. In chapter four 
we will see why this is the case, but for the moment, rather than speaking 
about the water, let's instead speak of the relation between a frog and the 
amoeba. When we discuss the relation between the amoeba and the frog, 
we encounter exactly the same problem as the relation between the water 
and stones, frogs, and wind: the frog does not distinguish amoebas. The 
amoeba does not encounter the frog as a frog, nor does the frog encounter 
the amoeba as an amoeba. From the standpoint of the frog's experience, 
the amoeba is indistinguishable from air or water. The frog is every bit as 
indifferent to the existence of the amoeba as an amoeba, as the water is 
indifferent to the existence of a rock or frog or the wind as a rock, frog, or 
wind. There is no real difference here. It might as well not exist. However, 
here's the rub: does the fact of the amoeba's non-existence within the frog’s 
Umwelt have anything to do with the amoeba's existence? To claim that it 
does is to be led to the peculiar conclusion that it is the entity's distinctions 
that make other entities what they are.
Here, then, we arrive at the difference between epistemologically-driven 
arguments and ontologically-driven arguments. Epistemologically-driven 
arguments will always pitch questions of what beings are in terms of our 
access to these entities. Rather than asking what beings must be by right, 
we instead ask what conventions we use to distinguish entities. However, as 
64 Levi R. Bryant
can be clearly seen, this changes the issue or question. Rather than treating 
the question as a question of what beings are, the correlationist instead 
transforms the question into a question of how we know what things are. 
And because the correlationist has transformed the question from the issue 
of what must belong to entities by right in order to be entities, regardless 
of whether anyone else knows these entities, to the question of how we 
know entities, the correlationist finds himself confronted with the question 
of givenness or access. Having transposed a properly ontological question 
into an epistemological question, and having thereby arrived at the problem 
of givenness (the reference to perception) or access, the correlationist now 
notices that different entities or observers perceive the world differently, i.e., 
that the world is given in different ways to different observers. The amoeba 
doesn't encounter the tree as a tree. A person who is colorblind cannot see 
the color purple, and so on.
Based on this line of argumentation, we can now see why Bhaskar 
refers to the epistemic fallacy as a fallacy. The epistemic fallacy does not 
lie in raising questions of epistemology. That would be absurd. Of course 
we should raise epistemic questions. The epistemic fallacy consists in the 
thesis that properly ontological questions can be fully transposed into 
epistemological questions. Because the correlationist has transformed 
questions of what beings are into questions of our access to beings, and 
because questions of access necessarily trace back to questions of givenness, 
givenness now comes to legislate what exists and what does not exist. 
The correlationist is therefore compelled to argue that the tree does not 
exist or that frogs and rocks don't exist. If this move is problematic, then 
this is because it always finds itself trapped in a self-referential paradox: 
to wit, it concedes the existence of at least one entity, and then uses the 
manner in which that entity observes the rest of the world through its own 
distinctions to erase the existence of other entities. Every argument of this 
sort, driven by how we cognize or perceive the world, will run afoul of this 
sort of problem.
The point here is that questions of ontology cannot, in any manner, 
shape, or form, be reduced to questions of epistemology. Put otherwise, 
claims about the being of beings cannot be transposed into claims about 
our access to beings. Wherever claims about the being of beings are 
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transposed into questions about our access to beings, we end up with 
givenness legislating what exists and what doesn't exist based on what is 
given or accessible, and we thereby find ourselves trapped in a self-defeating 
self-referential paradox where we simultaneously concede the existence of 
objects while denying their existence. 
As a consequence, claims about the being of entities are arrived at in an 
entirely different manner than the epistemological question of access. We 
do not begin with our access to beings, but instead ask what the world must 
be like for certain practices to be possible. The object-oriented ontologist 
is not claiming that we have access to beings, that they are given, or that 
our perception is identical to the way the world is, but that the existence 
of substance is a necessary premise for a whole slew of our practices to be 
intelligible. In other words, the onticological thesis is that the world must 
be a particular way for certain practices and activities like perception, 
experimentation, discourse, and so on, to be possible and that the world 
would be this way regardless of whether we perceived, experimented, or 
discoursed about it.
Perhaps the best way to defeat the correlationist is to shift the terms 
of the debate. It is almost always the case that the correlationist proceeds 
through a discussion of how humans perceive and discourse about the 
world. Rather than beginning with humans, however, why not instead 
begin with the amoeba? Does the correlationist really wish to claim that 
the amoeba constitutes his being? This conclusion follows directly from 
the correlationist argument about how the amoeba encounters the tree. 
If he doesn't wish to arrive at this conclusion, then why? There are only 
two possible conclusions here, both of which lead to the collapse of the 
correlationist's argument. The first possible conclusion would be that it is 
not possible for the amoeba to constitute the correlationist's being because 
humans are somehow special in the order of being by virtue of being the 
only beings capable of constituting other beings from the primordial flux 
of “other-being”. The second possible argument is that the amoeba doesn't 
constitute the correlationist's being through perceiving the correlationist 
because the correlationist is a substance or independent being in his own 
right and how something perceives another being has nothing to do with 
that being's status as a substance.
66 Levi R. Bryant
Now, one might expect the realist to reject the first possibility on the 
grounds that it is anthropocentric. However, while this is true, this is not 
my argument. If we follow the correlationist in the first counter-argument 
(which really is the disavowed, yet fully embraced, implicit premise of all 
correlationisms), we have to note that the correlationist has conceded the 
existence of at least one object, namely, the correlationist himself. From 
here it is but a short step to asking why humans or the correlationist should 
have this privileged status within the order of being. Moreover, it's quite 
remarkable that any being should be able to perform this feat like Atlas 
holding the world on his shoulders, carving up a structureless world, a 
pre-individual flux, into discrete packets or units. If we grant the second 
argument, then, of course, we've conceded the existence of withdrawn 
substances that have their own being regardless of how other substances 
perceive them. Those who advise us to observe the observer somehow seem 
to miss the point that the very act of observing the observer or observing 
how other observers observe presupposes the existence of an observer that 
is doing the observing of other observers. Far from undermining the thesis 
that substances or objects exist, in other words, this move presupposes the 
existence of at least one substance or object. And as a consequence, this 
move is incapable of consistently maintaining the thesis that the world is a 
product of how observers perceive other objects.
Chapter 2
The Paradox of Substance
When the materiality of the glove, the rat, the pollen, the 
bottle cap, and the stick start to shimmer and spark, it was 
in part because of the contingent tableau that they formed 
with each other, with the street, with the weather that 
morning, with me. For had the sun not glinted on the black 
glove, I might not have seen the rat; had the rat not been 
there, I might not have noted the bottle cap, and so on. 
But they were all there just as they were, and so I caught a 
glimpse of an energetic vitality inside each of these things, 
things that I generally conceived as inert. In this assemblage, 
objects appeared as things, that is, as vivid entities not 
entirely reducible to the contexts in which (human) subjects 
set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics. 
— Jane Bennett 48
2.1. Introduction
From Roy Bhaskar's early work we have learned that, if experimental 
practice is to be intelligible, the world must be a particular way. First, 
objects must be capable of behaving differently in open and closed systems. 
For this reason, the being or substance of generative mechanisms cannot 
be identified with its actualized qualities, but must be located elsewhere. 
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It is only in closed systems, Bhaskar contends, that constant conjunctions 
of events in cause and effect relations obtain. In open systems, by contrast, 
objects can remain dormant, producing no events at all, or the intervention 
of countervailing causes can either a) hide events produced by objects, or 
b) produce events different from those that the generative mechanism or 
object would produce in a closed system by virtue of how entanglements 
of objects are woven together. Consequently, second, objects or generative 
mechanisms must be distinguished from events or actualities. Objects or 
generative mechanisms are defined not by their qualities or events, but 
rather by their powers or capacities. An object cannot be without its powers 
or capacities, but it can be without its qualities or events. Finally, third, if 
it is possible to form closed systems where constant conjunctions of events 
can obtain, then it also follows that objects or generative mechanisms must 
be independent of their relations. 
While I readily concede that objects can enter into relations—how 
else would open systems be possible?—it does not follow from this that 
objects are their relations. In short, if it is to be possible to form closed 
systems in which constant conjunctions of events occasionally obtain as 
they sometimes do in experimental settings, then it follows that relations 
cannot ontologically be internal to their terms or the objects that they 
relate. In other words, objects are not constituted by their relations to the 
rest of the world. While relations to other objects often play a key role 
in the precipitation of events or qualities in objects, we must here recall 
that objects are not identical to their qualities but are rather the ground 
of qualities. Accordingly we must distinguish between objects and their 
relations, or rather the structure of objects and the relations into which 
objects enter. I call the former “endo-relations” (or, following Graham 
Harman, “domestic relations”), and the latter “exo-relations” (or, as 
Harman calls them, “foreign relations” 49 ). Endo-relations constitute 
the internal structure of objects independent of all other objects, while 
exo-relations are relations that objects enter into with other objects. Were 
objects constituted by their exo-relations or relations to other objects, the 
being would be frozen and nothing would be capable of movement or 
change. It is only where relations are external to objects that such change 
can be thought.
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Insofar as what Bhaskar calls generative mechanisms are the ground of 
events or qualities, they deserve the archaic, Aristotelian name of substance. 
Because substances have the power to produce events, I shall refer to 
them as difference engines, for the production of an event is the production 
of differences in the world. Because difference engines or substances are 
not identical to the events or qualities they produce, while nonetheless 
substances, however briefly, endure, the substantial dimension of objects 
deserves the title of virtual proper being. And because events or qualities 
occur only under particular conditions and in a variety of ways, I will refer 
to events produced by difference engines as local manifestations. Local 
manifestations are manifestations because they are actualizations that occur 
in the world. 
To this list of the properties of substances we can add a fourth: local 
manifestations are not to be confused with manifestations to or for a subject, 
but are rather events that take place in the world regardless of whether or 
not any subjects or sentient beings exist to witness them. Consequently, 
local manifestation is not equivalent to the empirical or what is experienced 
by a subject. Experience is a subset of local manifestation, but the set 
comprised of local manifestations is infinitely larger than the set consisting 
of experience. In this respect, the category of local manifestation shares 
some affinity to Badiou's conception of appearance as appearing without a 
subject to which appearance appears or is given.50
If, by contrast, local manifestations or events are local, then this is 
because the qualities or events of objects are variable depending on internal 
dynamisms in the object or difference engine and the exo-relations into 
which the object enters. Consequently, we must not say that an object has 
its qualities or that qualities inhere in an object, nor above all that objects 
are their qualities, but rather in a locution that cannot but appear grotesque 
and bizarre, we must say that qualities are something an object does. The 
concept of local manifestation is here designed to capture the context 
dependency—whether that context be internal or external—of the events an 
object produces in its manifestations.
Finally, insofar as substances are not identical to events or their 
qualities—nor, moreover, their exo-relations to other objects—I refer to 
difference engines as split-objects. The characterization of difference engines 
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as split-objects refers not to a physical split such as the idea that objects 
can always be broken in half or divided, but rather to the split between the 
virtual proper being of objects or their powers and their local manifestations 
or qualities. Here the point to be borne in mind is that objects are always in 
excess of any of their local manifestations, harboring hidden volcanic powers 
irreducible to any of their manifestations in the world. In this respect, the 
concept of split-object captures my version of what Graham Harman has 
referred to as the “withdrawal” of objects. As Harman puts it, “[t]here 
are objects [...] withdrawn absolutely from all relation, but there is also a 
ubiquitous ether of qualities through which these objects interact”.51
Harman defends the withdrawal of objects in a much more radical 
sense than I do here; however, there are strong points of overlap between 
our positions. Within the framework of onticology, the claim that objects 
are withdrawn from other objects is the claim that 1) substances are 
independent of or are not constituted by their relations to other objects, 
and 2) that objects are not identical to any qualities they happen to locally 
manifest. The substantiality of objects is never to be equated with the 
qualities they produce. Thus, as Harman goes on to remark,
If there are objects, then they must exist in some sort of 
vacuum-like state, since no relation fully deploys them. 
The recent philosophical tendency is to celebrate holistic 
interrelations endlessly, and to decry the notion of anything 
that could exist in isolation from all else. Yet this is precisely 
what an object does. An object may drift into events and 
unleash its forces there, but no such event is capable of 
putting the object fully into play. Its neighboring objects will 
always react to some of its features while remaining blind 
to the rest. The objects in an event are somehow always 
elsewhere, in a site divorced from all relations.52
Onticology finds much to admire in this passage. Like Harman's 
object-oriented philosophy, onticology argues that objects or substances 
are withdrawn from or independent of their relations to other substances. 
Like Harman's object-oriented philosophy, onticology rejects the thesis 
of holistic interrelations where objects or substances are understood to 
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be constituted by their relations to other substances. Finally, like Harman's 
object-oriented philosophy, onticology holds that no relation ever deploys 
all of the forces contained within an object. The point where onticology 
and Harman's object-oriented ontology diverge is on the issue of whether 
the independence of objects or substances entails that objects never touch 
or encounter one another, or that objects, by virtue of their withdrawal, 
must be vacuums. Were this the case, it seems that it would be impossible 
for any object to ever unleash the forces of another object. Given that 
objects often do unleash forces in other objects, it thus appears that objects 
must somehow be capable of perturbing one another, while the virtual 
proper being of an object forever remains in excess of this encounter and is 
nonetheless closed.
In this chapter, my aim is to articulate the structure of substance and 
the relationship between virtual proper being and local manifestation in 
the production of qualities. However, before proceeding to this task it is 
first necessary to articulate some features of the concept of substance and 
respond to what Kenneth Burke has called “the paradox of substance”. If 
Burke’s discussion of the paradox of substance in The Grammar of Motives 
is here relevant, then this is because what Burke treats as a paradox, and 
therefore critique of substance, unwittingly provides us with a fundamental 
clue as to the ontological structure of substance and why it is necessarily 
characterized by withdrawal. 
2.2. Aristotle, Substance, and Qualities
It is often said that Aristotle has an analogical conception of being, holding 
that being is said in many senses. However, as is so often the case in the 
history of philosophy, the issue is more complicated than this; for while 
Aristotle does indeed argue that, for example, we use the term “being” 
differently when referring to secondary substances (qualities) and primary 
substances (individual things or objects), Aristotle also argues that the 
primary meaning of being is that of individual things. As Aristotle puts it in 
book Z of the Metaphysics,
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be 
[...], for in one sense it means what a thing is or a 'this', and 
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in another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality 
or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it. While 
'being' has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily 
is the 'what', which indicates the substance of a thing [...]. 
And all other things are said to be because they are, some 
of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, 
others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some 
determination of it. And so one might raise the question 
whether 'to walk' and 'to be healthy' and 'to sit' signify in each 
case something that is, and similarly in any other case of this 
sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of 
being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is 
that which walks or is seated or is healthy that is an existent 
thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is 
something definite which underlies them; and this is the 
substance or individual, which is implied in such a predicate; 
for 'good' or 'sitting' are not used without this. Clearly 
then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others 
is. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not is 
something) must be substance.53
To be, for Aristotle, is to be a substance or a thing. All other senses of 
being, Aristotle argues, ultimately refer back to substance for ultimately 
all these other forms of being reside in substances or are made possible 
by substances. It is this Aristotelian orientation to the being of being as 
substance or individual thing that onticology, and object-oriented ontology 
more broadly construed, defends. The question, then, is what precisely is a 
substance? It is this question that this book seeks to answer.
Elsewhere, in the Categories, Aristotle gives us an important clue as to 
the nature of substance. There Aristotle writes that, “[a] substance—that 
which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that 
which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man 
or the individual horse”.54 In short, a substance is that which is not predicated 
of anything else, and which therefore enjoys independent or autonomous 
existence. Color, for example, is always predicated of a substance. Put 
differently, color must always reside in something else. The color red is 
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never a substance in its own right, but is always in a ball or a strawberry or 
lipstick. Qualities reside in substances, they are predicated of substances, 
whereas substances are not predicated of anything. 
Thus Aristotle will remark that, “of the primary substances one is no 
more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance 
than the individual ox”.55 In short, there is an equality of objects, a 
democracy of objects, in the precise sense that all substances are equally 
substances. This does not entail that substances are equal to one another, 
that there are no differences among substances, and that there are not 
substances more or less powerful than other substances, but rather that 
all substances are equally substances. When I discuss the concept of 
flat ontology we will see that this thesis of “equal being” has profound 
consequences for critical theory and how we practice critical theory. In 
particular, it entails that we cannot treat one kind of being as the ground of 
all other beings. 
Likewise, when I discuss mereology later, we will see that the thesis 
that 1) a substance is not itself predicated of anything else, and the thesis 2) 
that no substance is more or less a substance than any other gives rise to a 
host of delicate and fascinating problems pertaining to relations between 
parts and wholes. If objects or substances are not predicated of anything 
else, then it follows that substances cannot be treated as identical with 
their parts. Were objects identical to their parts, then this would entail that 
objects are predicates of their parts. This, in turn, would undermine the 
autonomy or independence of objects. Consequently, while substances 
certainly cannot exist without their parts, substantiality must be something 
other than the parts of which an object is composed. Here we encounter 
one of the ways in which the realism advocated by onticology is anathema 
to every form of classical materialism. The sorts of classical materialism 
defended by thinkers such as Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius hold 
that objects ultimately are their parts in the form of atoms and that these 
atoms, in their turn, are the only true substances. Onticology, by contrast, 
argues that scale and whether or not something is an aggregate is irrelevant 
to whether or not something is a substance. As Harman nicely articulates 
it, “[n]o privilege is granted to objects over and against mere aggregates, as 
though atoms were real and baseball leagues only derivative, or individual 
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soldiers real and armies only derivative”.56 “Instead”, Harman goes on 
to remark, “we have a universe made up of objects wrapped in objects 
wrapped in objects wrapped in objects” such that, “[e]very object is both a 
substance and a complex of relations”.57
Mereologically this entails that we must develop an ontology capable 
of maintaining the autonomy or independence of substances from one 
another such that parts are understood as themselves being substances 
independent of the whole to which they belong—i.e., they are not merely 
predicates of the wholes to which they belong—and wholes are treated 
as independent of their parts. A key feature of each and every object—in 
fact, a defining feature—is its autonomy. Regardless of whether an object 
is simple or compound—and onticology strongly suspects that all objects 
are compound—each object is nonetheless autonomous. As we will see, 
these seemingly arid ontological issues of the relation between parts and 
wholes are of surprising importance for a host of issues in social and 
political theory. Here it is also important to note that “size doesn't matter”. 
Insofar as no substance is neither more nor less a substance than another 
substance, it follows, as Harman points out, that atoms are no more nor less 
substances than molecules, aardvarks or baseball teams.
Insofar as substances are not predicated of anything else, it follows 
that substances are not in anything else in the sense that qualities are 
in substances. As Aristotle puts it, “[i]t is a characteristic common to 
every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither 
said of a subject nor in a subject”.58 Substances are not something in an 
individual thing, but are rather what individual things are. Consequently, 
all substances have the characteristic of sets whereby sets do not include 
themselves as a member of themselves. Thus, while all substances are 
“multiplicities” insofar as they contain parts that are themselves objects—
though in a very different way, we shall see, than Badiou proposes in 
Being and Event—the substantiality of a substance is not itself a part of the 
substance. Substantiality, rather, is the substance.
Insofar as substances cannot be identified with their parts or the objects 
which compose them, it follows that substances are always numerically one. 
As Aristotle puts it, “[s]ubstance, it seems, does not admit of a more or a 
less”.59 A substance is always a substance. As a consequence, a substance 
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is neither more nor less than itself, nor is a substance ever any more than 
one. In the first instance, a substance is neither more nor less than itself in 
the sense that when a person gains weight or loses an arm they are still this 
substance. In the second instance, if a substance is always one then this is 
because, while a substance might be compounded of many parts or other 
objects, qua substance the substance is still one substance. Once again, it 
is clear that this determination of substance raises a number of delicate 
mereological issues revolving around problems of the one and the many.
Finally, it is a peculiar characteristic of substances that they are non-
dialectical. As Aristotle remarks, “[a]nother characteristic of substances is 
that there is nothing contrary to them”.60 Beginning with Hegel, dialectic 
takes on two meanings that are distinct but often conflated with one 
another. First, and especially in a Marxist context, dialectic can be taken 
to refer to thinking that is specifically relational in character. Marx, for 
example, shows how commodities can only exist in certain social formations 
characterized by wage labor and capitalism. Later, in our discussion of 
regimes of attraction and exo-relations we will see how some notion of 
dialectic in this relational sense can be retained with respect to local 
manifestations. Second, dialectic can be taken to mean a thinking of 
relation in terms of contraries and contradictions that are sublated in 
ever greater wholes or totalities. While onticology readily recognizes the 
existence of antagonisms, it sees no reason to see antagonisms as the 
equivalent to contraries or contradictions. 
Substances are not defined by contraries or opposites, but simply are 
what they are. This, of course, is not to suggest that substances do not 
come into being or that they cannot pass out of being, only that they do 
not admit of opposed or contrary terms. An individual cane toad does not 
have an opposite. Rather, if there is contrariety, it exists only in the domain 
of qualities. Later, when discussing local manifestation and virtual proper 
being we will see that there is reason to doubt that contrariety is a genuine 
ontological category. Insofar as substances are not constituted by their 
relations, insofar as relations are not internal to their terms, it follows that 
substances cannot be dialectical in either the relational sense or the sense 
of contrariety. Contrariety, if it exists, exists at the level of qualities, not 
substances. It is only through an erasure of substances, through a reduction 
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of substances to their qualities, through the gesture of actualism as discussed 
in the last chapter, that it can be supposed that substance is dialectical. 
This leads Aristotle to formulate another definition of substance that 
has wide-ranging ontological consequences. We have already seen that 
substance is that which is not predicated of anything else. In addition to 
this, Aristotle remarks that “[i]t seems most distinctive of substance that 
what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries”.61 
Aristotle goes on to illustrate this point with an example: “[A]n individual 
man—one and the same—becomes pale at one time and dark at another, 
and hot and cold, and bad and good”.62 In short, a substance is that which 
is capable of actualizing a variety of different qualities while remaining 
one and the same substance. Later in the Categories Aristotle will remark 
that qualities are “that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified 
somehow”.63 Here we find confirmation of the onticological thesis that 
substances are not identical to their qualities for, insofar as substances are 
able to take on different qualities while remaining the same substance, it 
follows that objects must be distinct from their qualities. 
However, here we must take care. For, in claiming that substances 
are distinct from their qualities, we do not mean to imply that they are 
numerically distinct from one another, as if the qualities were one entity 
and the substance another entity. Speaking of the difference between real 
distinctions, numerical distinctions, and formal distinctions, Deleuze writes,
We can conceive that names or propositions do not have 
the same sense even while they designate exactly the 
same thing (as in the case of the celebrated examples: 
morning star- evening star, Israel - Jacob, plan - blanc). The 
distinction between these senses is indeed a real distinction 
[distinctio realis], but there is nothing numerical—much 
less ontological—about it: it is a formal, qualitative or 
semiological distinction.64
While I do not wish to follow Deleuze in his thesis that the difference 
between numerical distinction and formal distinction is merely a semiological 
distinction that refers to nothing ontological, Deleuze nonetheless draws 
attention to a difference between two very important forms that real 
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distinctions take. On the one hand, two things are numerically distinct when 
they exist independently of one another. As we have seen, all substances are 
numerically distinct insofar as they are independent of one another. On the 
other hand, two things are formally distinct if they really are distinct from 
one another, but they cannot exist independently of one another.
In the case of the relation between substances and their qualities, 
there is a real distinction insofar as substances are never identical to their 
qualities. However, the distinction between substances and their qualities is 
not a numerical distinction but a formal distinction. Here, however, I hasten 
to add that the formal distinction between substances and their qualities 
is not symmetrical but rather asymmetrical. As we saw in the last chapter, 
substances can exist unactualized or without producing any events. As a 
consequence, substances are not dependent on their qualities, but can exist 
without any qualities at all (in a form yet to be specified). The contrary, 
however, is not true. Where substances can exist without their qualities or 
without producing any events, qualities can never exist without substances 
in which to exist. Finally, to this we must add that the distinction between 
substance and quality is not a distinction between what is real and what is 
not real. Both substances and qualities are entirely real. The point is merely 
that substances can never be reduced to any of their local manifestations or 
actualized qualities.
2.3. The Paradox of Substance
As we saw in the last chapter, the ontological category of substance is 
indispensable to rendering our account of experimental practice intelligible. 
The practice of experiment is premised on the existence of generative 
mechanisms, difference engines, or substances that act in open systems, 
that they can be out of phase with the events they are capable of producing, 
and that they are separable from their relations to other substances. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the concept of substance has fallen into 
disrepute within philosophy, often being equated with a metaphysical ghost 
or fiction with no warrant whatsoever. 
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One of the roots of the disdain with which the concept of substance 
is today received can be found in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. There Locke writes that,
if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure 
Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at 
all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of 
such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas 
in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any 
one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or 
Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid 
extended parts: And if he were demanded, what is it, that that 
Solidity and Extension inhere in, he would not be in a much 
better case, than the Indian before mentioned; who, saying 
that the World was supported by a great Elephant, was asked, 
what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great 
Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support 
to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not 
what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use words 
without having clear and distinct Ideas, we talk like Children... 
The Idea then we have, to which we give the general name 
Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown 
support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagine 
cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support 
them, we call that Support Substantia; which, according to the 
true import of the Word, is in plain English, standing under, or 
upholding.65
Locke's criticism of the concept of substance spins on the manner in 
which substance and qualities are split. Within the Aristotelian framework, 
substance is the ground of qualities, yet we never encounter substance 
as such, but rather only ever encounter the qualities of substance. From 
this observation, two problems emerge for Locke: first, what warrant is 
there for supposing the existence of substance at all? If substance is never 
encountered at all, if all we ever encounter are qualities, how is substance 
any different from a reference to Zeus to explain lightning? Second, if 
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substance differs fundamentally from its qualities, what could it possibly 
be? If substance is stripped of all its qualities aren't we left with a bare 
substratum, leading to the bizarre and absurd conclusion that all substances 
are ultimately identical?
Elsewhere, in The Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke, in a discussion 
of Locke, will call this “the paradox of substance”. There Burke writes 
that, “the word ‘substance,’ used to designate what a thing is, derives from 
a word designating something that a thing is not. That is, though used to 
designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, the word etymologically 
refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it”.66 Burke's point is that 
substance is supposed to be that which is intrinsic to an object, that which 
makes an object what it is, but that oddly substance ends up being external 
to the object. If substance, according to Burke, turns out to be external 
to the object, then this is because we only ever encounter the qualities of 
the object, and never the substance of the object. If, then, the object is 
equated with its qualities, then substance turns out to be strangely other 
than the object.
Locke's critique of substance precipitates something of a crisis that 
reverberates all the way down to contemporary philosophy today. As 
Meillassoux remarks, in prior philosophy “one of the questions that divided 
rival philosophers most decisively was, 'Who grasps the true nature of 
substance? He who thinks the Idea, the individual, the atom, God? Which 
God?'” 67 However, with Locke's critique of substance, this entire debate 
is thrown into crisis as there no longer seems to be any epistemic warrant 
for the ontological concept of substance. However, while the ontological 
concept of substance seems to be banished to the world of occult and 
unwarranted suppositions with no place in philosophy, individual things 
nonetheless persist in the world of our experience. Having banished the 
ontological concept of substance—viz., substances as they exist in their own 
right, independent of any cognition—philosophy thus finds itself confronted 
with the question of how to account for individual things without recourse 
to mind-independent substances inaccessible to experience. Hume, for 
example, will argue that substance is not a feature of the world—or, at least, 
any world that we can know—but rather arises from the operations of mind. 
Having experienced the combination of many similar sensations occurring 
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together in the past, the mind comes to associate these impressions or 
sensations with one another. In this respect, the object itself, for Hume, 
is not a substance, but rather the sense that one encounters a substance 
when encountering an object is instead an effect of how the mind associates 
impressions and ideas together in a unity. In this way, Hume responds to 
Locke's challenge by making no reference to “occult entities” independent 
of what is given in sensation.
We encounter a similar move from world to mind in Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason. As Kant observes, 
in experience, to be sure, perceptions come together only 
contingently, so that no necessity of their connection is or 
can become evident in the perceptions themselves, since 
apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the manifold of 
empirical intuition, but no representation of the necessity of 
the combined existence of the appearances that it juxtaposes 
in space and time is to be encountered in it. But since 
experience is a cognition of objects through perception, 
consequently the relation in the existence of the manifold is 
to be represented in it not as it is juxtaposed in time but as it 
is objectively in time, yet since time itself cannot be perceived, 
the determination of the existence of objects in time can only 
come about through their combination in time in general, 
hence only through a priori connecting concepts. Now since 
these always carry necessity along with them, experience is 
thus possible only through a representation of the necessary 
connection of the perceptions.68
For Kant, the realm of empirical intuition (sensation) is a sort of 
confused chaos and therefore cannot, contra Hume, provide us with any 
ordered or structured experience. “[O]ur entire sensibility is nothing but 
the confused representation of things, which contains solely that which 
pertains to them in themselves but only under a heap of marks and partial 
representations that we can never consciously separate from one another”.69 
Or, as Kant will write when discussing the first analogy, “[o]ur apprehension 
of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always 
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changing. We can therefore never determine from this alone whether this 
manifold, as objects of experience, is simultaneous or successive”.70
It will be noted that Kant fully carries over the premise of Locke's 
critique of substance, leaving this critique itself unquestioned. Beginning 
with the premise that we have no access to substances but only qualities 
as they are experienced, and with the thesis that the “manifold of intuition” 
or empirical sensation is unformatted, Kant has no other recourse than 
to claim that the substantiality of substances is not an ontological feature 
of objects themselves, but rather issues from our mind. To be sure, Kant 
endorses the thesis that things-in-themselves exist, but maintains that we 
have no access to these objects and therefore no means of determining 
whether, like the objects of our experience, things-in-themselves are 
autonomous, individual unities, or whether the things-in-themselves are, 
in reality, really a thing-in-itself, a primordial unity or One, that is then 
subsequently formatted or “cut up” by our minds. Since the substantiality 
of substance must issue from somewhere, and since we cannot appeal to 
being itself to ground substance, Kant contends that substance is instead 
an a priori category of mind that is imposed on the chaotic manifold of 
intuition giving it structure or formatting it.
What we have here is what Harman has referred to as the “overmining” 
of substances. Where undermining dissolves objects in a something that is 
purported to be more fundamental such as atoms, water (Thales), the One, 
the pre-individual, and so on, overmining dissolves objects in something 
that is treated as being more immediate. Of overmining, Harman writes, 
“it is said that [objects] are too deep. On this view the object is a useless 
hypothesis, a ‘je ne sais quoi’ in the bad sense”.71 In the case of Hume, 
substances are overmined in favor of impressions or sensations that are 
then bundled together by associations of the mind, while in the case of 
Kant, substances are overmined in favor of the manifold of intuition 
(sensations), along with the pure a priori forms of space and time and the 
a priori categories of the mind. In both instances, objects or substances 
are treated as effects of something more immediate or accessible (empirical 
experience and mind). 
It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of Locke's critique of 
substance and Hume’s and Kant's proposed solution to the paradox of 
82 Levi R. Bryant
substance on the subsequent history of philosophy and theory. For while 
direct reference to Locke, Hume, and Kant in subsequent philosophy and 
theory will often be absent, we nonetheless encounter Locke's critique of 
substance as an implicit presupposition, and Hume’s and Kant's style of 
solving this problem throughout contemporary philosophy and theory. 
Wherever, for example, we are told that it is language that structures reality, 
we are encountering a variant of Kant's response to Locke. While, to be 
sure, the content of the critique and the proposed solution differs, the form 
of the critique remains the same. Here the premises that 1) the ontological 
category of substance should be banished because we have no direct access 
to substance, and 2) that the manifold of intuition is a chaotic rhapsody of 
sensation have been fully embraced and Kant's mind and a priori categories 
have been replaced by society and language.
Ironically, however, Kant's reasoning is based on an amphiboly, though 
of an ontological rather than a transcendental sort. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant tells us that a transcendental amphiboly is, “a confusion of 
the pure object of the understanding with [an empirical] appearance”.72 
For Kant, there is both a rationalist and an empiricist way of falling into 
amphibolous reasoning. Drawing on Leibniz and Locke as examples, Kant 
argues that “Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally 
sensitivized the concepts of the understanding, i.e., interpreted them as 
nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection”.73 Kant's charge 
is that Leibniz is guilty of amphibolous reasoning by virtue of finding, 
directly in sensation, what only issues from the a priori concepts of the 
understanding. Leibniz treats sensations as if they were identical to what 
is found only in concepts. For example, sensations are always particular 
and require the presence of a thing, whereas concepts allow me to think a 
plurality of things with a shared characteristic in their absence. By contrast, 
Locke, according to Kant, falls prey to amphibolous reasoning by virtue of 
arguing that categories that can only be found a priori in the understanding, 
concepts that can only be generated by mind, can be abstracted from 
sensation or the domain of the empirical. In both cases, Kant contends, 
Locke and Leibniz conflate the transcendental structure of mind and the 
empirical dimension of sensation.
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If Kant (and Locke) are guilty of amphibolous reasoning, this arises not 
from conflating the transcendental (as understood by Kant as a structure of 
the mind) and the empirical, but rather from conflating the ontological and 
the empirical. For on the one hand, Locke infers that because substances 
are not given in experience but rather only empirical qualities are given, we 
are warranted in banishing substance from our ontology. Likewise, Kant 
infers that because substance is not given in the manifold of sensation, we 
must reject the claim that substance pertains to things-in-themselves, but 
must instead see substance as a category issuing from mind. An ontological 
amphiboly thus consists in confusing two distinct domains of inquiry: the 
ontological and the epistemological. The ontological is here subordinated to 
the epistemological, and the epistemological is then used to determine what 
is and is not. The problem is that what we can and cannot know cannot 
be used to legitimately legislate what is and is not. The being of a thing is 
independent of our ability to know a thing.
However, the problem with the Humean and Kantian solution is much 
more serious than a mere conflation of two distinct sets of questions or 
domains of inquiry. Let us take the example of Kant to illustrate this point. 
Kant's thesis is that the manifold of intuition, being a sort of rhapsodic 
chaos, cannot deliver the determinations necessary for experience. Rather, 
this delirious manifold must be structured by a priori categories of mind. 
And for this reason, these a priori categories of mind cannot be drawn or 
abstracted from experience, but must instead spring from the mind alone. 
Whether these categories represent reality as it is independent of our mind 
is, according to Kant, forever beyond our knowledge because we cannot 
sneak up on ourselves from behind to see how we see reality and determine 
whether our experience corresponds to reality. Consequently, whenever we 
experience an individual thing or speak of an individual thing, this thing is 
the result of how our mind has formatted the chaotic manifold of intuition 
through the application of the a priori categories of unity, reality, substance, 
and existence. And here we must note that these four categories issue from 
mind not world.
Initially it would seem that Kant provides a clever solution to the 
question of why our experience is formatted in the way that it is, thereby 
evading Locke's critique of substance as a sort of occult concept by 
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showing how these concepts issue a priori from the mind (to which we do 
have access). However, a moment’s reflection reveals that Kant's solution 
is far more problematic than it first appears. Speaking in the context of 
Heidegger's early 1919 discussions of being where being is distinguished 
between “being as a whole” and “something at all”, Harman observes 
that “no explanation is offered of why certain specific qualities should be 
assigned to one 'something at all' rather than another”.74 This same criticism 
applies equally to Kant's proposed solution to Locke's critique of substance. 
Kant has no way of explaining how or why a priori categories such as 
unity, substance, and existence get applied to one manifold of sensations 
rather than another. Why, for example, are the categories of substance and 
unity not applied to an aggregate consisting of my daughter, my parents' 
dog Rula, and the United Nations? Insofar as the categories are purely 
a priori, they themselves have no content. What is it then that leads an a 
priori category to be applied to one thing rather than another? The same 
problem emerges with those variations of the Kantian solution that would 
have language rather than pure a priori concepts of the understanding do 
this work. In both cases we are left without the means of explaining how 
the “something at all” is ever specified as a concrete entity. As Deleuze puts 
it in the context of his discussion of Bergson's critique of dialectic and the 
category of possibility, these categories are “like baggy clothes, [that] are 
much too big”.75
The point here is not that we have incorrigible knowledge of substances 
and access to them in our experience, nor that the way we parse the world 
is the way the world is actually formatted. Rather, the point is that 1) 
questions of substance are ontological questions absolutely distinct from 
how we know substances, and 2) that questions of substance cannot be 
dissolved in questions of access or knowledge. As we saw in the last chapter, 
ontology cannot be erased by epistemology, nor can ontological questions 
be transformed into epistemological questions revolving around our access 
to beings. Wherever one attempts to erase ontological questions in this way, 
we end up with a variant of Harman's “something at all” problem.
Locke, Kant, Hume and much of the subsequent philosophical tradition 
ends up where they do precisely because they fall into what Bhaskar calls 
the “epistemic fallacy” and actualism, confusing questions of our access 
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to beings with questions of what beings are. Beginning with the actualist 
thesis borne out of a desire for secure foundations (i.e., a desire secondary 
to the demands of ontology), they restrict discourse to what is given in 
experience. They then find that they are unable to account for the furniture 
of the universe precisely because substance is that which withdraws from 
any givenness, experience, or, indeed, actuality. As such, substance is 
not something that can anywhere be found in experience—no one has 
ever seen or experienced, I contend, a single substance—but is rather an 
irreducible ontological premise necessary if our commerce with the world 
and experimental activity is to be intelligible. The existence of substance 
is not something that can be arrived at through an experience or a direct 
observation, but can only be arrived at as a premise through transcendental 
argumentation. When we adopt the actualist gesture of restricting 
knowledge to what is directly given in experience, this way of reaching 
substance is irrevocably foreclosed.
Returning then to what Burke called “the paradox of substance”, we 
should not so much argue that Burke is mistaken in his characterization of 
substance, as that Burke articulates the very essence of substance. In short, 
we should embrace Burke's characterization of substance as split between 
qualities and substantiality. It is only when we begin from the standpoint 
of epistemology, from the standpoint of what is given in experience, that 
substance appears paradoxical. And if this is the case, then it is because 
beginning with epistemology leads us to simultaneously claim that the 
object we experience is its qualities and that it is something radically other 
than its qualities. However, if we begin from the other end with ontology 
and note that substance is such that 1) it can actualize different qualities 
at different times (Aristotle), and that 2) it can fail to actualize qualities 
(Bhaskar), we can now argue that the very essence or structure of substance 
lies in self-othering and withdrawal. Insofar as objects or substances alienate 
themselves, as it were, in qualities, they are self-othering. They generate 
differences in the world. However, insofar as objects are never identical to 
their qualities, insofar as they always harbor a volcanic reserve in excess of 
their qualities, they perpetually withdraw from their qualities such that they 
never directly manifest themselves in the world. As Harman remarks, it's 
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as if all objects are vacuums populating the universe. It is precisely for this 
reason that the being of substance is essentially split.
And here it should be noted that onticology and object-oriented 
philosophy are both metaphysics or ontologies that thoroughly escape what 
Derrida refers to as ontotheology and the metaphysics of presence. Far 
from being a signifier that denotes presence or the fullness of being, the very 
essence of substance is to withdraw from presence and to be in excess of all 
actuality. However, this overturning of the metaphysics of presence occurs 
not through a demonstration of the manner in which being always harbors 
deferral and difference for us such that presence is forever unobtainable, but 
rather by showing that being as such, being in itself, withdraws in this way. 
Let us look more closely at this split between virtual proper being and local 
manifestation through a concrete example.
Chapter 3
Virtual Proper Being
What would a truly democratic encounter between truly 
equal beings look like, what would it be—can we even 
imagine it? 
— Timothy Morton76
3.1. The Mug Blues
Although we have addressed Locke's criticism of substance as an occult 
entity not warranted by the givens of experience, the problem of the 
bare substratum remains. If substance is not its qualities, does this not 
entail that substance as such is without qualities and is therefore a bare 
substratum? And if substance is a bare substratum, does this not entail that 
all substances are identical? If this is the case, then this spells the ruin of 
the concept of substance for substance is supposed to account, in part, for 
the individuality of substance. Yet where substance is bare, all individuality 
is erased. If this difficulty is to be avoided, we require some way of talking 
about the structure or formatting of substances or split-objects without this 
structure consisting of qualities. Towards this end, it would prove helpful to 
investigate the being of a particular substance. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that my blue coffee mug sitting 
here on the table is a substance. When I distinguish between the virtual 
proper being of an object and the actual local manifestation of an object, I 
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am attempting to distinguish between the object qua formatted structure 
and as an enduring unity, and the object qua qualities or properties. The 
virtual proper being of an object is its self-othering substantiality, its 
being as substance, or its being as a (more or less) enduring unity. Here 
it is important to bear in mind that the time of endurance is irrelevant 
to whether or not a substance is a substance. A substance can exist for 
the briefest moment before being destroyed, or for billions of years. It 
will be recalled that, according to Aristotle, no substance is any more 
or less a substance than any other. This holds no less for the difference 
between a rock and a human than it does for an object that is long-lived or 
instantaneous. 
The virtual proper being of an object is what makes an object properly 
an object. It is that which constitutes an object as a difference engine 
or generative mechanism. However, no one nor any other thing ever 
encounters an object qua its virtual proper being, for the substance of an 
object is perpetually withdrawn or in excess of any of its manifestations. 
Rather, the virtual proper being of an object can only ever be inferred from 
its local manifestations in the world. By contrast, the local manifestation 
of an object is the manner in which a substance or virtual proper being is 
actualized in the world under determinate conditions. Here it is important 
to emphasize that manifestation refers not to phenomena or appearances 
for a subject, though clearly this can take place as well. When I refer to 
manifestation, I am not referring to givenness to a subject, but rather to 
actualization within a world. Objects require no subject to manifest 
themselves in the world. The universe could be a universe in which no 
sentient beings of any sort exist and manifestation would continue to take 
place. We are therefore fortunately relieved of playing Atlas. Consequently, 
appearances and phenomena, what is given, are a subset of manifestation, 
not the reverse. Manifestation is an ontological predicate, not an 
epistemological predicate.
It is my contention that traditional ontology was correct to distinguish 
between the substance and qualities of objects, but mistaken in how it 
thought about the nature of substance. It is correct to hold that objects 
cannot be reduced to their qualities because qualities change and shift 
while the object remains this substance. Traditional philosophy goes astray, 
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however, in concluding that because substances cannot be reduced to their 
qualities, then substance must be the object stripped of all qualities or, as 
Locke puts it, a bare substratum. Where substance is conceived in this way, 
its concept becomes entirely incoherent.
My thesis is that the substantiality of objects is not a bare substratum, 
but rather an absolutely individual system or organization of powers. 
Powers are the capacities of an object or what it can do. The powers of an 
object are never something that is directly manifested in the world. And if 
this is so, then this is because the qualities of an object are only ever local 
manifestations of the object’s power. That is, the domain of power possessed 
by an object is always greater than any local manifestation or actualization 
of an object. For this reason, following Manuel DeLanda, I distinguish 
between the phase space of an object and the powers of an object. A phase 
space is a set of points that can be occupied in a series of variations. For 
example, as a pendulum swings back and forth, it passes through a series 
of points between two maxima and a minima. Each of these points is a 
point in phase space. Moreover, none of these points are ever occupied 
all at once. Likewise, we can think qualities or properties as points an 
object manifests or actualizes as points in a phase space. The power of the 
pendulum is its ability to move through this phase space, to produce these 
actualizations, while each point the pendulum moves through is a local 
manifestation of this power of the pendulum. 
Two points follow from this thesis about the relationship between 
substance or virtual proper being and qualities or local manifestations. 
First, we should not speak of qualities as something an object possesses, has, 
or is, but rather as acts, verbs, or something that an object does. Second, 
knowing an object does not consist in enumerating a list of essential 
qualities or properties belonging to an object, but rather consists in knowing 
the powers or capacities of an object. As we will see in the next chapter, 
this entails that no object is ever fully known insofar as every object 
necessarily has an infinite phase space while simultaneously having a finite 
structure of powers.
Here I return to the blue mug with which I began this section. Within 
the ontological framework I am proposing, it would be inaccurate to 
suggest that the mug is blue or that the mug possesses the quality of blue. 
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Rather, if we had an ontologically accurate language, we would instead 
say that “the mug blues” or that “the mug is bluing” or that “the mug 
does blue”. The blueness of the mug is not a quality that the mug has but 
is something that the mug does. It is an activity on the part of the mug. 
Nor would it be accurate to claim, at the level of the mug's virtual proper 
being, that “the mug has blue power”. The mug does not have blue power, 
but rather coloring power. If this is the case, then it is because the mug 
always has the power to produce a broader range of colors than the shade it 
produces at any given time.
The decision to think qualities of an object as acts or doings rather than 
as possessions, along with onticology's rejection of the thesis that the mug 
has blue power rather than coloring power, is motivated by two interrelated 
concerns. First, qualities are acts on the part of objects precisely because 
qualities vary. If it is inaccurate to suggest that the mug is blue, then this is 
because the mug is a variety of different colors as a function of the exo-
relations with light the mug enters into. As I look at the mug under the 
warm light of my desktop lamp, it is now a very dark, deep, flat blue. Now 
I open the shade to my office window, allowing sunlight to stream in. The 
mug becomes a brilliant, bright, shiny blue. Sharing a romantic moment 
with my coffee mug by candlelight, the colors are deep and rich as they 
were under my office light, but now the blue flickers and dances in response 
to the shifting intensity of the candle flame. And finally, I blow out the 
candle and the mug becomes black.
Here there are a couple of points worth making. First, in pointing to 
the manner in which the qualities of the mug change, I am not making the 
claim that these qualities are unreal or that the mug is truly one shade of 
blue and that these other shades are distortions or deviations from the mug’s 
true color. Rather, these qualities of the mug are entirely real and the mug 
is all these colors. Indeed, we can say that in principle the mug is potentially 
an infinite number of colors because there is no limit to the exo-relations 
into which the mug can enter. Consequently, we cannot say that we would 
finally get the true being of the mug by adding up all the qualities that it 
actualizes. The being of the mug is not the sum of its qualities, but rather 
qualities are unique events that a substance produces. 
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Second, what is true of the color of the coffee mug is also true of all its 
qualities or properties. For example, the spatial shape of the mug, while 
certainly far more enduring than the color of the mug, is no less variable, 
in principle, than the color of the mug. The mug tends to have a relatively 
stable spatial or extensional structure because it exists within a stable 
regime of attraction or set of exo-relations. Change the temperature or 
gravity of the mug’s exo-relations and the extension or spatial shape of the 
mug will also change. 
Here, then, we encounter one of the central ways of distinguishing 
between the virtual proper being of an object and its local manifestations. 
Where local manifestation is geometrical, virtual proper being is topological. 
As described by Steven Connor,
Topology may be defined as the study of the spatial properties 
of an object that remain invariant under homeomorphic 
deformations, which is to say, broadly, actions of stretching, 
squeezing, or folding. [It is] not concerned with exact 
measurement, which is the domain of geometry [...] but 
rather with spatial relations, such as continuity, neighborhood, 
insideness and outsideness, disjunction and connection [...]. 
Because topology is concerned with what remains invariant as 
a result of transformation, it may be thought of as geometry 
plus time, geometry given body by motion.77
Where geometry treats fixed metric properties and shapes, topology, 
by contrast, treats of structures capable of undergoing variation through 
operations of stretching, squeezing, or folding while retaining its structure. 
Here the distinction between topology and geometry should not be 
understood mathematically in terms of two different ways of approaching 
space, but rather philosophically as two distinct aspects of substance. The 
topological domain refers to the domain of how the virtual powers of a 
substance are organized, whereas the geometrical refers to how substances 
are actualized in locally fixed qualities. There is no less a topology and 
geometry of colors in substances than there is topology and geometry of 
spatial qualities in objects. As a consequence we can say—and I'll have 
much more to say about this in section 3.5—that the virtual proper being 
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of objects is characterized by a topological plasticity that is nonetheless 
absolutely individual and concrete.
The coloring power of the mug is not a Euclidean property of the mug, 
a geometric property of the mug—which is to say, a fixed property—but 
is rather a topology or series of variations that are a function of the exo-
relations the mug enters into with other objects (different photons of light). 
For this reason, we must say that the mug blues, that it “does” blue, rather 
than that the mug is blue. The bluing of the mug is the local manifestation 
of the mug. Likewise, if we don't say that the mug has blue power, but 
rather has coloring power, then this is because the mug has the topological 
power to produce a whole range of colors ranging from black to brilliant 
blue. This range is the power of the mug, while every point or variation 
within this range is the phase space of the mug. Finally, the actualization 
of a point within this topology or phase space is a local manifestation of 
the mug. Aristotle's formal cause must be rescued from its fixed-structure 
Euclideanism and placed soundly within the field of topology or structures 
that contain the potential for a series of variations volcanically locked 
within substances. And this is why I refer to objects as “difference engines” 
or “generative mechanisms”, for objects are these powers of producing 
differences in the world at the level of qualities or local manifestations.
Why, then, are we inclined to say that the mug is blue rather than that 
the mug blues and has coloring power? I think there are three reasons for 
this, one cognitive, another sociological, and a third having to do with 
logoi, local ontological situations, or regimes of attraction in which objects 
manifest themselves. Cognitively our thought and perception is geared 
towards action and therefore what interests us. As Bergson so nicely puts it, 
[m]y body [...] acts like an image which reflects others, and 
which, in doing so, analyzes them along lines corresponding 
to the different actions which it can exercise upon them. And 
consequently, each of the qualities perceived in the same 
object by my different senses symbolizes a particular direction 
of my activity, a particular need.78
In relating to other objects, there's a way in which our body reduces 
objects, simplifies them, as a target of its own aims, needs, and desires. As 
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a consequence, variations in objects are ignored and the object is reduced 
to a geometric identity most congenial to its desired action. As we will see 
in the next chapter, this is not a peculiarity of human or animal nature, but 
rather is true of all inter-object relations, whether animate or inanimate, 
whether human or animal, whether living or non-living. The reduction or 
simplification of one object by another object is a general ontological feature 
of how objects relate to one another. In short, this sort of simplification is 
not an epistemological peculiarity of human beings.
Sociologically, philosophers, as writers and scholars, do a lot of sitting. 
This is also true of those times when we pause to reflect and wonder what 
objects are. Everything is still. Rather than acting on objects, we look at 
objects. Where acting on objects tends to produce qualitative differences 
in the objects, gazing at objects tends to reveal fixed properties (especially 
if we and the object are sitting still). As such, when we cast about for 
objects to contemplate, our tendency is to encounter objects in relatively 
fixed circumstances. The philosopher picks up the first item that is about 
or nearby, such as my blue mug. But as a result of these relatively fixed 
circumstances characterizing reflection, we encounter qualities not in 
their changes or transitions, but rather as abiding qualities possessed by 
an object. We then build this lack of engagement with objects and the 
consequent non-variation into the very foundations of our ontology 
without realizing it. In this connection, Gilbert Simondon suggests that 
a prejudice for fully constituted local manifestations or the geometric 
reflects the social hierarchy of Greek philosophy.79 Likewise, in works 
like Pascalian Meditations, Pierre Bourdieu shows how what he calls “the 
scholastic disposition” leads us to systematically distort questions about 
the nature of practice.80 The claims of Simondon and Bourdieu hold 
not only for ancient Greece and sociological questions of practice, but 
also for our contemporary historical moment and questions of ontology. 
Intellectual work today, no less than in ancient Greece, is dependent on a 
certain distribution of labor that renders academic life possible by relieving 
a particular segment of society largely independent of manual labor. This, 
in turn, leads objects to be encountered in a particular way insofar as the 
academic, by and large, does not encounter the volcanic potentials hidden 
within objects by virtue of not directly acting on objects. As a consequence, 
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this leads to a systematic distortion of ontological questions and what 
constitutes an object.
Finally, third, the objects that populate our world tend to exist in fairly 
stable sets of exo-relations or regimes of attraction. For example, gravity, 
pressure, and temperature are fairly stable on our planet—at least in the 
environments where we most commonly act. This entails that there is very 
often very little variation in the qualities of the objects that make up the 
furniture of our daily experience. This, no doubt, is one reason that the 
confusion of objects with their qualities is such a persistent tendency of 
thought. If Aristotle was able to think the formal cause of objects in largely 
fixed Euclidean or geometric terms rather than in dynamic topological 
terms, then this is because there is often a sort of détente of exo-relations 
among objects leading to fairly stable qualities or local manifestations 
among objects. If I am led, for example, to think my body as possessing a 
rather fixed form, then this is because the atmospheric pressure produced by 
the Earth's gases pressing down upon me is fairly constant. If, by contrast, a 
mad scientist were to place me in a room that slowly decreased atmospheric 
pressure, the form or shape of my body would change in subtle ways up 
to the point where I would finally decompress and become a plurality of 
objects. Likewise, the form of my body changes in subtle ways with changes 
in temperature, becoming now more compact when it is very cold and 
somewhat swollen when it is very hot. Even the spatial form of my body is 
an act on the part of my body, something that my body does, not something 
my body has or is. This is why I refer to logoi, local ontological situations, 
or regimes of attraction rather than logos. These logoi or local ontological 
situations are relatively stable exo-relations among objects that tend to 
generate, as a consequence, enduring and stable qualities in objects.
3.2. Deleuze's Schizophrenia: Between Monism and Pluralism
No one has explored this anterior side of substance—in the transcendental, 
not the temporal, sense—more profoundly than Gilles Deleuze. In 
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze names this dimension of substance that 
is formatted or structured without possessing qualities the virtual. Here 
the virtual is not to be confused with virtual reality. The latter is generally 
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treated as a simulacrum of reality, as a sort of false or computer generated 
reality. By contrast, the virtual is entirely real without, for all that, being 
actual. The term “virtuality” comes from the Latin virtus, which has 
connotations of potency and efficacy. As such, the virtual, as virtus, refers 
to powers and capacities belonging to an entity. And in order for an entity 
to have powers or capacities, it must actually exist. In this connection, 
while the virtual refers to potentiality, it would be a mistake to conflate this 
potentiality with the concept of a potential object. A potential object is an 
object that does not exist but which could come to exist. By contrast, the 
virtual is strictly a part of a real and existing object. The virtual consists 
of the volcanic powers coiled within an object. It is that substantiality, 
that structure and those singularities that endure as the object undergoes 
qualitative transformations at the level of local manifestations. 
However, in evoking Deleuze's concept of the virtual, we must proceed 
with caution for two deeply opposed tendencies animate Deleuze's 
discussions of the virtual. On the one hand, Deleuze often speaks of the 
virtual in terms of an ontological monism that suggests he is committed 
to the thesis that there is only one substance that is then broken up into 
discrete entities through a process of actualization. Monism tends to come 
in one of two variants. One variant of monism has it that only a single 
substance exists and that everything that exists is a property or quality 
of that one substance. Spinoza's monism, for example, argues that only a 
single substance exists and that all entities (modes) are expressions of this 
one substance. Another variant of monism has it that there is only a single 
type of being, but that being is populated by numerically distinct entities 
of this type. Lucretius, for example, could be construed as a monist of this 
sort, as he holds that only atoms and their combinations exist, not two 
distinct ontological types such as Plato's world of the forms and the fallen 
world of entities or appearances. 
Deleuze often appears to advocate this former sort of monism, while 
object-oriented ontology and onticology might appear to be committed to 
the latter type. Throughout Deleuze's work, we find the theme of a single 
substance that somehow comes to be formatted into discrete entities. 
By contrast, object-oriented ontology advocates the thesis that being is 
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composed only of discrete entities or substances. DeLanda articulates this 
variant of Deleuze nicely when he remarks that,
Deleuze distinguishes the progressive unfolding of a 
multiplicity through broken symmetries (differentiation), from 
the progressive specification of the continuous space formed 
by multiplicities as it gives rise to our world of discontinuous 
spatial structures (differenciation). Unlike a transcendent 
heaven which exists as a separate dimension from reality, 
Deleuze asks us to imagine a continuum of multiplicities 
which differentiates itself into our familiar three-dimensional 
space as well as its spatially structured contents.81
I will discuss Deleuze's concept of multiplicity momentarily, but for 
the moment it is important to note that “multiplicity” is among Deleuze's 
terms for the virtual. The suggestion here is that the virtual seems to consist 
of a single continuum, such that there is only one virtual, one substance, 
that is then partitioned into apparently distinct entities. And indeed, as 
Deleuze remarks, “all [multiplicities] coexist, but they do so at points, on 
the edges”.82 Moreover, Deleuze's constant references to the virtual as 
the pre-individual suggests this reading as well, for it implies a transition 
from an undifferentiated state to a differenciated individual. If the virtual is 
pre-individual, then it cannot be composed of discrete individual unities 
or substances. Here the individual would be an effect of the virtual, not 
primary being itself.
On the other hand, Deleuze speaks of the virtual as a part of the real 
object. Here Deleuze seems to move in the direction of the second sense of 
the monism, where monism entails that being is composed of a pluralism of 
distinct entities, all of the same type. As Deleuze remarks, “the virtual must 
be defined as strictly a part of the real object—as though the object had one 
part of itself plunged as though into an objective dimension”.83 Deleuze 
goes on to ask,
How, then, can we speak simultaneously of both complete 
determination and only a part of the object? The 
determination must be a complete determination of the 
object, yet form only a part of it. Following suggestions made 
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by Descartes in his Replies to Arnauld, we must carefully 
distinguish the object in so far as it is complete and the object 
in so far as it is whole. What is complete is only the [virtual] 
part of the object, which participates with other parts of 
objects in the [Multiplicity] (other relations, other singular 
points), but never constitutes an integral whole as such. What 
the complete determination lacks is the whole set of relations 
belonging to actual existence. An object may be ens, or rather 
(non)-ens omni modo determinatum, without being entirely 
determined or actually existing.84
In treating the virtual as a part of the object and as completely 
determined (structured), Deleuze seems to suggest that the virtual—far 
from constituting a pre-individual continuum that is then parceled up 
into discrete entities—is, in fact, purely discrete and individual. Under 
this reading, multiplicities or endo-relational structures would be discrete, 
existing individuals. Here there would be no transition from the pre-
individual virtual to the individual actual, but rather the relation between 
endo-structure and actuality would be a transition between unexercised 
power and actualized quality within an individual.
It is not my aim here to provide a commentary on Deleuze's ontology 
nor to remain true to his thought, but rather to determine how it is 
possible for substance to be formatted without this formatting consisting 
of substance's qualities. My contention is that the transcendental condition 
(in the transcendental realist sense) under which it is possible for an object 
to be out of phase with its qualities lies in a formatted structure that is not 
itself qualitative. It is only in this way that the bare substratum problem can 
be avoided and Aristotle's insight that substances are capable of carrying 
contrary qualities can be vindicated. However, paraphrasing Karen Barad 
in her discussion of Niels Bohr, “I propose an ontology that I believe to be 
consistent with [a number of Deleuze's] views, although I make no claim 
that this is what he necessarily had in mind”.85 Consequently, Deleuze's 
thought is only relevant here insofar as it advances our understanding of the 
split-nature of substance. In chapter 1, I take it that I have demonstrated 
the ontological necessity for the existence of discrete or individual 
substances. Contra Deleuze's Spinozist monism and his continuum 
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hypothesis with respect to the virtual, this necessity follows above all from 
the requirement that objects be separable from their relations to other 
objects if experimental activity is to be intelligible. In order for experiment 
to be possible, it is necessary that it be possible to form closed systems in 
which objects can express their powers. If objects or generative mechanisms 
were merely expressions of a continuum that is itself one, then it is difficult 
to see how this condition could ever be met. Yet given that it seems that 
this condition is regularly met, it seems that Deleuze's monism must clearly 
be mistaken.
Approaching Deleuze's thought more directly, two difficulties seem to 
besiege his monist continuum hypothesis. First, if the virtual is a single 
substance that is then partitioned into discrete entities, it is difficult to 
understand why the virtual ever departs from itself to become “alienated” 
in individuals at all. Deleuze's tendency is to speak of the actual, of the 
individuated, as that which contributes no differences of its own but which 
is merely a sort of sterile secretion of the virtual. As Deleuze puts it, 
[d]ifference is explicated, but in systems in which it tends 
to be cancelled; this means only that difference is essentially 
implicated, that its being is implication. For difference, to be 
explicated is to be cancelled or to dispel the inequality which 
constitutes it. The formula according to which 'to explicate is 
to identify' is a tautology. We cannot conclude from this that 
difference is cancelled out, or at least that it is cancelled in 
itself. It is cancelled in so far as it is drawn outside itself, in 
extensity and in the quality which fills that extensity. However, 
difference creates both this extensity and this quality.86
The terms “implication” and “explication” should be read etymologically 
here, rather than literally. “Explication” denotes not the activity of 
explanation, but rather “to unfold”. Here, then, the emphasis should be 
placed on the term “plication”, which indicates that which is folded. 
Consequently, the term “implication” should be read not in the sense of 
a possible logical inference from a given fact, but rather as denoting that 
which is enfolded or hidden in something else. From this we can derive the 
following table:
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Implication Explication
Virtual Potent, yet unactualized difference/
Cause of beings/Pre-Individual
Canceled Difference/Formation of 
Quality/Sterile Being
Actual Condition/Cause of the Actual Product/Individual being without 
causal efficacy/Completion or 
end of Process
Following Simondon, Deleuze arrives at this conception of being and 
the relationship between the virtual and the actual on the grounds that 
“[i]t is notable that extensity does not account for the individuations which 
occur within it”.87 When Deleuze refers to an extensity, he is referring to an 
entity with qualities situated in time and space. Returning to the example 
of my blue coffee mug, simply by examining my coffee mug here and now, I 
cannot determine how it came to have the shape it has, the color that it has, 
why it is sitting here on my desk, etc.
Deleuze's suggestion is thus that because extensity does not account 
for the individuations that occur within it (the qualities and structure that 
make it this individual), we must refer to another dimension, the implicit, 
the virtual, to account for these individuations. Furthermore, since the 
extensive consists of individual or individuated entities, Deleuze concludes 
that this supplementary dimension must be pre-individual. As Deleuze 
remarks, “[t]he individuating is not the simple individual”.88 However, in 
making this move, Deleuze renders the motivating grounds of individuation 
thoroughly mysterious. If the virtual is, as Deleuze suggests, a continuum 
and a whole populated by potent yet unactualized differences, and if the 
actual is merely a secretion or excresence of the virtual, what is it that leads 
the virtual to ever ex-plicate itself, to unfold itself, or to leave itself and 
fall into the sterile, actual individual? Difference comes from the domain 
of the virtual, not the actual, for the actual is precisely that domain where 
difference is canceled. Here, then, we encounter a problem similar to the 
one that haunted Plato's theory of the forms, where we are left to wonder 
why the world of imperfect creatures ever comes into being and why the 
world of the perfect forms doesn't simply reside in tranquil and unmoving 
eternal existence.
These observations lead to a second problem. As Hallward notes in 
his controversial study, Out of This World, Deleuze's ontology essentially 
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conceives being in terms of creativity and creating. This, according to 
Hallward, leads Deleuze to distinguish between the creating and the 
creature, the individuating and the individual, with the creature and the 
individual being granted a derivative status to that of the creating and 
individuating. As Hallward puts it,
Almost every aspect of Deleuze's philosophy is caught up with 
the consequences of this initial correlation of being, creativity 
and thought. Roughly speaking, it implies: (a) that all 
existent things or processes exist in just one way, as so many 
distinct acts of creation or so many individual creatings; (b) 
that these creatings are themselves aspects of a limitless and 
consequently singular creative power, a power that is most 
adequately expressed in the medium of pure thought; (c) that 
every creating gives rise to a derivative creature or created 
thing, whose own power or creativity is limited by its material 
organisation, its situation, its actual capacities and relations 
with other creatures, and so on; (d) that the main task 
facing any such creature is to loosen and then dissolve these 
limitations in order to become a more adequate or immaterial 
vehicle for that virtual creating which alone individuates it.89
Hallward's third point here is particularly salient. In treating difference, 
the virtual, the implicit, as that which is responsible for individuation, and 
the explicate, the actual, the individual as the product of individuation, 
Deleuze inevitably grants the creature or the individual a derivative place 
within being. The individual becomes a product of being, an effect of virtual 
difference, but certainly cannot be treated as a motor of difference in the 
world. Like the trail of slime left behind in the wake of a snail or slug, the 
individual is merely the remainder or excresence of a differential process of 
individuation that has already moved on. 
What we thus get in Deleuze's thought is a sort of vertical ontology of 
the depths. Rather than entities or substances interacting with each other 
laterally or horizontally, we instead get an ontology where difference arises 
vertically from the depths of the virtual. As a consequence, the individual 
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takes on a secondary status as a mere effect of the genuine processes that all 
occur at the level of the virtual.
In a philosophically rich review of Hallward's book, John Protevi 
contends that Hallward illicitly flattens the complexity of Deleuze's 
ontology. As Protevi remarks,
The relations among actual, virtual and intensive form the 
most important issue in explicating Deleuze's ontology. I 
would argue that we should consider the intensive as an 
independent ontological register, one that mediates the virtual 
and actual, which are its limits. Even if one doesn't accept this 
and insists on a dualism of the virtual and actual, one would 
have to say that the intensive belongs with the actual.90
Protevi goes on to argue that,
Spatio-temporal dynamisms, that is, morphogenetic processes 
exhibiting intensive properties, are processes of individuation, 
of emergence from pre-individual fields. The paradigm 
cases for Deleuze are embryos and weather systems. In the 
biological register, the “field” of individuation (the gradients 
of which are laden with pre-individual singularities) is 
the egg, while the process of individuation is embryonic 
morphogenesis; in the meteorological register, the field of 
individuation is the pre-condition (the bands of different 
temperature and pressure in air and water) to the formation 
of wind currents or storms, which are the spatio-temporal 
dynamisms. [...]. Any resident of Louisiana will be able to 
locate hurricanes for you in terms of their spatio-temporal 
co-ordinates. To be fair, we do have to distinguish between 
the location of a hurricane as embedded in a geographic 
co-ordinate system—its extensive properties—and the 
thresholds proper to its intensive properties. It's only at 
certain singular points in the differential relations among air 
and water temperature and wind currents that thunderstorms, 
tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes form. 
Nonetheless, the point is that the weather system itself is the 
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intensive process by which those singularities are actualized, 
and that this intensive process operates here, in this world.91
Quite right. What Protevi doesn't seem to notice, however, is that 
this treatment of the relationship between the virtual, the actual, and 
the intensive requires a significant revision of Deleuze's ontology. In his 
reading of Deleuze's ontology, we note that Protevi perpetually refers to 
discrete and actual substances or individuals that interact with one another 
and perturb each other in a variety of ways. Far from a monistic virtual 
continuum that is then cut up into discrete entities, Protevi's parsing of 
Deleuze's ontology requires the existence of discrete substances or entities 
that interact with one another and evoke virtual powers within one another 
through these interactions. And here, in passing, we should recall Deleuze's 
constant polemics against the concept of causality. As Deleuze remarks, 
It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place 
in time not between one actual term, however small, 
and another actual term, but between the virtual and its 
actualisation—in other words, it goes from the structure to 
its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases 
of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal 
connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which 
constitute at each moment the actuality of time.92
If Deleuze is so quick to reject the notion of causality, then this is 
because causality works laterally or horizontally, from object to object, 
whereas the virtual works vertically from the implicate to the explicate. 
It is precisely this thesis that must be rejected under Protevi's account. 
If Deleuze's account of time in the relation between the virtual and the 
actual is here embraced, it is difficult to see how the actual terms evoked 
in Protevi's characterization of Deleuze's thought can have the sort of 
causal efficacy Protevi attributes to them. Rather, under Deleuze's model of 
virtual time, any causal relation between actual terms can only be apparent 
or a sort of transcendental illusion. My point here is not that Protevi is 
mistaken in his account of the relation between the virtual, the actual, and 
the intensive, but rather that Deleuze's account of virtual time, of the time 
of actualization, must be abandoned if something like Protevi's account is 
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to remain coherent. It must be possible for actual terms to causally interact 
with one another and for the actual to affect the virtual.
But if this is the case, then we can no longer say that the virtual is 
the pre-individual and the actual is the individual. The virtual is not 
something that produces the individual, but rather must strictly be a 
dimension of the individual. It is precisely the individual that precedes the 
virtual—transcendentally, not temporally—not the virtual that precedes 
the individual. If it is to be possible for substances or individuals to perturb 
each other, then being cannot consist of a whole or a continuum, but must 
instead come in discrete packets or substances. Moreover, it follows that 
the actual dimension of the entity cannot mark the erasure or cancellation 
of difference, but must instead itself be an instigator of difference in other 
entities and one of the mechanisms by which the volcanic, yet unactualized, 
powers of the virtual are released and set forth in the world. And here I 
note that when outstanding commentators on Deleuze such as Protevi 
and DeLanda set out to analyze the world, it is precisely in these terms 
that they speak. Far from treating the actual and substances as derivative, 
they instead display a profound attentiveness to the differences that 
individual substances make. Here the ontology of theoretical practice belies 
the ontology espoused when striving to describe what they're doing in 
their practice.
In an interview Deleuze once remarked that,
Philosophers introduce new concepts, they explain them, 
but they don't tell us, not completely anyway, the problems 
to which those concepts are a response. Hume, for example, 
set out a novel concept of belief, but he doesn't tell us how 
and why the problem of knowledge presents itself in such 
a way that knowledge is seen as a particular kind of belief. 
The history of philosophy, rather than repeating what a 
philosopher says, has to say what he must have taken for 
granted, what he didn't say but is nonetheless present in what 
he did say.93
It is in this way, I believe, that we should approach Deleuze's 
deployment of the concept of the virtual. In short, what is the problem to 
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which Deleuze's concept of the virtual responds? However dimly Deleuze 
might have discerned the problem himself, the problem to which the 
concept of the virtual seems to respond is that of the split in objects 
between withdrawn being and qualities, coupled with the problem of the 
bare substratum. It appears that Deleuze clearly recognized that the being 
of substance cannot be identified with its qualities and actualized structure. 
Because substance changes, because it is capable of carrying contrary 
qualities, substance, in its proper being, must differ from its qualities. 
However, if substance is to differ from its qualities, then it requires a 
form of structure that is formatted without being qualitative. Without this 
other dimension of substances, we fall into the bare substratum problem 
discussed in the last chapter, where substances are completely blank, 
completely indifferent, and therefore, absurdly, all identical to one another. 
It is precisely this domain of being that the virtual names, for the virtual 
is structure and potency without quality. However, having dimly glimpsed 
this problem, Deleuze immediately falls into a set of errors that lead his 
account of the virtual into incoherence. Oddly, these problems seem to 
arise from conceding far too much to actualism. Having recognized that the 
domain of the actual or qualities and extensities is incapable of accounting 
for the individuality of the individual or the substantiality of substance, 
Deleuze nonetheless treats the actual as the sole domain of the individual 
or primary substance. As a consequence, he's led to characterize the 
domain of the virtual as the pre-individual, when he should instead treat the 
domain of the virtual as the domain of the individual, the substantial, or 
that which persists through change. The consequences of this decision are 
profound. By treating the domain of the virtual as the pre-individual and 
the domain of the actual as an effect of the virtual, Deleuze is left without 
an account of why the virtual actualizes itself at all (despite his impressive 
efforts to the contrary), and is led to treat the actual as a mere product, 
an excresence, that itself has no efficacy within being. What is required, by 
contrast, is an account of the virtual that treats it as a dimension of primary 
substances or discrete individuals, where substance precedes the virtual 
(transcendentally, not temporally) not the reverse, and where actual entities 
are capable of interacting with one another. It is to this account of the 
virtual that I now turn.
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3.3. Virtual Proper Being
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze remarks that “[t]he virtual is opposed 
not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is 
virtual. Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be said of the 
virtual: 'Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract'“.94 Within 
the framework of onticology, the claim that the virtual is real is the claim 
that the virtual is always the virtuality of a substance or individual being. 
Put differently, the claim that the virtual is real is not the claim that the 
virtual is a potential being, but rather the claim that the virtual is always 
the virtuality or potentiality of a being or substance. Here the genitive 
is of the utmost importance. The virtual always belongs to a substance, 
not the reverse. Moreover, the virtual is always the potential harbored or 
carried by a discrete or individual being. In this regard, we must distinguish 
between the two halves of any object, substance, or difference engine. On 
the one hand, there is the actual side of an object consisting of qualities and 
extensities, while on the other hand, there is the virtual side of substances, 
consisting of potentialities or powers. In claiming that the virtual is “ideal”, 
Deleuze is not claiming that the virtual is mental or cognitive—though 
minds too have their virtual dimension—but rather that the virtual is 
relational. These relations, however, are not relations between entities, but 
constitute the endo-structure of an object, its internal topology. Finally, 
we can claim that it is entirely possible—if not common—for actually 
existing entities to remain in a state of virtuality such that they are fully real 
and existent in the world, fully concrete, without producing any qualities 
or extensities. Only on this condition can we make sense of Bhaskar's 
claim that it is possible for generative mechanisms, difference engines, or 
substances to be real while remaining dormant such that they are out of 
phase with their qualities or events.
How, then, are we to understand this dimension of substance that is 
formatted without possessing qualities? Two features in particular render 
Deleuze's concept of the virtual particularly well suited for theorizing this 
withdrawn dimension of substance. On the one hand, Deleuze is careful 
to emphasize that the virtual shares no resemblance to the actual. “Every 
object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one 
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another”.95 If the actual is treated as embodying qualities and geometrical 
structure in the sense specified in section 3.1, then this captures the 
manner in which the virtual dimension of a substance differs from anything 
qualitative, thus providing us with substance that is structured or formatted 
without being qualitative. To illustrate this lack of resemblance between 
the virtual and actual halves of split objects, Deleuze gives the illuminating 
example of genes. “[G]enes as a system of differential relations”, of which 
virtual multiplicities are composed, “are incarnated at once in a species and 
the organic parts of which it is composed”.96 Genes, as a contributor to the 
overall form that an actualized organism embodies form a set of differential 
relations and singularities that share no resemblance to that actualized 
organism. Genes are among the conditions for the form the organism will 
take, but in no way resemble that organism. 
On the other hand, the concept of virtuality allows us to theorize the 
manner in which substances are always individual substances without 
requiring reference to other substances or beings. According to Deleuze, 
the virtual is composed of “multiplicities”. I will have more to say about 
multiplicities momentarily, but for the moment it bears noting that 
according to Deleuze, “'[m]ultiplicity', which replaces the one no less than 
the multiple, is the true substantive, substance itself”.97 Deleuze draws the 
concept of multiplicity from the differential geometry of Friedrich Gauss 
and Bernhard Riemann. As explained by Manuel DeLanda,
In the early nineteenth century, when Gauss began to tap into 
these differential resources, a curved two-dimensional surface 
was studied using the old Cartesian method: the surface 
was embedded in a three-dimensional space complete with 
its own fixed set of axes; then, using those axes, coordinates 
would be assigned to every point of the surface; finally the 
geometric link between points determining the form of the 
surface would be expressed as algebraic relations between 
the numbers. But Gauss realized that the calculus, focusing 
as it does on infinitesimal points on the surface itself (that 
is, operating entirely with local information), allowed the 
study of the surface without any reference to a global embedding 
space. Basically, Gauss developed a method to implant the 
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coordinate axes on the surface itself (that is, a method of 
'coordinatizing' the surface) and, once points had been so 
translated into numbers, to use differential (not algebraic) 
equations to characterize their relations.98
The concept of multiplicity is of great significance not for only 
mathematics, but ontology as well. For through enabling us to think the 
internal structure of a space without reference to a global embedding space, the 
concept of multiplicity also enables us to think the being of an individual 
substance independent of its relations to other substances or its exo-relations. 
It is for this reason that I refer to the virtual proper being of substance as 
consisting of endo-relations, an endo-structure, or an endo-composition. 
The point is not that all substances are spatial—when we discuss flat 
ontology we will see that this is not the case—but rather that multiplicity 
allows us to think individual substance in a purely immanent fashion 
detached from any sort of global embedding space or set of exo-relations. 
While substances can and do enter into relations with other substances, 
their being qua substance is not constituted by these exo-relations. Exo-
relations often play a crucial role in the qualities a substance comes to 
embody at the level of local manifestations, but the being of substance in its 
substantiality is something other than these exo-relations. As an additional 
consequence of this concept of multiplicity, the Kantian conception of 
space and time as containers must here be abandoned as well in favor of a 
model of space and time arising from substances.
In defining multiplicities Deleuze remarks that “the utmost importance 
must be attached to the substantive form: multiplicity must not designate a 
combination of the many and the one, but rather an organisation belonging 
to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order 
to form a system”.99 A moment later, Deleuze goes on to explain that 
multiplicities must “thus be defined as a structure”.100 If multiplicities must 
be defined as a structure or a system, then this is because the elements that 
compose them,
must in effect be determined, but reciprocally, by reciprocal 
relations which allow no independence whatsoever to subsist. 
Such relations are precisely non-localisable ideal connections, 
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whether they characterise the multiplicity globally or proceed 
by the juxtaposition of neighboring regions. In all cases 
the multiplicity is intrinsically defined, without external 
reference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would be 
submerged.101
In his drive to formulate a differential ontology or account of being 
resting on nothing but difference without reference to identity, Deleuze’s 
concept of multiplicity is pulled in two opposing directions. On the one 
hand, associating unity with identity, Deleuze wishes to deny any unity 
to multiplicities. On the other hand, in his discussions of multiplicities 
Deleuze seems ineluctably drawn to treating them as unities. With respect to 
this second tendency, we need only observe the manner in which Deleuze 
refers to multiplicities as structures where all the elements are reciprocally 
determined, such that they embody an organization. If multiplicities are 
structured or organized, if they are intrinsically “defined”, then it seems 
difficult to maintain that they lack unity. 
Rather, it appears that the very being of multiplicities consists in their 
unity. It is only on these grounds that we can refer to them as substances. 
In thinking multiplicities, Deleuze seems to be groping for the classical 
categories of totality or community. A totality is a system in which all of 
the parts depend on one another such that they are, as Deleuze puts it, 
reciprocally determined. My body, for example, is a totality. By contrast, 
a community is not so much a social entity, as a system in which all the 
parts simultaneously cause and affect one another. Thus, for example, 
every organic body is simultaneously a totality and a community insofar 
as its parts are both dependent on one another and constantly interact 
with one another. Likewise, the relation between the Earth and the moon 
is a community insofar as the moon's gravitation affects the Earth and the 
Earth's gravitation affects the moon. It is precisely this sort of structure that 
Deleuze seems to have in mind when he evokes the concept of multiplicity. 
However, while systems of this sort are certainly differentiated internally, 
they are nonetheless unities or substances.
In defining the being of the virtual or multiplicities, Deleuze argues that 
“[t]he reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations 
along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of 
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the virtual is structure”.102 If Deleuze treats the virtual or multiplicities as 
pre-individual and the actual as individual, then this is because he fails to 
adequately distinguish between the topological and the geometrical within 
substance. Concluding that the individuality of the individual resides in 
its qualities, parts, or in geometric extensity, Deleuze is forced to deny 
individuality to multiplicities. But as I argued in section 3.2, this thesis is 
untenable for a variety of reasons. Rather, while multiplicities are without 
qualities, they are nonetheless the structure or “form” that functions as the 
ground of a substance's qualitative variations. 
Here, then, we might think of Harman's discussion of Xavier Zubiri in 
Tool-Being. There Harman begins by noting that “[t]he reality of a thing 
cannot be identified with its presence”.103 Here presence can be equated 
with the actuality of a substance or thing, with the properties or qualities 
that it embodies. In contrasting the substance of a thing with its qualities 
or properties, Harman's Zubiri accords closely with Bhaskar's thesis that 
substances can be out of phase with their events or properties. Harman goes 
on to remark that “[t]he reality of a thing cannot be regarded as a substance 
endowed with properties. Instead, the thing is always a system, a system that 
unifies all of its numerous 'notes.'” 104 In treating the substantiality of a thing 
as a system of notes, Harman's Zubiri displays an exceptional proximity to 
Deleuze's conception of virtual multiplicities as composed of differential 
relations and singularities. Harman goes on to remark that,
A reality is defined as that which acts on other things by 
virtue of its notes. This term “note” is meant as a replacement 
for the word “property”, which Zubiri regards as biased 
towards reality viewed conceptively, that is, from the external 
standpoint of a relation rather than from the thing in and 
of itself. To speak of a property, he says, is to speak of the 
idiosyncrasies that distinguish one thing from another; in this 
way, the property is an extraneous feature grafted onto some 
underlying substrate, and always viewed from the outside 
rather than from within. As opposed to properties, the notes 
of a thing make up even the most intimate parts of that thing: 
“matter, its structure, its chemical composition, its psychic 
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'faculties', etc”. Instead of qualities belonging to a substance, 
Zubiri's notes are the reality of the thing itself.105
Like Zubiri's notes, Deleuze's singularities are the most intimate reality 
of a thing, defining and structuring its being. However, unlike Zubiri's 
notes, Deleuze's singularities do not replace the concept of properties or 
qualities, but rather are evoked as the ground of properties or qualities. 
Singularities are those potencies that generate qualities or properties as 
acts on the part of the object. And if Deleuze is compelled to develop 
the concept of singularity to account for the being of objects, then this 
is precisely because the properties of objects or substances are variable 
and changing, yet a substance still—within certain limits—remains that 
substance. What is thus required is a ground that is plastic, that can vary, 
while retaining its identity. It is precisely this requirement that the concept 
of multiplicity satisfies.
Unfortunately, Deleuze tells us very little as to just what these 
singularities are. We know that we need them, that substances must possess 
singularities, but insofar as these singularities are not themselves qualities, 
we don't know what they are. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze defines 
singularities as “the point of departure for a series which extends over all 
the ordinary points of the system, as far as the region of another singularity 
which gives rise to another series which may either converge or diverge 
from the first”.106 Unfortunately, this definition isn't very helpful. What 
are the ordinary points? What are the singular points? What are the series 
in question? Perhaps some light is shed on this issue if we return to the 
concept of topology. 
It will be recalled that topology is a sort of dynamic geometry that 
studies the invariant features of an object that remain the same under 
homeomorphic deformations through operations of bending, stretching, 
folding and so on. Thus, for example, within the framework of Euclidean 
geometry, a triangle and a quadrilateral are completely distinct, whereas 
in topology quadrilaterals and triangles are equivalent to one another. If 
this is the case, then it is because triangles, through operations of folding, 
stretching, and bending can be transformed into quadrilaterals and vice 
versa. To transform a triangle into a quadrilateral, simply take one of its 
vertices and fold it over. In this regard, singularities occupy a paradoxical 
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place within topology. Clearly singularities must simultaneously define 
the series of ordinary points and mark the threshold at which new forms 
emerge. On the one hand, the singularities of a topological space cannot 
be, for example, the vertices of the triangle. Were this the case, then the 
triangle and the quadrilateral would not be structurally equivalent. Rather, 
the vertices of the triangle and the quadrilateral must define ordinary points 
within a topological space of singularities. And here it bears noting that 
the singularities of a topological space themselves never appear or manifest 
themselves. What manifests itself are the ordinary points, the Euclidean 
geometry, of each individual figure. The singularities serving as the ground 
of these figures can only be inferred. They are never directly given but are 
perpetually withdrawn. There is no shape that embodies the singularities 
of the topological space, nor does the corresponding geometrical space 
ever resemble the topological space. On the other hand, singularities define 
thresholds between different topological spaces. For example, if I take a 
strip of paper and fasten its two ends or twist it and then fasten its two 
ends, I am now in two new topological spaces with their own variety of 
possible mutations.
Now, in evoking topology in the context of onticology's ontological 
concerns, it is important to exercise caution. First, topology is concerned 
specifically and exclusively with spatial relations, whereas ontology is 
concerned with entities and qualities of all kinds. Second, topology is 
concerned with homeomorphisms or structural identities across a variety of 
distinct entities, whereas here I am trying to account for the substantiality 
of individual entities. Consequently, parallels between topology and 
multiplicities diverge in important respects. The lesson to be drawn from 
topology is that there are variations that are nonetheless structure- or 
system-preserving. As Deleuze puts it, “[e]very phenomenon refers to an 
inequality by which it is conditioned. Every diversity and every change 
refers to a difference which is its sufficient reason”.107 Phenomena here 
should be understood in the sense of “local manifestation”, whereas 
inequality or difference should be understood in terms of the singularities 
or notes belonging to a multiplicity as the condition or ground for the 
production of qualities.
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In Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Manuel DeLanda proposes 
to treat Deleuze's singularities as attractors. With a few qualifications 
and conceptual modifications, this is the interpretation of Deleuze's 
singularities that I would like to defend. However, before proceeding to 
discuss attractors, it is first necessary to distinguish the position I am 
developing here from DeLanda's position. In Intensive Science and Virtual 
Philosophy, DeLanda argues that Deleuze's concept of multiplicities is 
designed to replace the old philosophical concepts of essences, and that 
things, substances, or objects are to be explained in terms of how they 
are produced, rather than in terms of their essence. As DeLanda puts it, 
“[i]n a Deleuzian ontology [...] a species (or any other natural kind) is not 
defined by its essential traits but rather by the morphogenetic process that gave 
rise to it”.108
Clearly onticology, and object-oriented philosophy more broadly 
construed, rejects this thesis. In section 3.2, we already saw that DeLanda 
endorses the Deleuzian thesis that the virtual is composed of a monistic 
continuum of singularities that is then cut up into discrete entities with 
qualities. There I argued that this position is incoherent and that the virtual 
must instead be strictly conceived as a part of discrete entities such that 
each object has its own virtual dimension. Likewise, the thesis that an entity 
is defined by the morphogentic process by which it came to be conflates two 
distinct issues. While many entities must certainly come to be, it does not 
follow from this that the being of entities can be defined by the process by 
which they came to be. Were this the case, then we would reduce entities 
to their history. However, as every parent knows, while they were certainly 
the efficient cause of their child coming to be, the child has a being 
independent of this morphogenetic process by which it came to be. The 
being of a being cannot be reduced to its efficient cause, but also has its 
formal or structural cause.
Moreover, DeLanda seems to be at odds with his own thesis, for later, 
in the same text, he proposes a flat ontology that would be “one made 
exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spatio-temporal 
scale but not in ontological status”.109 In formulating his ontology as a 
flat ontology, DeLanda's thesis seems to work against his prior claim that 
the being of beings is to be conceived in terms of their morphogenetic 
Chapter 3: Virtual Proper Being 113
processes. For here it seems that DeLanda takes the Aristotlean route of 
treating individual substances as what are primary. As Aristotle puts it, 
“anything which is produced is produced by something [...], and from 
something”.110 In other words, individual substances are produced by 
and through other individual substances. As a consequence, individual 
substances necessarily precede processes of production and are the 
condition of production. The point, then, is not that we shouldn't examine 
processes of production. We should. Rather, the point is that substance 
ontologically precedes production.
In Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, DeLanda remarks that 
“[s]ingularities [...] influence the behaviour [of objects] by acting as 
attractors for [their] trajectories”.111 Here it is crucial to note that the 
concept of attractors is not a teleological concept. Attractors are not goals 
towards which a substance tends, but are rather the potentialities towards 
which a substance tends under a variety of different conditions in the 
actualization of its qualities. As DeLanda goes on to say, “singularities are 
[...] the inherent or intrinsic [...] tendencies of a system, the states which the 
system will spontaneously tend to adopt [...] as long as it is not constrained 
by other forces”.112 In this respect, DeLanda's attractors are extremely close 
to Bhaskar's generative mechanisms developed in A Realist Theory of Science.
However, in contrast to DeLanda—though I believe his analysis already 
suggests this distinction—I want to argue that attractors are not states of 
an object or substance, but rather are what in substances preside over 
the genesis of actualized states or local manifestations. In this respect, 
the attractors of a substance constitute what Harman, following Zubiri, 
refers to as the notes or the most intimate reality of the object. They are 
the generative mechanisms within an object that preside over the events 
or qualities of which the object is capable. However, while serving as the 
condition of these events or qualities, these attractors are not themselves 
qualitative or events. As DeLanda puts it, “attractors are never actualized, 
since no point of a trajectory [of an object] ever reaches the attractor 
itself”.113 As such, the attractors or singularities inhabiting the endo-
structure of an object are radically withdrawn. They are that which serves 
as the condition for the actual dimension of an object, for the local 
manifestations of an object, but are never themselves found on the actual 
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side of an object. For this reason, DeLanda contends that we must “make 
[...] a sharp ontological distinction between the trajectories as they appear in 
the phase portrait of a system, on the one hand, and the vector field, on the 
other”.114 The phase portrait or phase space of an object is the variety of 
states an object occupies at the level of its actualized qualities or properties, 
while the vector field consists of the attractors that preside over the genesis 
of these qualities. Thus, for example, the phase space of the coffee mug 
would be, among other things, the variety of different colors it actualizes, 
whereas the attractor would be that singularity that functions as the genetic 
conditions for all of these different colors. It is the attractor that persists 
throughout these variations or transformations.
The claim that objects are split-objects is the claim that they are split 
between their virtual proper being and their local manifestations. The 
virtual proper being of an object is its endo-structure, the manner in which 
it embodies differential relations and attractors or singularities defining a 
vector field or field of potentials within a substance. The local manifestation 
of a substance is the actualization of a point within the phase space of this 
vector field in the form of actualized qualities. If it is crucial to distinguish 
between virtual proper being and local manifestation, then this is because 
the qualities of an object can undergo variations while still remaining the 
object that it is. It is a vague recognition of this capacity within substances 
that leads Aristotle to distinguish between substance and its qualities. 
However, if we are to avoid falling into Locke's bare substratum problem 
while maintaining the distinction between substance and its qualities, it 
is necessary to articulate the way in which substance can be structured 
without possessing qualities. It is precisely this problem that the concept of 
virtual proper being resolves. Yet, above all, the distinction between virtual 
proper being and local manifestation teaches us that objects are plastic. As 
a function of the exo-relations objects enter into with other objects, the 
attractors defining the virtual space of a substance can be activated in a 
variety of different ways, actualizing objects in a variety of different ways 
at the level of local manifestations. It is for this reason that the confusion 
of objects with their actualization in local manifestations always spells 
theoretical disaster, for in doing so we foreclose the volcanic potentials 
harbored in the depths of objects.
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3.4. The Problem With Rabbits and Hats
In Prince of Networks, Harman, following Latour, levels a trenchant critique 
against the concepts of potentiality and virtuality that are at the core of my 
concept of split-objects. By responding to this critique, I hope to render 
the concept of virtual proper being a bit more concrete and bring out some 
of its important consequences. In Irreductions, Latour remarks that “[t]he 
origin of potency lies in this confusion: it is no longer possible to distinguish 
an actor from the allies which make it strong”.115 As Latour goes on to remark, 
“[t]alk of possibilities is the illusion of actors that move while forgetting the 
cost of transport”.116 Perhaps one way of articulating this critique would be 
to say that you can't pull a rabbit out of a hat without first putting it in the 
hat. The problem with the concept of potentiality under this model is that 
it treats the rabbit as if it were already in the hat, without accounting for the 
work it takes to put the rabbit in the hat.
This seems to be precisely the sense in which Harman takes Latour's 
critique. As Harman argues, “[t]o speak of something existing in potentia 
implies that it is already there but simply covered or suppressed. This 
is what Latour denies. For him, a thing is only here once it is here, not 
sooner”.117 Illustrating this point, Harman remarks that “[f]or Latour a 
person does not stand up by drawing on an inner reservoir of potency, 
but through a series of mediations—nervous excitations acting on 
muscles, which then shift the body's weight onto a hard, unyielding floor. 
Numerous allies are brought into play even in the simplest movements of 
our bodies”.118 What Latour wishes to capture are all the translations an 
actant or object must go through in order to engage in even the simplest of 
motions such as standing up. In this regard, the problem with the concept 
of potentiality is that it treats these powers as already residing in the being 
of the substance, thereby leading us to ignore these myriad translations 
necessary for an action to take place. We say, for example, that the prince 
has power even when he doesn't exercise it, thereby ignoring all the work 
that goes into keeping soldiers in line, maintaining a legal system, forming 
stable alliances with other nobles, dealing with peasant uprisings, and so on. 
Or, similarly, we say that the acorn contains an oak tree within it, such that 
it is already there only waiting to come out.
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In response to Harman-Latour's critique of potentiality, there are a 
couple of points worth making. First, while Harman and Latour's points 
about translation and work are well taken, this critique seems to miss the 
point that substances must be susceptible to these translations. Returning 
to Harman's remarks about standing up, I readily grant that nerves must 
be excited so that muscles must be activated so that feet can press against 
a hard floor, and so on. However, in order for nerves to be excited, nerves 
must be capable of being excited. When Harman and Latour argue that 
only the actual exists, are they arguing that the excited nerves are an entirely 
new entity, or are they claiming that this entity merely changes its states? If 
they are making the claim that the excited nerves are an entirely new entity, 
then they seem committed to the rather odd thesis that entities are popping 
into existence ex nihilo. As a consequence of his principle of irreduction 
and commitment to Whitehead's ontology, it seems that this is precisely the 
thesis that Latour advocates. Within the Whiteheadian framework, every 
actual occasion (entity) is an instantaneous entity that is fully complete in 
its being. As Steven Shaviro puts it,
each occasion, taken in itself, is a quantum: a discrete, 
indivisible unit of becoming. But this also means that 
occasions are strictly limited in scope. Once an occasion 
happens, it is already over, already dead. Once it has reached 
its final “satisfaction”, it no longer has any vital power. “An 
actual occasion [...] never changes”, Whitehead says; “it only 
becomes and perishes.119
What we get with Whitehead is a sort of radical actualism where every 
change implies an entirely new entity. Yet if this is the case, it is difficult to 
see how we can get from one entity to another entity. Rather, it seems that 
entities must possess the capacity, the potentiality, to undergo change.
In this regard, another way of understanding the concept of virtual 
singularities or attractors is in terms of Spinoza's concept of affect. As 
Spinoza writes in the Ethics, “By [affect] I understand the affections of 
the body by which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished, 
assisted or checked”.120 What makes Spinoza's concept of affect so 
interesting is that it doesn't restrict affect to what is felt, but links the 
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concept of affect to the capacities of an object. And here, if I refer to the 
capacities of an object, then this is because for Spinoza all entities, whether 
human, animal, or inanimate possess what Spinoza calls affects. And these 
affects consist of both an entity's “receptivity” to other entities and the 
various capacities an entity has to act. Unless we are to fall into an atomism 
where there is an insurmountable gulf between entities, it seems that we 
must attribute to objects affects in Spinoza's sense. Those nerves must have 
the capacity of being excited or stimulated.
In discussion with me surrounding these issues, Harman remarks that, 
“[c]ontra what Bryant implies [...] however, I don’t think that the acorn 
already has oak-qualities. I think it has acorn-qualities”.121 However, 
this is precisely what I don't claim. To suggest that the acorn has oak-
qualities would be to conflate qualities with substance. But as I argued in 
section 3.3, the virtual proper being of an object cannot be equated with 
anything qualitative. Virtual proper being is radically other than qualities. 
Moreover, it cannot be said that the acorn already contains the oak tree. 
What the acorn contains are acorn powers or attractors, and while these 
powers or attractors are entirely determinate, their actualization is a purely 
creative process producing new qualities and eventually a new object. 
In this respect, Harman and I are very close, for like Harman I advocate 
the thesis that the acorn does not contain oak-tree qualities, but is fully 
determinate at its virtual level as an acorn. The virtual dimension of objects 
is concrete without being actual. In this regard, Harman and Latour seem to 
conflate the virtual with the possible.
It is precisely this conflation of the potential with the possible that 
Deleuze seeks to avoid with his account of the virtual. As Deleuze cautions,
The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be 
confused with the possible. The possible is opposed to the 
real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a 
'realisation'. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; 
it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is 
that of actualization.122
Deleuze criticizes the concept of the possible for reasons similar to 
those Latour levels against the potential. In short, he criticizes the concept 
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of the possible for treating the rabbit as if it were already in the hat. As 
Deleuze argues,
Every time we pose the question in terms of the possible 
and real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute 
eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind 
our backs and as subject to a law of all or nothing. What 
difference can there be between the existent and the non-
existent if the non-existent is already possible, already 
included in the concept and having all the characteristics that 
the concept confers upon it as a possibility. Existence is the 
same as the possible but outside the concept.123
Between the possible oak tree and the actual oak tree there is absolutely 
no difference beyond the brute fact of existence. If, then, we conflate 
the potentiality of the acorn with the possibility of the oak-tree, we are 
making the claim that the acorn already contains the oak tree, but in a 
potential state. 
Alternatively, “[t]he actualization of the virtual, on the contrary, always 
takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation [...]. Actual terms 
never resemble the singularities they incarnate”.124 In contrast to a process 
of realization or a movement from the possible to the real, the process 
of actualization is a creative process within substances that requires work. 
Moreover, the local manifestation produced in the process of actualization 
is something new and shares no resemblance to the singularities which it 
actualizes. To illustrate this point, let's return to the vexed example of the 
acorn. The virtuality of the acorn is not the oak tree, but rather is the notes 
of its being. The singularities that characterize its concrete existence are 
folded deep within that existence and withdrawn from the world. When the 
acorn enters into exo-relations with other entities, these singularities will be 
activated in a variety of ways depending on the exo-relations it entertains 
with other entities. If the soil is too damp and the temperature doesn't get 
warm enough, the acorn rots. If the temperature is right and there is a 
requisite amount of water in the soil, the acorn begins to germinate. But 
now, as the acorn germinates, it encounters other entities in the field of its 
exo-relations. There are, for example, all sorts of other plants growing in 
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the region of the acorn with which the acorn's own roots must compete. 
As a consequence of this, the seedling becomes weak and anemic or strong 
and thriving. The region in which the acorn grows is perhaps particularly 
windy, with sheets of wind buffeting the plain where the seedling grows 
from a predominantly westerly direction. When we come across the oak tree 
decades later, we notice that it is bent and knotted in an easterly direction 
like a carefully pruned bonsai tree. It is as if the oak tree has become 
petrified wind.
The point here is that the singularities or attractors belonging to the 
acorn do not contain the oak tree in advance. Rather, the acorn negotiates a 
milieu of exo-relations to other entities in producing its local manifestations 
or qualities. The attractors that preside over this process are radically 
non-qualitative. Here I find myself inclined to embrace Latour's thesis that 
“[w]hatever resists trials is real”.125 The problem with Latour's formulation 
is that it is purely negative and relational. In situating the endo-structure of 
an entity in terms of resistance, Latour emphasizes what occurs when an 
entity enters into exo-relations with other entities. This confuses epistemic 
criteria through which we or other entities recognize another entity as real, 
with what constitutes the reality of the entity regardless of whether anyone 
or anything knows it. In this regard, he thinks the being of an entity from 
the perspective of other entities encountering that entity. The wind, itself 
composed of many entities, encounters the seedling and must move around 
it. The seedling resists the wind. It is by virtue of its singularities, its endo-
structure, that the seedling is able to resist the wind, but these singularities 
aren't the resistance. Rather, the singularities would be there in the seedling 
regardless of whether or not anything interacted with them.
From these observations, a number of distinctions follow. On the 
one hand, we must distinguish between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
qualities or local manifestations. Symmetrical qualities are qualities that can 
repeatedly snap in and out of existence. For example, the various shades 
of color the coffee mug manifests are symmetrical qualities in that, barring 
a transformation of the endo-structure of the coffee mug, these qualities 
can come in and out of existence. Turn off the lights and the mug becomes 
black. Turn on the light and the mug returns to that particular shade 
of blue. Asymmetrical qualities, by contrast, are irreversible qualitative 
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transformations that take place within an object. These are qualitative 
transformations that can be produced by either the object itself, or through 
exo-relations to other objects. Thus, for example, the bent figure of the 
tree is an asymmetrical quality produced by the tree's exo-relations to the 
wind and perhaps other plants in its vicinity it competes with for sunlight. 
The key point not to be missed with asymmetrical qualities is that they are 
irreversible. Asymmetrical transformations cut off other possibilities within 
the vector field of a substance's attractors.
On the other hand, we must distinguish between exo-qualities and 
endo-qualities. Exo-qualities are qualities that can only exist in and 
through a set of exo-relations to other objects. Color, for example, seems 
to be a quality of this sort. Color is an event that only takes place through 
a network of exo-relations between the molecular endo-composition of 
the object, particular wavelengths of light, and a particular neurological 
structure in an organism. Take any of these elements away and color puffs 
out of existence. As such, color, as an exo-quality, is a genuine creation of 
these three agencies being woven together. It is not the cup that is colored, 
but rather the entanglement of these agencies that produces color as an 
event. The cup merely has the power to contribute to the production of 
this exo-quality. Endo-qualities, by contrast, are qualities that really are in 
the object. However, endo-qualities, as local manifestations of a substance, 
come about in two ways. First, endo-qualities are local manifestations that 
can come about through the internal dynamisms of an object independent 
of any other objects. Here the object need not be perturbed by another 
object for the endo-quality to be produced. Second, endo-qualities can 
come about through exo-relations to other objects, where these exo-
relations irreversibly transform the local manifestation of the object. All 
asymmetrical qualities are of this sort. These events also harbor the power 
of transforming the endo-structure of objects, leading to the genesis of new 
singularities, powers, attractors, or vector fields in the virtual proper being 
of an object.
The great error to be avoided lies in conceiving the virtual or potential 
in teleological terms, or in believing that the entity could be captured or 
fully grasped by summing up all possible points of view on the object. 
The relation between virtual proper being and local manifestation is not a 
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teleological relation or a relation between an agency and a goal. Throughout 
the last three chapters, I have attempted to argue that objects can be fully 
concrete without locally manifesting themselves or actualizing themselves 
in qualities. Another way of putting this is to say that local manifestation is 
not the fulfillment of objects. Local manifestation is something that objects 
can do, but an object that does not locally manifest itself is not lacking in 
some way, nor is it somehow incomplete. Nor is it the case that we would 
encounter the complete being of a substance if only we could see it from 
everywhere at once. Where the local manifestations of a substance are 
concerned, these manifestations are, in principle, infinite. There is no limit 
to the number of local manifestations that an object can actualize, precisely 
because there is no limit to the exo-relations an object can enter into and 
the exo-relations it can consequently produce. Yet even if God exists and is 
capable of perceiving an infinity of local manifestations, the being of objects 
is nonetheless radically withdrawn even from God for the subterranean 
dimension of substance, its virtual proper being, is in excess of any of its 
local manifestations. The virtual proper being of objects consists not of 
qualities, but of powers and these powers are never exhausted by local 
manifestations. In this regard, there is never a complete mapping of any 
phase space, but rather only ever a limited mapping of a phase space 
dependent on the exo-relations into which the object has been placed. 
Here I see no reason to follow Bhaskar in privileging closed systems 
over open systems. Bhaskar's thesis seems to be that the events we witness 
when a substance is placed in the closed system of an experimental setting 
constitute the true being of an object. Here, I believe, Bhaskar betrays 
his fundamental insight: that substances can be out of phase with the 
qualities or events of which they are capable, and that there is therefore a 
fundamental difference between substance and qualities. All that takes place 
in the closed system of an experimental environment is the situating of an 
object within a particular set of exo-relations such that particular events 
take place. Nothing about this suggests that the substance thus situated is 
exhausted by this setting or that we have been brought before the true being 
of the object. That being is always withdrawn and in excess of any of its 
manifestations. As every cook knows, when placed in other exo-relations 
other local manifestations take place. 
122 Levi R. Bryant
As I reflect on Harman's vigorous critique of potentiality, it seems to me 
that the real motivating desire behind this critique is the desire to preserve 
the concreteness of objects. As Harman writes,
The recourse to potentiality is a dodge that leaves actuality 
undetermined and finally uninteresting; it reduces what is 
currently actual to the transient costume of an emergent 
process across time, and makes the real work happen outside 
actuality itself. The same holds true if we replace 'the 
potential' with 'the virtual', not withstanding their differences. 
In both cases, concrete actors themselves are deemed 
insufficient for the labour of the world and are indentured to 
hidden overlords: whether they be potential, virtual, veiled, 
topological, fluxional, or any adjective that tries to escape 
from what is actually here right now.126
However, if what Harman says here is true, I fail to see how it is possible 
for an object to change while remaining the same substance. Rather, this 
thesis seems to lead us to the punctualistic atomism of Whitehead's actual 
occasions, where each change constitutes an absolutely new entity. Here, 
perhaps, we should distinguish between the concrete, the actual, and the 
virtual. Harman appears to treat the concrete and the actual as synonyms 
of one another. Yet if we treat the concrete and the actual as synonyms of 
one another, then we're forced to go the route of Whitehead and treat every 
change in an actual entity as an absolutely new entity. With each stroke 
of the keyboard, with each movement of my finger, with each beat of my 
heart, I am, under this model, not the same entity now writing this essay, 
but rather am an absolutely new and distinct entity. This seems like a high 
ontological price to pay for preserving the concrete and seems to lead to the 
thesis that entities are created ex nihilo precisely because no entity contains 
potentials by which a new entity could be produced.
It is far better, in light of these concerns, to distinguish between the 
concrete, the actual, and the virtual. Within this framework, all entities are 
absolutely concrete, but have virtual and actual dimensions. The virtual 
is not the possible, nor is it an entity or substance that doesn't yet exist. 
Rather the virtual is a fully concrete, real, and existing dimension of objects. 
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Nor does it indenture objects to hidden overlords, rendering actuality 
irrelevant. This would only hold if the true being of objects were their 
virtual dimension, but as we have seen, the virtual is but a dimension of 
objects and actuality plays a key role in objects; not the least of which lies 
in unleashing potentials within objects when they enter into exo-relations. 
Here, in many respects, I sense that my position and Harman's are much 
closer than might initially be suggested. In Guerilla Metaphysics, Harman 
remarks that “[a]n object may drift into events and unleash its forces 
there, but no such event is capable of putting the object fully into play”.127 
Without the dimension of potentiality or virtuality, it's difficult to see how it 
would be possible for objects to unleash their forces in this way. In his most 
recent work, Harman distinguishes between real objects and real qualities, 
and sensuous objects and sensuous qualities. Real objects and qualities refer 
to objects and qualities withdrawn from all relation to other objects, while 
sensuous objects and qualities refer to how one object encounters another 
object. Between Harman’s real objects and sensuous objects, I sense more 
than a passing resemblance between my virtual proper being and local 
manifestations.
3.5. Žižek's Objecting Objects
Characterizing objects as split-objects onticology naturally invites 
comparison with Žižek's conception of objects as developed in his ontology. 
In concluding this chapter, I will discuss both where onticology is in 
agreement with Žižek and where it diverges from his thought. In The 
Parallax View, Žižek remarks that,
Many times I am asked the obvious yet pertinent question 
about the title of my longest book (the present one excepted): 
“So who or what is tickling the ticklish subject?” The answer, 
of course, is: the object—however, which object? This, in a 
nutshell (or, rather, like a nut within the shell), is the topic of 
this book. The difference between subject and object can also 
be expressed as the difference between the two corresponding 
verbs, to subject (submit) oneself to object (protest, oppose, 
create an obstacle). The subject's elementary, founding, 
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gesture is to subject itself—voluntarily, of course: as both 
Wagner and Nietzsche, those two great opponents, were well 
aware, the highest act of freedom is the display of amor fati, 
the act of freely assuming what is necessary anyway. If, then, 
the subject's activity is, at its most fundamental, the activity 
of submitting oneself to the inevitable, the fundamental mode 
of the object's passivity, of its passive presence, is that which 
moves, annoys, disturbs, traumatizes us (subjects): at its most 
radical the object is that which objects, that which disturbs the 
smooth running of things. Thus the paradox is that the roles 
are reversed (in terms of the standard notion of the active 
subject working on the passive object: the subject is defined 
by a fundamental passivity, and it is the object from which 
movement comes—which does the tickling. But, again, what 
object is this? The answer is the parallax object.128
The parallax object of which Žižek here speaks is “the apparent 
displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background), 
caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line 
of sight”.129
The concept of the parallax summarizes a long line of development in 
Žižek's thought revolving around the non-identity of the One with itself. As 
Žižek remarks elsewhere, “[t]he Hegelian Twosome, rather designates a split 
which cleaves the One from within, not into two parts: the ultimate split 
is not between two halves, but between Something and Nothing, between 
the One and the void of its Place”.130 As a consequence, “the Real is the 
'almost nothing' which sustains the gap that separates a thing from itself”.131 
With respect to the ontology of objects, Žižek's concept of the parallax 
functions to surmount the Kantian opposition between the thing-in-itself 
and phenomena or between reality and appearance. 
It will be recalled that one of Kant's central claims is that we only ever 
have access to phenomena (appearances) and never things-as-they-are-in-
themselves (reality). As a consequence, in the best case scenario, we are 
unable to determine whether reality or things-in-themselves are anything 
like they appear to us, while in the worst case scenario it is possible that 
reality or things-in-themselves are entirely different from how they appear 
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to us. The Hegelian gesture for overcoming this duality advocated by 
Žižek lies not in showing how we can overcome appearances, but rather 
in arguing that this split between phenomena or appearances and things-
in-themselves arises from within appearance itself.132 In other words, the 
split between reality and appearance is a sort of illusion of perspective. As 
Žižek remarks,
[A]ppearance implies that there is something behind it 
which appears through it; it conceals a truth and by the same 
gesture gives a foreboding thereof; it simultaneously hides and 
reveals the essence behind the curtain. But what is hidden 
behind the phenomenal appearance? Precisely the fact that 
there is nothing to hide. What is concealed is that the very act 
of concealing conceals nothing.133
In short, the parallax that Žižek effects with respect to the relation 
between appearance and reality is not to show us how we can get beyond 
appearances to reach or touch reality, but lies rather in showing how this 
apparent gap between appearance and reality lies, in fact, on the side of 
appearance itself. Not only is appearance internally split, but this split is itself 
an appearance, a sort of optical illusion. If, then, this constitutes a parallactic 
shift, then this is because where, in the first figure of subjectivity, we 
experience ourselves as trapped within appearances, unable to touch reality, 
we now see this as an illusion qua illusion. Put differently, we come to see 
that appearances themselves are structured in such a way as to produce 
this very illusion. It is for this reason that we can say, in Žižek's sense, that 
objects are split. And as a consequence, reality is not something beyond or 
behind appearances, but is rather appearance itself.
But why do objects or phenomena produce this sort of illusion whereby 
phenomena appear to be manifestations of an inaccessible reality? Žižek's 
answer is that this effect arises from the split in the object embodied in the 
relation between the object and the void of its place. As Žižek remarks, the 
identity of an entity with itself equals the coincidence of this 
entity with the empty place of its “inscription”. We come 
across identity when predicates fail. Identity is the surplus 
which cannot be captured by predicates—more precisely (and 
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this precision is crucial if we want to avoid a misconception of 
Hegel), identity-with-itself is nothing but this impossibility of 
predicates, nothing but this confrontation of an entity with the 
void at the point where we expect a predicate, a determination 
of its positive content (“law is…”.). Identity-with-itself is thus 
another name for absolute (self-referential) negativity, for the 
negative relationship towards all predicates that define one's—
what?—identity.134
Because entity, according to Žižek, is this non-identical identity divided 
between the object and the empty place of its inscription, it creates a 
“reality effect” in the object such that the object simultaneously appears to 
be an appearance through predicates and the expression of an unreachable 
reality in excess of this appearance. As Žižek argues elsewhere, 
[objet] a, qua semblance deceives in a Lacanian way: not 
because it is a deceitful substitute of the Real, but precisely 
because it invokes the impression of some substantial Real 
behind it; it deceives by posing as a shadow of the underlying 
Real. And the same goes for Kant: what Kant fails to notice is 
that das Ding is a mirage invoked by the transcendental object. 
Limitation precedes transcendence: all that “actually exists” is 
the field of phenomena and its limitation, whereas das Ding is 
nothing but a phantasm which, subsequently, fills out the void 
of the transcendental object.135
And, as Žižek will go on to remark a moment later,
What we experience as “reality” discloses itself against the 
background of the lack, of the absence of it, of the Thing, 
of the mythical object whose encounter would bring about 
the full satisfaction of the drive. This lack of the Thing 
constitutive of “reality” is therefore, in its fundamental 
dimension, not epistemological, but rather pertains to the 
paradoxical logic of desire—the paradox being that this Thing 
is retroactively produced by the very process of symbolization, 
i.e, that it emerges from the very gesture of its loss. In other 
(Hegel's) words, there is nothing—no positive substantial 
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entity—behind the phenomenal curtain, only the gaze whose 
phantasmagorias assume different shapes of the Thing.136
The key point not to be missed is precisely that the “reality effect” is a 
result of inscription in the symbolic. Everywhere Žižek is careful to remark 
that the fundamental opposition is not between a signifier and an opposing 
signifier such as the opposition between wet and dry, but rather that the 
fundamental opposition, the founding opposition, is between a signifier 
and its place of inscription.137 However, insofar as a signifier simultaneously 
embodies itself and the emptiness of its place of inscription, it is always 
non-identical to itself in its identity, thereby suggesting an excessive being 
beyond itself. Yet this excessive being or reality is something that can never 
be reached precisely because it is a radically void or empty place. In other 
words, this being, this transcendence, is an “optical illusion”.
The fundamental point is that it is not a domain distinct from the 
symbolic, but rather is a peculiar twist in the symbolic. As Žižek explains,
the bar which separates [the symbolic and the real] is strictly 
internal to the Symbolic, since it prevents the Symbolic from 
“becoming itself”. The problem for the signifier is not 
its impossibility to touch the real but its impossibility to 
“attain itself”—what the signifier lacks is not the extra-
linguistic object but the Signifier itself, a non-barred, non-
hindered One.138
In short, the real is not something other than the symbolic, but rather 
is a sort of effect of the symbolic resulting from the difference that haunts 
every signifier by virtue of the split between the signifier and its place of 
inscription. Because the signifier always embodies this difference between 
itself and its place of inscription, the signifier always and everywhere 
necessarily fails to attain identity with itself. However, this very failure 
to attain identity with itself is precisely the very essence of its identity. As 
Hegel playfully remarks in the Science of Logic, if A were identical with itself, 
why would I need to repeat it? The repetition of an identity in a tautology 
like “A = A” actually marks the difference or non-identity of A with itself. 
Along these lines, Žižek will compare the shift from viewing the real as a 
prediscursive reality that is then “chopped” up by mind to viewing the real 
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as an effect of the symbolic, to the shift from special to general relativity in 
Einstein's theory of gravity. 
And is not the shift from purification to subtraction also the 
shift from Kant to Hegel? From tension between phenomena 
and Thing to an inconsistency/gap between phenomena 
themselves? The standard notion of reality is that of a 
hard kernel that resists the conceptual grasp—what Hegel 
does is simply to take this notion of reality more literally: 
nonconceptual reality is something that emerges when 
notional self- development gets caught in an inconsistency 
and becomes nontransparent to itself. In short, the limit 
is transposed from exterior to interior: there is Reality 
because and insofar as the Notion is inconsistent, doesn't 
coincide with itself. The multiple perspectival inconsistencies 
between phenomena are not an effect of the impact of 
the transcendent Thing—on the contrary, this Thing is 
nothing but the ontologization of the inconsistency between 
phenomena. The logic of this reversal is ultimately the 
same as the passage from the special to the general theory 
of relativity in Einstein. While the special theory already 
introduces the notion of curved space, it conceives of this 
curvature as the effect of matter: it is the presence of matter 
that curves space—that is to say, only empty space would 
be noncurved. With the passage to the general theory, the 
causality is reversed: far from causing the curvature of space, 
matter is its effect. In the same way, the Lacanian Real—the 
Thing—is not so much the inert presence that “curves” the 
symbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), 
but, rather, the effect of these gaps and inconsistencies.139
And to complete Žižek's sentence, we can say that the gaps and 
inconsistencies in the symbolic produce these effects of the real. The shift 
from the “special theory of the Lacanian Real” to the “general theory of 
the Lacanian real” is thus a shift from viewing the real as a prediscursive 
reality that is subsequently formatted by the symbolic and that perpetually 
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perturbs the symbolic, to a theory of the real as an effect of the symbolic 
or deadlocks of formalization within the symbolic such that any reference 
to a prediscursive real is mythological or a sort of optical illusion. As a 
consequence, any defense of pre-discursive reality becomes the height of 
dogmatic thought.
Returning, then, to the quotation with which I began this section, why is 
it that the real or the split object in Žižek's sense “tickles” the subject? If the 
real tickles or perturbs the subject, then this is because it creates the illusion 
of the Thing that the subject simultaneously lacks access to and that blocks 
its access to this Thing. This Thing is the illusion of something that would 
satiate and satisfy the subject’s unsatisfied desire.
The Real is thus the disavowed X on account of which 
our vision of reality is anamorphically distorted; it is 
simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not 
possible and the obstacle which prevents this direct access, 
the Thing which eludes our grasp and the distorting screen 
which makes us miss the thing.140
However, this Thing from which we are blocked is precisely an effect of 
the internally split nature of the object between the object and its place of 
inscription. If the object appears suggestive of a Thing, of a complete object 
beyond appearances that would satisfy our desire once and for all, then this 
is precisely because, at the level of appearances, predicates fail to capture 
the object. However, if predicates fail to capture the identity of the object, 
then this is precisely because the object is internally fissured by the void of 
its place of inscription in the signifier, suggesting a fullness through its very 
absence that can never be filled.
As a consequence, this split within the object becomes the site of social 
antagonism. “The 'Real'” is “the traumatic core of some social antagonism 
which distorts” our view of actual social organization. And, as Žižek goes 
on to remark, “the parallax Real is [...] that which accounts for the very 
multiplicity of appearances of the same underlying Real—it is not the hard 
core which persists as the Same, but the hard bone of contention which 
pulverizes the sameness into the multitude of appearances”.141 Earlier 
Žižek remarks that the Real, the parallax gap, is “that unfathomable X 
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which forever eludes the symbolic grasp, and thus causes the multiplicity 
of symbolic perspectives”.142 Insofar as the symbolic is haunted by an 
irreducible and ineradicable kernel of the Real, it becomes the site of 
social struggle as different groups strive to fill in the void that perturbs 
the symbolic.
In the preceding pages I have not done nearly enough justice to the 
complexity of Žižek's ontology and his account of the relationship between 
the subject and the object, but have only sought to outline the most relevant 
features of his account of being. In the next chapter we will see how a 
good deal of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Žižek's critique of ideology can 
be retained within the ontological framework proposed by onticology. 
However, it is clear that ontologically onticology and Žižek must diverge 
markedly from one another. The first point worth noting is that for Žižek 
the object is a pole in a relation between subject and object. In other words, 
there is one type of being, the subject, and another type of being, the 
object. The object is always an object for a subject and the subject is always 
a subject for an object. As such, Žižek’s ontology is a variant of absolute 
correlationism or the position that there is no being apart from the subject.
Within the framework of onticology, by contrast, there is no special 
category referred to as “the subject” that is necessarily and irrevocably 
attached to an object. Rather, the central thesis of onticology is that being 
is composed entirely of objects or primary substances. To be sure, objects 
differ from one another and have different powers or capacities. Moreover, 
there are objects which we refer to as persons. However, the category of 
objects composed of persons possesses no special or privileged place within 
being, nor are all beings necessarily related to persons in some form or 
another. As Latour remarks, the zebras gallop across the steppes just fine 
without the benefit of our gaze. Humans are among beings and are beings 
among being, they aren't at the center of being, nor are they the necessary 
condition for being. Were Žižek's claims true, there could be no being apart 
from the human insofar as language, no matter how alien and alienating, 
only exists for humans and perhaps some other animals.
By way of a second point, while both onticology and Žižek argue that 
objects are split, the two do so for radically different reasons. For Žižek, 
objects are split between their appearance and the void of their place of 
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inscription in the symbolic. As a consequence of this divide between place-
holder and place, objects can never be identical to themselves. Insofar as 
objects are split between their appearance and the void of their place of 
inscription, objects are effects of the symbolic or the signifier. Here Žižek 
directly follows Lacan, for as Lacan remarks in Encore, “[t]he universe is 
a flower of rhetoric”.143 The claim that the universe is a flower of rhetoric 
is the claim that the universe is an effect or product of rhetoric. The 
universe, for Lacan, is that which blooms out of language and speech. And 
indeed, earlier we find Lacan remarking that, “[t]here isn't the slightest 
prediscursive reality, for the very fine reason that what constitutes a 
collectivity—what I called men, women, and children—means nothing 
qua prediscursive reality. Men, women, and children are but signifiers”.144 
Presumably Lacan would claim the same thing of flowers, zebras, 
subatomic particles, burritos, stars and all other entities.
The thesis that objects are an effect of the signifier, the symbolic, or 
language is a variant of what I call the “hegemonic fallacy”. Put crudely, 
in political theory a hegemonic relation is a social, ideological, cultural, or 
economic dominance exerted over all other members of the social field. 
For example, Christianity and, in particular, evangelical Christianity, has 
a hegemonic influence on United States politics in comparison to other 
religious beliefs or the absence of religious belief altogether. Onticology 
shifts the concept of hegemony from the domain of political theory to the 
domain of ontology and might be fruitfully compared to the concept of 
ontotheology. Within the framework of onticology, the hegemonic fallacy 
occurs whenever one type of entity is treated as the ground or explanans of 
all other entities.
In treating language or the signifier as the ground of being or the 
universe as an effect of the signifier, this is precisely what takes place 
in Žižek and Lacan. Beings are hegemonized under the signifier or 
language, just as they are hegemonized under mind in Kant. Lurking in 
the background of Žižek's argument is, I suspect, a variant of the epistemic 
fallacy and actualism as discussed in the first chapter. Just as Locke rejected 
the coherence of the concept of substance on the grounds that we are not 
given any access to substance in consciousness, the grounds for rejecting 
anything like prediscursive reality would lie in the fact that we can only 
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speak about prediscursive reality through signifiers or language and that, 
no matter how hard we strive to escape language, we only produce more 
signifiers. Here language is the actuality that is given and we are invited to 
think of all being in terms of the epistemological or how beings are given to 
us through language. 
However, as we saw in the first chapter, this argument only follows if it 
is possible to transform properly ontological questions into epistemological 
questions. The reasoning through which we arrive at the existence of objects 
is found not in our access to objects through language or consciousness, 
but rather through a reflection on what the world must be like for our 
practices to be intelligible. And indeed, it is difficult to see how language 
could ever have the power to divide or parcel in the way suggested by the 
linguistic idealists were it not for the fact that the world is itself structured 
and differentiated. Absent a world that is structured and differentiated, the 
surface of the world, as a sort of formless flux, would be too slippery, too 
smooth, for the signifier to structure at all.
The point here is not that we should ignore the signifier, language, 
and signs, but that the signifier cannot function as the ground of being. 
Here the “hegemon” of the hegemonic fallacy needs to be taken seriously. 
A hegemon is a monarch that stands above, overdetermining everything 
else in a collective of objects. A hegomonic relation is a vertical relation 
from top to bottom, where the entity serving as the hegemon functions 
as a monarch governing all that falls underneath the hegemon. In Žižek-
Lacan's schema, this is precisely how language functions. The hegemon of 
the hegemonic fallacy thus functions like an active form giving structure 
or formatting a passive, structureless matter. Rather than thinking in terms 
of hegemonic conditioning, onticology recommends that we instead think 
in terms of entanglements of objects. Without sharing all the conclusions of 
her agental realism (especially her relationist ontology), while nonetheless 
being deeply sympathetic to her project, I borrow the term “entanglement” 
from the work of Karen Barad.145 Barad encourages us to think in terms 
of entanglements of different agencies and the diffraction patterns these 
entanglements produce. As described by Barad, 
diffraction has to do with the way waves combine when they 
overlap and the apparent bending and spreading of waves that 
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occur when waves encounter an obstruction. Diffraction can 
occur with any kind of wave: for example, water waves, sound 
waves, and light waves all exhibit diffraction under the right 
conditions.146
The concept of diffraction patterns proposed by Barad embodies a 
much “flatter” conception of being than the sort of vertical conception of 
being we encounter in hegemonic ontologies. Where a hegemonic ontology 
treats one agency as making all the difference, an ontology premised on 
entanglements is attentive to how a variety of different objects or agencies 
interact in the production of phenomena. Just as new patterns emerge when 
waves intersect one another or encounter an obstacle with no one agency 
entirely responsible for the pattern, networks of objects interacting with one 
another produce unique patterns that cannot be reduced to any one of 
the agencies involved. Thus, Barad remarks, “diffractions are attuned to 
differences—differences that our knowledge-making practices make and the 
effects they have on the world”.147 And here the crucial point is that “these 
entangled practices are productive, and who and what are excluded through 
these entangled practices matter: different intra-actions produce different 
phenomena”.148 Within an entanglement and a diffraction pattern there can 
be no hegemon, which isn't to say that some objects might not contribute 
more differences within a particular constellation than other objects. It is 
precisely this tangled contribution of differences that an obsessive focus on 
the signifier blinds us to. And once again, the point here isn't that signifiers 
and signs don't contribute differences, but that we need to be attentive to 
the role played by other, non-signifying differences within a collective.
With reference to Barad, we thus arrive at the profound difference 
between Žižek's conception of split objects and the conception of split-
objects proposed by onticology. For Žižek, the object is internally split 
between its appearance and the void of its place of inscription within the 
symbolic order, whereas for onticology objects are split between their 
manifestation and their virtual proper being. Here local manifestion is not 
manifestation to a subject or humans, but rather actualization in the world. 
Moreover, local manifestation would take place regardless of whether 
or not any humans existed to receive it and whether or not the symbolic 
existed. And, in this respect, the multiplicity of perspectives Žižek discusses 
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are not the product of the split between appearance and the void of the 
place of inscription in the symbolic, but rather are a product of different 
intra-actions among objects. As we saw in our discussion of virtual proper 
being, the virtual dimension of objects is such that it can actualize itself 
in different ways as a function of the various exo-relations into which an 
object enters with other objects. There is nothing special or privileged 
here about the human-object relation. What is true of the human-object 
relation is true of any object-object exo-relation, regardless of whether or 
not humans are involved or exist. And insofar as this is true of object-object 
relations regardless of whether or not humans exist, it follows that the 
signifier cannot play a constitutive role in the constitution of objects. The 
key point here is that local manifestations are, in part, a product of how 
objects act on one another when they enter into exo-relations. Salt brings 
about different local manifestations in water than, for example, wood. 
However, while local manifestation is a phenomenon that takes place 
regardless of whether or not humans exist, the concept of exo-relation 
and local manifestation does encourage us to be particularly attentive 
to questions of how humans act on objects through their instruments 
and under specific conditions in the production of local manifestations. 
In short, so long as we remain within the framework of representation, 
asking how we mirror or reflect objects, we have posed the questions of 
epistemology poorly. The logic of representation, based as it is on visual 
metaphors of reflecting and mirroring, raises only the question of whether 
there is a similitude between the representation and the represented. As 
such, it necessarily misses the field of exo-relations and inter-actions among 
objects in the production of local manifestations. What onticology instead 
recommends is a particular attentiveness to fields of action among objects 
that enter into exo-relations with one another, examining how these inter-
actions produce a variety of local manifestations in a diffraction pattern.
Chapter 4
The Interior of Objects
What those who use hermeneutics, exegesis, or semiotics 
say of texts can be said of all [objects]. For a long time it 
has been agreed that the relationship between one text and 
another is always a matter of interpretation. Why not accept 
that this is also true between so-called texts and so-called 
objects, and even between so-called objects themselves? 
— Bruno Latour 149
...[E]very prehension consists of three factors: (a) the 
'subject' which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in 
which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' 
which is prehended; (c) the 'subjective form' which is how 
that subject prehends the datum.
—  Alfred North Whitehead 150
4.1. The Closure of Objects
In chapter 2, I argued that, far from being a paradox, the very essence 
of objects consists in simultaneously withdrawing and self-othering. If 
objects simultaneously withdraw and are self-othering, then this is because, 
on the one hand, substances never directly manifest themselves in the 
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world while, on the other hand, they perpetually alienate themselves in 
qualities and states as a consequence of their own internal dynamics and 
the exo-relations they enter into with other objects. In the last chapter, I 
analyzed the self-othering of objects in terms of the relationship between 
the perpetually and necessarily withdrawn virtual proper being of objects 
and the local manifestations of objects that take place through the internal 
dynamics of substance and the exo-relations they enter into with other 
objects. The claim that substances withdraw from one another suggests that 
it is impossible for objects to directly encounter one another. If this is the 
case, then this raises the question of how objects relate to one another or 
how we are to think the interior of objects with respect to other objects.
In this chapter, I will discuss the manner in which one entity, to use 
Whithead's vocabulary, “prehends” another entity, producing what Graham 
Harman has called “sensuous objects” on the interior of a real entity. Here 
“prehension” refers to the manner in which one entity grasps or relates to 
another entity. Whitehead carefully distinguishes between the subject that 
prehends (what I call a substance or object), what is prehended (another 
substance or object), and how that other substance is prehended. In this 
chapter, I focus on the first and third dimension of prehension in terms of 
autopoietic systems theory. In underlining the “how” of how one substance 
prehends another entity, Whitehead implicitly captures the sense in which 
entities or substances withdraw from one another insofar as no entity 
encounters another entity in terms of how that entity itself is, but rather 
every entity reworks “data” issuing from other entities in terms of the 
prehending substance's own unique organization. However, the position I 
develop here diverges markedly from Whitehead's own ontology in rejecting 
the thesis that in “the analysis of an actual entity [...] into its most concrete 
elements” the entity is disclosed in its most concrete elements “to be a 
concrescence of prehensions”.151 While substances do indeed prehend 
other entities, substances must exist, it is argued, for these prehensions to 
take place. In other words, I seek to maintain a much stronger distinction 
between the subject/substance doing the prehending and the how of 
prehensions than the one Whitehead seems to suggest in his thesis that 
substances are a concrescence of prehensions. Part of this distinction was 
already developed in the last chapter with respect to the endo-structure of 
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objects or their being as multiplicities. While prehensions can, as we will 
see, lead to the modification of the endo-structure of objects, the point 
throughout my analysis of inter-object relations is that objects must have 
a structure for the “how” of prehensions to take place at all and that this 
endo-structure constitutes the substantiality of objects.
It is to this issue that I now turn by drawing on the resources of 
autopoietic systems theory as developed by Maturana, Varela, and especially 
Niklas Luhmann. At the outset, it is important to note that my thesis is 
not that all objects are autopoietic machines. In their early founding essay, 
“Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living”, Maturana and Varela 
distinguish between autopoietic machines and allopoietic machines.152 Later 
I will explain the distinction between these two types of objects in greater 
detail, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that when Maturana 
and Varela refer to autopoietic machines, they are referring to living 
objects, while when they refer to allopoietic machines they are referring 
to non-living objects. Luhmann expands the domain of the autopoietic 
beyond living organisms to include social systems within the purview 
of autopoiesis, but for the moment this rough and ready distinction is 
sufficient for our purposes. With a few qualifications, I accept Maturana 
and Varela's distinction between autopoietic and allopoietic machines. 
However, if the work of Luhmann is so vital to this project, then this is 
because he ontologizes autopoietic systems, treating them as real entities, 
whereas Maturana and Varela advocate a radical constructivism that treats 
autopoietic systems as constructed by an observer. As Luhmann writes 
at the beginning of the first chapter of the sublime Social Systems, “[t]he 
following considerations assume that there are systems. Thus they do not 
begin with epistemological doubt”.153 For Luhmann, systems are really 
existing objects in the world. I believe that I have shown in the first chapter 
why, following Roy Bhaskar, this supposition is warranted.
Additionally, it might come as a surprise to enlist a thinker like Niklas 
Luhmann in defense of object-oriented ontology. In essays like “Identity—
What or How?” Luhmann levels a substantial critique against the very idea 
of ontology. There Luhmann remarks that “ontology is understood to be a 
certain form of observing and describing, to wit, that form that consists of 
the distinction between being and nonbeing”.154 A moment later, Luhmann 
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goes on to remark that “[a]mong the consequences of an ontological 
dissection of the world, one that differentiates being and nonbeing is this 
one: that the identity of what is [des Seienden] must be presupposed”.155 
I will discuss Luhmann's concept of distinction in more detail in the 
next section. Here what is to be noted is the manner in which Luhmann 
deconstructs ontology. Luhmann's point is that a particular distinction 
precedes the identity of an entity, such that the identity of an entity is an 
effect of the distinction that allows for observation, not a substantial reality 
that precedes observation. To understand Luhmann's point we must refer 
back to Spencer-Brown's calculus of forms. Spencer-Brown opens Laws 
of Forms with the thesis that indication is only possible on the basis of a 
prior distinction. As Spencer-Brown writes, “[w]e take as given the idea 
of distinction and the idea of indication, and that we cannot make an 
indication without drawing a distinction”.156 An indication might be, for 
example, a reference to anything in the world. Spencer-Brown's point is 
that any indication requires a distinction if the indication is to be made. A 
distinction cleaves a space in two, defining an outside and an inside. For 
example, we can imagine a piece of paper populated by a plurality of x's. We 
draw a circle on this paper (the distinction), and can now indicate x's within 
the circle and x's outside of the circle. Every distinction thus contains a 
marked and an unmarked space. The marked space is what falls within the 
distinction (in this instance, what is inside the circle), while the unmarked 
space is everything else. This unity of marked and unmarked space 
generated by a distinction is what Spencer-Brown calls a “form”. There's 
a very real sense in which distinction is “transcendental” with respect to 
indication. Form is the condition under which indication is possible. As 
a consequence, the indicated does not precede the distinction, but is the 
condition under which the indicated comes into being for the system drawing 
the distinction. The point, of course, is that while distinctions or forms obey 
rigorous laws once made, the founding distinction itself is contingent in 
that other distinctions could have always been made.
By analyzing ontology in terms of how its indications are possible 
through a prior distinction, Luhman, in effect, deconstructs the grounding 
premise upon which ontology, as he understands it, is based. By tracing 
ontology back to the being/non-being distinction upon which it becomes 
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possible to observe beings as identical, Luhmann effectively shows how this 
distinction is contingent such that identity is no longer the ground of being 
but an effect of a distinction that enables observation. The point, then, 
is that insofar as distinctions are contingent, they can be drawn otherwise, 
producing other objects as effects. As a consequence, objects become not 
autonomous substances that exist in their own right, but rather what Heinz 
von Foester called “Eigenvalues”.157 As von Foester articulates the concept,
Eigenvalues have been found to be ontologically discrete, 
stable, separable, and composable, while ontogenetically 
to arise as equilibria that determine themselves through 
circular processes. Ontogenetically, Eigenvalues and objects, 
and likewise ontogenetically, stable behaviour and the 
manifestation of the subject's “grasp” of an object cannot 
be distinguished. In both cases, the objects appear to reside 
exclusively in the subject's own experience of his sensori-
motor coordinations.158
In other words, the object is not something that exists substantially in 
its own right, but is rather something that is constructed by the cognizing 
system through the production of stable equilibria in perception that 
can be returned to again and again. Elsewhere, Gotthard Bechmann and 
Nico Stehr sum up this line of thought when they remark that Luhman 
“describes the old European style of thought as concerned with the 
identification of the unity underlying diversity [...] Ontology refers to a 
world existing objectively in separation from subjects aware of it, capable of 
unambiguous linguistic representation”.159 It is precisely this model of being 
that Luhmann challenges.
What we have here is a variant of the epistemic fallacy and actualism as 
discussed in the first chapter. In treating objects as Eigenvalues, Luhmann 
conflates substances with what substances are for a particular observing 
system. However, he cannot coherently get by without the category of 
substance. Although Luhmann everywhere focuses on epistemological 
issues, he requires the existence of systems in order to launch these 
epistemological inquiries. These systems are characterized by unity, 
autonomy, and endurance, which are precisely the marks of substance. 
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As a consequence, it is necessary to distinguish between substances as 
such and what other substances are for a substance. Here onticology and 
object-oriented philosophy encounters an unexpected ally in the anti-
realism of autopoietic theory and Luhmann's autopoietic systems theory in 
particular. Insofar as Luhmann's systems are characterized by autonomy, 
they avoid the holism of relationism and therefore present us with a 
picture of the universe that is parceled or composed of units. As I argued, 
following Graham Harman, in the last chapter, objects are characterized 
by withdrawal such that they never directly encounter one another. In their 
account of how systems always encounter other systems in terms of their 
own organization, Luhmann and autopoietic theory provide onticology 
and object-oriented philosophy with powerful conceptual tools for fleshing 
out the concept of withdrawal. The sort of ontological realism Bechmann 
and Stehr rightly denounce only pertains to those accounts of substance 
premised on presence. Yet where substances perpetually withdraw from 
other substances and from themselves such that they are characterized by 
closure, we encounter an ontology adequate to the critique of ontotheology 
and the metaphysics of presence. 
What interests me in autopoietic systems theory is not so much its 
account of life or society, as its account of operational closure. As Maturana 
and Varela elsewhere define it, “their identity [the identity of autopoietic 
machines] is specified by a network of dynamic processes whose effects 
do not leave that network”.160 The concept of operational closure as it 
applies to autopoietic machines embodies two key claims: First, the claim 
is that the operations of an autopoietic system refer only to themselves 
and are products of the system itself. For example, if, as Luhmann has 
argued, social systems are composed entirely of communications, if 
communications are the elements that compose social systems, then 
communications refer only to other communications and never anything 
outside of themselves. Here communication is not something that 
takes place between systems but is strictly something that takes place 
in a system. Another way of putting this would be to say that a system 
cannot communicate with its environment and an environment cannot 
communicate with a system. 
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Second, the claim is that autopoietic systems are closed in on 
themselves, that they do not relate directly to an environment, that they do 
not receive information from an environment. As a consequence, it follows 
that information is not something that pre-exists an autopoietic machine, 
waiting out there in the world to be found. To be sure, objects outside an 
autopoietic machine can perturb or irritate an autopoietic machine, but this 
perturbation or irritation does not, in and of itself, constitute information 
for the system being perturbed. Rather, any information value the 
perturbation takes on is constituted strictly by the distinctions belonging 
to the organization of the autopoietic machine itself. As I argue in what 
follows, this closure of machines or objects in terms of perturbations is 
not unique to autopoietic machines, but to both autopoietic machines and 
allopoietic machines. Both autopoietic and allopoietic machines possess 
only selective relations to the world around them, such that both self-
referentially constitute that to which they're open. Thus, while allopoietic 
machines do not reproduce themselves through their own operations as 
is the case with autopoietic machines, allopoietic machines nonetheless 
constitute the way in which they are open to other entities in the world.
In “Autopoiesis: The Organization of the Living”, Maturana and Varela 
argue that “[a]n autopoietic machine
is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) 
of components that produces the components which (i) 
through their interactions and transformations continuously 
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) 
that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a 
concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) 
exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as 
a network.161
The unity of a system is what I call the system's “endo-consistency”, 
its virtual proper being, or a multiplicity. As unities, systems, whether 
allopoietic or autopoietic, are substances. Autopoietic machines, systems, 
or substances are unique in that not only are they unities, not only are 
they operationally closed to the rest of the world, but they also constitute 
142 Levi R. Bryant
their own elements. As Luhmann puts it elsewhere, “[i]n contrast to what 
ordinary language and conceptual tradition suggest, the unity of an element 
[...] is not ontically pre-given. Instead, the element is constituted as a unity 
only by the system that enlists it as an element to use it in relations”.162
Perhaps no one has gone further in formalizing, radicalizing, and 
developing the implications of autpoietic systems theory than Luhmann in 
his autopoietic sociological theory. Although I will here discuss elements 
of Luhmann's sociological theory, it should be borne in mind that my 
main aim is to outline the general features of autopoietic and allopoietic 
systems, rather than to focus on Luhmann's conception of society as 
an autopoietic system. Before proceeding, it is important to note that 
there are significant differences between how Maturana and Varela think 
autopoietic systems, and how Luhmann thinks them. For Maturana and 
Varela, autopoietic machines are homeostatic in character. “Autopoietic 
machines are homeostatic machines”.163 That is, they are systems that 
attempt to maintain a particular equilibrium across time. By contrast, 
Luhmann's autopoietic machines, at least in the case of meaning systems, 
are inherently characterized by unrest. “[W]e begin, without attempting 
reductive 'explanation,' from the fundamental situation of basal instability 
(with a resulting 'temporalized' complexity) and assert that all meaning 
systems, be they psychic or social, are characterized by such instability”.164 
In a communication system, for example, the system aims not simply at 
maintaining equilibrium or homeostasis, but rather it is always necessary 
to find something new to say if the system is to continue to exist. Consider, 
for example, a conversation. Were the participants in the conversation 
to simply keep repeating themselves, the conversation would cease. It's 
necessary to find something new to say for the conversation, as a system, to 
continue its existence. Indeed, Luhmann will remark that both absence and 
remaining unchanged can therefore function as impetuses for change. As 
Luhmann remarks,
On the one hand, given the capacity to process information, 
things that are not present can also have an effect; mistakes, 
null values, and disappointments acquire causality insofar 
as they can be grasped via the schema of difference. On the 
other, not just events but facts, structures, and continuities 
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stimulate causalities insofar as they can be experienced as 
differences. Remaining unchanged can thus become a cause 
of change.165
The key problem for any autopoietic system is how to get from one 
element to another in the order of time. Every autopoietic system is 
challenged by entropy and must find ways of staving off a collapse into 
entropy or disorganized complexity. The elements of autopoietic machines 
within the Luhmannian framework are events. As events, they disappear 
as soon as they occur. As a consequence, every autopoietic machine faces 
the problem of how it can reproduce itself or generate new elements 
from moment to moment. Confronted with an absence of change, that 
absence of change itself becomes the instigator of new events or elements 
in the ongoing autopoiesis of the system. Only through the production of 
subsequent elements or events is the autopoietic machine able to persist or 
continue existing. It is for this reason that meaning systems, at least, must 
necessarily be basally unstable. Here it should be noted that the substance 
of autopoietic systems resides not in the materiality of its parts—these 
parts can be and are replaced while the substance continues to exist—but 
rather by virtue of their structure or organization which I have referred to as 
multiplicities or the “endo-structure” of substances.
In arguing that the elements that compose autopoietic systems are not 
ontically pre-given, it is argued that these elements are not themselves 
substances, but rather only exist for the endo-consistency of the substance 
or multiplicity that constitutes them. The point is not that nothing exists 
apart from a system—everything must be built out of other things as 
Aristotle observed—but rather that what constitutes an element for a 
system does not pre-exist the system that constitutes or constructs it. 
Luhmann observes that we “must distinguish between the environment of 
a system and systems in the environment of this system”.166 If the distinction 
between the environment of a system and systems in the environment 
of a system is crucial, then this is because the former refers to how one 
substance encounters other substances in the world through its own 
closure and organization, while the latter refers to actually existing systems 
or substances that would exist regardless of whether or not the system 
encountering them existed. These actually existing systems, whether 
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autopoietic or allopoietic themselves, can and do serve as material through 
which systems constitute their elements. 
In his sociological systems theory, Luhmann develops the closure of 
systems to dramatic effect. For autopoietic systems theory 
the point of departure for all systems-theoretical analysis 
must be the difference between system and environment. Systems 
are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and 
adaptively, but structurally, and they cannot exist without an 
environment. They constitute and maintain themselves by 
creating and maintaining a difference from their environment, 
and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference. 
Without difference from an environment, there would not 
even be self-reference, because difference is the functional 
premise of self-referential operations.167
Insofar as onticology maintains that substances are fully autonomous, 
it parts ways with Luhmann in the thesis that substances or systems 
cannot exist independently of an environment. Nonetheless, onticology 
also recognizes that many systems would produce less than ideal local 
manifestations were they separated from an environment of exo-
relations with other entities of a particular sort. A cat, for instance, is 
unable to exercise all sorts of powers of acting in the absence of oxygen. 
The important point here is that the distinction between system and 
environment is self-referential. Although this distinction refers to two 
domains (system and environment), the distinction itself originates from 
one of these domains: the system. The distinction between system and 
environment is a distinction drawn by each system. This is not only one of 
the origins of the operational closure of systems, but is also a condition for 
the autonomy of systems as individual and independent substances. 
In the case of autopoietic machines, the distinction between system and 
environment emerges “because for each system the environment is more 
complex than the system itself”.168 As a consequence, “[t]here is [...] no 
point-for-point correspondence between system and environment”.169 Were 
there a point-for-point correspondence between system and environment, 
there would be no distinction between systems and their environments. 
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Moreover, this would require systems to respond or react to every event 
that takes place in their environment, thereby overburdening the system. 
Consequently, one way of thinking about autopoietic systems or substances 
is as strategies of selection or continuance within an environment that 
they are unable to completely anticipate and which they are certainly 
unable to dominate or master by virtue of the greater complexity that each 
environment possesses when compared to the complexity of systems.
A similar point holds with respect to the elements that systems produce 
or constitute. In the case of elements composing the endo-consistency of a 
multiplicity or system, these elements only exist in relation to one another. 
“Just as there are no systems without environments or environments 
without systems, there are no elements without relational connections 
or relations without elements”.170 Here we must carefully distinguish 
between substances and elements. Elements are always elements for a 
substance. They only exist as elements within the endo-structure or endo-
composition of a system and do not, as we have seen, have any independent 
ontological existence of their own. Substances, by contrast, always enjoy 
an autonomous ontological existence in their own right, and therefore only 
exist in relations that are external to them. That is, substances are capable of 
breaking with their relations and entering into new relations, or of existing 
completely without relations at all. With an increase in the complexity 
of a system or the number of elements it must maintain to exist, special 
problems emerge. As Luhmann observes, “when the number of elements 
that must be held together in a system or for a system as its environment 
increases, one very quickly encounters a threshold where it is no longer 
possible to relate every element with every other element”.171
Three interesting consequences follow from this endo-complexity of 
systems. First, insofar as it is not possible to feasibly connect every element 
of the system to every other element, it follows that systems must maintain 
selective relations among their elements, such that, they “[omit] other 
equally conceivable relations [among elements]”.172 These selective relations 
among elements are thus strategies for contending with an environment 
that is always more complex than the system itself. Luhmann emphasizes 
the contingency of these relations and the manner in which they involve 
risk. However, second, because not every element relates to every other 
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element in a complex system, but rather relations are contingent strategies 
for contending with the environment, it follows that “very different kinds 
of systems can be formed out of a substratum of very similar units”.173 In 
other words, when speaking about the virtual proper being of an object 
or a multiplicity, it is not so much the substance's elements that constitute 
their substantiality, but rather how their elements are organized or related. It 
is for this reason that I speak of “endo-relations” in relation to the endo-
consistency of the virtual proper being of an object. Finally, third, because 
systems constitute their own elements it follows that “systems of a higher 
(emergent) order can possess less complexity than systems of a lower order 
because they determine the unity and number of elements that compose 
them”,174 along with the relations among these elements.
One paradoxical feature of the system/environment distinction at 
the heart of any system, whether autopoietic or allopoietic, is that this 
distinction is not a distinction between two entities in their own right, but 
is rather a distinction that arises from one side of the distinction. In short, 
it is the system itself that “draws” the distinction between system and 
environment. As Luhmann remarks, “[t]he environment receives its unity 
through the system and only in relation to the system”.175 An environment 
is thus an environment only for the interior of an object or substance. Two 
consequences follow from this: First, the environment is not a container of 
substances or systems that precedes the existence of substances or systems. 
There is no environment “as such” existing out there in the world. Put 
otherwise, there is no pre-established or pre-given environment to which a 
system must “adapt”. Rather, we have as many environments as there are 
substances in the universe, without it being possible to claim that all of 
these systems are contained in a single environment. As Timothy Morton 
puts it in a very different context, “[t]here is no environment as such. It's 
all 'distinct organic beings.'” 176 The environment is not a container lying 
there present at hand, awaiting the system to adapt to it. Rather, there are 
as many environments as there are systems, and the environment is nothing 
more than other systems that in turn “draw” their own system/environment 
distinctions. As we will see in chapter six, this leads to the conclusion 
that the world does not exist. Second, the distinction between system and 
environment is, as a consequence, paradoxical and self-referential. Insofar as 
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the distinction between system and environment is a distinction “made” by 
the system, this distinction is also self-referential or a distinction belonging 
to the system itself. As we will see in a moment, this has significant 
consequences for how systems or substances relate to other entities.
To illustrate these points, take the example of the humble tardigrade. 
The tardigrade is a microscopic multicellular organism with eight legs, 
two eyes, and antennae and which looks somewhat like an alien pig. The 
tardigrade is particularly interesting because it is capable of surviving 
extreme variations of heat and cold without dying. Thus, for example, it 
can be subjected to extremely high temperatures such as those that occur 
when a meteor enters the Earth's atmosphere. When this occurs, all the 
water in the tardigrade’s body steams away and it withdraws its legs into its 
trunk, becoming a hard pellet that appears to be dead. However, if water is 
introduced back into the tardigrade's environment, the tardigrade plumps 
back up and is walking around again within a few hours as if nothing 
happened. Returning to some themes of the first chapter, it is highly 
unlikely that substances like cats or humans belong to the environment of 
the tardigrade. As a microscopic organism, it perhaps crawls in and out 
of the different fissures in the skin and bodies of larger scale organisms, 
completely unaware that such organisms even exist. Nor, we can say, do 
these larger scale organisms function as that to which the tardigrade must 
adapt. The point is not that these larger scale organisms don't exist or that 
tardigrades get to decide what exists and what does not exist. To claim 
this, one would be confusing the environment of a system with systems or 
substances in a system's environment. Rather, the point is that substances 
maintain only selective relationships to their environment. 
The self-referentiality of the system/environment distinction is one of 
the meanings of operational closure, and is common to both allopoietic 
substances and autopoietic substances alike. It is a common feature of all 
substances that they are one and all closed to the world, relating to systems 
in their environment only through their own distinctions or organization. 
As a consequence of this closure, systems or substances only relate to 
themselves. Put differently, while substances can enter into exo-relations with 
other substances, they only do so on their own terms and with respect to their 
own organization. 
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Luhmann draws startling conclusions from this thesis in his analysis of 
society. If societies are autopoietic systems or substances, and if autopoietic 
substances both constitute their own elements and are operationally closed, 
then it follows that humans are not a part of society. Luhmann's conception 
of society is thus radically at odds with that found in the humanist tradition. 
As Luhmann writes,
The point of difference is that for the humanistic tradition 
human beings stand within the social order and not outside 
it. The human being counts as a permanent part of the 
social order, as an element of society itself. Human beings 
were called “individuals” because they were the ultimate, 
indivisible elements of society.177
Here it is important to note that, far from denying the existence of 
humans, Luhmann is defending their existence. Were we to claim that 
humans are products or effects of society as Althusser, for example, does 
in his essay on the ideological state apparatus and elsewhere, we would be 
conflating the existence of humans with that of elements in the system of 
society. However, just as societies are operationally closed systems, so too 
are humans. “If one views human beings as part of the environment of 
society (instead of as part of society itself), this changes the premises of all 
traditional questions, including those of classical humanism”.178
Humans belong not to society, but rather the environment of society. 
Paradoxically, then, humans are outside of society. For Luhmann, society, 
by contrast, consists of communications and nothing but communications. 
And insofar as humans belong to the environment of society, they do 
not participate in society. As Luhmann puts it elsewhere, “one could 
say that the environment of the social system cannot communicate with 
society”.179 Likewise, systems or substances cannot communicate with 
their environments. If this is the case, then it is because systems only relate 
to themselves and “[i]nformation is [...] a purely system-internal quality. 
There is no transference of information from the environment into the 
system”.180 Put a bit differently, systems or substances communicate only 
with themselves. If, then, society is not composed of persons or humans, 
what is it composed of? As Luhman remarks, “[i]n the end, it is always 
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people, individuals, subjects who act or communicate. I would like to assert 
in the face of this that only communication can communicate and that 
what we understand as “action” can be generated only in such a network 
of communication”.181 The elements that compose society consist of 
nothing but communications and the production of new communications 
in responses to communications. It is not persons that communicate, but 
rather communications that communicate.
To be clear, Luhmann is not advancing the absurd thesis that societies 
can exist without humans. Social systems are autonomous from humans, 
they are distinct substances in their own right, but they require the 
perturbations or irritations of humans in order to come into existence. As 
Luhmann puts it in Social Systems, 
Psychic and social systems have evolved together. At any 
time the one kind of system is the necessary environment 
of the other. The necessity is grounded in the evolution that 
makes these kinds of systems possible. Persons cannot emerge 
and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social 
systems without persons.182
How, then, are we to understand this jaw droppingly counter-intuitive 
thesis that humans do not belong to society and that they are incapable of 
communication insofar as only communications communicate? Elsewhere 
Hans-Georg Moeller explains this point well:
The Old European philosophical tradition and Indo-
European grammatical habits have contributed to the 
establishment of the “conventional assumption” that human 
beings can communicate—but it is an empirical fact that 
the “essential” elements of what is understood to constitute 
the human being cannot. Neither brains nor minds can 
communicate. We cannot say what our brainwaves are 
“oscillating”, and we can't even say what we think. What 
is said in communication is never equal to what is thought 
and felt in the mind. It is impossible for me to adequately 
represent on this page what is going through my mind—
intellectually, emotionally, “perceptionally”—while I am 
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writing this sentence. And the same is true for every sentence 
I say or write—there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between communication and mind. I suppose the same is 
true in regard to your reading of what I write. What you think 
and feel while reading this sentence will be, in each single 
case, entirely different from what is communicated in this 
sentence. Communication systems and mental systems are 
operationally separate.183
Minds are operationally closed with respect to brains. Minds relate to 
themselves through thought alone, whereas brains relate to one another 
through electro-chemical reactions alone. Neither of these systems 
knows anything of the other. Likewise, the communications of society are 
operationally closed with respect to minds such that communications can 
respond only to communications. In each of these cases we have systems 
and their environments.
To illustrate Luhmann's thesis, I turn to the simple example of a humble 
dialogue. For the last few years I have been fortunate to have the friendship 
of my colleague Carlton Clark, a rhetorician at the institution where I teach. 
Within a Luhmannian framework, this dialogue is not a communication 
between two systems (Clark and myself), but rather is a system in its 
own right. In this respect, Clark and I belong not to the system of this 
dialogue, but to the environment of this dialogue. We are outside the system 
constituted by this dialogue insofar as neither of us have access to the 
thoughts or neural system of the other. What communicates in this dialogue 
is thus neither Clark, nor myself, but rather communications. Moreover, this 
dialogue continually makes self-references (references to events that are 
within the dialogue and communications that have been made in the past 
of the dialogue) and other-references (references to the environment of the 
dialogue). In other words, the dialogue is organized around what is internal 
to the dialogue itself, to the system that has emerged over time, and to what 
is outside the dialogue or in the environment of the dialogue constituted by 
the dialogue itself. An event that has taken place at the college, for example, 
is treated as belonging to the environment of the dialogue, as outside the 
dialogue, while it can also become a topic within the dialogue that is related 
to according to the meaning-schema that the dialogue has developed over 
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time. Over the course of this lengthy dialogue, the dialogue as a system has 
evolved its own distinctions, themes, topics, and ways of handling these 
themes and topics. Some of these topics and themes include rhetoric, 
teaching, philosophy, family, college politics, politics, and so on. The 
distinctions inhabiting the dialogue are the implicit ways in which these 
themes and topics are handled or the meaning schema that regulate the 
dialogue. Events in the environment of the dialogue can perturb or irritate 
the dialogue, providing stimuli for new communicative events. For example, 
a new book can be published that becomes a stimulus for the production 
of new communications within the system. However, the publication of 
this new book does not enter the dialogue qua book, but is integrated into 
the dialogue according to the distinctions and organization of the dialogue 
itself. In this respect, the dialogue is an entity itself that constitutes its own 
elements (the communication events that take place within it) and that 
is something Clark and I are bound up in without being parts or elements 
within the dialogue. Just as Meno is not himself an element in Plato's 
dialogue Meno, Clark and Bryant are not elements in this dialogue. 
From our discussion of the operational closure of autopoietic objects, we 
have thus learned four important features of the nature of objects. First and 
foremost, objects relate only to themselves and never to their environment. 
Here it is as if the universe were populated by solipsists, Aristotle's First 
Cause, Unmoved Mover, Leibnizian monads, or, as Harman has put 
it, vacuums. Second, every substance or system is organized around a 
distinction between system and environment that the system itself draws. 
As a consequence, this distinction between substance and environment 
is self-referential. Third, autopoietic substances, in contrast to allopoietic 
substances, constitute their own elements or perpetually reproduce 
themselves through themselves or their own activities. In the case of 
autopoietic substances, the elements composing the autopoietic substance 
constitute one another and are constituted by one another. Finally, 
substances are such that we can have substances nested within substances, 
while these substances nested within substances nonetheless belong to the 
environment of the substance within which they are nested. This is the case, 
for example, with societies. Humans are nested within societies but do not 
belong to the social system but rather the environment of the social system. 
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In many respects, humans are the matter upon which social systems draw 
to construct themselves insofar as they constantly perturb social systems, 
without the humans being the ones doing the constructing. Instead, it is 
communication that constructs communications. To see this point, think 
of the way in which our intentions get entangled in communications. 
We make, for example, a claim that contradicts some claim we made in 
the past and the subsequent communication that follows points out this 
contradiction, regulating, as it were, our subsequent communications. 
We find an analogous case of substances nested within substances with 
respect to the relationship between cells and the body. Each cell is its own 
closed autopoietic system, yet the body employs cells in the construction 
of itself through its own autopoietic processes. Here we encounter, once 
again, the strange mereology of onticology and object-oriented philosophy 
where objects can be nested in other objects while nonetheless remaining 
independent or autonomous of those objects within which they are nested. 
This mereology destroys organic conceptions of both society and the 
universe, where all substances are thought of as parts of an organic whole.
One important consequence that follows from the operational closure of 
substances is that this closure renders unilateral control of one substance by 
another substance impossible. As Luhmann puts it,
An important structural consequence that inevitably 
results from the construction of self-referential systems 
deserves particular mention. This is abandoning the idea of 
unilateral control. There may be hierarchies, asymmetries, or 
differences in influence, but no part of the system can control 
others without itself being subject to control. Under such 
circumstances it is possible [...] that any control must be 
exercised in anticipation of counter-control.184
In this context, Luhmann is speaking of subsystems of a system and 
how they relate to one another. Because each subsystem of a system is itself 
founded on an operationally closed, self-referential system/environment 
distinction, one subsystem of the social system cannot control another 
subsystem of the social system. For example, the political subsystem 
cannot control the economic subsystem because each subsystem relates 
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to its own environment in its own unique way as a function of its peculiar 
organization. The economic subsystem of the social system, for example, 
encounters perturbations from the political subsystem of the social system 
in terms of economics. What holds for subsystems within a larger system 
holds equally and even more so for relations between different systems or 
substances. Each substance interacts with other substances in terms of its 
own peculiar organization. As a consequence, there can be no unilateral 
transfer of actions from one system to another system, such that the content 
or nature of the initiating system or substance's action is maintained as 
identical. As we will see in the next chapter, this requires us to rethink 
relations of constraint between substances in what Timothy Morton has 
called “meshes” or networks of substances.
4.2. Interactions Between Objects
If, then, objects or substances are operationally closed, if they only relate 
to themselves, how do objects interact? While substances are closed to 
one another, they can nonetheless perturb or irritate one another. And 
in perturbing or irritating one another, information is produced by the 
system that is perturbed or irritated. However, here we must proceed 
with caution, for information is not something that exists out there in the 
environment waiting to be received or detected. Moreover, information 
is not something that is exchanged between systems. Often we think of 
information as something that is transmitted from a sender to a receiver. 
The question here becomes that of how it is possible for the receiver to 
decode the information received as identical to the information transmitted. 
However, insofar as substances are closed in the sense discussed in the last 
section, it follows that there can be no question of information as exchange. 
Rather, information is purely system-specific, exists only within a particular 
system or substance, and exists only for that system or substance. In short, 
there is no pre-existent information. Instead, information is constructed 
by systems. As Luhmann remarks, “above all what is usually called 
'information' are purely internal achievements. There is no information that 
moves from without to within a system”.185 Elsewhere, Luhmann remarks 
that “[i]nformation is an internal change of state, a self-produced aspect 
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of communicative events and not something that exists in the environment 
of the system”.186 Consequently, information is a transformation of 
perturbations of an object into information within a system.
This point can be illustrated with respect to my relationship with 
my cats. When my cat rubs against me or jumps on my lap these events 
constitute perturbations for me. However, as a system I translate these 
perturbations into information, registering them as signs of affection. In 
response, I pet my cat to show my affection. By contrast, my cats might 
merely be seeking warmth or marking me with their scent so as to establish 
territory. The point here is that no identity of shared information need be 
present for this interaction to take place and maintain itself. My cat and 
I are perhaps occupied with each other for entirely different reasons, 
completely unaware that we have different reasons, yet an interaction and 
communication still takes place. 
However, two points must be made here: first, substances are not 
capable of being perturbed in any old way. My eyes, for example, are not 
capable of being perturbed by infrared light. Dogs and cats, as I understand 
it, have a very limited range of color vision. Neutrinos pass straight through 
most things on the planet Earth. Rocks, as far as I know, are unable to see 
color at all. Electric eels sense the world through various electric signals, 
whereas cats very likely have no sense of what it would be like to experience 
the world in such terms. Consequently, all substances, whether allopoietic 
or autopoietic, are only selectively open to the world. Second, and in a 
closely related vein, not all perturbations are transformed into information. 
In the next section we will see that allopoietic machines and autopoietic 
machines relate to information events in very different ways. In the case 
of autopoietic machines, however, it is always possible for perturbations 
to which a system is open to nonetheless produce no event of information 
such that the perturbation is coded merely as background noise. As I am 
writing this, for example, my three-year-old daughter is dancing about the 
room, yet I scarcely notice her at the moment. 
Information is thus not something that exists in the world independent 
of the systems that “experience” it, but is rather constituted by the systems 
that “experience” it. Nonetheless, this constitution does not issue entirely 
from the system constituting the information itself. Information is, as it 
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were, a genuine event that befalls a substance or happens to a substance. 
The perturbations that function as the ground for the production of 
information can issue from either the environment or transformations 
in the system itself, but they are always events that must take place for 
information production to occur. Following Gregory Bateson, Luhmann 
treats information as a difference that makes a difference.187 If information 
is a difference that makes a difference then this is because it selects system-
states. As Luhmann writes, “[b]y information we mean an event that selects 
system states. This is possible only for structures that delimit and presort 
possibilities. Information presupposes structure, yet is not itself a structure, 
but rather an event that actualizes the use of structures”.188 Information 
is thus not so much a property of substances themselves, but is rather 
something that occurs within substances. In “Pathologies of Epistemology”, 
Bateson articulates this point nicely. As Bateson writes,
1. The system shall operate with and upon differences.
2. The system shall consist of closed loops or networks 
of pathways along which differences and transforms of 
differences shall be transmitted (What is transmitted on a 
neuron is not an impulse, it is news of a difference.)
3. Many events within the system shall be energized by 
the respondent part rather than by impact from the 
triggering part.
4. The system shall show self-correctiveness in the direction 
of runaway. Self- correctiveness implies trial and error. 189
Elsewhere, Bateson remarks that differences are “brought about by 
the sort of 'thing' that gets onto the map from the territory”.190 Here we 
can think of map and territory as system and environment, where the 
territory is always more complex than the map. Bateson's point seems 
to be that difference is not an identical unit that is transmitted from one 
thing to another—for example, from one neuron to another—but rather 
is a perturbation or irritation that is then transformed into information by 
the receiving entity. As such, information is constituted by the systems 
receiving the differences. Situated within the context of the thing-schema 
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developed in chapter three, information, as that event that selects system 
states, actualizes virtual potentials belonging to the virtual proper being of 
an object, which are then deployed to produce local manifestations. 
Later Luhmann will remark that “information is nothing more than 
an event that brings about a connection between differences”.191 Although 
Luhmann does not develop his thesis in this way, we can characterize 
the linkage of difference that events of information generate in terms of 
three dimensions. First, information differentially links an object to itself 
in a relation between the withdrawn virtual proper being of the object 
and its local manifestations. Here we encounter the process by which 
local manifestations take place within an object; or rather, the process 
of self-othering and withdrawal characteristic of every object whether 
that object be autopoietic or allopoietic. Through the selection of a 
system state, information affects a self-othering in the object whereby the 
virtual dimension of the object simultaneously withdraws and a quality is 
produced. These information events can take place both internally or as 
a result of external interactions of the object with other objects. Second, 
events of information link difference to difference through the linkage 
of perturbations to information. Perturbations are never identical to 
information precisely because information is object-specific, whereas the 
same perturbation can affect a variety of different objects while producing 
very different information for each object perturbed. Finally, third, 
events of information link difference to difference through a linkage of 
different withdrawn objects to one another. No object directly encounters 
another object precisely because all objects are operationally closed. As 
a consequence, no object is capable of representing another object or of 
functioning as a pure carrier of the perturbations issued from another 
object. This is because objects always transform or translate perturbations. 
Nonetheless, information links the different to the different in a substance-
specific manner wherever substances relate to one another.
Because information is not a property of a substance, but rather an 
event that befalls or happens to a substance and which selects a system 
state, “[i]nformation [...] always involves some element of surprise”.192 
For this reason, information plays a key role in the evolution and 
development of autopoietic systems, contributing to the formation of new 
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forms of organization within existing autopoietic substances. Insofar as 
information selects object-states it always carries an element of surprise. As 
Luhmann puts it,
a piece of information that is repeated is no longer 
information. It retains its meaning in repetition but loses 
its value as information. One reads in the paper that the 
deutsche mark has risen in value. If one reads this a second 
time in another paper, this activity no longer has value as 
information (it no longer changes the state of one's own 
system), although structurally it presents the same selection. 
The information is not lost, although it disappears as an 
event. It has changed the state of the system and has thereby 
left behind a structural effect; the system then reacts to and 
with these changed structures.193
Here whether or not a bit of information functions as information 
depends on the preceding object-state of the substance in question. If, 
after hearing that the value of the dollar has fallen, I shift to another news 
channel and hear the same thing once again, this bit of information has lost 
its status as information because it no longer selects a new cognitive state 
within my mental system. However, if I hear this bit of information a week 
or month later it can once again become information by virtue of how it 
contrasts with my preceding mental state. The value of the dollar has fallen 
again. And if this information selects a system state, this might be in the 
form—were I an investor—of not selling stocks at this particular time by 
virtue of the fact that I won't get a good return on my sale.
In order for information to take place as an event within a system it 
is thus necessary for distinctions to be operative within the system. As 
we will recall from the last section, indication can only occur based on a 
prior distinction that cleaves a space into a marked and unmarked space 
the unity of which Spencer-Brown refers to as a “form”. Information is 
a sort of indication that an environment “forces”, as it were, on a system. 
For example, when I awoke early this morning I saw that it was raining. 
Certainly I didn't conjure this weather state into existence through my own 
whim. However, for this weather state to function as information, there 
158 Levi R. Bryant
had to be a prior distinction at work in my cognitive system. Perhaps this 
distinction consists of something like the distinction between precipitation 
(marked state) and non-precipitation (non-marked state). It will be noted 
that this distinction doesn't tell me in advance what states exist in my 
environment. It doesn't tell me in advance whether the precipitation will be 
a torrential downpour, snow, sleet, a drizzle or whether the day is sunny or 
overcast. Nonetheless, for cognitive and communication substances, it is the 
distinction that allows for any of these states, and many others besides, to 
take on significance. Here the environment selects how this distinction will 
be actualized or filled with content, yet the prior distinction predelineates 
what environmental states can serve this function for the system.
There are a variety of ways in which such events select system-states. 
Not only do such events actualize the operative distinction in a particular 
way (“it's a heavy downpour!”), but they also play a role in subsequent 
operations of the system. For example, upon seeing that it is raining, I now 
conclude that I don't need to water my garden for the next couple of days, 
that I need to bring an umbrella if I go out, and that I need to dress in a 
particular way to keep warm and dry. In short, the information leads to 
subsequent events within the system. 
Here it is important to note that the subsequent events that take place 
within the system are not of a determinate nature but could unfold in a 
variety of different ways. This is especially true of systems organized around 
meaning such as psychic systems and social communications systems. As 
Luhmann argues,
the momentary Given that fills experience at any time 
always and irrevocably refers beyond itself to something 
else. Experience experiences itself as variable—and unlike 
transcendental phenomenology we assume organic bases 
for this. It does not find itself closed and self-contained, not 
restricted to itself, but is always referring to something that is 
at that moment not its actual content. This referring-beyond-
itself, this immanent transcendence of experience, is not a 
matter of choice; rather, it is the condition on the basis of 
which all freedom to choose must first be constituted.194
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Here, in his discussion of “experience”, we encounter Luhmann's basic 
concept of meaning. Meaning is the unity of a difference between actuality 
and potentiality. Each actualized meaning simultaneously refers beyond 
itself to other meanings that could have been actualized. For example, 
while I conclude that since I am going out I must carry an umbrella, 
this actualization still refers beyond itself to the possibility of staying in. 
The phenomenon of meaning is such that while it actualizes a meaning, 
the negated or excluded alternatives remain, even though under the sign 
of negation. This is one reason every meaning has an air of contingency 
about it. Every meaning is haunted by the other potential meanings it has 
excluded. And this, incidentally, is why ultimate foundations are impossible 
within philosophy. Insofar as meaning is the unity of a difference between 
actuality and potentiality, every ground that purports to function as the 
final ground nonetheless refers beyond itself to other excluded potentials 
that could have functioned as grounds.
This account of meaning provides us with the means of distinguishing 
between information and meaning. As Luhmann writes,
Meaning functions as the premise for experience processing 
in a way that makes possible a choice from among different 
possible states or contents of consciousness, and in this 
it does not totally eliminate what has not been chosen, 
but preserves it in the form of the world and so keeps it 
accessible. The function of meaning then does not lie in 
information, i.e., not in the elimination of a system-relative 
state of uncertainty about the world, and it cannot, therefore, 
be measured with the techniques of information theory. If it 
is repeated, a message or piece of news loses its information 
value, but not its meaning. Meaning is not a selective event, 
but a selective relationship between system and world.195
Information is an event that reduces uncertainty within a system by 
selecting a state based on a prior distinction (“what will the weather be 
like today?” “it's raining!”). Meaning, by contrast, maintains the unity 
of a difference between an actualized given and other potentialities or 
possibilities.
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Because information is premised on a prior distinction that allows 
events in the environment to take on information value, it follows that 
systems, in their relation to other objects, always contain blind spots. What 
we get here is a sort of object-specific transcendental illusion produced as a 
result of its closure. As Luhmann remarks in Ecological Communication, “one 
could say that a system can see only what it can see. It cannot see what it 
cannot. Moreover, it cannot see that it cannot see this. For the system this 
is something concealed 'behind' the horizon that, for it, has no 'behind'”.196 
If systems can only see what they can see, cannot see what they cannot see, 
and cannot see that they cannot see this, then this is because any relation 
to the world is premised on system-specific distinctions that arise from the 
system itself. As a consequence of this, Luhmann elsewhere remarks that, 
“[t]he conclusion to be drawn from this is that the connection with the 
reality of the external world is established by the blind spot of the cognitive 
operation. Reality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it”.197
If reality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it, then this 
is because (1) objects do not relate directly to other objects, but rather 
relate to other objects only through their own distinctions, and (2) because 
objects do not themselves register the distinctions that allow them to relate 
to other objects in this way. Objects are thus withdrawn in a dual sense. 
On the one hand, objects are withdrawn from other objects in that they 
never directly encounter these other objects, but rather transform these 
perturbations into information according to their own organization. On the 
other hand, objects are withdrawn even from themselves as the distinction 
through which operations are possible, the endo-structure of objects, 
withdraw into the background, as it were, in the course of operations. When 
I note that it is raining, the distinction between precipitation and non-
precipitation is not there before me for my cognitive system, but is rather 
used or employed by my cognitive system. 
The transcendental illusion thus generated by the manner in which 
objects relate to one another is one in which the states “experienced” by a 
system are treated as other objects themselves, rather than system-specific 
entities generated by the organization of the object itself. In other words, 
the object treats the world it “experiences” as reality simpliciter, rather than 
as system-states produced by its own organization. Here it is important 
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to note that the foregoing analysis does not require us to follow Luhmann 
or Spencer-Brown in the thesis that such system-states are produced by 
binary distinctions. All that is required is that these states be produced as a 
consequence of an object's endo-structure or virtual proper being. It could 
be that binary distinctions are only operative in “more advanced” objects 
such as cognitive systems and communication systems, with other systems 
simply having an endo-structure composed of networks of relations defining 
a particular organization that can only be perturbed in various ways along 
the lines described by Bateson in terms of a transmission (or better yet, 
production) of differences. It could be that “more advanced” systems are 
non-linear networks of this sort as well. What is important is not whether 
or not information is produced through binary distinctions, but rather that 
information is a product of the organization of the system in question, not a 
transfer of information as self-identical from one object to another.
Between Luhmann's account of how systems relate to the world and 
Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology, we find remarkable points 
of overlap. Like Harman's objects, Luhmann's systems are autonomous 
individuals that are closed and independent of other systems. In his most 
recent work, Harman has argued that all objects are quadruple in their 
structure.198 Without going into all the details of his account of objects, 
Harman distinguishes between real objects and real qualities, and sensuous 
objects and sensuous qualities. Here we must proceed with caution, for 
Harman's sensuous objects 1) do not refer solely to objects that are merely 
fictional, and 2) are not restricted to humans and animals alone. Rather, 
all objects, whether animate or inanimate, relate to other objects not as 
real objects, but as sensuous objects. Evoking a sort of quasi-Lacanianism, 
we can say that “a sensuous object is an object for another object”. 
Sensuous objects are not the real object itself, but are, rather, what objects 
are for other objects. In this respect, sensuous objects are very similar to 
Luhmann's information events and system-states.
Unlike real objects, Harman's sensuous objects exist only on the interior 
of a real object. These sensuous objects can arise both from the interior of 
the real object that encounters them or from other real objects. In Prince 
of Networks, Harman gives the examples of “Monster X” and a friend’s cat 
that he is taking care of.199 Monster X is a monster that Harman generates 
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through his imagination and whose qualities he refuses to share with us 
(he assures us that this is the most fearsome and frightening monster 
ever imagined). Now, unlike a real object, Monster X only exists in the 
interior of Harman's imagination, is not withdrawn, and ceases to exist 
when he falls asleep at night or ceases thinking about it. Monster X is 
capable of acting on Harman through a sort of auto-affection of Harman 
by Harman, but it is not an object out there in the world that is capable 
of being perturbed by other objects. The case is similar with the cat 
Harman was taking care of when writing about Monster X. The cat is, of 
course, a real entity out there in the world that is an “autonomous force 
unleashed in Harman's apartment” regardless of whether he is aware of its 
activities. However, for Harman, the cat is also a sensuous object that exists 
on the interior of Harman. Like Monster X, the cat qua sensuous object 
ceases to exist when Harman ceases to think about it or when he goes to 
sleep. However, unlike Monster X, the cat qua real object continues to 
be an autonomous force unleashed in the world even when he ceases to 
think about it.
In this context, the important point to take away from Harman's 
quadruple objects is that objects only ever relate to other objects through 
sensuous objects. No object ever encounters another object as a real object. 
If we translate Harman's thesis into Luhmannian terms, we can say that 
systems or real objects only ever encounter other objects as information 
and system-states. Harman's fearsome Monster X would be an example 
of a system-state. Monster X is not an event produced within a system 
as a consequence of a perturbation from the environment, but rather is a 
meaning-event that Harman produced on his own. By contrast, Harman's 
friend's cat is a combination of information and meanings. When the cat 
perturbs him in a particular way, the cat functions as information, selecting 
a particular system-state within Harman. Various thoughts Harman might 
have about the cat would be meaning-events produced by Harman. Yet 
in both cases, what we have are purely internal system states that differ 
from whatever other objects might happen to be in the environment. As 
a consequence, we only ever encounter other objects as sensuous objects 
rather than real objects, such that we are both withdrawn from these real 
objects and they are withdrawn from us.
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4.3. Autopoietic and Allopoietic Objects
Returning to the themes of the last chapter, we can now situate the 
functioning of systems with respect to how they produce and respond to 
information in terms of virtual proper being and local manifestation. As I 
observed in 4.1, Maturana and Varela distinguish between autopoietic and 
allopoietic machines. Autopoietic machines are machines or objects that 
produce their own elements and “strive” to maintain their organization 
across time. Our bodies, for example, heal when they are cut. The key 
feature of autopoietic machines is that they produce themselves. Not only do 
autopoietic machines constitute their own elements, but they paradoxically 
constitute their own elements through interactions among their elements. 
By contrast, allopoietic machines are machines produced by something else. 
Generally the domain of allopoietic machines refers to inanimate objects. 
Here it's worth noting that the distinction between autopoietic objects 
and allopoietic objects is not a hard and fast or absolute distinction, but is 
probably a distinction that involves a variety of gradations or intermediaries. 
Despite the differences between allopoietic machines and autopoietic 
machines, I want to argue that both undergo actualizations through 
information and both involve system/environment distinctions that 
constitute their relations to other objects. Here a major difference between 
autopoietic machines and allopoietic machines would be that allopoietic 
machines can only undergo actualization through information, whereas 
autopoietic machines can both be actualized in a particular way through 
information and can actualize themselves in particular ways through 
ongoing operations internal to their being. Here it might appear strange 
to speak of information in relation to allopoietic or inanimate objects. 
However, we must recall that information is neither meaning, nor is 
information a message exchanged between objects. Rather, as we have seen, 
information is a difference that makes the difference or an event that selects 
a system state. In this regard, there is no reason to restrict information 
to autopoietic objects, for such events take place within allopoietic 
objects as well. 
Before proceeding to discuss the differences between how these 
two types of objects relate to information, it is important to make some 
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points regarding the system/environment distinction as it is deployed in 
autopoietic theory. Maturana, Varela, and Luhmann tend to speak of the 
distinction between system and environment as a distinction that systems 
draw such that this distinction allows systems to observe their environment. 
In my view, these are conventions that should be abandoned, or rather, that 
should be evoked in highly system-specific contexts. Rather than claiming 
that systems draw distinctions between themselves and their environment—
implying that there's a homunculus that does the drawing—we should 
instead say that systems are their distinction or form. Here it will be 
recalled that “form”, as Spencer-Brown understands it, is the unity of the 
marked and unmarked space produced by a distinction. The distinction that 
generates the marked and unmarked space is, of course, self-referential in 
the sense that it belongs to one side of the distinction: the system. Insofar 
as objects are autonomous and independent, they are necessarily self-
referential in that their separation from the environment is produced by 
the object itself. It is the distinction between system and environment that 
both constitutes the closure of objects and their particular form of openness 
to other objects. In the case of more “advanced” systems like cognitive 
systems, social systems, and perhaps some computers, we get the ability 
to actively draw distinctions and follow through their consequences or 
what subsequent operations they generate, but in many other instances it's 
unlikely that systems have any real freedom in how the distinction between 
system and environment is constituted. 
Likewise, rather than claiming that systems observe their environment 
through their distinctions, we should instead claim that objects interact with 
other systems through their distinctions. The emphasis on observation, in 
my view, is one of the greatest drawbacks of various strains of autopoietic 
theory. Observation implies a distinction between self-reference or 
reference to internal states of the system and other-reference or references 
to the environment. The distinction between self-reference and other-
reference, in its turn, requires a doubling of the distinction between 
system and environment within the system itself. That is, systems that 
distinguish between self-reference and other-reference are systems where 
the distinction between system and environment re-enters the system 
that draws this distinction so that the distinction between system and 
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environment can itself be observed. In other words, self-reference and 
other-reference requires a self-referential operation whereby the system 
observes how it observes and thereby distinguishes between what arises 
from within the system itself and what comes from without. Rather 
than simply undergoing a perturbation, I now treat this perturbation 
as something that issues from the environment and register that this 
perturbation comes from the environment. This doubling of the system/
environment distinction is a necessary condition for observation. 
In their discussions of autopoietic theory, Maturana and Varela often 
evoke cells as a prime example of autopoietic systems. However, this 
example, above all, indicates just why we should not talk about the self-
referential distinction upon which any system or object is founded in terms 
of observation. Although cells cannot exist without a boundary between 
system and environment that is constituted self-referentially by the cell 
itself, it is misleading to suggest that there's any meaningful sense in which 
cells observe their environment or make other-references to the world 
independent of them. To be sure, cells interact with their environment 
and are, like any other system, perturbed by their environment, but there's 
no meaningful sense in which they refer to their environment. To suggest 
otherwise is to imply that entities like cells operate according to meaning. 
Rather than speaking in terms of observation and other-reference, both of 
which are far too epistemological and cognitive in their connotations, we 
should instead speak in terms of how systems are selectively open to their 
environment and how they interact with their environment. Other-reference 
and observation, rather, seems to be something that only emerges with 
more complicated systems such as tardigrades, frogs, and perhaps certain 
computer systems.
The term “information” is fortunate in that it contains within itself a 
certain productive polysemy that allows it to resonate in a variety of ways. 
In addition to treating information as an event that selects system states, 
we can also read the term “information” avant la lettre to play on the more 
literal connotations of the term. When we break information into its units, 
we can say that information refers to what is in formation. Here information 
refers to the genesis of local manifestations as ongoing processes rather 
than as fixed identities. The identity of objects is not fixed, but is rather a 
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dynamic and ongoing identity that is in formation. While there is indeed 
an identity to the object, in the sense that it has a virtual endo-structure 
that persists across time, this identity is always manifesting itself in a 
variety of ways. Similarly, we can also read information as “in-form-ation”. 
Here information does not refer to the ongoing genesis and openness of 
objects—that which is “in formation”—but rather refers to the manner in 
which objects take on new form or come to embody new form with their 
actualizations in local manifestations. Returning to the distinction I drew 
between the topology of objects and the geometry of objects in the last 
chapter, information as in-form-ation here refers to the transition that takes 
place within an object from the domain of virtual proper being and the 
potentialities populating virtual proper being to the geometric actualization 
of a form or quality in an object. In other words, in-form-ation refers to the 
local manifestation of an object embodied in a specific quality.
In both allopoietic and autopoitic systems, information is an event 
that makes a difference by selecting a system-state. However, information 
functions in very different, yet related, ways in the case of allopoietic and 
autopoietic systems. In both cases, information is non-linear and system-
specific, existing only for the system in question and as a function of the 
organization or endo-structure of the object. In saying that information is 
non-linear, my point is that it is an effect of the endo-structure of the object as 
it relates to its environment and how this endo-structure resonates within 
the field of differential relations that define that structure. Information is 
not in the environment, but is a product of the system perturbed by its 
environment. In the case of allopoietic systems, information functions to 
actualize a degree in the phase-space of the virtual proper being of the 
substance, leading to the actualization of a particular quality in a local 
manifestation. 
Here the point I wish to make is so basic as to appear trivial. However, 
this point has important consequences for how we analyze allopoietic 
objects in the world. When an allopoietic object is perturbed in a particular 
way, it produces an actuality proper to the endo-structure of its being. One 
and the same perturbation can produce very different local manifestations 
in different allopoietic objects. Thus, for example, water behaves differently 
than rocks when hit by another object or heated up. When water is heated 
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up, it locally manifests itself in the quality of boiling. When a rock is heated 
up, heat is distributed throughout the rock. When water is hit by another 
object, it produces waves. When a rock is hit by another object, it begins to 
roll and perhaps vibrates.
These are obvious and familiar points about the objects that populate 
our world. We all recognize, even if only implicitly, that different objects 
or different types of substances respond differently to one and the same 
perturbation. However, while this is an obvious point, it is nonetheless a 
point that needs to be accounted for. It is precisely this which the concepts 
of virtual proper being, local manifestation, and information attempt to 
account for. When an allopoietic object is perturbed in a particular way, 
information is produced as a consequence of how the object in question is 
organized. This information, in turn, selects a system-state which actualizes 
a potentiality in the virtual proper being of the object in the form of a 
particular quality or local manifestation.
Now, there are two important points worth making here. First, as in 
the case of autopoietic objects, allopoietic objects are only selectively open 
to their environments. Many events can occur in the environment of an 
object without all of these events being capable of perturbing the object 
and thereby being transformed into information. While rocks, for example, 
are certainly open to sound waves, they are not, as far as I know, open to 
signifiers. Uluru or Ayers Rock, for example, is in-different to its title as 
Uluru or any special legal status it is given. It does not get offended when 
a stranger that has never heard of it fails to refer to it by its proper name, 
it doesn't answer to its proper name, nor does it likely worry itself over 
any sacred or legal preferences it might gain through being Uluru. Here 
reference to Uluru's in-difference to its name should be taken quite literally 
as signifying that Uluru's name cannot select system-states within Uluru. 
Uluru is entirely closed with respect to its name.
Lest one conclude that this sort of closure to its name is merely a 
feature of the difference between culture and nature, I offer an example 
of (non)relations between completely natural beings as well. Neutrinos 
are extremely small elementary particles that travel close to the speed of 
light. Because neutrinos are electrically neutral, they pass through most 
matter completely undisturbed and without disturbing that matter. This 
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causes, of course, massive problems in the detection of neutrinos as most 
detection devices we might use to detect them cannot be perturbed by 
them due to the electric neutrality of the neutrino. Here the neutrino is 
a perfect example of a strongly closed entity that cannot be perturbed by 
other entities and that cannot perturb many other entities. Between the 
indifference of Urulu to its proper name and the indifference of neutrinos 
to most other entities, there's a difference in degree rather than kind. While 
it is important to recognize that most inanimate objects cannot answer to 
their name (computers are quickly calling this generalization into question), 
there is no reason to treat culture as a special domain or distinct realm 
unlike material interactions. In both cases, the issue is one of how entities 
are selectively open to their environment.
The second consequence that follows from treating allopoietic objects 
in terms of self-referential system/environment distinctions that are only 
selectively open to their environment is that allopoietic objects cannot 
be treated as bundles of qualities. Qualities are results of how allopoietic 
objects are actualized by their perturbations. They are things that objects 
can do, but they do not define the proper being of objects which consists of 
powers. As I tried to show in my discussion of Bhaskar in the first chapter, 
objects can be “out of phase” with the events they're capable of producing. 
When situated in terms of qualities, this means that objects can exist, they 
can be there in the world, either in a dormant state where they produce no 
qualities of a particular sort, or in a state where, due to the intervention 
of other generative mechanisms or objects they produce exo-qualities that 
inhibit the production of particular qualities of which the object is capable.
The key point not to be missed is that the qualities of an object are 
variable. Every object, allopoietic or autopoietic, is capable of a variety of 
different local manifestations. And we can say that perhaps every object 
is capable of producing an infinite number of different properties. This 
is among the reasons that we cannot treat objects as bundles of qualities. 
Qualities are products of how allopoietic objects are perturbed, how those 
perturbations are transformed into information, and how that information 
selects system-states producing local manifestations. 
The question that emerges here is that of why, if objects cannot 
be equated with their qualities, we have such a persistent tendency to 
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reduce objects to their qualities. I think there are two basic reasons for 
this. The first has to do with the type of objects we are. Like all objects, 
we are operationally closed and relate to the world only through the 
distinctions that regulate our openness to the world. These distinctions, 
like all distinctions, have a marked and an unmarked space, such that 
the unmarked space becomes invisible or disappears. In the case of our 
perceptual world, one operative distinction seems to be the distinction 
between identity and change. Here identity functions as the marked state, 
while change functions as the unmarked state. If this schema plays such 
an important role in our experience of the world, then this is because, as 
Bergson observed long ago, our perception is geared towards action and 
our ability to act on other objects. Since action requires a more or less 
stable platform to take place, change and difference is thrown over into the 
unmarked side of the distinction governing our perception and cognition. 
When I go to grab my beloved coffee mug, I register it not as a series of 
variations or different local manifestations, but as a blue coffee mug. I register 
my mug in this way even when the lights are out and the mug is no longer 
blue. Here the blueness of the mug functions as a marker for returning to 
the mug. “Oh, there's my mug!”
However, while the manner in which we translate objects plays a role 
in our tendency to treat objects as bundles of qualities, there are object-
centered reasons for this tendency as well. While objects are, in principle, 
independent of their relations, objects are only ever encountered in and 
among relations to other objects. Terrestrial existence is such that these 
relations are more or less stable and enduring. The consequence of this 
is that allopoietic objects tend to be perturbed by other objects in their 
environment in more or less constant ways. Insofar as objects are perturbed 
in more or less constant ways by other objects in their environment, 
they tend to have fairly stable and ongoing local manifestations. As a 
consequence, the volcanic powers objects have folded within them remain 
largely hidden from view.
I refer to networks of exo-relations like this as “regimes of attraction”. 
Regimes of attraction are networks of fairly stable exo-relations among 
objects that tend to produce stable and repetitive local manifestations 
among the objects within the regime of attraction. Within a regime of 
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attraction, causal relations can be bi-directional or symmetrical or uni-
directional or asymmetrical. Bi-directional causation is a circular relation 
in which two or more entities reciprocally perturb one another in response 
to each other. Like fireflies signaling to one another, one lightning bug 
lights up and another lights up in response, leading the first to light 
up again. Similarly, one object perturbs another, producing an act in 
the second object that in turn perturbs the first object that started the 
sequence. As a consequence of these sorts of relations, we get constant 
local manifestations. The moon’s gravity affects the earth and the earth's 
gravity affects the moon. Likewise, we can have uni-lateral or asymmetrical 
relations of perturbation that bring about a largely constant state 
in an object.
Fire is a particularly good example for illustrating the idea of regimes 
of attraction. In its terrestrial manifestation, fire behaves in relatively 
predictable ways. It leaps up towards the sky and is characterized by 
pointed tongues of flame that dance and oscillate. As a consequence, we 
are led to think of this sort of behavior (these qualities) as constituting the 
essence of fire. However, in outer space, fire behaves more like water, rolling 
over things in waves, expanding everywhere like liquid on the surface of a 
table. In its terrestrial manifestation, fire behaves this way because of the 
gravity of the earth. Here fire exists within a particular regime of attraction 
that leads to very specific local manifestations. When situated in different 
regimes of attraction, fire behaves in a very different way.
The concept of regimes of attraction is of central importance to 
onticology and has profound implications for how we think about 
epistemology or inquiry. The concept of regimes of attraction entails that 
it is not enough for inquiry to merely gaze at objects to “know” them, but 
rather that we must vary the environments of objects or their exo-relations 
to discover the powers hidden within objects. Knowledge of an object does 
not reside in a list of qualities possessed by objects, but rather in a diagram 
of the powers hidden within objects. However, in order to form a diagram 
of an object we have to vary the exo-relations of an object to determine 
that of which it is capable. And here, of course, the point is that knowledge 
is gained not by representing, but, as Aristotle suggested in a different 
context in the Nicomachean Ethics, by doing. In the case of Aristotle, this 
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doing consists of repeated actions so as to produce habits or dispositions 
of action. In the case of other forms of knowledge, by contrast, this doing 
consists in acting upon objects to see what they do under these conditions.
As should be obvious, the concept of regimes of attraction is crucial 
to our understanding of both allopoietic and autopoietic objects. In “A 
Developmental Psychobiological Systems View”, biologist Gilbert Gottlieb 
recounts his early doctoral research on the sensitive period for imprinting 
in ducklings.200 Imprinting refers to any time-sensitive phase of learning 
that occurs very quickly and appears to be independent of behavior. As one 
might suspect, lurking in the background here is the issue of innateness or 
whether certain phases of imprinting are innate or learned. While Gottlieb 
did indeed discover a critical period of imprinting before and after which 
imprinting could not occur, he also discovered that the developmental 
age for imprinting could be moved around through a manipulation of the 
duckling's early environment. As Gottlieb puts it, “[t]he sensitive period for 
imprinting was not exclusively a function of maturation but depended also 
on the nature and extent of the bird's prenatal and postnatal experiences 
prior to entering into the imprinting situation”.201 Here maturation, of 
course, refers to factors of innateness. The crucial experiences that played 
a role in the timing of the onset of imprinting (or, presumably, lack 
thereof) had to do with whether or not the duckling was reared with visual 
and social experiences with other ducklings, or whether it was raised in 
complete darkness and in complete social isolation. 
What we encounter here is the importance of regimes of attraction as 
they function in the development of allopoietic objects. The point here is 
that, if we don't attend to the regime of attraction in which the autopoietic 
system develops, we fall prey to a tendency to treat local manifestations as 
strictly resulting from innate factors in the system, rather than seeing them 
as results of an interaction between both system-specific properties of the 
system and perturbations from the environment that are translated into 
information which then selects system-states. Here the conclusion seems 
to be that development does not have any one particular attractor in the 
teleological sense. Rather, through entering into different exo-relations with 
other objects in the world, an allopoietic object can develop in a variety 
of different ways. This entails that a key component of inquiry consists 
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in 1) mapping the exo-relations in which particular local manifestations 
take place, and 2) varying the exo-relations into which an object enters to 
determine the variations of which it is capable.
Nonetheless, there are significant differences between how autopoietic 
and allopoietic systems respond to information events. With allopoietic 
systems, the selection of a system-state is a terminal process. When the water 
is frozen in response to a change in temperature, it is frozen. There are 
no additional operations that take place within the system until it is once 
again perturbed in a new way. By contrast, in autopoietic systems, there 
are continuous operations that take place within the object even after the 
selection of a system-state through information. Taking an example from 
a social system, a news report that the value of the dollar has risen selects 
a system-state within the economic system. This information event, in its 
turn, kicks off a variety of subsequent operations within the social system. 
For example, people begin selling their stocks to maximize their profit. 
The point here is that, even in the absence of new information events, these 
subsequent operations continue apace. These system-states and operations 
are, of course, local manifestations of the autopoietic system in question.
Another, perhaps counter-intuitive, difference between autopoietic 
systems and allopoietic systems is that there's a way in which the local 
manifestations of allopoietic systems are more elastic than the local 
manifestations of autopoietic systems. As I noted in a previous chapter, it is 
necessary to distinguish between symmetrical and asymmetrical qualities. 
In the current context, the important nuance of this distinction is that 
symmetrical qualities are reversible qualities, while asymmetrical qualities 
are irreversible qualities. While there are certainly asymmetrical qualities that 
characterize a number of local manifestations for allopoietic objects (paper 
yellowed with age comes to mind), many qualities of allopoietic objects are 
symmetrical in character. I turn out the lights and my beloved coffee mug 
becomes black. I turn the lights on and the mug becomes a shade of blue 
once again. 
In the case of autopoietic objects, by contrast, asymmetrical qualities 
seem to be the rule rather than the exception. Developmental processes, 
for example, appear to be largely irreversible, changing the structure of 
an autopoietic object's local manifestation irrevocably. In communication 
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systems, a statement that is repeated is no longer the same statement, but 
has now taken on ever so slight new resonances. In the structural coupling 
of psychic systems and communications systems, I cannot read the same 
book twice because the very act of having read the book through once to 
the end already changes how the beginning of the book reads the second 
time when I begin it anew. As Bergson recognized at the beginning of the 
last century, the presence of memory as a dimension of all living, psychic, 
and social experience transforms each event, no matter how apparently 
repetitious in the brute sense, into a novelty.
However, where allopoietic systems often appear to have a greater 
degree of elasticity with respect to qualities, autopoietic systems seem to 
have a greater degree of elasticity with respect to distinctions or what we 
might refer to as “channels”. It will be recalled that distinctions play a key 
role in how closed systems are open to their environment or other objects 
in their environment. One of the crucial features of autopoietic systems is 
that they have the ability to develop new distinctions, thereby enhancing 
their capacity to be irritated or perturbed by other objects. This occurs in a 
variety of ways that are subject to very different degrees of freedom. Thus, 
for example, it is likely that many plants can only transform the distinctions 
through which it is possible for them to be irritated by their environment 
through evolutionary processes of random variation and natural selection. 
Throughout the animal world, we seem to get increasing degrees of 
freedom in forming new distinctions through developmental processes that 
take place through learning rather than innate structure. The same holds 
true of social systems. And finally, it appears that computers are slowly 
developing the ability to revise their own distinctions, broadening their 
ability to be irritated by their environment.
What is important here in these reflections on the difference between 
autopoietic and allopoietic objects is that both types of objects are 
organized around a system/environment distinction, both objects are 
operationally closed, both types of objects are only selectively related 
to their environment, and both objects transform perturbations into 
information that selects system-states presiding over local manifestations. 
In the case of both allopoietic and autopoietic systems, local manifestations 
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are a product of actualizations of virtual proper being rather than fixed 
properties in substances.
4.4. Translation
In light of the foregoing, we can now make sense of Latour's thesis, cited in 
the epigraph to this chapter, that objects “interpret” one another. Insofar as 
all objects are operationally closed, no object can transfer a force to another 
object without that force being transformed in some way or another. 
This generates a specific set of questions when analyzing relations among 
entities in the world. On the one hand, in any discussion of relations among 
entities, we must first determine whether the receiving entity even has 
channels capable of receiving perturbations from the acting entity. Because 
substances only maintain selective relations to their environment, they are 
not open to all perturbations that exist in their environment. As we saw 
in the last section, for example, rocks, as far as we know, are indifferent to 
our speech. This sort of selectivity is true not only of relations of objects 
between different sorts, but also of relations between objects of the same 
sort. Many, I'm sure, have experienced and been baffled by conversations 
with others from very different theoretical backgrounds and orientations. 
In such discussions, points and claims you take for granted as obvious seem 
not even to be registered or noticed by the interlocutor when made. Here 
we have different forms of selective openness among humans in discourse. 
On the other hand, in those cases where an entity is open to 
perturbations of a particular sort, we must nonetheless be attentive to the 
manner in which the entity that receives that perturbation transforms it 
according to its own organization. In other words, we cannot begin with 
the premise that the effect is already contained in the cause, but must 
instead be attentive to how the cause is transformed into something new 
and unexpected. In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan 
contrasts laws and causality in a way that resonates nicely with this point.202 
As Lacan remarks,
Cause is to be distinguished from that which is determinate 
in a chain, in other words the law. By way of example, think 
of what is pictured in the law of action and reaction. There 
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is here, one might say, a single principle. One does not go 
without the other.203
Lacan goes on to remark that,
Whenever we speak of cause, on the other hand, there is 
always something anti- conceptual, something indefinite. The 
phases of the moon are the cause of the tides—we know this 
from experience, we know that the word cause is correctly 
used here. Or again, miasmas are the cause of fever—that 
doesn't mean anything either, there is a hole, and something 
that oscillates in the interval. In short, there is cause only in 
something that doesn't work.204
Lacan concludes “there remains essentially in the function of the 
cause a certain gap”.205 In characterizing causality in terms of a gap and 
something that “doesn't work”, Lacan emphasizes the manner in which the 
effect of a cause always contains an element of surprise or something that 
can't simply be deduced from the cause. Here there's a way in which the 
effect is always in excess of the cause. And the claim that the effect contains 
something in excess of the cause is the claim that the entity being affected 
translates the cause producing something new.
Lacan's concept of causality is deeply related to his understanding of 
objet a, the object-cause of desire, and the unconscious. Without going 
into all the details of Lacan's understanding of the unconscious, objet a, 
and desire, we can here make a few brief remarks as to how this is to be 
understood. The first point to note is that objet a is not the object desired, 
but the object that causes desire. In other words, the object desired can 
be quite different from the object-cause of desire or the objet a. The objet 
a is rather that gap that generates desire. Desire is the effect of objet a, and 
objet a is the cause of desire. Put otherwise, we can say that it is that point 
where the symbolic fails and that it is the explanation of the effects of this 
failure. To illustrate this point, take the example of someone who desires 
an expensive luxury car. The car is the object of desire, but not the object-
cause of desire. Rather, the object-cause of the desire for the car is perhaps 
the gaze of others who will envy the car or attribute status to the owner 
of the car. 
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This relation can be illustrated in terms of Lacan's discourse of the 
master, first introduced in Seminar XVII: 
//



a
Each of Lacan's four discourses has four positions and defines a 
structure.206 In the upper left position we have an agent, addressing an other 
in the upper right position, producing a product in the lower right position, 
with an unconscious truth in the lower left position.
One way of reading Lacan's discourse of the master is in terms of how 
signifiers relate to one another. We have a master-signifier, S
1
, relating to 
another signifier, S
2
, producing a remainder, a. The point is that in all speech 
or utterances something escapes. When we utter something, we feel as if we 
never quite articulate what we wish to say. Indeed, we aren't even entirely 
sure what we wish to say in our own speech. On the other hand, when we 
hear another person's utterances, we're never quite sure why they say what 
they say. This is the gap that lies at the heart of all discourse. One way 
of thinking about Lacan's discourses is as diagrams of little machines in 
interpersonal relations. In the diagram above, it is paradoxically the product, 
the failure, objet a, that keeps the discourse going. Because I never quite feel 
that I've articulated what I wish to say and because I'm never quite sure 
if I've understood what the other has said, new utterances are produced 
that strive to capture this allusive remainder that perpetually recedes in 
the discourse. 
Within a psychoanalytic context, the gap by which objet a functions 
as the object-cause of desire can be fruitfully thought in terms of the role 
played by the unmarked side of a distinction as it functions in psychic 
systems. Put a bit differently, while the unmarked side of a distinction is 
not indicated by a system employing a particular distinction, this unmarked 
side nonetheless has effects on how the psychic system functions. In his 
discussion of the cause, Lacan remarks that “what the unconscious does is 
show us the gap through which neurosis recreates a harmony with a real”.207 
Here the unconscious is the network of unconscious signifiers, while the 
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gap is the real. The psychoanalytic formation (the symptom) is the harmony 
recreated with the real. 
To illustrate this point, I refer to an example from early in my own 
analysis years ago. During this time, I was just beginning to teach. This 
was back in the days when chalk was still used. Much to my dismay, I 
found that I was breaking multiple pieces of chalk during every class 
session. Indeed, this symptom was so pronounced and noticeable, that 
it became a running joke with my students. They even got together and 
left a chalk guard in my mailbox with a petition written in calligraphy 
imploring me to stop killing the citizens of “Chalkville” and a picture of a 
piece of chalk dressed in armor. Now, I found all of this quite upsetting as 
I felt it was undermining my authority in the classroom and revealing my 
incompetence. One day, in a session, I was rambling on about this little 
symptom. “I don't know what my problem is. I can't seem to modulate my 
pressure on the chalk. I try not to, but I always end up pressing too hard. 
Why can't I use less pressure?” And so on. As my ramble went on, my 
analyst, in a flat voice, intoned in a statement that was ambiguous as to 
whether it was a question or a statement, “pressure at the board?” “Yes”, I 
responded, completely missing the polysemy of his remark, “pressure at the 
board! I just can't keep myself from using too much pressure!” After this 
session, I didn't think about the discussion of the chalk at all. Two weeks 
later, however, I noticed that I hadn't broken any chalk for two weeks. 
Somehow the desire embodied in my symptom had been articulated and 
therefore, from the standpoint of my unconscious, I no longer had to break 
chalk to articulate that desire.
Now where is the objet a, desire, and the unconscious in this example? 
Where is the gap through which the unconscious recreates a harmony with 
the real? Here the objet a is very likely the gaze of my students. That gaze 
poses a question: what am I for them? This gaze, however, was not the object 
of my desire, but the cause of my desire. It was that which set the desire 
in motion. In his various glosses on desire, Lacan said that “desire is the 
desire of the Other”. This is a polysemous aphorism that has a number of 
different connotations. It can mean that desire desires the Other. Likewise, 
it can mean that our desire is not, as it were, truly our own, but rather is 
the Other's desire. That is, it can mean that we desire as the Other desires, 
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as in the case of an adult who lives her life pursuing the career her parents 
wanted. Finally, it can mean that we desire to be desired by the Other. 
In this instance, my chalk breaking symptom did not seem to desire the 
Other (my student's here standing in the place of the Other), but rather 
seemed to be an articulation of their desire (or, rather, my fantasy of what 
they desired). Faced with the opacity or enigma of my students' desire, 
my unconscious sought to transform this traumatic and enigmatic desire 
into a specific demand or judgment: “You are not competent, you do not 
belong here!” In other words, through the breaking of the chalk I was 
perhaps unconsciously trying to satisfy my fantasy of what I took to be their 
demand. The breaking of the chalk at the board was both an articulation 
of how I was feeling (“pressured at the board”) and a potential solution 
to the pressure I was experiencing: “if I'm incompetent then I won't have 
to teach!” The unconscious recreated a harmony with the real by giving 
content to the enigmatic gaze of my students through the symptom of 
breaking the chalk.
The gap functions in a very specific way in Lacan's conception of the 
mechanisms of the unconscious, but we can say that Lacan also makes 
a broader and more profound point about the gap and the relationship 
between cause and effect that holds for all inter-object relations. Here we 
can coin the aphorism, “there is no transportation without translation”, 
or, alternatively, “there is no transportation without transformation”. 
Here we must take care not to take Lacan's notion of the gaze too literally, 
but the point in this connection would be that the effects of the gaze as a 
perturbation cannot be anticipated in advance. Rather the effect that the 
gaze produces is an aleatory product of the organization or virtual proper 
being of the system that is perturbed by the gaze. Each substance translates 
perturbations in its own particular way.
Here, then, we can make sense of what Latour means when he claims 
that objects interpret one another. To interpret is to translate, and to 
translate is to produce something new. As Latour remarks, “[t]o interpret 
something is to say it in other words. In other words, it is to translate”.208 
The translated is never identical to the original, but rather produces 
something different from the original. For example, if this book is some day 
translated into, say, German, it will very likely take on resonances that it 
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doesn't have in English. My discussions of “existence” might be translated 
into Dasein. Yet the German term Dasein has connotations that English 
doesn't have, such as “there-being” or “here-being”. In being translated 
into another language a text becomes something different. Likewise, 
when a perturbation is received by another entity, it becomes something 
different. As Latour says earlier in Irreductions, “[n]othing is, by itself, the 
same as or different from anything else. That is, there are no equivalents, 
only translations”.209 The point here is that no perturbation ever retains its 
identity or self-sameness when transported from one entity to another, but 
rather becomes something different as a consequence of being translated 
into information and then producing a particular local manifestation in the 
receiving object.
Along these lines, Latour elsewhere draws a distinction between 
mediators and intermediaries in Reassembling the Social. As Latour 
articulates this distinction,
An intermediary [...] is what transports meaning or force 
without transformation: defining its inputs is enough to 
define its outputs [...]. Mediators, on the other hand, cannot 
be counted as just one; they might count for one, for nothing, 
for several, or for infinity. Their input is never a good 
predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into 
account every time. Mediators transform, translate, distort, 
and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed 
to carry.210
All objects are mediators with respect to one another, transforming 
or translating what they receive and thereby producing something new 
as a result. By contrast, intermediaries merely carry a force or meaning 
without transforming it in any way. In this connection, we can say that the 
concept of intermediaries treats objects as mere vehicles of the differences 
contributed by another entity. In one of his most recent works, Latour 
drives this point home, remarking that,
what should appear extraordinarily bizarre is [...] the 
invention of inanimate entities which should do nothing 
more than carry one step further the cause that makes them 
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act to generate the n+1 consequence which in turn are 
nothing but the causes of the n+2 consequences. This conceit 
has the strange result of composing the world with long 
concatenations of causes and effects where (this is what is 
so odd) nothing is supposed to happen, except probably at the 
beginning—but since there is no God in those staunchly 
secular versions there is not even a beginning [...]. The 
disappearance of agency in the so called “materialist world 
view” is a stunning invention especially since it is contradicted 
every step of the way by the odd resistance of reality: every 
consequence adds slightly to the cause. Thus, it has to 
have some sort of agency. There is a supplement. A gap 
between the two.211
Our treatment of objects in terms of autopoietic and allopoietic 
machines has explained just why this is the case. Insofar as all entities 
draw a system/environment distinction and transform perturbations into 
information as a function of their own internal organization, they always 
contribute something new to the perturbations they receive.
The concept of translation, coupled with the distinction between 
mediators and intermediaries has profound implications for both theory 
and practice. In the docile bodies chapter of Discipline and Punish, we 
encounter a prime example of theories and practices organized around the 
conceptualization of substances in terms of mere intermediaries.212 There 
Foucault analyzes a disciplinary structure of power that aims to form the 
soldier down to the tiniest detail.
By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become 
something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt 
body, the machine required can be constructed; a posture 
is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly 
through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, 
ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of 
habit; in short, one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him 
'the air of a soldier'.213
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This conception of the formation of the soldier is premised on an 
implausible idea of causation where causes are transported from one object 
to another without remainder. Here the soldier is a pliable clay that can be 
formed however we like. Here information is conceived as something that 
is transported as self-identical, producing a univocal effect in the body of 
the soldier-to-be. What is entirely missed in such a model is the manner in 
which the entity receiving the perturbation transforms it according to its 
own organization.
In a very different context, biologist Richard Lewontin contrasts the 
difference between how applied biologists approach research into plants 
and animals and how developmental biologists in the laboratory approach 
plants and animals.214 For the developmental biologist in the laboratory, 
a lot of research revolves around the manipulation of genes to see how 
they affect the phenotype. This encourages a conception of organisms in 
which genes are thought of as already containing the information whereby 
the phenotype is produced. In other words, genes are thought as a map 
or blueprint of the organism. By contrast, applied biologists investigating 
potentially new crops, test these crops for several years by growing variants 
of the crop in different environments or in different regions. As Lewontin 
notes, the crop that is eventually chosen for sale is not necessarily the 
crop that produces the largest yield but the one that produces the most 
consistent yield when grown in a variety of different regions.215
In Lewontin's example, we find a perfect instance of the difference 
between approaching the world in terms of intermediaries and approaching 
the world in terms of mediators. In treating information as already 
contained in the genes, the developmental biologist treats the organism as a 
mere intermediary. The blueprint is already contained within the genes and 
it is enough to merely manipulate the genes in a particular way to produce 
a particular phenotype. The point here is not that such manipulations don't 
produce particular phenotypes but that 1) these particular perturbations 
are a particular environment, and 2) in many instances environmental 
perturbations can produce similar transformations of phenotypes. As a 
consequence, we should see genes not as something that already contain 
information, but rather as one causal factor among others, where information 
is not already there, but rather where it is produced as a result of operations 
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in the system/environment relation. In this connection, Susan Oyama calls 
for parity in investigating objects. As Oyama puts it, developmental systems 
theory (DST),
makes extensive use of parity of reasoning. Descriptions 
and explanations of development are often asymmetric: the 
logic that is used (when there is a logic at all) to characterize 
certain factors as informing, coding, controlling, and so forth, 
could be, but typically is not, applied to other factors that play 
demonstrably comparable roles. In contrast, DST includes as 
full-fledged interactants many factors that are generally left in 
the background.216
In contrast to the developmental biologist described by Lewontin, the 
applied biologist's investigative practice implicitly indicates parity reasoning 
in its approach to new crops. In growing crops in different environments 
and regions, the applied biologist works on the premise that genes are not 
blueprints already containing information, but rather are one causal factor 
among others that can generate very different effects at the level of the 
phenotype when grown under different environmental conditions.
For the applied biologist, the entity (the seeds) are full-blown mediators. 
Between cause and effect there is here a gap, such that the effect is 
unknown. That is, we don't know what phenotypes will be produced under 
these circumstances. By contrast, the gap between cause and effect tends to 
disappear in the research practices of Lewontin's developmental biologist. 
Lewontin's developmental biologist, of course, begins with the premise 
that we don't know what phenotype will be produced if we manipulate 
this gene. The point, however, is that through the focus on genes alone, 
the developmental biologist tends to create the implicit conclusion that 
the information is already contained in the genes. In other words, the 
developmental biologist creates the impression that the effect is already 
there, requiring only a perturbation to take place. Lewontin's applied 
biologist, by contrast, works from the implicit premise that the phenotype 
is something that is constructed and that it is constructed in a way that 
can't be determined from the genes alone. One and the same genotype can 
produce very different results when cultivated in different environments. 
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As such, the seed is, for the applied biologist, a mediator. In short, there 
is no one-to-one mapping between genotype and phenotype. In this 
regard, we need to think the role that information plays in an object not 
as something that exists already in the entity, but as a cascade of events 
where information is simultaneously constructed and where information 
selects system-states. Needless to say, these selections have an impact on 
subsequent stages of development, playing a role in the determination of 
what subsequent information constructions are possible and excluding 
other possibilities.
Implicit assumptions about the transmissibility of information are rife in 
various forms of cultural studies as well. Whenever we speak of discourses, 
narratives, signifiers, social forces, and media as structuring reality and 
dominating people behind their backs, we speak as if persons were mere 
intermediaries or as if information can be exchanged without remainder. 
In other words, we ignore the manner in which systems are closed and 
how there is always a gap between cause and effect. Yet social systems, 
which are always themselves objects or substances, have a tough go of it 
as the objects of which these objects are composed never quite cooperate. 
All communication, as Lacan said, is miscommunication. And if this is the 
case, then it is because all systems produce their own information according 
to their own organization. As a consequence, every object or system is beset 
by its own system internal entropy as a consequence of the other objects or 
systems of which it is composed. Because objects are not intermediaries but 
rather mediators, the elements that a system constitutes never quite behave 
in the way the system anticipates.
The point here is that society cannot, as Latour said, be treated as an 
explanation but is precisely what has to be explained.217 What is remarkable 
is that any stable social relations ever emerge at all. In A Sociological Theory 
of Communication, Loet Leydesdorff raises a similar question with respect 
to the self-organization of scientific discourse. How is it, we might ask, that 
something like a Kuhnian paradigm comes into existence? Leydesdorff 
proposes that first we have a field of heterogeneous communication acts, or 
a field that might be characterized by a high degree of entropy. Now, one of 
the remarkable and important features about human communication is that 
it is self-reflexive. That is, we can communicate about our communications 
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or talk about our talk. At the second stage, reflexive discourse begins to set 
in. As Leydesdorff puts it, 
if reflexive analysts begin to communicate among themselves 
not only in terms of how they analyze data, but also at the 
reflexive level, e.g., about standards of analysis, the standards 
may become de-personalized; they begin to circulate in the 
communication system of this community, and thus begin 
to form a supra-individual dimension of quality control for 
the actors.218
With the reflexive moment of communication, distinctions and 
selections begin to emerge, determining a marked state or that which is 
selected and an unmarked state or that which is excluded. Over time, 
this talk about talk spreads through the community and becomes a sort 
of assumed background of those involved in communication, such that 
communications that deviate from these newly formed norms, themes, and 
distinctions are simply coded out as noise. In other words, a social system 
organizes itself and now develops its own capacity for selection at the 
second-order level through the manner in which talk about talk has become 
sedimented in those participating in the discourse. 
In this way, the system thereby attains closure, both being produced by 
its own elements and producing its own elements. The system only comes 
into being from the action of those participating in the communication, but 
their communications begin to play a constraining role and produce new 
elements in the form of both new communications within the framework of 
the distinctions and selections produced by the system, and to produce new 
communicators capable of participating within that system. The production 
of these new elements, of course, takes place through the training of 
those participating in scientific discourse. The important point to keep in 
mind, however, is that even while such a self-organizing system comes to 
constitute its own elements, these elements aren't just elements. Rather, 
they are substances in their own right as well. As a consequence, such 
systems always struggle against a system-specific entropy. Communications 
are perpetually emerging that either diverge from the system that has 
emerged, or that challenge that system. In other words, the elements of the 
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system are never simple intermediaries. Communications within the system 
perpetually generate surprising results as they pass through the mediators 
in the form of the persons participating in the discourse.
The concept of translation encourages us to engage in inquiry in a 
different way. Working from the premise that entities are mediators, it 
discourages any mode of theorizing that implicitly or explicitly treats objects 
as mere intermediaries such that effects are already contained within 
causes. As Latour suggests, all entities are treated as having greater or 
lesser degrees of agency by virtue of having a system-specific organization 
that prevents the relation between cause and effect from being treated as a 
simple exchange of information that inevitably produces a particular result. 
Likewise, in approaching entities as mediators, we are encouraged to attend 
to the manner in which entities produce surprising local manifestations 
when perturbed in particular ways and to vary the contexts in which entities 
are perturbed to discover what volcanic powers they have hidden within 
themselves. That is, we begin to investigate the manner in which substances 
creatively translate the world around them. In this respect, we move from 
the marked to the unmarked space of much contemporary thought. Rather 
than treating deviations from our predications as mere noise to be ignored, 
we instead treat these deviations as giving us insight into the way in which 
entities translate their world. 
4.5. Autopoietic Asphyxiation: The Case of the Lacanian Clinic
To illustrate these points about the nature of translation and the closure of 
objects, I now turn briefly to some schematic remarks about the ontological 
foundations of the Lacanian clinic. My aim here is twofold. On the one 
hand, my aim is to schematically outline why Lacanian analysts conduct 
themselves as they do with respect to the treatment of their analysands. 
On the other hand, I wish to head off the criticism that object-oriented 
ontology ignores humans or the subject. As discussed in the introduction, 
the thesis of onticology and object-oriented philosophy is not that we 
should ignore subjects and focus instead on objects, but rather that being 
is composed entirely of objects or substances. In this respect, subjects are 
not other than objects, but rather are a particular type of object that relates 
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to the world in a specific way. Far from excluding subjects, onticology is 
completely able to integrate various theories of the subject. What onticology 
and object-oriented philosophy object to is thus not the category of the 
subject, but rather the modernist conception of the subject in which the 
object is always coupled to the subject or culture in some form or another. 
Onticology, by contrast, seeks to think a subjectless object or an object that 
is not merely a correlate of a subject.
The account of autopoietic systems and operational closure 
developed in the foregoing turns out to be quite consonant with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. In many respects, this comes as no surprise for, as a 
brief glance at the index to Seminar II indicates, Lacan was well aware 
of cybernetics which is, in turn, deeply related to autopoietic theory.219 
One of the features that marks Lacan's account of the subject is that it is 
thoroughly “intersubjective”. The subject is both constituted in the field of 
the Other and is a perpetual relation with the Other. This is reflected both 
in Lacan's theory of the various subject-structures (neurosis, psychosis, and 
perversion) and how analysis is conducted.
Speaking strictly in the context of neurosis, it is ordinarily a symptom 
that brings a person to analysis. Setting aside the intricacies and 
transformations Lacan's theory of the symptom undergoes over the course 
of his teaching, it is important to note that Lacan's conception of the 
psychoanalytic symptom is not that of an underlying pathology arising 
from organic causes—for example, a chemical imbalance—but rather of 
the expression of a repressed desire and a relation to the Other. In this 
respect, the symptom is a form of speech, an address to the Other, that 
speaks without speaking. For example, my breaking of the chalk was saying 
something to my students. In this regard, Lacan remarks “that symptoms 
can be entirely resolved in an analysis of language, because a symptom is 
itself structured like a language: a symptom is language from which speech 
must be delivered”.220 The symptom, in short, is a way of speaking or 
addressing the Other while simultaneously not speaking.
Yet the symptom is also an expression of desire. However, here we must 
recall that for Lacan “desire is the desire of the Other”. As we saw in the 
last section, this can entail that desire desires the Other, that desire desires 
to be desired by the Other, and that desire desires as the Other desires. In 
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each instance, desire marks an intersubjective relation to the Other or a way 
of relating to the Other. In the case of neurosis, the desire that underlies 
the symptom is a repressed desire that the analysand, for whatever reason, 
cannot acknowledge or embrace. In this connection, it is crucial to note 
that the aim of analysis is not to treat the symptom, but to transform the 
analysand's relationship to both their own desire and the Other. While 
psychoanalytic treatment can, indeed, dissolve many symptoms—I ceased, 
for example, breaking chalk after that session—those symptoms that are 
dissolved come to be replaced by other symptoms. This is because, in the 
case of neurosis, the subject very much is its desire. What Lacan aims for 
rather is an avowal of desire and a separation from the Other.
In many respects, the symptom can be seen as a way of responding to 
the enigma of the Other's desire. In Seminar X, Lacan asks us to imagine 
standing before a female praying mantis without knowing whether or not 
we are wearing the mask of a male or female praying mantis.221 As is well 
known, the female praying mantis devours the male praying mantis after 
mating with him. This perfectly embodies the dilemma of desire. Insofar 
as we don’t know which mask we are wearing, we don’t know what we are 
for the female praying mantis. The symptom can thus be thought as a way 
of surmounting or filling out this enigma by forming a hypothesis of what 
the Other desires. Desire, it could be said, embodies our non-knowledge 
with respect to the Other's desire. Embodied in all intersubjective relations 
is the sense that despite the fact that we are being addressed by the Other, 
we nonetheless do not know why the Other is addressing us. Put differently, 
we do not know the desire that animates the Other's relation to us. In 
this regard, the desire of the Other closely mirrors the phenomenon of 
operational closure with respect to systems. The Other perturbs us in a 
variety of ways, but we are unable to determine what intentions lie behind 
the Other's interaction with us. 
It is this non-knowledge with respect to the desire of the Other that 
generates the fantasy and the symptom. Within the Lacanian framework, 
the fantasy is not so much a wish for something we lack, but is rather 
an answer to the enigma of the Other's desire. Fantasy, we could say, is a 
hypothesis as to what the Other desires. Through fantasy, the anxiety the 
subject encounters in the face of the enigma of the Other's desire is thereby 
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minimized. Even where the fantasy is rather grim (“the Other wants to 
beat and exploit me!”), the answer to the enigma of the Other's desire is 
nonetheless preferable to the anxiety-provoking non-knowledge of that 
desire. With the answer provided by the unconscious fantasy, the analysand 
can now set about either thwarting or satisfying what they unconsciously 
believe to be the Other's demand, while also providing themselves with a 
schema for understanding what the Other wants from her.
Within a Luhmannian framework, we can already see that fantasy serves 
a function deeply analogous to the role of distinction in the continuing 
operations of a system. Here it will be recalled that distinction is a necessary 
condition for indication. If a system is to be capable of indicating anything 
within its environment, then it must first draw a distinction. However, 
distinction embodies two blind spots. On the one hand, every distinction 
contains a blind spot in the form of its unmarked state or what falls outside 
of the distinction. On the other hand, the distinction itself embodies a 
blind spot insofar as in the use of the distinction to make indications, 
the distinction itself becomes invisible, disguising the manner in which 
it renders indication possible. Just as Lewis Carroll said that you can eat 
your food or talk to your food but not eat your food and talk to your food, 
distinction is such that you can use your distinctions to make indications or 
observe your distinctions, but you can't observe your distinctions and use 
your distinctions. As a consequence, the use or operation of distinctions in 
making indications or observations produces a “reality effect” where what 
is observed or indicated appears to be a direct property of the indicated 
itself, rather than an effect of the distinction that renders the indication 
possible. So it is with fantasy as well. The fantasy is that which recedes 
in the background while structuring relations to the Other. As such, 
fantasy creates an effect whereby the manner in which fantasy transforms 
perturbations from the Other into information appears to directly result 
from the Other or to be a property of the Other itself. As Žižek puts it, 
“[t]he role of fantasy [is to] mediate between the formal symbolic structure 
and the positivity of objects we encounter in reality—that is to say, it 
provides a 'schema' according to which certain positive objects in reality 
can function as objects of desire, filling in the empty places opened up by 
the formal symbolic structure”.222 However, it is not simply the holes in the 
Chapter 4: The Interior of Objects 189
symbolic structure that are at stake here, but the opacity of the Other in our 
relations to the Other that fantasy fills. In this regard, it can be seen that 
fantasy is a direct response to the withdrawal of objects or others, to their 
constitutive opacity borne out of the operational closure of other persons 
and the social field as a whole.
The operational closure of subjects and the role played by the fantasy 
pose special challenges in the analytic setting. If fantasy structures the 
analysand's interpersonal relations in such a way as to pre-interpret 
perturbations from others in a particular way, how can the analyst 
intervene in the psychic economy of the analysand without merely 
reinforcing the analysand's fantasy and confirming their unconscious 
conception of the Other? Already we see that this question is a question of 
how it is possible to relate to operationally closed objects that cannot be 
dominated or controlled. Expressed a bit differently, the point here revolves 
around the status of information as it functions in psychic systems. One 
psychotherapeutic approach might have it that information is something 
that can be exchanged between therapist and patient such that it retains 
its identity or the meaning of the message. This seems to have been the 
premise of Freud's early treatments where he would didactically explain 
the dreams of his patients and their symptoms as, for example, in the case 
of Dora. However, as Freud quickly learned, not only did such didactic 
explanations have little impact on the symptom or in transforming the 
relationship of the subject to the Other, but in certain instances, such 
as in the case of Dora, it actually led patients to flee the analytic setting. 
Somehow a practice had to be devised that allowed the analysands to arrive 
at these discoveries for themselves, and the reason for this revolves around 
how information functions in closed systems.
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that 
the end of analysis consists in traversing the fantasy and separating from 
the desire of the Other. In light of the foregoing, we are now in a position 
to understand what Lacan is getting at with these proposals. Traversing the 
fantasy consists in a shift in perspective from relating to the Other in terms 
of first-order observation through the fantasy to second-order observation 
of the fantasy. The analysand shifts from making indications based on the 
distinctions drawn by the fantasy, to observing how he or she observes; that 
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is, observing the fantasy itself. Accompanying this shift is a realization of 
the contingency of the manner in which the fantasy has drawn distinctions 
or how the analysand might be mistaken about the Other's desire. In other 
words, the analysand is confronted with the enigma of the Other's desire 
and thereby freed from the unconscious belief that the Other is making 
a specific demand of the subject. Accompanying this shift is a separation 
from the desire of the Other. Where first-order observation based on fantasy 
creates the impression that it is the Other itself that is making a specific 
demand, the shift towards second-order observation reveals the manner in 
which the subject's fantasy formatted perturbations from the Other in such 
a way as to transform them into a specific demand. Like Harry Angel in 
Alan Parker's Angel Heart, the analysand discovers that what he took to be 
the Other's demand was his desire all along.223 At this point, the analysand 
is in a position to avow his desire, which, in turn, is often accompanied by a 
quite significant shift in how the subject relates to his or her symptom.
Yet how is this shift accomplished within the psychoanalytic setting? 
This shift is brought about by the manner in which the analyst conducts 
herself. As has often been remarked, the analyst is an enigmatic and 
impassive figure who seldom responds to the analysand. Lacan goes so 
far as to compare the position of the analyst with playing dead. As Lacan 
remarks, “the analyst concretely intervenes in the dialectic of analysis by 
playing dead—by 'cadaverizing' his position, as the Chinese say—either by 
his silence where he is the Other with a capital O, or by canceling out his 
own resistance where he is the other with a lowercase o”.224 This activity of 
playing dead serves the important function of confronting the analysand 
with the enigma of the Other's desire. Where the analysand expects the 
analyst to say something, thereby giving him a framework by which to 
transform this enigma of the Other's desire into a specific demand that 
the analysand can then satisfy or thwart, the analyst instead presents the 
analysand with a blank screen, thereby bringing the analysand before an 
inscrutable desire or a question: What does the Other want? In the early 
sessions of my own analysis, for example, I recall asking my analyst how 
he was doing at the beginning of my sessions or would inquire about some 
aspect of an article that he had recently published. My analyst would 
respond with utter silence that would then be punctuated with a drawn out 
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“so?” inviting me to begin free associating. In this way, the analyst gave me 
no foothold to transform his desire into a demand. Whatever I began talking 
about issued from me and me alone rather than taking place as a response 
to a demand. This impassivity of the analyst's position thus gradually 
brings the analysand before the manner in which he or she projects certain 
demands on to the Other. Insofar as the analyst makes no specific demands 
beyond the demand to free associate, the analysand increasingly becomes 
aware of the manner in which the Other makes a specific demand of him 
issues from himself rather than the Other. In this way, he gradually traverses 
the fantasy, coming to see how he throws the net of fantasy over the Other 
as a way of transforming the enigma of desire into demand.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that the analyst merely 
sits there quietly. The analyst does ask questions and make remarks. Yet 
the remarks that the analyst makes are generally of an enigmatic and 
polysemous nature, amenable to a variety of different interpretations. 
Lacanian interpretation does not tell an analysand what such and such 
means, but is rather an enigmatic and polysemous speech-act on the part 
of the analyst wherein the analysand or the patient creates the meaning. 
In this respect, one way of understanding Lacanian interpretation is as 
systematic misinterpretation. A properly psychoanalytic interpretation does 
not register that the analyst has understood—this would reinforce the 
belief that information is transmitted between closed systems—but rather 
works on the statements of the analysand in a surprising way that creates 
new meaning. Returning to the example from the last section, when my 
analyst intoned “pressure at the board”, this statement systematically 
misinterpreted my discourse and upset my anticipations by taking the 
discourse I was articulating around physiology and physics (placing too 
much pressure on the chalk) and formulated a polysemous statement that 
simultaneously articulated these points about physics and physiology while 
also transforming the meaning in such a way as to indicate my pressure and 
anxiety at the board. 
This particular form or practice of interpretation serves two important 
functions within the clinical setting. On the one hand, insofar as the 
interpretation is never quite what the analysand expects and insofar as 
it always slightly misinterprets what the analysand is saying, it becomes 
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an event capable of producing information or resonance within the 
analysand. That is, it functions as an event capable of selecting new 
system-states. Where an interpretation that merely indicates the analyst 
has understood produces no new information (information repeated is no 
longer information), the minimal surprise embodied in a psychoanalytic 
interpretation carries the possibility of generating new meaning and 
redrawing distinctions that structure the analysand's experience of the 
world. As such, it becomes possible to shift the symptom into new basins 
of attraction that might be far less painful for the subject. On the other 
hand, insofar as the interpretation seems to misunderstand the analysand, 
it systematically undermines the analysand's deeply held belief that he 
has access to the Other, thereby assisting in the process of separation 
from the Other.
This brief gloss on Lacanian practice hardly does justice to the depth 
and complexity of Lacanian theory. I have, for example, said nothing 
about the objet a, jouissance, the various subject-structures, the imaginary, 
symbolic, and the real, and so on. However, my point is that if Lacan is 
right, then the quandaries the neurotic subject finds himself in follow 
directly from the ontological withdrawal of objects and their operational 
closure as systems. The quandaries of the neurotic subject are quandaries 
that emerge when psychic systems are coupled to other operationally closed 
systems such as the social system into which they are born and relations to 
other people. The subject wonders what their place is in the social system, 
what they are for the social system, and what they are for other people. 
Yet because systems are operationally closed, because psychic systems are 
both outside other psychic systems and exist only in the environment of the 
social system, there is no univocal answer to these questions. The symptom 
and the fantasy are ways in which this dilemma is navigated. This is true 
even where the symptom has an organic foundation in, for example, the 
neurology of the analysand, for the psychic system must still give these 
perturbations coming from within its own internal environment a meaning. 
Lacanian theory and practice gives us insight into just what is entailed by 
the withdrawal of objects, how this withdrawal is organized, and the reality 
effect produced as a function of the way in which objects construct their 
openness to their environment.
Chapter 5
Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure
The final step in the integration of developmental biology 
into evolution is to incorporate the organism as itself a cause 
of its own development, as a mediating mechanism by which 
external and internal factors influence its future. 
— R. Lewontin225
Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of 
plants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, 
each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still 
another such garden or pond. 
— G.W. Leibniz226
5.1. Constraints
In Critical Environments, Cary Wolfe, a strong defender of Luhmann's 
systems theory, develops an important critique of autopoietic theory. As 
Wolfe writes,
We might say [...] that Luhmann's “blind spot”, his 
unobservable constitutive distinction, is his unspoken 
distinction between “differentiation” and what historicist, 
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materialist critique has theorized as “contradiction”, a 
blind spot that manifests itself in Luhmann's inability or 
unwillingness to adequately theorize the discrepancy between 
the formal equivalence of observers in his epistemology and 
their real lack of equivalence on the material, social plane. 
It seems that the category of contradiction—insofar as it 
names precisely this difference—proves much more difficult 
to dispose of than Luhmann's systems theory imagines. Or 
rather—to put a somewhat finer point on it—it is disposed of 
by systems theory, but only “abstractly”, as Marxist theorists 
like to say, only in thought, but not in historical, material 
practice.227
In point of fact, this shortcoming of autopoietic theory arises not simply 
with respect to social relations, but rather besets all discussions of exo-
relations with respect to objects. In its focus on the operational closure of 
objects, the self-regulation and self-production of objects, and the manner 
in which objects constitute their own information, autopoietic theory tends 
towards a utopianism that ignores material constraints on the activity of 
objects when objects enter into exo-relations with other objects. In its 
emphasis on the closure of objects, autopoietic theory often tends towards a 
picture of objects in which they are completely self-determining and therefore 
entirely sovereign. Each object is treated as an observer that observes 
the world through its own distinctions, and all observers are treated as 
absolutely equal. For example, we encounter Luhmann saying that objects 
cannot be dominated. What is missed here, however, are inequalities among 
objects that emerge as a result of how they are related to other objects 
in networks.
In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx observes that, 
“[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past”.228 What 
Marx says here is true not only of human actors, but also of all nonhuman 
actors. In many of its formulations, autopoietic theory threatens to invert 
this thesis. That is, autopoietic theory tends towards a characterization of 
the world in which entities not only make their own history, but make their 
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own history in conditions of their own making. What we get here is a sort of 
radical idealism, where every entity, by virtue of its operational closure, 
fully constructs its own world. As Paul Bains articulates it in The Primacy 
of Semiosis,
There are nothing but interpretations. Maturana contends 
that reality as a universe of independent entities is a fiction of 
the descriptive domain and that the notion of reality should 
be applied to this domain of descriptions in which we, the 
describing system, interact with our descriptions as if with 
independent entities.229
As a consequence, Bains continues, “we can begin to see that 
Maturana and Varela oscillate between realist claims about the nature 
of the individuality of autopoietic systems independent of an observer 
and idealist and phenomenological claims wherein thought is not able to 
have a real relation with something other than itself”.230 Do Maturana 
and Varela contend merely that we cannot have a direct relation with 
other objects, or are they making the more radical claim that each object 
constructs all other objects? The two claims are very different. The first 
claim is broadly consistent with the claims of object-oriented philosophy 
and onticology, insofar as both hold that all objects withdraw from one 
another, encountering each other only on conditions of closure. The second 
claim seems to lead to incoherence in that it is not clear how there can 
simultaneously be no independent reality and be entities that construct 
other entities. In other words, minimally autopoietic theory requires the 
independent reality and existence of entities doing the construction. 
However, the more significant problem with autopoietic systems 
theory is that in its focus on the internal functioning of the entity, it tends 
towards a conception of entities that carry out their functions in a purely 
frictionless space, where each entity is a complete sovereign encountering 
no constraints from the world around it. It is one thing, following 
Aristotle, to defend the autonomy and independence of substance. It is 
quite another to argue that this autonomy and independence of substance 
entails that when substances enter into exo-relations with other objects they 
nonetheless remain completely unconstrained. The absurdity of the thesis 
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that there are no independent objects can be discerned by simply reversing 
Maturana and Varela's claims about observation. Are Maturana and Varela 
prepared to claim that they are constructed by the observations of another 
autopoietic system such as the tardigrade? If not, why? And if they do grant 
independent existence to themselves, why do they not follow Bhaskar in 
granting a similar autonomous existence to other objects? What we need is 
an account of exo-relations capable of doing justice to both the closure and 
withdrawal of objects as well as the constraints that other objects exercise 
on withdrawn objects.
In this connection, we can ask ourselves how it is possible for objects 
to be constrained despite their autonomy, independence, and self-
determination. In many respects, it is the distinction between virtual proper 
being and local manifestation, coupled with the concept of regimes of 
attraction that allows us to theorize these constraints. For while, in their 
virtual proper being, objects withdraw from any of their actualizations in 
local manifestations, while every object always contains a reserve excess 
over and above its local manifestations, nonetheless local manifestations 
are often highly constrained by the exo-relations an object enters into with 
other objects in a regime of attraction. 
The key point not to be missed is that while objects are only selectively 
open to their environments, this doesn't entail that objects are free to do 
whatever they might like with their environments. In the case of autopoietic 
systems, for example, the distinctions which organize a system's relation 
to its environment are more or less anticipations, selecting events that are 
relevant to the ongoing autopoiesis of the system. However, as anticipations, 
these distinctions can be disappointed and those disappointments play a role 
in the subsequent development of the system. What we need is a model 
of exo-relations that allows us to thematize these complex exo-relations 
between system and environment. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
remarks that,
A living being is not only defined genetically, by the 
dynamisms which determine its internal milieu, but also 
ecologically, by the external movements which preside over 
its distribution within an extensity. A kinetics of population 
adjoins, without resembling, the kinetics of the egg; a 
Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 197
geographic process of isolation may be no less formative 
of species than internal genetic variations, and sometimes 
precede the latter. Everything is even more complicated 
when we consider that the internal space is itself made up 
of multiple spaces which must be locally integrated and 
connected, and that this connection, which may be achieved 
in many ways, pushes the object or living being to its own 
limits, all in contact with the exterior; and that this relation 
with the exterior, and with other things and living beings, 
implies in turn connections and global integrations which 
differ in kind from the preceding.231
Deleuze here presents us with a model of objects in which the 
development of objects unfolds in a relation between three environments. 
In the case of the organism, there is the internal environment defined by 
the genes of the organism. In addition to the internal environment of the 
organism, there is the external environment of the organism defined by 
relations to other organisms and entities out there in the world. Finally, 
there is what we might call the “horizontal” environment of the organism, 
consisting of the internal parts of the organism and the pressures they place 
on one another requiring integration. When we think this threefold relation 
between environments, we must not forget the dimension of time and 
interactivity among these different domains. Development, which continues 
throughout the entire life of the organism, unfolds interactively and in the 
dimension of time, such that events in one of these environments impact 
events in other environments, actualizing them in aleatory ways. 
Missing in Deleuze's mapping of developmental relations, however, 
is a role for the agent itself in its own construction. Formulated in terms 
of Kenneth Burke's pentad, Deleuze's map of development is all scene 
with no agent. Rather, the agent (object) ends up becoming an effect 
of the dynamics taking place in the scene (the interactions among the 
environments). Deleuze's mapping of exo-relations thus points us in the 
right direction for thinking constraints or relations of dependency in local 
manifestations, but suffers from treating the agent or object as a mere 
effect of these relations rather than granting the agent a causal role in 
these developmental processes. In my view, developmental systems theory 
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(DST) provides the resources for navigating the radical constructivism of 
autopoietic theory where each object is a sovereign constructing all other 
objects, and the extreme “environmentalism” of Deleuze's mapping of 
ecological relations where the object is merely an effect of relations between 
internal, horizontal, and external environments. 
Although the focus of DST has revolved around debates in 
developmental biology, it nonetheless provides us with a general model 
of how objects behave in regimes of attraction or within fields of exo-
relations to other objects. DST research has focused primarily on 
nature/nurture debates within biology and the social sciences, strongly 
contesting models of genetics that treat genes as blueprints pre-delineating 
the eventual form that the phenotype (what I would call the “local 
manifestation”) of an organism will take. In her early groundbreaking work, 
The Ontogeny of Information, for example, Susan Oyama shows that while 
mainstream biology gives lip service to the interactionist hypothesis that 
the development of the phenotype results from the interaction between 
genes and environment, nonetheless biologists tend to discuss genes as 
already containing information that presides over the development of the 
phenotype as a sort of map. In contrast to this, DST theorists argue that, 
information “in the genes” or “in the environment” is not 
biologically relevant until it participates in the phenotypic 
processes. It becomes meaningful in the organism only as it is 
constituted as “information” by its developmental system. The 
result is not more information but significant information.232
Along the lines I argued in the last chapter, information is not 
something that exists out there in the world, but is rather something that 
is constituted and constructed. There is no pre-existent information in the 
environment, nor can it be said, in the context of genes, that genes already 
contain information. Rather, events that take place in the development 
of the organism, cell development, and protein production themselves 
have an effect on how genes are actualized and the activation of particular 
genes also impacts how other genes are actualized or set in motion. As a 
consequence, while genes are indeed a causal factor, they cannot be said to 
constitute a map or blueprint of the organism. 
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In the introduction to Cycles of Contingency—a collection of articles by 
developmental systems biologists and theorists—Oyama, Griffiths, and 
Gray outline six basic themes of DST research: 
1. Joint determination by multiple causes—every 
trait is produced by the interaction of many 
developmental resources. 
2. The gene/environment dichotomy is only one of many 
ways to divide up interactants.
3. Context sensitivity and contingency—the significance of 
any one cause is contingent upon the state of the rest of 
the system. 
4. Extended inheritance—an organism inherits a wide range 
of resources that interact to construct that organisms 
life cycle. 
5. Development as construction—neither traits nor 
representations of traits are transmitted to offspring. 
Instead, traits are made—reconstructed—in development. 
6. Distributed control—no one type of interactant controls 
development. 
7. Evolution as construction—evolution is not a matter 
of organisms or populations being molded by their 
environments, but of organism-environment systems 
changing over time.233
Here it is important to note that developmental systems theorists use 
the term “system” in a different way than I have been using it up to this 
point. For the DST's, the organism-environment relation constitutes a 
developmental system. By contrast, within the framework of autopoietic 
theory, systems are one side of a distinction between system and 
environment. 
Despite these differences, however, there are strong points of resonance 
between the autopoietic conception of systems and that advocated by 
dynamic systems theorists. Like autopoietic theorists, DST emphasizes the 
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manner in which organisms construct their environment. The construction 
of the environment does not simply consist in the construction of things 
such as ant nests and bird nests, but also involves the way in which 
organisms are selectively open to their environments. As biologist Richard 
Lewontin observes, 
Organisms determine what is relevant. While stones are 
part of a thrush's environment, tree bark is a part of a 
woodpecker's, and the undersides of leaves part of a warbler's. 
It is the life activities of these birds that determine which 
parts of the world, physically accessible to all of them, are 
actually parts of their environments.234
In short, environments cannot be treated as something that is simply 
given or there such that the organism subsequently fills a niche that 
already existed in the environment. Rather, organisms take an active role 
in constructing their environment, both through determining relevancies 
in the environment and through actively changing their environment 
through activities like building nests. In terms of autopoietic theory, systems 
(organisms/objects) determine that to which they are open or what is 
relevant in the world about them. In other words, there is no such thing as 
an “environment as such”. Rather, we can only discover what constitutes 
the environment of an organism through a second-order observation of how 
the organism relates to the world around them. 
A central axiom of traditional evolutionary biology is that “the organism 
proposes and the environment disposes”. Here the theory runs that random 
variations within the population of a species are proposed as various 
solutions to the problem of the environment. Individual organisms are 
proposed as various solutions to the problem posed by the environment. 
The premise of such a thesis is that the environment is something there, 
present-at-hand, that the organism must adapt to. This thesis, however, 
becomes significantly complicated when we recognize that organisms 
construct their own environments. Here the organism can no longer be 
treated as a passive object, such that genes and the environment are the 
subjects forming this object, but rather the organism itself becomes a 
“subject” that plays a role both in how its genes are actualized and how 
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its environment is constructed. This does not entail that the organism is a 
sovereign acting without constraint in a purely smooth space it can define at 
will, but it does entail a far more active role on the part of the organism in 
these processes. 
Lewontin goes so far in this line of thought as to argue that species 
actually co-construct one another. As Lewontin remarks, 
It might be objected that the notion of organisms constructing 
their environments leads to absurd results. After all, hares do 
not sit around constructing lynxes! But in the most important 
sense they do. First, the biological properties of lynxes are 
presumably in part a consequence of selection for catching 
prey of a certain size and speed, i.e., hares. Second, lynxes are 
not part of the environment of moose while they are of hares, 
because of biological differences between moose and hares.235
Part of the reason lynxes are as they are has to do with how the 
properties of hares and other similar creatures have constructed them. 
In other words, those lynxes that were more adept at catching the speedy 
hare were more likely to reproduce. Likewise, we can say that hares are 
constructed by lynxes and other similar organisms. 
One of the central themes in DST is the concept of extended 
inheritance. Where traditional evolutionary biology tends to treat genes 
as the only thing inherited by organisms, thereby leading to the neo-
Darwinist thesis that genes are the true units of natural selection, DST 
emphasizes, how, in addition to genes, all sorts of environmental factors 
are selected as well. Ant larvae, for example, inherit the nest and traces of 
pheromones built and left by other ants. These inheritances play a role in 
the development of the organism’s phenotype, determining, for example, 
what type of ant the larvae will become (worker ant, soldier ant, and so 
on). Needless to say, these are non-genetic inheritances. Likewise, humans 
inherit culture, infrastructure, practices, and so on. 
Observations such as these lead DST to defend parity in explanations 
and to remodel the concept of natural selection. Parity reasoning is a form 
of reasoning in which the theorist refuses to grant one sort of agency—
for example, genes –control of development. Rather, parity reasoning 
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emphasizes distributed causality, where a variety of different causal factors 
contribute to the development of the phenotype. The thesis here is not 
that all causal factors contribute equally to the local manifestation of the 
phenotype or organism, but that the interaction or interplay of a variety 
of different causal factors play a role in the local manifestation of the 
entity. This has real consequences for how research is conducted in both 
biology and the social sciences. In biology, for example, we might conduct 
experiments where we keep the environment constant to see what effects 
this has on the phenotype, but also conduct experiments where we vary 
the environment while keeping the genes constant to see what effects these 
shifts have on the phenotype. 
Returning to some themes from the introduction, we saw how a good 
deal of contemporary theory focuses on the subject's and culture's relation 
to the world. Within this framework, the framework of representation, the 
subject falls in the marked space of the grounding distinction of thought. 
Beneath the subject or culture, we find a sub-distinction referring to 
content that leads us to focus on signs, signifiers, and representations. While 
clearly signs, signifiers, and representations play an important role in how 
human relations come to be organized, we can see how parity reasoning 
would lead us to expand the focus of our analyses in the social sciences 
and in social and political thought. Jared Diamond, for example, raises the 
question of why Western Culture has enjoyed such a dominant position 
throughout world history.236 Why, for example, did the West conquer the 
Americas, rather than the Americas conquer the West? If we begin from the 
standpoint of the subject and culture, thereby indicating signs, signifiers, 
and representations as our sub-distinction, we are led to explain these 
cultural differences based on something unique to Western systems of 
representation or narratives that allowed the West to conquer other groups. 
For example, we follow Heidegger in asserting something unique and 
singular about the “Greek event”, or perhaps we follow the theology of 
Radical Orthodoxy promoted by figures such as John Milbank, locating a 
fundamental historical break for humanity in the “Christian event”. 
Through careful analysis, however, Jared Diamond emphasizes the 
environmental differences between different cultures and the advantages 
and disadvantages these created for various people. Thus, for example, 
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Diamond contends that there were few animals fit for domestication in 
the Americas. This had a profound impact on how Eurasian and American 
populations developed. Because Eurasian populations had far more 
domesticated animals, there was also a much higher degree of cross-species 
germ development in Eurasian history. This meant that Eurasians not only 
developed greater immunity to disease, but also had far more diseases 
in the environment. One reason European conquest of the Americas 
was so unilateral was precisely because there were a variety of diseases 
moving from Europe to the Americas without the reverse movement 
from the Americas to Europe. As a consequence, tens of thousands of 
Native Americans died, rendering the European conquest far easier in 
the long run. Again, the point here is not that semiotic differences make 
no difference, nor that disease alone (Diamond explores a variety of 
geographical factors) completely explain such brutal events. The point 
is that when we draw distinctions in particular ways, certain phenomena 
and causal factors become completely invisible. Diamond practices an 
exemplary form of parity reasoning in exploring these geographical factors. 
Continental social and political thought and theory needs to do a much 
better job in exploring the role played by non-semiotic actants such as 
natural resources, the presence or absence of power lines, road distributions 
and connections, whether or not cable internet connections are available, 
and so on, in their exploration of why certain social formations take the 
form they do. 
Insofar as it is not simply genes that are inherited, but environments as 
well, it follows that natural selection must operate not only at the level of 
the organism or genes, but at the level of environments too. Here we must 
recall that many organisms quite literally construct their environments, 
building nests and so on. Those constructed environments that confer an 
advantage in the reproduction of the organism will tend to be selected 
and passed on through generations. Here it's worth recalling that Darwin 
nowhere specifies what the mechanism of inheritance is, only that in 
order for natural selection to take place there must be inheritance. There 
is thus no reason to suppose that genes alone are the sole mechanism of 
inheritance. Constructed environments such as ant nests and culture are 
also forms of inheritance. In their article, “Darwinism and Developmental 
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Systems”, Griffiths and Gray give a striking example of such environmental 
inheritance (and a number of other examples as well). As Griffiths and 
Gray observe, 
Certain aphid species reliably pass on their endosymbiotic 
Buchnera bacteria from the maternal symbiont mass to 
either eggs or developing embryo. The bacteria enable their 
aphid hosts to utilize what would otherwise be nutritionally 
unsuitable host plants. Aphids that have been treated with 
antibiotics to eliminate the bacteria are stunted in growth, 
reproductively sterile, and die prematurely.237
The point here is that the Buchnera bacteria is not a part of the aphid's 
genome, but nonetheless plays a significant role in the development of 
the phenotype. Far from the genes already containing information in 
the form of a blueprint of what the organism will turn out to be, genes 
are one developmental causal factor among a variety of others. The 
phenotype is plastic in the sense that it can take on a variety of different 
forms. Here it goes without saying that the plasticity of the phenotype isn't 
entirely without constraint. The organism-environment system indeed 
constrains the development of the phenotype in a variety of ways, defining 
a topological space of possible variations. What's important here is that 
the information presiding over the genesis of the phenotype is something 
constructed in the process of development from a variety of factors, and, 
moreover, the qualities that the organism comes to embody are not located 
already in the organism in a virtual or implicit form, but are rather new 
creations in the process of development. 
In light of the foregoing, we are now in a position to theorize the 
emergence of constraints within an onticological and object-oriented 
philosophical framework. The whole problem arises from the manner 
in which objects are operationally closed and the manner in which they 
constitute their own environment through their distinctions, defining 
that to which they are open and that to which they are not open. This, in 
turn, leads to Luhmann's thesis that objects can neither be dominated nor 
controlled. However, while objects indeed constitute their own openness to 
their environment, it does not follow from this that objects control or create 
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their own environment. Here we will recall that the environment is always 
more complex than the object or system that unifies the environment 
through a determination of what is and is not relevant to it. Moreover, while 
openness to the environment arises from the manner in which the object 
or system is organized, this openness does not determine which events take 
place in the environment. Were this the case, then each substance would be 
controlling or “dominating” the other substances or systems that exist in 
its environment. Just as other substances in a substance's environment can 
only perturb the substance without determining what information events 
will be produced on the basis of these perturbations, the most the substance 
can do is attempt to perturb other substances without being able to control 
what sort of information-events are produced in the other substances. And 
these attempted perturbations can always, of course, fail. My three-year-old 
daughter, for example, might yell at her toy box when she bumps into it, yet 
the toy box continues on its merry way quite literally unperturbed. 
Everything turns on recognizing that, while objects construct their 
openness to their environment, they do not construct the events that take 
place in their environment. When Luhmann observes that objects cannot 
be controlled or dominated, his point is not that objects are completely 
free sovereigns capable of creating whatever reality they might like, but 
rather that any event that perturbs them will be “interpreted” in terms of 
the system’s own organization. As a consequence, objects cannot be steered 
from the outside. However, the events that do or do not take place in the 
environment of an object and to which the object is open nonetheless play 
a tremendously significant role in the local manifestations of which the 
object is capable. We see a significant example of this in the case of Griffith 
and Gray's aphids, where the presence or absence of the Buchnera bacteria 
makes a significant difference in the formation of the aphid's phenotype. 
Those other objects and events in the environment of the object define a 
regime of attraction with respect to the object, creating regularities in the 
local manifestation of the object and producing constraints on what local 
manifestations are possible. 
Regimes of attraction should thus be thought as interactive networks 
or, as Timothy Morton has put it, meshes that play an affording and 
constraining role with respect to the local manifestations of objects. 
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Depending on the sorts of objects or systems being discussed, regimes 
of attraction can include physical, biological, semiotic, social, and 
technological components. Within these networks, hierarchies or sub-
networks can emerge that constrain the local manifestations available to 
other nodes or entities within the network. Thus, for example, government 
officials and high ranking business leaders such as CEO's have access to 
both contacts and business information that gives them an advantage in 
the capture of wealth and power. This appropriation of wealth and power 
leads, in its turn, to an absence of resources for those without this access. 
As a consequence, local manifestations at less “connected” levels of the 
social sphere are severely limited in terms of what is possible for them in 
much the same way that aphids without access to the Buchnera bacteria 
develop in a particular way. While the particular texture of a regime of 
attraction does not determine what an object will become or be because such 
actualizations depend on the organization of the object in question, they 
can play a significant role in limiting what local manifestations are possible 
for an object. 
Similarly, in another context, Marx discusses the manner in which the 
repetitive activity of factory work has the effect of de-skilling the worker and 
dampening his or her cognitive abilities.238 Without going into too much 
detail, the factory form arises, in part, as a consequence of the development 
of wage-labor and the necessity it engendered for diminishing the cost of 
production so as to maximize the production of surplus-value. The paradox 
of the factory form is that through de-skilling labor as a result of highly 
specialized and rote, repetitive activity, the laborer becomes increasingly 
dependent on the wage-labor system that divests him of control of his 
own life and circumstance, reinforcing the very system that limits his own 
freedom. The knowledge and skills are lost that would allow him to do other 
tasks. As a result, he becomes trapped in the factory system in part through 
his own actions. Technology here plays a central role in both this de-skilling 
and the diminution of cognitive ability as a result of endless repetitive 
activities that require little thought or skill. As such, wage-labor, the factory, 
and technologies function as a regime of attraction that deeply influence 
local manifestations at both the societal level (the texture that society takes 
on) and at the individual level of the worker. Different activities, regimes 
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of attraction, and modes of production might lead to very different local 
manifestations at the cognitive and affective level. 
Within this context, one of the central roles of social and political theory 
ought to be the cartography of regimes of attraction. This cartography 
consists in mapping those networks of objects that play a significant role in 
the production of local manifestations at the level of individuals, groups, 
and the texture of societies at large. Through such cartographies, it becomes 
possible to strategically locate those places where bifurcation points within 
the social system are available, allowing for the possibility of new local 
manifestations at the level of individuals and society. In this regard, Marx 
was an exemplary cartographer. In Capital, at least, Marx did not use 
“society” and “class” as explanatory variables, but instead mapped the 
regimes of attraction within particular historical settings precisely to explain 
why society takes the form it does and how class structures come to exist as 
they do. However, in his cartography of the social sphere, Marx sought to 
map not only existing social relations, but also virtual social tendencies as 
well. That is, Marx sought to locate those tensions and lines of flight within 
existing social structures to determine where change might be taking place 
and where new forms of social organization might be emerging. Through a 
knowledge of regimes of attraction, the attractors that organize them, and 
the bifurcation points to which they are susceptible, it becomes possible to 
strategize practices that might intensify and accelerate these processes. The 
presence of a bifurcation point is no guarantee that a system will shift into 
a new basin of attraction. Consequently, cartography, a cartography of the 
virtual, becomes an indispensable dimension of practice, providing us with 
resources for determining how to activate these bifurcation points. 
Above all, we must avoid the conclusion that regimes of attraction 
determine the local manifestations of objects or entities. While regimes 
of attraction play a significant role in the form that local manifestations 
take, objects are not merely effects of regimes of attraction. When objects 
enter into exo-relations with other objects, these other objects certainly 
perturb the object in a variety of ways, influencing its local manifestations, 
but objects, and above all, autopoietic objects, are also causes and actors 
in the world. A cat that finds that the heat of the fire in the fireplace is a 
bit too hot does not merely sit there and roast, but rather gets up, paces 
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back and forth a bit, and finds a place to sit more amenable to its desired 
temperature. In this way, the cat takes an active role in modulating the 
production of its local manifestations in relation to the milieu in which it 
finds itself. Likewise, beavers construct imposing dams, creating optimal 
environments for themselves to live in. While the regimes of attraction 
we find ourselves enmeshed in might constrain us in a number of ways, 
through our movement and action we have the ability to act on these 
regimes of attraction, construct our environments, and therefore modify 
the circumstances in which we find ourselves. We are not simply acted upon 
by regimes of attraction, but act on them as well. Given the unpredictable 
nature of other actors, however, the question revolves around which form of 
action might be most conducive to enhancing our existence. 
5.2. Parts and Wholes:
The Strange Mereology of Object-Oriented Ontology 
Within Continental philosophy and theory, a lot of mischief has been 
caused as a result of failing to carefully think through issues of mereology 
or the relationship between parts and wholes. This has especially been the 
case for bodies of social and political thought deeply influenced by the 
structuralist turn arising out of Lévi-Strauss and a variety of other French 
thinkers. In its focus on social structure as a totalizing relational system 
without an outside, structuralism created a crisis in French social and 
political thought, raising questions as to how any sort of agency or social 
change is possible. For if structure consists in differential or oppositional 
relations between elements and elements cannot be said to exist 
independent of their relations, then the question emerges of how any action 
whatsoever is possible that doesn't merely reproduce the social structure. 
Matters were further complicated in the tendency of structuralism to treat 
the subject as an effect of impersonal and collective structures that function 
according to their own pulse and rhythm. In this connection, who can 
forget Althusser's pronouncements concerning the subject in “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses”? There Althusser remarks that, 
the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but 
at the same time and immediately I add that the category of the 
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subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has 
the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals 
as subjects. In the interaction of this double constitution 
exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing 
but its functioning in the material forms of existence of that 
functioning.239
Althusser's pronouncements about the subject immediately generated a 
crisis in French social and political theory, generating, in subsequent years, 
a series of responses from both his students and those deeply influenced by 
his thought and conception of the social. 
In many respects, the problem is quite simple. If the subject is both 
constitutive of ideology and constituted by ideology, and if ideology is 
the means by which the social system “reproduces the conditions of 
production”,240 then it would appear that social and political thought is 
unable to account for how it is possible for social change to take place. This 
problem emerges from the relational conception of the social developed 
within the various structuralist frameworks. Insofar as the relations 
constituting structure are themselves internal relations in which all elements 
are constituted by their relations, it follows that there can be no external 
point of purchase from which structure could be transformed. As an 
element of structure, this would hold for the subject as well. Like anything 
else within the social system, the subject would necessarily be differentially 
constituted by the relations making up social structure. 
With these grim pronouncements, a desperate search began to 
find a free or void point within structure, a point not overdetermined 
by the differential relations constituting social structure, such that the 
transcendental condition under which change is possible could be 
articulated. Surprisingly, the theoretical resources for such an account were 
already suggested in the early work of Lévi-Strauss. In his early Introduction 
to the Work of Marcel Mauss, Lévi-Strauss's theorization of the concept of 
mana suggested the existence of a paradoxical feature of structure that is 
simultaneously internal to structure and undetermined by structure. As 
Lévi-Strauss observes, 
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always and everywhere, those types of notions [mana], 
somewhat like algebraic symbols, occur to represent an 
indeterminate value of signification, in itself devoid of 
meaning and thus susceptible of receiving any meaning at all; 
their sole function is to fill a gap between the signifier and 
the signified, or, more exactly, to signal the fact that in such a 
circumstance, on such an occasion, or in such a one of their 
manifestations, a relationship of non-equivalence becomes 
established between signifier and signified, to the detriment of 
the prior complementary relationship.241
Further on, Lévi-Strauss goes on to remark that, 
I believe that notions of the mana type, however diverse they 
may be, and viewed in terms of their most general function 
[...] represent nothing more or less than that floating signifier 
which is the disability of all finite thought (but also the surety 
of all art, all poetry, every mythic and aesthetic invention), 
even though scientific knowledge is capable, if not of 
staunching it, at least of controlling it partially.242
To this list we can add politics. What this floating signifier suggested 
was the possibility of a void point within structure, a point of complete 
indetermination, marking a space where both the social might be 
transformed and where the subject might exist as something more than a 
patient or object of social forces. 
And indeed, if we look at the trajectory of subsequent French social and 
political theory, we see a variant of precisely this option being embraced. 
The later work of Althusser comes increasingly to focus on Lucretius and 
a discourse of the swerve and the void.243 Rancière comes to emphasize 
the role of the “part of no part” as that void point within the social order 
(which he calls “the police”) from which the social order comes to be 
transformed.244 Badiou emphasizes the manner in which every structured 
situation is haunted at its edge by a void where entirely novel and 
undecidable events can occur that a subject can then decide, inaugurating 
truth-procedures that gradually change the organization of the structured 
situation.245 And Žižek emphasized the unrepresentable real at the heart of 
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the symbolic from whence a subject becomes possible that marks the failure 
of the symbolic and such that an absolute act that completely abolishes 
the subject and re-creates it is open. All of these themes, developed in so 
many different ways, appear to be variations of the floating signifier that 
simultaneously marks the limit of the social and its infinite transformability. 
Closely connected with this recognition of the void or floating 
signifier that haunts every social structure was a growing awareness of the 
contingency of structure. In a certain respect, the contingency of structure 
had been a persistent theme of structuralist thought. Where Kant had 
proposed one universal transcendental structure of the world issuing from 
the transcendental subject, structural anthropology and linguistics had 
revealed a variety of different structures organized in very different ways. 
However, increasingly structure came to be thought as veiling an infinite 
multiplicity bubbling beneath structure without order or unity. No one 
has developed this line of thought with more rigor and in greater detail 
than Alain Badiou in his magnificent Being and Event. There, developing 
an ontology based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, Badiou advances 
something of a dialectical ontology partitioned between what he calls 
inconsistent multiplicities and consistent multiplicities. Inconsistent 
multiplicities can be thought as a sort of chaos insofar as they are pure 
multiples without any structure or individuated entities. These multiplicities 
constitute being as such or being itself. Consistent multiplicities, by 
contrast, are structured and unified situations. Consistent multiplicities are 
formed from inconsistent multiplicities through an operation Badiou refers 
to as the “count-as-one” and, by virtue of being founded in inconsistent 
multiplicities, are always haunted by a chaos that bubbles just beneath 
the surface. As such, any consistent multiplicity is only a contingent 
organization of a situation. 
It is not difficult to detect, lurking behind Badiou's ontology, the desire 
to rigorously ground revolutionary social theory. One of the main ways in 
which ideology functions is through the naturalization of the social world. 
In other words, ideology presents the structure and organization of the 
social world as the inevitable and natural order of things, such that other 
arrangements are impossible. One major form of ideological critique has 
thus historically taken the form of demonstrating the manner in which 
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social formations are contingent or capable of being otherwise through 
maneuvers of historicization and so on. Badiou's thought provides an 
ontological grounding for this capacity to be otherwise. In many respects, 
such a conclusion is already internal to set theory. Recall that, within the 
framework of set theory, sets are defined strictly through their extension 
or the elements that belong to the set. Here we can distinguish between 
a set and a type based on whether or not membership in the collection is 
defined extensionally (by the parts that belong to it) or intensionally (by 
some shared feature among the elements). The collection of all dogs, for 
example, is a collection that is defined intensionally insofar as membership 
in it is a function of all elements belonging to the collection sharing a 
common characteristic or set of characteristics. In contrast to types, sets 
are collections defined purely in terms of their members, such that there is 
no necessity of these elements sharing a common characteristic. Nor must 
the elements of the set be ordered in any particular way. Insofar as sets 
are defined extensionally, the set {x, y, z} is equivalent to the set {y, z, x}. 
In short, the elements of sets are non-relational or are not defined by the 
relations among their elements. The point here is that if social structures 
are sets, there is no one way in which they can be organized and a variety of 
other forms of social organization are possible. 
Initially these issues pertaining to set theory might seem remote from 
issues of ideology and the naturalization of the social field. However, if 
it is true that being is “set theoretical” and that, at its most fundamental 
level, being consists of inconsistent multiplicities rather than consistent 
multiplicities, then it also follows that any social structure is contingent in 
the precise sense that relations among elements can be otherwise. From 
the foregoing, this can be seen in two ways. On the one hand, because sets 
are defined extensionally and without any ordering relations among the 
elements, it follows that there is no necessary relation among the elements. 
Here relations are external to their terms. Likewise, a similar point can 
be made through the power set axiom in set theory. The power set axiom 
allows us to take all possible subsets of a set, forming a new set out of this 
collection. Thus, for example, given a set {x, y, z}, its power set would be 
{{x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y}, {x, z}, {y, z}, {x, y, z}}. The power set can then be 
applied recursively yet again to generate an even larger set and so on. The 
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“cash value” of the power set axiom at the level of ideology critique is that 
it reveals the manner in which social groupings are contingent and capable 
of being otherwise by being grouped in different ways. In effect, Badiou 
provides an ontological “foundation” for demonstrating the contingency of 
social relations, thereby underlining the manner in which they are always 
capable of being structured otherwise. 
Through this maneuver, Badiou strikes a strong blow against the 
internalism of structuralism. Structuralism had argued that all relations 
are strictly internal to their elements, such that elements cannot be said 
to have any existence independent of their relations. Through an ontology 
of inconsistent multiplicities coupled with an account of the externality 
of relations, Badiou is able to show that while elements do indeed enter 
into temporary relations with one another, these relations are always and 
everywhere necessarily contingent and capable of being otherwise. As such, 
Badiou significantly broadens the possibility of our ability to think change 
within the social sphere, while also allowing us to maintain the best insights 
of structuralism through his account of consistent multiplicities. 
Badiou's meditations on the relationship between sets and subsets 
is thoroughly mereological in character. In making claims about the 
extensional composition of sets (parts), Badiou underlines the manner in 
which the parts of a set are simultaneously objects in their own right while 
also being parts of larger objects, to wit, the sets from which they are drawn. 
What is interesting here is that the parts are not defined by their relations 
to other elements in the set, but are objects of their own that can be 
detached from their membership in the set. Here object-oriented ontology 
and onticology find an unexpected ally with Badiou and a surprising point 
of resonance. As we have already seen, Graham Harman argues that all 
objects are such that there are objects wrapped in objects wrapped in 
objects, such that we can simultaneously treat objects as relations among 
objects and discrete units in their own right. Badiou argues—and, I might 
add, argues well –that all sets are infinite in the sense that they are infinitely 
decomposable. This is the dimension of inconsistent multiplicity haunting 
every consistent multiplicity. 
What we encounter here is what I call the “strange mereology” of 
onticology and object-oriented philosophy. Mereology is that branch of 
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mathematics, ontology, and logic that studies the relationship between parts 
and wholes. The study of mereology is highly complex and formalized, 
however onticology and object-oriented philosophy are concerned with 
a particular mereological relation; namely, that relation between objects 
where one object is simultaneously a part of another object and an 
independent object in its own right. To understand why this mereology is 
such a strange mereology, we must recall that all objects are independent 
or autonomous from one another. Objects can enter into exo-relations with 
one another, but they are not constituted by their relations. Put differently, 
their being does not consist of their relations. Consequently, the strangeness 
of this mereology lies in the fact that the subsets of a set, the smaller objects 
composing larger objects, are simultaneously necessary conditions for that 
larger object while being independent of that object. Likewise, the larger 
object composed of these smaller objects is itself independent of these 
smaller objects. 
Despite profound points of overlap between Badiou's mereology and 
the mereology advocated by onticology and object-oriented philosophy, 
there are nonetheless important points of divergence between the two 
ontological frameworks. While both Badiou and onticology and object-
oriented philosophy endorse an extensionalism of relations between objects, 
onticology and object-oriented philosophy endorse an intensionalism 
of relations within individual objects. In short, objects are not merely 
aggregates of other objects, but have an irreducible internal structure 
of their own. However, it's important to note that the intensionalism 
advocated by onticology and object-oriented philosophy is not an 
intensionalism revolving around a predicate shared by a plurality of objects, 
but is rather an intensionalism pertaining to the relations composing the 
internal relations of an object. To avoid confusion, I thus follow Graham 
Harman's convention of distinguishing between “domestic relations” and 
“foreign relations”. Domestic relations are relations that structure the 
internal being of an object and correspond to what I have called “endo-
relations” in chapter 3. Foreign relations, by contrast, are relations an 
object enters into with another object and which I have referred to as 
“exo-relations”. Foreign relations are external to objects in the sense that 
objects are not constituted by exo-relations and can be detached from these 
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relations. Of course, such detachment can also bring about less than happy 
local manifestations. If I am launched into outer space by a giant catapult 
without any sort of life-support suit, I will undergo a local manifestation 
that freezes me solid and kills me. Domestic relations, by contrast, are 
those relations that constitute the internal being of an object, its internal 
structure, and therefore the essence of an object. 
Where Badiou sees sets or objects as possessing only foreign relations 
among the elements composing the set—e.g., {x, y, z} is equivalent to 
{y, x, z}—onticology and object-oriented philosophy insist that objects 
contain domestic relations such that their elements cannot be related 
in any old way. I will have more to say about this in the next section, 
but for the moment it is sufficient to note that Badiou's account of the 
relationship between inconsistent and consistent multiplicities generates 
special problems for his ontology. I have already discussed some of these 
problems in the first chapter when addressing those ontologies that argue 
that being is composed of chaos or a one-All that is then subsequently 
carved up into units. A similar problem emerges with respect to Badiou's 
ontology concerning the question of just how the transition from 
inconsistent multiplicities without unity or one to consistent multiplicities 
that are unified such that “one-ification” takes place. To explain this 
transition from inconsistent multiplicity to consistent multiplicity, Badiou 
refers to operations of the “count-as-one”. These operations somehow 
effect both a selection and a unification of elements within the field of 
inconsistent multiplicity, producing consistent multiplicities. Two questions 
emerge here: first, what is the agency that carries out this operation, and 
second, exactly how does this agency accomplish this feat of both making 
selections from the field of inconsistent multiplicity and producing unified 
collections? Despite the advancements of Logics of Worlds, it is my view that 
the answers to these two questions are significantly underdetermined in 
Badiou's ontology. 
By contrast, object-oriented ontology begins with the premise that the 
world is composed of distinct entities or units, each of which has its own 
internal structure or set of endo-relations. The twist is that larger scale 
objects can emerge from smaller scale objects and larger scale objects are 
composed of smaller objects. Similarly, larger scale objects can break apart 
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into a plurality of other independent objects under certain circumstances. 
Thus, while onticology maintains that there are ordering relations, domestic 
relations, or endo-relations among elements within an object, it also argues 
that larger scale objects contain autonomous smaller scale objects. In this 
connection, what constitutes the substantiality of a substance is not the 
parts that compose it, but rather the organization, domestic relations, or 
endo-relations presiding over the organization of these parts. 
A variety of examples can be marshaled in defense of this thesis. 
Organic bodies, for example, continuously lose cells and generate new cells. 
Although a body cannot exist without its cells, it is clear that bodies cannot 
be reduced to their cells either. What constitutes the substantiality of a body 
is not its cells, but its organization or its endo-relations. This point might be 
readily granted, yet someone might object that while bodies and cells are 
distinct, it is a mistake to suggest that cells are independent objects in their 
own right insofar as cells only exist within bodies. However, this is not true. 
On the one hand, we can think of the various forms of cancer as relations 
between a body and its cells in which cells have begun to act autonomously. 
Likewise, organ transplants are dependent on the possibility of cells being 
separated from bodies. Recently, scientists in Surrey, England have created 
a monstrous hybrid of organic life and machine, splicing a certain number 
of rat brain neurons into a computer chip that sends radio messages to a 
robot that can sense the world and that develops pattern and cognitive skills 
over time.246
Various forms of social relations have this structure as well. The 
citizens of the United States, for example, are born, die, and sometimes 
renounce their citizenship, yet the United States continues to exist. 
While it is certainly true that the United States would not exist at all 
without any citizens, it cannot be equated with its citizens. Additionally 
these citizens must be linked in some way. In Imagined Communities, for 
example, Benedict Anderson shows how print culture, among other things, 
contributed to the formation of national communities.247 My only caveat 
here would be that these entities aren’t imagined, but are, once built, real 
entities in their own right. Moreover, the United States cannot be equated 
with a particular geography either. The United States was the United 
States when it was just thirteen small colonies. Similarly, were some sort of 
Chapter 5: Regimes of Attraction, Parts, and Structure 217
national catastrophe to occur, the United States would remain the United 
States even if located solely on an island like Hawaii, or, more radically, 
even if citizens scattered all over the world maintained its existence through 
the internet. Moreover, the citizens of the United States are not just elements 
of the United States, but are autonomous entities in their own right. They 
can plot against the United States, seek to bring about the demise of the 
United States, renounce their citizenship, and engage in many activities not 
related to how they are counted as citizens of the United States. 
From a certain perspective it can thus be said that all objects are 
a crowd. Every object is populated by other objects that it enlists in 
maintaining its own existence. As a consequence, we must avoid reducing 
objects to the manner in which they are enlisted by other objects precisely 
because the objects enlisted are always themselves autonomous objects. 
Another way of putting this would be to say that there is no harmony or 
identity of parts and wholes. Parts aren't parts for a whole and the whole 
isn't a whole for parts. Rather, what we have are relations of dependency 
where nonetheless parts and wholes are distinct and autonomous from 
one another. In this respect, we must reject the thesis of holism. Latour 
remarks that when one object enlists another “the two join together and 
become one for a third [object]”.248 While I do not go as far as Latour in 
claiming that every relation between objects generates a third object, the 
important point is that the object that emerges out of other objects does 
not erase the objects out of which it is composed, but rather generates a 
third autonomous object related to these other autonomous objects. For 
example, if we treat romantic relationships and friendships as objects we 
must ask how many objects are before us. For the sake of simplicity, we 
can say that the romantic relationship is composed not of two objects, but 
of three objects. Here you have the two people involved in the relationship, 
as well as the amorous relationship itself. The amorous relationship is 
an object independent of the two persons in the amorous relationship. 
While initially this sounds very strange, we should here recall how couples 
talk about their relationships. They talk about being in a relationship, 
about how the relationship is going well or is in a state of crisis. Likewise, 
friends of couples often treat couples as units, behaving as if one person 
cannot be invited to dinner without inviting the other. Similarly, from a 
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legal standpoint, a person is married regardless of whether or not she has 
renounced the marriage or has decided to step out on her spouse. In all of 
these cases, the relationship is an autonomous object that has an existence 
over and above the persons that it enlists in its own continuing existence. 
The relationship between multiples and sub-multiples or larger scale 
objects and smaller scale objects is one in which sub-multiples provide 
constant perturbations to multiples and where multiples perturb sub-
multiples. Each object is an operationally closed object that relates to the 
sub-multiples of which it is composed or the multiples that it composes 
only in terms of its own internal organization. Sub-multiples and multiples 
are only “interested” in one another in terms of the perturbations they 
provide for one another with respect to their own respective autopoietic 
processes. The United States, for example, only relates to American citizens 
qua citizens, being exclusively concerned with things such as taxes, votes, 
positions on a variety of issues determining strategies for Congress and 
administrations, whether or not their action is legal or illegal, and so on. 
Most of the things that occupy the personal life of individual citizens are 
completely invisible to an object such as the United States and are treated 
as mere noise. The United States, for example, is completely oblivious to 
what I cooked for dinner last night or the fact that I am now sitting on 
the floor before my computer. Put in terms of Spencer-Brown's theory 
of distinctions, things like what I had for dinner last night belong to 
the unmarked state of the distinctions deployed by the United States in 
defining its channels of openness to its environment. These are events that 
cannot perturb or “irritate” the United States in its processes of producing 
information. 
These relations between multiples or larger scale objects and sub-
multiples are thus relations of what Maturana and Varela refer to as 
“structural coupling”. As they describe this relation, “[w]e speak of 
structural coupling whenever there is a history of recurrent interactions 
leading to the structural congruence between two (or more) systems”.249 
In short, structural coupling is a relation in which two or more objects 
constantly perturb or irritate one another, thereby making contributions to 
the local manifestations of each other and the evolutionary development 
of one another. The key point here is that while these systems or objects 
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perturb or irritate one another, each system relates to these perturbations 
according to its own organization or closure such that we can't treat 
relations between objects as simple input/output relations. 
Because objects are operationally closed and are composed of other 
objects, it follows that tensions or conflicts can emerge between multiples 
or larger scale objects and sub-multiples or smaller scale objects. As 
Latour writes, “[n]one of the actants mobilized to secure an alliance stops 
acting on its own behalf [...]. They each carry on fomenting their own 
plots, forming their own groups, and serving other masters, wills, and 
functions”.250 Here it could be said that each object contends with its own 
system-internal entropy arising from the surprising and dissident role that 
other objects play within it. In enlisting other objects to produce them, 
larger scale objects must contend with the tendencies of other objects 
to move in other directions and act on behalf of other aims. Each object 
therefore threatens to fall apart from within, to have the endo-relations 
presiding over its own organization destroyed, and therefore must develop 
negative feedback mechanisms to maintain its own structural order. 
For example, if a class is an object, the professor, an element or sub-
multiple of the class, might conduct him- or herself in a way different from 
his or her prescribed role as professor, teaching nothing at all, talking about 
unrelated things, relating to students in inappropriate ways, and so on. In 
these circumstances, some or all of these students or perhaps administrators 
might relate back to the professor in such a way as to steer him or her back 
to his role as a professor. Indeed, today one major administrative trend in 
academia is to formulate ways of gauging the performance of professors 
by selecting samples of student work as well as student evaluations. At a 
higher system-specific level, these are ways in which the administrative 
level increases its capacities to be “irritated” or “perturbed” by classes that 
are difficult to directly observe on a day to day basis. Based on these ways 
of constructing openness to an inaccessible environment, administrations 
devise techniques to steer faculty or introduce negative feedback into 
the classroom that strive to normalize or codify academic standards and 
techniques. Meanwhile, many faculty who are called upon to construct 
educational rubrics for these purposes try to structure them in such a way 
as to minimize the intervention of administration into their classroom 
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and while appeasing the desire of administrations to have a spread sheet 
that shows their institution is successfully instructing students. In other 
words, we get relations of counter-feedback where faculty attempt to steer 
administrations in such a way as to keep them out of their business. In 
this instance, we can see the operational closure of two distinct systems, 
the classroom and administration, that do not so much communicate 
with one another but rather produce very different information based on 
perturbations with respect to one another. 
Returning to the themes with which I began this section, we can see 
that the issues of social change are far more complex than is suggested by 
both structuralist thought and the heirs of structural thought. On the one 
hand, I believe that Althusser and his heirs tend to over-estimate the role 
that ideology plays in reproducing the conditions of production. While it is 
certainly true that “subjects” can internalize ideologies and therefore act to 
“reproduce the conditions of production”, the role that negative feedback 
plays in larger scale objects such as social systems, coupled with problems 
arising from operational closure, play at least as great a role if not a greater 
role in explaining why certain social systems tend to reproduce themselves 
in such a way that they are resistant to change. Moreover, we cannot 
blithely reduce subjects to effects of social structure. While social structures, 
like any other system or object, indeed constitute their own elements, it 
is also important to recall that they do so from other systems or objects 
outside the system itself. That is, they draw on systems in their environment 
as the “matter” out of which they produce their elements. However, 
these systems are themselves operationally closed, governed by their own 
distinctions and organization, and thus can never be reduced to mere 
elements within a higher order system. The result, as social and political 
theory inflected by Lacanian psychoanalysis has constantly reminded us, is 
that subjectification is never complete or entirely successful. Nonetheless, 
within the framework of activist politics, groups, which are themselves 
objects within larger scale objects such as societies, find themselves beset by 
negative feedback issuing from these larger scale objects that tend to stand 
in the way of producing the sort of change for which these groups aim. 
Returning to the theme of ideology as only one element among others 
explaining why social systems take the form they have, we must not forget 
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that individuals or psychic systems exist in regimes of attraction that might 
severely limit or impede their capacity for action. For example, a subject 
might very well know that he is getting a raw deal, that the political and 
social system within which he is enmeshed functions in such a way as to 
disproportionately benefit the wealthy and powerful, diminishing his wages, 
quality of life, benefits, and so on. However, such a subject must also eat, 
especially if he has a family, and must therefore have a job. In order to 
have a job, such a subject must have a place to live so as to eat, rest and be 
presentable, must have transportation, very likely requires a phone, etc., 
etc., etc. As a consequence, such a subject finds himself trapped within 
a regime of attraction and a form of employment that, while unsavory, 
is required for his existence. Taking action against such a system might 
very well amount to cutting off the very branch the person is sitting on to 
sustain his own existence. In this connection, I suspect that people are far 
more aware of the manner in which the cards are stacked against them by 
the broader social system and far less “duped” by ideology than one might 
initially suspect. 
Similar observations can be made with respect to how people are 
dragging their feet with respect to responding to the growing environmental 
crisis. Here we are trapped between an awful knowledge that the 
environment is changing in ways that might very well affect human 
existence in a radical way and a social structure that is organized in such a 
way that nearly everything required for mere existence carries a significant 
carbon footprint. We need some form of transportation to get to work and, 
absent affordable electric cars or some equivalent, are therefore trapped 
within a system dependent on fossil fuels. We do not produce our own food 
and, due to the de-skilling of labor that has arisen as a consequence of the 
functional differentiation of society, are largely unable to do so on a scale 
necessary to sustain a family. Thus, we are dependent on food transported 
by vehicles that run on fossil fuels and that is produced in a way that harms 
our environment. Likewise, electricity, largely produced by fossil fuels, is 
now a necessity of life. Meanwhile, the broader social system is structured 
in such a way that it is very difficult to persuade politicians to change 
regulatory standards for industries like trucking to invest in alternative 
energies and so on because such changes would be detrimental to large 
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businesses that both create jobs (which translate into votes) and which 
line the pockets of politicians through the campaign contributions they 
require to get re-elected. Closely related to this, we might note that many 
politicians enter the private sector as lobbyists and consultants after their 
terms of office, getting paid handsomely for the access they have to other 
politicians and agencies. Faced with the option of low-paying activist work 
that improves the world and high-paying consultant and lobbying work 
that largely benefits big corporations, they tend towards the latter and most 
likely are thinking about such a future while they’re in office. 
Finally, questions of political change are constantly beset by issues 
revolving around resonance between systems. Resonance refers to the 
capacity of one system to be perturbed or irritated by another system. As 
we saw in the last chapter, because systems or objects are operationally 
closed such that they only maintain selective relations to their environment, 
they can only see what they can see and cannot see what they cannot 
see. Most importantly, they cannot see that they cannot see this. Niklas 
Luhmann has argued that modern society is functionally differentiated 
(legal system, media system, economic system, and so on), such that it 
contains a variety of different subsystems each organized around its own 
system/environment distinction within the social system. In addition to 
these function systems, society is also inhabited by various groups that 
become objects or systems in their own right, organized around their own 
system/environment distinctions. 
As a consequence of this, one of the major issues facing any collective 
seeking to produce change within a social system is that of how to produce 
resonance within the various subsystems in the social system. This issue 
can be seen with particularly clarity in terms of how the 1999 World Trade 
Organization (WTO) protests were reported by the media system in the 
United States. While there was indeed a great deal of reporting on these 
protests, one curious feature of this reporting in televisual media was 
that there was very little discussion of just what was being protested and 
why it was being protested in cable and network news. Rather, viewers 
were presented with images of massive throngs of people and acts of 
vandalism protesting the WTO, while being told little in the way of just 
why these activists were protesting the WTO. The positions and complaints 
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of the protestors were almost entirely absent from media coverage. As 
a consequence, the manner in which the message resonated within the 
media system ended up working, in many respects, counter to the aims 
of the protestors. Within the media system, the protestors were coded or 
portrayed as anarchistic hooligans with no respect for private property and 
as “dirty hippies” filled with the enthusiasm of youth and its accompanying 
immaturity. There was next to no analysis of the protestor's arguments 
against how the WTO places countries in massive debt, forcing them to 
privatize various industries and local resources, bringing about massive 
environmental exploitation and the oppression of indigenous peoples, 
thereby causing a severe decline in wages and quality of life. Nor was 
there any discussion of how similar dynamics are occurring in “first tier” 
countries, causing significant inequalities of wealth and diminishing the 
ability of average citizens to represent their interests within the political 
system. In many respects, we can thus say that the manner in which the 
WTO protests perturbed or irritated the media system and the way in 
which those perturbations were transformed into information ended up 
working contrary to and against the very aims of the protestors. Within the 
psychic systems inhabiting the broader social system and coupled to the 
media system, it is likely that the protestors resonated as an anarchic threat 
against which the social system needs to be defended. 
Similar points about system resonance or the lack thereof can be made 
with respect to the notorious response of the United States government to 
Hurricane Katrina. Everything about the government’s delayed response 
to the events that were unfolding in Louisiana and New Orleans suggests 
that there was a lack of resonance between the political system and what 
was unfolding on the ground. Given the detail and pervasiveness of the 
reporting of these events in television and print media, this is difficult to 
believe yet, without such a thesis, it is difficult to account for how the Bush 
administration could have acted in a way so contrary to its own political 
interests. Here we should recall that the environment of a system or an 
object is always more complex than the system itself. As a consequence, 
there is much in a system's environment that a system cannot observe or 
register. The events following Hurricane Katrina suggest a form of system-
closure at the level of government and administration that was structured 
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in such a way that these entities lacked the capacity for resonance with 
these features of the environment occurring in both New Orleans and 
Louisiana and the media system. This lack of resonance with the media 
system is particularly difficult to explain. However, if we recall that within 
conservative circles the media has been branded as biased by liberal 
ideology and that the Bush administration had taken many steps to manage 
the media and control their access to government, it becomes plausible to 
conclude that the then current administration and Congress had ceased 
observing the media and instead created an “echo chamber” that severely 
diminished their openness to the environment. 
In the Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk argues that cynicism 
has become the new form of dominant ideology.251 Cynicism differs from 
traditional ideology in that where traditional ideology is a false belief 
about the world and social relations, cynicism has a true knowledge of 
social relations, power, exploitation and so on, yet continues to participate 
in these oppressive forms of social structure as before. As Žižek puts it, 
“[t]he cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological 
mask and the social reality, but he nonetheless still insists upon the mask. 
The formula, as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: 'they know very 
well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it”.252 From this, Žižek 
concludes that ideology resides not at the level of what subjects know, but of 
what subjects do. In other words, if we are to locate ideology, we ought not 
look at the level of their beliefs, but at the level of their actions. 
In his treatment of society at the level of ideology, Žižek returns social 
analysis back to the domain of content, meaning, or signification. Recalling 
figure 4 from the introduction, we can see that Žižek's engagement of the 
social structure is organized around the culturalist or humanist schema: 
content:
signs/signifiers/representations
subject/culture
Within the field of this distinction, the subject or culture falls in the 
marked space of distinction and we get a sub-distinction where all other 
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entities in the world are comprehended or related to as vehicles for signs, 
signifiers, meanings, discourses, narratives, or representations. To analyze 
a cultural practice or artifact according to this structure of distinction is 
thus to focus on its meaning-content in some form or another. Nonhuman 
objects and entities qua nonhuman objects and entities thereby fall into the 
unmarked space of the distinction. 
Putting a finer note on this point, we can say that the culturalist or 
humanist approach to the world of objects treats any differences objects 
might contribute as signifying or representational differences. By way of 
analogy, we can say that the culturalist schema of distinction thinks about 
nonhuman objects in much the same way that we might think about 
the relation between a movie screen, a projector, and the images that 
appear on that screen. Objects are reduced to the status of screens and 
culture or subjects are treated as projectors. The only thing that becomes 
relevant to the analysis of social formations is thus the images that appear 
on the screen and how they are cultural or subjective projections. As a 
consequence, non-signifying differences contributed by nonhuman objects 
or actors are largely excluded from the domain of social analysis. Indeed, 
within the culturalist framework, objects aren't actors at all but are merely 
screens for the projection of human meanings and representations. 
Within the framework of onticology and object-oriented philosophy, by 
contrast, we get an entirely different structure of distinction: 
objectsubject/culture/nonhumans
Here objects fall into the marked space, such that being is composed of 
only one sort of thing: objects or substances. While objects or substances, 
no doubt, differ from one another, being is nonetheless composed 
entirely of substances. As a consequence of this shift, we now encounter a 
subdistinction where subjects, culture, and nonhumans are placed on equal 
footing. In short, nonhuman actors are no longer treated as an opposing 
pole necessarily related to culture or human subjects, but rather are treated 
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as autonomous actors in their own right. Thus, while we can and do indeed 
have relations between humans and nonhuman objects, these relations 
are no more privileged than relations between nonhuman objects and 
nonhuman objects. Moreover, insofar as nonhuman objects are themselves 
actors or agents, they can no longer be treated as passive screens for human 
and cultural projections. 
In light of the foregoing, I hope it is now evident as to just why this 
redrawing of distinctions is of such crucial importance. Because the 
culturalist model of distinction places nonhuman actors or objects in the 
unmarked space of its distinction, regimes of attraction become largely 
invisible. Likewise, because the culturalist model focuses on content 
within the marked space of its sub-distinction, questions of resonance 
between systems or objects become largely invisible. The point is not 
that we ought not to analyze ideology or content, but that the manner 
in which we have organized our distinctions renders all sorts of other 
objects crucial to why society is organized as it is invisible or outside 
the space of discourse. As a consequence, we deny ourselves all sorts of 
strategic possibilities for engaging with the social world around us. In this 
regard, it is not enough merely to debunk the “ideological mystifications” 
from which we suffer. It is additionally necessary to raise questions and 
devise strategies for enhancing the resonance of other systems or objects 
within the social sphere so that change might be produced. Similarly, in 
his recent “Compositionist Manifesto”, Latour proposes the practice of 
composition as an alternative to critique. Where critique aims at debunking, 
composition aims at building. Where critique focuses on content and modes 
of representation, composition focuses on regimes of attraction. If regimes 
of attraction tend to lock people into particular social systems or modes 
of life, the question of composition would be that of how we might build 
new collectives that expand the field of possibility and change within the 
social sphere. Here we cannot focus on discourse alone, but must also 
focus on the role that nonhuman actors such as resources and technologies 
play in human collectives. For example, activists might set about trying 
to create alternative forms of economy that make it possible for people to 
support families, live, get to work, and so on without being dependent on 
ecologically destructive forms of transportation, food production, and food 
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distribution. Through the creation of collectives that evade some of the 
constraints that structure hegemonic regimes of attraction, people might 
find much more freedom to contest other aspects of the dominant order. 
The point here is that the failure for change to occur despite compelling 
critiques of the dominant social order cannot simply be attributed to 
ideological mystifications. Social and political thought needs to expand 
its domain of inquiry, diminish its obsessive focus on content, and 
increase attention to regimes of attraction and problems of resonance 
between objects. The social space is far more free and informed than the 
structuralists and neo-structuralists, in their focus on content, acknowledge 
and it is more likely that the lack of change arises not from subjects being 
ideologically duped alone but from the manner in which we are entangled 
in life. It is not by mistake that often profound social change only occurs 
when the infrastructure of social systems encounter profound collapse, for 
in these circumstances psychic systems no longer have anything left to lose 
and live in the midst of a situation where the regime of attraction in which 
they once existed has ceased to be operative. Observations such as these 
teach critical theorists something important, yet the message of these events 
seems to be received with deaf ears. It is not an accident, for example, that 
the Russian Revolution took place in the middle of massive economic crisis 
and World War I. What examples such as these teach us are that content 
alone is not enough and that political theorists need to enhance their 
capacity of resonance with respect to nonhuman actors and regimes of 
attraction. 
5.3. Temporalized Structure and Entropy 
As we discovered in the last section, every object is threatened from within 
and without by entropy such that it faces the question of how to perpetuate 
its existence across time. Entropy refers to the degree of disorder within a 
system. Suppose you have a tightly closed glass box and somehow introduce 
a gas into it. During the initial phases following the introduction of the 
gas into the system, the gas will be characterized by a high degree of order 
or a low degree of entropy. This is so because the particles of gas will be 
localized in one or the other region of the box. However, as time passes, the 
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degree of disorder and entropy within the system will increase as the gas 
becomes evenly distributed throughout the box. In this respect, entropy is 
a measure of probability. If the earlier phases of the gas distribution indicate 
a lower degree of entropy than the later stages, then this is because in the 
earlier phases there is a lower degree of probability that the gas will be 
localized in any one place in the box. As time passes, the probability of 
finding gas particles located evenly throughout the box increases and we 
subsequently conclude that the degree of entropy has increased. 
In many respects, the real miracle is not that change takes place, but 
rather that change is not more frequent. This is especially mysterious in 
the case of higher-order or higher-scale systems or objects such as social 
systems. How is it that they maintain their endo-consistency or organization 
across time, such that they don't disintegrate into a high degree of entropy? 
Put differently, why do such objects not dissolve as objects? In what follows, 
I focus on Luhmann's analysis of the relationship between structure, 
complexity, entropy, and time as it pertains to biological, psychic, and 
social objects. I leave the analysis of structure and entropy as it functions 
in nonliving objects to others, noting that when suitably modified by 
an object-oriented framework, the work of DeLanda and Massumi is 
particularly promising in this connection. 
There are a number of reasons that Luhmann's conception of structure 
is particularly promising. First, the tendency of structuralism was to fall 
into a sort of structural imperialism arising from a failure to note the 
manner in which systems distinguish themselves from their environment 
or are withdrawn. Structure became a sort of net thrown over the entire 
world without remainder or outside. To be sure, structuralists recognized 
that something other than structure exists, yet were unable to articulate 
what this might be because of the manner in which we are always-already 
situated within structure such that everything we might encounter is 
overdetermined by structure. This schema posed very difficult questions 
for structuralist thought with respect to the question of how change 
takes place. The structuralists recognized that structures are organized 
synchronically and evolve diachronically, yet were left without the means of 
accounting for just how this diachronic evolution takes place because their 
doctrine of internal relations, coupled with their formalism, prevented them 
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from appealing to any outside as a mechanism of change. As a consequence, 
the development or evolution of structure became thoroughly mysterious. 
I take it that I have already shown how, in the first chapter, we can 
speak of objects independent of us despite the fact that all objects are 
withdrawn. One major advancement introduced by Luhmann's concept 
of structure is to mark both the boundary of structure and the conditions 
under which structures can change or evolve. Closely connected to this is 
a pluralization of structure with respect to different systems, allowing us 
to conceptualize a variety of different structures embedded and entangled 
with one another, yet also operationally closed to one another, such that 
each one “comprehends” the entirety of the world in terms of its own 
organization. In this respect, Luhmann is able to account simultaneously 
for the particularity or finitude of objects and their curious universality. As 
Luhmann writes in The Reality of the Mass Media, 
[a]mong the most important consequences of [...] 
differentiation is the complementary relationship between 
universalism and specification. On the basis of its own 
differentiation, the system can assume itself, its own function, 
its own practice as a point of reference for the specification 
of its own operations. It does and can only do whatever has 
connective capability internally, according to the structure 
and historical situation of the system. It is precisely this, 
however, which also creates the conditions for being able to 
deal with everything which can be made into a theme for its 
own communication.253
In other words, each object or system is universal in the sense that it is 
able to comprehend the rest of the world in terms of its own distinctions. 
Nonetheless, each system is particular precisely because it relates to 
its environment or the rest of the world in terms of its own specific 
distinctions. 
The rise of structuralist thought marked a growing awareness of this 
paradoxical simultaneity of universality and specificity. Replacing the 
universal Kantian transcendental subject, the structuralists recognized the 
contingency and plurality of different structures and how they relate to the 
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environment through their own distinctions. Implicitly they thus recognized 
the manner in which objects are withdrawn from other objects. At the 
methodological level, they implicitly practiced second-order observation, 
observing how observers observe, by observing the manner in which other 
social systems or objects relate to the world. Yet this line of inquiry, as 
promising as it was, was itself under-theorized. On the one hand, having 
made the monumental discovery that there are other objects at a larger 
scale than human beings or subjects such as social systems, they made 
the move of treating lower scale objects such as humans as mere effects 
of structure so as to protect their important discovery and prevent all 
subjectivist or humanist attempts to ground these larger scale objects in the 
cognitive and affective capacities of psychic systems. Rather than adopting 
an ontological mereology of objects at a variety of scales and durations that 
are all operationally closed and that relate to each other only selectively, 
they instead attempted to banish these other lower-scale objects altogether. 
Yet, in making such a move, they swept the ground out from beneath 
themselves as they could no longer account for how their own discussion of 
structure was anything other than yet another formation being produced by 
structure itself. 
On the other hand, having recognized system-specific universality in 
the plurality of structures they had uncovered in the domain of culture 
and language, they nonetheless tended to fail in properly theorizing the 
conditions under which they could make these claims. In other words, in 
their structuralist imperialism of treating structure as a net thrown over 
the entire world, they undermined the possibility of accounting for how 
second-order observation of other structures might be possible. In part, 
this problem emerged as a result of failing to properly mark or identify the 
limits of structure. A similar problem has more recently emerged in the 
radical constructivism of Maturana's autopoietic theory. 
Among his major contributions to our understanding of structure lies 
Luhmann's treatment of structure in terms of the distinction between 
system and environment and the temporal problem of how structures 
reproduce themselves across time. It will be recalled that the environment 
is always more complex than any structure or environment. There is never 
a point-for-point correspondence between system and environment. 
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Were there such a correspondence, system would cease to exist. As a 
consequence, objects only maintain selective relations to their environment, 
and this entails that the relations a system maintains to its environment 
always involve contingency and risk with respect to the ongoing autopoiesis 
or existence of the object. As Graham Harman puts it, every object 
caricatures other objects when relating to them. Moreover, objects have an 
internal complexity such that every element is not related to every other 
element, but rather elements are only related in specific ways. Not only do 
the ongoing operations or events that take place within an object risk falling 
into entropy, but each object is threatened by disintegration from events in 
its internal and external environment. Structure names the mechanism or 
organization through which a system or object both makes use of entropy to 
continue its existence and resists falling into entropy. As Luhmann writes, 
[d]rawing on general systems theory and structuralism, we 
obtain an initial characteristic of the concept of structure by 
referring to problems of complexity. Structure transforms 
unstructured complexity into structured complexity—but 
how? Unstructured complexity is entropic complexity, which 
can at time disintegrate into incoherence. The formation of 
structure uses this disintegration and constructs order out of 
it. Out of the disintegration of elements (i.e, the necessary 
cessation of every action), it draws the energy and information 
to reproduce elements that therefore always appear within 
existing structural categories yet still always appear as new. In 
other words, the concept of structure defines more precisely 
how elements relate across temporal distance.254
The advantage of treating structure in terms of the system/environment 
distinction is that it allows us to think the manner in which structure is 
open to the world, thereby providing structure with events from the outside 
that play a role in how structure evolves or develops. Likewise, by treating 
structure in terms of entropy and complexity, we can see how structure is 
related to questions of how an object reproduces itself across time. 
It is sometimes contended that structure consists of relations between 
elements. Luhmann rejects this thesis on the grounds that it is too broad 
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and indeterminate. While it is indeed the case that within any structure 
elements are related to one another, these relations are of a specific kind. 
On the one hand, while it is the case that one and the same structure 
can be embodied in a variety of elements, it doesn't follow from this that 
a structure can be embodied in any element. This feature of multiple 
realizability is crucial to understanding structure and objects, for it is almost 
always the case that the elements that realize a structure are destroyed or 
pass away, while the structure remains and persists. For example, citizens 
are born and die in the United States, and offices are occupied by a variety 
of different politicians. It is thus not the parts that make an entity an entity 
precisely because these parts can change. However, it would be a mistake to 
conclude from this that structures can exist without their elements. Objects 
can be destroyed through their parts insofar as a point is reached where 
the endo-structure of an object can no longer embody or sustain itself. It is 
precisely because the elements that realize structure pass away that systems 
or objects face the question of how to perpetuate themselves across time. 
In the case of autopoietic objects, the object faces the question of how to 
produce new events or elements to maintain itself across time. 
In short, each system or object must reproduce itself across time. In the 
absence of a reproduction of elements and therefore of relations, the object 
dissolves or falls apart. In this respect, we can see just how dynamic objects 
are. Objects are not brute clods that simply sit there unchanging until 
provoked, but perpetually reproduce themselves in the order of time. This 
structure of reproduction can be represented in terms of Bergson's diagram 
of attention and memory as presented in Matter and Memory.255
D
C
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Bergson uses this diagram to outline the role of memory in the process 
of perception, yet it works equally well for thinking the reproduction of 
objects across time. In Bergson's schema, each moment of perception is 
overlaid by a memory image trailing off into the remote past. Bergson 
describes this as a “circuit” of perception and memory, where the two 
come to be ever more deeply intertwined. In the case of perception, the 
result is that each perception becomes increasingly overlaid by memory. 
Bergson's circuit of perception and memory is particularly illustrative of the 
dynamics of autopoietic objects in the order of time. ABCD refers to the 
subsequent reproduction of the object in the course of unfolding in time or 
in moving towards the future. By contrast, A'B'C'D' refers to the memory 
produced by the autopoietic object that can, in its turn, be reactualized in 
the present in a variety of ways. The object uses each prior phase, as well as 
stimulations from its environment, to reproduce itself across time. Similarly, 
in autopoietic objects, memory can be used to actualize new states in the 
present. As a consequence, objects are temporally elongated, tracing a path 
throughout time through their acts. 
Why, then, if objects must reproduce themselves from moment to 
moment, do I not follow Whitehead in arguing that being, at its most basic 
level, is composed of “actual occasions” and that objects are but “societies 
of actual occasions”? Whitehead's actual occasions are instantaneous events 
that cease to exist the very moment that they come into existence. They 
are the true atoms of being, with the important caveat that these atoms 
are not enduring entities, like Lucretius's atoms, but events that flicker in 
and out of existence like the flickering of fireflies. As a consequence, from 
a Whiteheadian perspective, objects are a sort of illusion in the sense that 
they are not the true units of beings, but are rather multiple-compositions 
or societies of actual occasions that are continually coming into existence 
and passing out of existence. In this respect, Bergson's circuit of the object, 
coupled with Luhmann's thesis that objects must perpetually reproduce 
themselves in the order of time, would seem to be a mirror image of 
Whitehead's metaphysical thesis. 
However, to treat actual occasions or instantaneous time-slices as the 
atoms or true units of being is to confuse the being of objects with their 
parts. An object is not its parts, elements, or the events that take place 
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within it—though all of these are indeed indispensable—but is rather 
an organization or structure that persists across time. This brings us to 
Luhmann's second reason as to why structure cannot be identified with 
relations among elements simpliciter. As Luhmann remarks, 
relations acquire structural value only because the relations 
realized at any given time present a selection from a plurality 
of combinatory possibilities and thus introduce both the 
advantages and the risks of a selective reduction. And only this 
selection can be held constant across change in elements, that 
is, can be reproduced with new elements.256
From this Luhmann concludes that “structure, whatever else it may 
be, consists in how permissible relations are constrained within the system”.257 
What Whitehead's account of objects as societies of actual occasions misses 
is that this organization, this constraint on permissible relations among 
elements, is not itself of the order of an actual occasion but is rather that 
which persists or endures across the existence of actual occasions. To be 
sure, these structures exist only in and through actual occasions, but this 
does not change the fact that these structures are irreducible to actual 
occasions for, without structure, there could be no regulation of how events 
are constrained and produced in the ongoing existence of the object. 
A system in which all elements related to one another would be a system 
characterized by absolute entropy and would thus be no system at all 
because it would be unable to distinguish itself from its environment. There 
are thus three problems that beset each system and to which structure 
responds. First, there is the question of how events are to be constrained 
and selected within a system. For example, were all possible memories, 
thoughts, and imaginings to suddenly flood the mind, the mind would 
immediately collapse into absolute entropy, falling into an autistic jumble 
preventing any action or attention. Within a psychic system, there must be 
selectivity as to what events take place within the psychic system and how 
these events are linked to one another. 
Second, and similarly, there must be selectivity or constraint with 
respect to the events that a system is open to from the world or its 
environment. Take the example of an object like a conversation at a cafe. 
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If such a conversation is to be possible, its relationship to its environment 
must be highly constrained, remaining open only to certain events within 
the coffee shop. Of course, this openness to the environment can shift with 
changing events within the system such that the system becomes open to 
events that it was previously closed to, but the point is that at any point in 
time the system only maintains selective relations to its environment. Within 
the cafe, all sorts of conversations are taking place, people are bustling 
about, waiters and waitresses are serving various customers, cappuccino 
machines are hissing their songs, music is playing, people are walking 
back and forth on the sidewalk, and cars are honking and screeching 
outside. Were the conversation as a system or object to share a one-to-one 
correspondence to all these events in the environment, the conversation 
would be impossible and would again fall into a maximum state of entropy. 
As a consequence, the conversation can only be selectively open to events 
in its environment, constituting itself as an object or system through a 
system/environment distinction that both constitutes the conversation 
as an object distinct from its environment and that institutes selective 
relations to the environment, allowing certain events occurring within 
the environment to perturb the system constituted by the conversation. 
Two young women heatedly discussing Sartre's Being and Nothingness and 
whether he stole his ideas from Simone de Beauvoir pause suddenly when 
an impending blizzard is announced over the radio. This event functions 
like a switch. Suddenly the conversation changes direction and the women 
begin discussing whether they should leave to beat the weather, only to 
turn back to Sartre's discussions of facticity and how they constrain choice. 
This event perturbs the conversation in a particular way, leading it to drift 
in another direction, yet what is more remarkable is all the other events 
in the environment that fall into the unmarked space of the distinctions 
regulating the conversation's relationship to its environment, becoming 
all but invisible. Only certain events from the environment are capable of 
influencing the local manifestations the conversation takes. 
Finally, each system faces the question of how to produce subsequent 
events so as to continue its existence across time. Luhmann remarks that 
“one must radically relate the concept of event [...] to what is momentary 
and immediately passes away”.258 Because events are momentary and 
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fleeting, and because structure can only exist so long as it is embodied 
in elements, each system or object faces the question of how to pass 
from one event to another so as to perpetuate its existence. As Luhmann 
observes, “we will constrain the concept of structure in another way: not 
as a special type of stability but by its function of enabling the autopoietic 
reproduction of the system from one event to the next”.259 In the space of a 
conversation, it is necessary to find something else to say if the conversation 
is to continue. The production of events can take place either through 
the internal domain of the system itself, as in those instances where one 
utterance in a conversation leads to another utterance or one secretion of 
a cell initiates processes in another cell in a body, or through perturbations 
coming from the environment. 
Because objects face the question of how to get from one moment to the 
next, they are condemned to change and their identity is a dynamic identity 
that perpetually reproduces itself across time. As Luhmann argues, 
the event, if one may say so, suffers the consequences of the 
fact that no object can change its relationship to the course of 
time. To endure, objects must change in time. Events prefer to 
pass away. On the other hand, every event brings about a total 
change in past, present, and future—simply because it gives 
up the quality of being present to the next event and becomes 
past for it (i.e., for its future). This minimal displacement 
can change the perspective of relevance that structures and 
bounds the horizon of past and future. In this sense, every 
event brings about a total modification of time.260
In the case of autopoietic objects such as organisms, tornadoes, social 
systems, psychic systems, and conversations, events taking place in the 
present modify the substance’s relationship to the past as well as the future. 
This is especially the case with respect to the role played by events that 
issue from the environment. Upon reading a book once, rereading the book 
produces a different impression of the book as a result of both how the first 
reading reconfigured my prior thoughts about the world and other texts and 
as a result of how the opening pages of the book now resonate differently 
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as a result of my anticipation of what is coming. As a consequence, objects 
develop and evolve. 
Information plays a particularly important role in the development and 
evolution of structures. Because structures operate within the framework 
of system/environment distinctions, they are selectively open to their 
environment and can therefore evolve and develop as a result of that 
openness to their environment. Objects constrain the sort of events to 
which they're open from their environment through their distinctions or 
organization. In the case of autopoietic objects, this entails that structures 
are anticipatory of what the future will bring. When events issue from the 
environment, information-events are produced selecting system-states 
within the system. This leads to the production of further events within the 
system, unfolding within a particular order and structured in a particular 
way. This can have the effect of reinforcing and intensifying certain 
developmental vectors within the object. 
However, because structures are anticipatory, they can also undergo 
disappointment when events anticipated from the environment fail 
to materialize. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the 
disappointment of an anticipation entails the absence of information. As 
we have seen, in more “advanced” objects, the absence of an event can 
itself function as information. In Sartre's famous example in Being and 
Nothingness, he walks into a cafe and discovers that his friend Pierre is 
not there.261 Far from being an absence of information, the non-event of 
Pierre's appearance creates an event, information, that selects subsequent 
system-states. Depending on the magnitude of the disappointment, such 
information events can have the effect of propelling systems capable of 
self-reflexivity to revise their distinctions, modifying their system structure 
and developing new forms of openness to the world while foreclosing other 
forms of openness. Similarly, in the case of autopoietic objects or systems 
not capable of self-reflexivity, such disappointments can play a key role 
in natural selection, leading to the death of certain substances reliant on 
particular forms of perturbation to continue their existence and paving 
the way for other organisms to more effectively reproduce themselves. 
This can occur when massive environmental changes take place. Indeed, 
certain organisms unwittingly produce their own demise as in the case of 
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pre-historic microorganisms that required carbon dioxide to continue their 
autopoiesis or self-reproduction and that produced oxygen as a bi-product 
of this process. One result of this process was that they eventually saturated 
their environment with oxygen, contributing to the construction of new 
niches in which other organisms could emerge and undermining the niche 
upon which they relied for their continued existence. 
From the foregoing, we can thus see why selection, constraint, 
distinction, and organization involve risk at the level of structure. Structure 
is contingent in the sense that both the manner in which elements are 
related and the openness to events within the environment could always 
be otherwise. Insofar as structure is a strategy for staving off entropy so as 
to reproduce system-organization across time, the contingency of selection 
and constraint carries with it the risk of dissolution in those instances 
where the selections opening the object to the environment anticipate 
perturbations or irritations that fail to reliably appear. In these instances, 
we encounter less than fortunate local manifestations or death. Here death 
can take one of two forms. On the one hand, death can take the form of a 
substance continuing to exist but becoming incapable of producing certain 
local manifestations such as movement, affect, and cognition. On the other 
hand, death can take the form of absolute death, where entropy completely 
sets in and the substance is utterly destroyed such that it is no longer able 
to enlist other objects in maintaining its own organization and the other 
objects of which the entity was once composed now go their separate ways 
autonomously, enjoying their existence elsewhere. The first death generally 
leads to the second eventually. 
The risk of selectivity and constraint can be seen with particular clarity 
with respect to the issue of climate change. At present, the world's various 
social systems and subsystems lack sufficient capacities for resonance to 
register the importance of changes taking place in the climate. To be sure, 
much of the world's various social systems are aware that climate change is 
taking place and that this will potentially have a massive impact on whether 
or not these social systems are able to sustain themselves. However, despite 
this knowledge, we don't see social systems making the sorts of changes 
necessary to avoid this destruction. Why is this? A good deal of the problem 
has to do with the nature of resonance between various subsystems within 
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the social system and between the various social systems and psychic 
systems. We can only learn of climate change through the scientific system 
and the media system because the changes produced by climate change 
are so diffuse and spread out that they can only be observed through very 
specific techniques. At the level of the other social systems and psychic 
systems, this generates doubt in the science system as the environments 
of these other social systems and psychic systems do not register any 
significant differences. Like two shades of red that are extremely close to 
one another, we see the climate as largely unchanged. The media system, 
in its turn, creates constant noise around the issue, endlessly parading 
experts before the viewing audience that claim that there is a lot of dispute 
surrounding whether or not anthropogenic climate change is taking place 
and who suggest it is based on junk science. Insofar as the media system is 
selectively open to its environment in terms of controversy so as to maximize 
its possibility of new reporting on a daily basis, it generates the impression 
in psychic systems that there is broad disagreement regarding these 
issues when, in fact, it is a minority of scientists, often funded by energy 
companies, who hold such views. 
The more significant problem emerges with respect to resonance 
between the science system, the political system, and the economic system. 
The code according to which the economic system functions is the profit/
no-profit code. In other words, the economic system encounters its 
environment in terms of whether or not it is capable of producing profit. 
As a consequence, the economic system is largely blind to the science 
system unless the findings of the science system create the opportunity 
for producing profit. Initially, it seems as if progress is being made in 
this regard as many businesses are adopting a “green orientation” that 
advertises an ecologically friendly orientation. However, the lion's share 
of our ecological problems issues not from whether we're using energy 
efficient light bulbs, but from farming practices (it's a dirty secret that 
livestock methane contributes more to climate change than the use of 
fossil fuels), industry, shipping, and the sort of energy we use. The sorts of 
changes required in these areas immediately fall into the “no-profit” side of 
the codes deployed by the economic system. 
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The political system, in its turn, finds itself entangled with the regimes 
of attraction governing the lives of psychic systems as well as the economic 
system. The code according to which the political system functions is that 
of power/no-power. In concrete terms, this code revolves around questions 
and issues of re-election. Many of the changes required to mitigate the 
effects of climate change would prove to be a significant hardship on lives of 
citizens, as it would require major changes in the regimes of attraction upon 
which they rely for their existence. This is especially the case in countries 
with developing economies where many are just trying to find a way to feed 
their families from day to day. While many might be abstractly supportive 
of taking action to mitigate the coming climate crisis, when concrete 
proposals are made, many of the suggested changes are deeply unpopular 
because these things would significantly impact how people live their 
lives (imagine how Americans would respond to being told to cut down 
on their meat consumption!) and might lead to the loss of jobs. This, in 
turn, translates into whether or not politicians get votes and get re-elected. 
As a consequence, it is likely that a Faustian bargain is made where the 
politician who is ecologically aware tells himself that at least he is making 
incremental change. 
Nonetheless, it seems that a lot could be done by more heavily 
regulating the shipping industry, encouraging the trucking industry, for 
example, to switch over to alternative fuels, giving large tax breaks to 
families and individuals that drive hybrid cars, use solar panels, increase 
their energy efficiency, making the use of school buses and trains a patriotic 
action for high school students, and providing government subsidies to 
developing countries that provide and develop environmentally friendly 
industries for their citizens, and so on. However, here the political system 
encounters another entanglement with industry and business that makes 
such actions less than appealing from a political perspective. These 
changes all imply major economic hardship for a variety of businesses and 
industries that make massive amounts of money from their practices. In 
the United States at least, the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission opened the gates for corporations 
to use unlimited funds for political purposes. This entails that every U.S. 
politician must now think twice before proposing policy changes as they 
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now face massive advertising campaigns—always conducted behind “front 
groups” implying that they're the work of average Americans and grass root 
activists—targeting the possibility of the politician's re-election. 
The point of this rather pessimistic analysis of resonance within 
social systems with respect to issues of climate change is to underline the 
manner in which the constraints and selections governing openness to 
the environment always involve risk. Within our current social system, the 
distinctions governing resonance between the various social subsystems, 
psychic systems, and the broader environment have generated a quagmire 
that renders responsiveness to climate change very difficult. The forms of 
resonance that do exist, in their turn, create the very real possibility that 
these social systems will themselves collapse as a result of changes in their 
environments that abolish sources of perturbation upon which they depend. 
As climate change and population growth intensifies, it is very likely that 
there will be famines as a result of changes in the climate that destroy 
farming and water resources. This will generate a variety of social crises that 
will reverberate throughout all the different social subsystems. 
The question of how certain forms of system resonance can be 
diminished and how other forms of resonance can be enhanced thereby 
becomes a key question for activists concerned with issues of climate 
change. In his book, Collapse, Jared Diamond notes that one reason Dutch 
citizens, politicians, and businesses seem to be more eco-friendly is not 
because they are more enlightened, but because much of their landmass is 
below sea-level, rendering climate change in the form of rising sea levels 
a potential threat to the majority of the population.262 Likewise, Diamond 
notes how foreign logging companies depleted the rain forests of the Malay 
Penninsula, Borneo, the Solomon Islands, Sumatra, and the Philippines by 
logging these lands as quickly as possible once they were leased to them by 
the local countries and then declaring bankruptcy rather than replanting as 
it was more beneficial financially to do so. The citizens of these areas were 
then left to endure the ecological consequences of these practices, losing 
their own sources of food and industry.263 One lesson of these contrasting 
examples seems to be that resonance is enhanced when a system or object 
has a direct stake in the long-term preservation of elements of the local 
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environment or climate. Yet how such a suture to local climate is to be 
produced in various industries is a very difficult question. 
Returning to some themes from the last section pertaining to mereology, 
we can also discern that a number of objects have some very peculiar 
properties with respect to space and time. It is fairly common to argue 
that objects are individuated by occupying a particular position in space 
and at a particular time. This, for example, was Locke's position. However, 
if it is true that it is the organization or structure, not the parts, that 
determine whether or not something is an object, it follows that objects 
can be discontinuous across time and can be vastly spread out across 
space. A conversation, for example, can cease and be resumed at a later 
point. Here the conversation falls out of existence for a time, it ceases to 
manifest itself locally, and comes back into existence at a later point in 
time. A variety of objects have this strange sort of temporal structure. An 
Alcoholics Anonymous group, for example, might only meet once or twice 
a week, thereby flickering in and out of existence. A number of groups and 
institutions only meet intermittently. 
Not only do we encounter this strange temporality where objects can flit 
in and out of existence while remaining the same object, but there are also a 
variety of different temporal scales characteristic of different objects that are 
oddly simultaneous with one another yet working at very different temporal 
levels. It takes the sun, for example, 225 million years to make one rotation 
around the Milky Way. The Milky Way is one object, characterized by its 
own temporal duration, whereas the solar system is yet another object. 
Here we encounter one temporal duration embedded in another temporal 
duration, with very different cycles unfolding in each object. Similarly, 
societies, climates, and ecosystems each have their own heterogeneous 
durations, moving at different rates and characterized by their own unique 
organizations. In this regard, there's a very real sense in which duration 
is always system-specific such that each object is characterized by its own 
duration and relates to other durations in terms of its own. Different 
social groups, for example, exist in their own “plane of history”, as can 
be observed with the old university professor who hasn't kept up with his 
reading and continues to fight philosophical wars that are decades past, or 
the Amish who live in a very different temporal frame both with respect to 
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the structuration of their daily life and their relation to the broader social 
system in which they're embedded. The temporal rhythms of an organism 
are different from those of a population of organisms, and these, in their 
turn, are different from the temporal rhythms of an entire ecosystem. 
Between all these different temporalities are different forms of resonance, as 
well as different possibilities of conflict. 
Similar features characterize the mereology of objects in space. Blog 
discussions involve participants located all over the world, integrating 
internet servers, various blogs, and participants so as to produce an 
evolving and developing object of its own. Increasingly a number of people 
work from home, yet various businesses still exist as entities in their own 
right. More recently, there's been a trend towards university courses being 
offered online, allowing students to enroll in courses at a specific university 
or college from all over the country and world. Indeed, a friend of mine 
makes his living teaching online courses “in” the United States from 
Israel. Currently, there are massive radio telescope arrays that span entire 
continents, drawing on many smaller radio telescopes to plumb the depths 
of outer space and using thousands of home computers volunteered by 
average citizens to increase their ability to compute the huge amounts of 
data they receive. And, were this not astonishing enough, the observations 
of these entities are not observations of entities existing in the present, but 
in the remote past! 
At the level of object-oriented and onticological mereology, we cannot 
work from the premise that location in time and space is sufficient to 
individuate an object, nor that objects exist only at a particular scale such as 
the mid-range objects that tend to populate the world of our daily existence. 
Rather, entities exist at a range of different scales, from the unimaginably 
small to the unimaginably large, each characterized by their own duration 
and spatiality. Here a tremendous amount of work remains to be done in 
thinking these spatial and temporal structures. In my view, onticology and 
object-oriented philosophy have opened a vast and rich domain for thinking 
these strange structures of space and time. What is important, however, 
is the recognition that the substantiality of objects lies not in their parts, 
but in their structure or organization, and that objects are not brute clods 
that merely sit there, contemplating their self-perfection like Aristotle's 
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Unmoved Mover, but that they are dynamic and evolving as a consequence 
of their own internal dynamics and interfaces with their environment. 
Chapter 6
The Four Theses of Flat Ontology 
The rock was one of those tremendously solid brown, 
or rather black, rocks which emerge from the sand like 
something primitive. Rough with crinkled limpet shells and 
sparsely strewn with locks of dry seaweed, a small boy has 
to stretch his legs far apart, and indeed to feel rather heroic, 
before he gets to the top. But there, on the very top, is a 
hollow full of water, with a sandy bottom; with a blob of jelly 
stuck to the side, and some mussels. A fish darts across. The 
fringe of yellow-brown seaweed flutters, and out pushes an 
opal-shelled crab— “Oh, a huge crab”, Jacob murmured— 
— Virginia Woolf 264
6.1. Two Ontological Discourses:
Lacan's Graphs of Sexuation and Two Ways 
of Thinking Being 
Onticology proposes what might be called, drawing on DeLanda's term 
yet broadening it, a flat ontology. Flat ontology is a complex philosophical 
concept that bundles together a variety of ontological theses under a 
single term. First, due to the split characteristic of all objects, flat ontology 
rejects any ontology of transcendence or presence that privileges one 
sort of entity as the origin of all others and as fully present to itself. In 
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this regard, onticology proposes an ontology resonant with Derrida's 
critique of metaphysics insofar as, in its treatment of beings as withdrawn, 
it undermines any pretensions to presence within being. If this thesis is 
persuasive, then metaphysics can no longer function as a synonym for 
“metaphysics of presence”, nor substance as a synonym for “presence”, 
but rather an ontology has been formulated that overcomes the primacy 
of presence. In this section, I articulate this logic in terms of Lacan's 
graphs of sexuation. Here I believe that those graphs have little to tell us 
about masculine or feminine sexuality—for reasons I will outline in what 
follows—but a great deal to tell us about ontologies of immanence or flat 
ontologies and ontologies of transcendence. Second, flat ontology signifies 
that the world or the universe does not exist. I will develop the argument 
for this strange claim in what follows, but for the moment it is important 
to recognize the definite article in this claim. The claim that the world 
doesn't exist is the claim that there is no super-object that gathers all other 
objects together in a single, harmonious unity. Third, following Harman, 
flat ontology refuses to privilege the subject-object, human-world relation 
as either a) a form of metaphysical relation different in kind from other 
relations between objects, and that b) refuses to treat the subject-object 
relation as implicitly included in every form of object-object relation. To 
be sure, flat ontology readily recognizes that humans have unique powers 
and capacities and that how humans relate to the world is a topic more 
than worthy of investigation, yet nothing about this establishes that humans 
must be included in every inter-object relation or that how humans relate 
to objects differs in kind from how other entities relate to objects. Finally, 
fourth, flat ontology argues that all entities are on equal ontological footing 
and that no entity, whether artificial or natural, symbolic or physical, 
possesses greater ontological dignity than other objects. While indeed some 
objects might influence the collectives to which they belong to a greater 
extent than others, it doesn't follow from this that these objects are more 
real than others. Existence, being, is a binary such that something either 
is or is not. 
Apart from the fact that I believe these propositions to be ontologically 
true, the broader strategic import of the concept of flat ontology is to 
diminish the obsessive focus on the human, subjective and the cultural 
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within social, political, cultural theory and philosophy. In particular, 
my ambition is to diminish an almost exclusive focus on propositions, 
representations, norms, signs, narratives, discourses, and so on, so as to 
cultivate a greater appreciation for nonhuman actors such as animate and 
inanimate natural entities, technologies, and such. To be clear, in seeking 
to diminish a focus on these sorts of actors, my aim is not to exclude these 
sorts of actors. Rather, I seek both to synthesize divergent trends within 
contemporary Continental social, political, cultural, and philosophical 
thought and broaden the field of inquiry available to these discourses and 
debates. Within the framework of contemporary Continental thought, it 
would not be too far off the mark to say that there are two highly different 
cultures. Within the one culture, we have a focus on lived experience, text, 
discourse, signifiers, signs, representation, and meaning. This is a form 
of inquiry dominated by figures such as the various phenomenologists, 
Derrida, Lacan, Žižek, and Foucault, for example. Here there is very 
little in the way of a discussion of the role played by nonhuman actors in 
collectives involving human beings. Rather, nonhuman entities are treated 
as screens upon which humans project their intentions, meanings, signs, 
and discourses, rather than as genuine actors in their own right. They 
are instead passive matter awaiting formatting by humans. This is not 
entirely fair to the theorists of this culture, as Foucault devotes a great 
deal of attention to institutions, architecture, and practices, while Derrida 
recognizes the importance of simple agencies like writing in the most literal 
sense and digital encoding, yet nonetheless, these are dominant tendencies 
within this culture or orientation of theory. 
By contrast, the other culture ranges widely over nonhuman actors 
or objects and pays careful attention to the differences contributed by 
nonhuman agencies such as technologies, animals, environments, and so 
on. Here we might think of monumental intellects such as Donna Haraway 
and Katherine Hayles, the work of McLuhan, Kittler, Ong, and Stiegler, 
the later work of Deleuze and Guattari, the thought of Latour and Stengers, 
engagements with technology such as that found in Ian Bogost's work, 
pathbreaking work such as that found in Protevi, DeLanda, and Massumi, 
ecologists like Timothy Morton, Marx's meditations on how the money-
form, technologies, and factories change our very identities, critical animal 
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theorists such as Cary Wolfe, and a host of other thinkers. Within this 
culture, we find two important trends. On the one hand, there is a tendency 
to decentralize the human by describing the impact of the nonhuman in 
the form of technology and other inhuman agencies on collectives involving 
humans and how these agencies cannot be reduced to human intentions, 
signs, meanings, norms, signifiers, discourses, and so on. 
On the other hand, there is, in this culture, a speculative tendency, 
deserving of the title of “Spinozism”, that ranges freely over the 
“experience” of nonhuman entities, plumbing the worlds of other 
entities without being obliged to relate everything back to the human. 
Graham Harman's universe is a universe populated by circuses and 
clowns, vampires, unnamed monsters, fire and cotton, and a host of other 
frightening and delightful carnivalesque entities that erupt across his pages 
like so many apparitions that simultaneously withdraw and capture us with 
their inherent fascination and allure. Jane Bennett's universe is inhabited by 
the vital forces of abandoned bottle caps, dead rats, trash heaps undergoing 
various forms of bio-chemical decomposition, and a host of other objects. 
Ian Bogost is currently writing his Alien Phenomenology, which promises 
to bring us into the subterranean experience of all sorts of other entities 
such as computer software we scarcely notice in our day to day existence. 
Donna Haraway's universe is pervaded with wolves, microbes, lab reports 
and articles, various types of primates, plants, and all sorts of laboratory 
equipment. Karen Barad's universe is populated by all sorts of particles, 
instruments and waves. 
What I aim for with the concept of flat ontology is a synthesis of 
these two cultures. I desire an ontology capable of doing justice to these 
strange nonhuman actors, capable of respecting these strange strangers 
on their own terms, and an ontology capable of doing justice to the 
phenomenological and the semiotic. Moreover, I believe that such a 
project is absolutely vital to the future of contemporary thought. The first 
of these two cultures is regnant in the contemporary world of theory. The 
aim of diminishing the primacy of the human is not nihilistic nor designed 
to exclude the human, but is premised on the thesis that, so long as the 
first culture maintains center stage, we are thoroughly unable to properly 
comprehend human collectives nor theorize strategic ways of transforming 
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them. In this connection, flat ontology makes two key claims. First, humans 
are not at the center of being, but are among beings. Second, objects are not 
a pole opposing a subject, but exist in their own right, regardless of whether 
any other object or human relates to them. Humans, far from constituting 
a category called “subject” that is opposed to “object”, are themselves one 
type of object among many. 
The difference between philosophies of transcendence and philosophies 
of immanence such as those advocated by the flat ontology of onticology 
can be thematized in terms of Lacan's graphs of sexuation. Here my aim 
is to argue that onticology and its conception of objects aligns itself with 
the feminine side of Lacan's graph of sexuation. Before proceeding to 
outline this congruence and the difference between ontological discourses 
organized around withdrawal and ontological discourses organized around 
presence (the masculine side of Lacan's graphs of sexuation), it is first 
necessary to make some qualifications. Within the history of philosophy, 
there has been a long history of associating women with nature, being, and 
passivity coupled with an objectification of women that denies them agency 
as subjects in their own right. Onticology certainly does not wish to align 
itself with these unfortunate tendencies, yet doesn't it risk doing precisely 
this in arguing that the true discourse of being falls on the side of the 
feminine side of Lacan's graphs of sexuation? Moreover, doesn't it fall into 
an even worse plight in treating being as composed of objects? 
There are a few points worth making in response to this entirely justified 
concern. First, and above all, it is necessary to recognize that it is difficult 
to see what, if anything, Lacan's graphs of sexuation have to do with sex or 
gender. As Bruce Fink articulates this point, 
[i]t should be recalled that sexuation is not biological sex: 
What Lacan calls masculine structure and feminine structure 
have to do not with one's biological organs but rather with 
the kind of jouissance one is able to obtain. There is not, 
to the best of my knowledge, any easy overlap between 
sexuation and “sexual identity”, or between sexuation and 
what is sometimes referred to as “sexual orientation”. [...]. 
When I refer to men in the ensuing discussion, I mean those 
people who, regardless of biological sex, fall under certain 
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formulas—what Lacan calls “the formulas of sexuation” – 
[...] and when I refer to women I mean those people who, 
regardless of their biological sex, fall under the [feminine 
side] of the formulas.265
Having spent more time than I care to admit with the Lacanian 
secondary literature and the seminars in which he develops his account of 
sexuation, I believe that Bruce Fink is essentially correct in this judgment. 
While Lacan does indeed articulate two different structures of the 
deadlocks that beset desire and jouissance, it is not at all clear why these 
two structures should be called “masculine” and “feminine”. In my view, 
Lacan fails to establish any direct link between these structures and sex and 
gender. For example, any subject, whether biologically male or female—
assuming, questionably, that we can even speak univocally of subjects being 
biologically male or female—can occupy either side of Lacan's graphs of 
sexuation. Put differently, biologically “male” subjects can enjoy or fail to 
enjoy as feminine subjects and biologically “female” subjects can enjoy or 
fail to enjoy as masculine subjects. 
The strongest argument in favor of associating the graphs of 
sexuation with the masculine and the feminine arises from the fact that 
the masculine side of the graph of sexuation can be read as a highly 
abstract and formalized version of the structure of Freud's patriarchal 
Oedipus Complex and myth of the Primal Father in Totem and Taboo. If 
the Oedipus Complex and the myth of the Primal Father are understood 
to be intrinsically patriarchal and phallocentric structures, then there is 
some reason to associate the masculine side of the graph of sexuation 
with forms of jouissance and desire related to masculinity. However, here 
again we encounter the question of why the feminine side of the graph of 
sexuation should be associated with women. We could just as easily refer to 
the two sides of the graphs of sexuation as outlining logics of immanence 
(the feminine) and logics of transcendence (the masculine), or logics of the 
“not-all” (the feminine) and logics of exception (the masculine). 
A second point to be made is that in arguing that the objects of 
onticology and object-oriented philosophy fall on the feminine side of the 
graphs of sexuation, it is imperative to recall that, within the framework of 
onticology, objects are neither passive nor a pole opposed to the subject. 
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Within the framework of object-oriented ontology, there are not two 
domains of being, one belonging to the domain of the subject, the other 
belonging to the domain of the object, but rather just one type of being: 
objects. On the one hand, we can thus say that subjects are not a pole 
opposed to objects, but are themselves a type of object. They are objects 
among other objects. To be sure, what we refer to as subjects have special 
powers and capacities, but they are nonetheless a sort of object in the 
world. On the other hand, far from being passive clods awaiting formatting 
from humans and getting worked over by humans, objects, as theorized 
by onticology, are themselves, following Latour, actors or actants that are 
themselves agents. In this regard, treating objects as falling on the feminine 
side of the graphs of sexuation in no way suggests that women are passive 
objects. To the contrary, the feminine side of the graph of sexuation turns 
out to be the side of agency. 
With these caveats in mind, I now turn to Lacan's graphs of sexuation. I 
will first discuss the graphs of sexuation within the framework of Lacanian 
theory and then reformulate them in ontological terms. Lacan's graphs 
of sexuation attempt to symbolize or display certain deadlocks that occur 
whenever we attempt to totalize the symbolic order or the world. Lacan 
argues that whenever we attempt to totalize the world, certain deadlocks 
emerge preventing such totalities from being successfully accomplished. 
Because of the absence and metonymy introduced into the world of the 
subject by language, Lacan contends that each potential object of jouissance 
contains a remainder of absence or lack that prevents it from conferring 
complete enjoyment. Complete enjoyment would require the totalization 
or completion of the symbolic, yet such totalizations always fail. Moreover, 
there is not merely one way in which we attempt to totalize the world and 
for this totalization to fail, but rather two ways. These two ways of failing 
are what Lacan refers to as the “masculine” and the “feminine”. These 
two forms of failure, in their turn, generate two very different structures 
of desire and jouissance. Put differently, depending on how the subject is 
structured as either a “masculine” or a “feminine” subject, different forms 
of jouissance will be available to the subject. The term “jouissance” is highly 
polysemous within Lacanian theory, however within the framework of the 
graphs of sexuation we can treat jouissance as the sort of enjoyment open 
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to a subject. Put more precisely, the two graphs explain why our jouissance 
comes up short or lacking as a result of our being enmeshed within the 
symbolic order. As Bruce Fink remarks, “[w]e find the pleasures available 
to us in life inadequate, and it is owing to that inadequacy that we expound 
systems of knowledge—perhaps, first and foremost, to explain why our 
pleasure is inadequate and then to propose how to change things so that it 
will not be”.266
Within the Lacanian framework, this deficit of jouissance is not 
accidental but rather structural. In other words, our deficit of jouissance 
arises not from an accidental lack such that if we could only find the 
appropriate object we would experience complete enjoyment, but rather is 
a structural feature of how we are enmeshed in language or the symbolic 
order. These structural impossibilities of complete jouissance, in their turn, 
generate fantasies to account for both why jouissance is lacking and how 
this lack might be surmounted. For example, racists are often particularly 
attentive to the imagined jouissance of other groups, believing these groups 
to both possess a greater jouissance than themselves, and believing that the 
other group has perhaps stolen their jouissance from them. The racist might 
endlessly talk about how the other group is lazy, how they get free rides 
from the government, how they are promiscuous, how they lack moral 
values, and so on. Based on such fantasies, the racist might imagine all sorts 
of ways to take action against these other groups so as to get back their 
stolen jouissance. It's not difficult to discern such mechanisms at work in 
misogyny and homophobia as well. The tragedy of this sort of jouissance is 
two-fold. On the one hand, these dark fantasies lead to the persecution of 
other people and groups based on an imagined jouissance that one believes 
these other groups have stolen. The pursuit of jouissance purported to be 
lost and stolen thus riddles the social field with conflict. On the other 
hand, the belief that total jouissance exists, that it is possible to attain 
complete jouissance, makes it all the more difficult to enjoy the jouissance 
that is available because it always falls short of imagined jouissance. As 
a consequence, the subject suffers from fantasies of total jouissance that 
transform life into cold ashes. Filled with envy at the jouissance one believes 
to be enjoyed by other groups, and crushed by bitterness at the absence of 
jouissance in one’s own life, the subject becomes unable to enjoy anything. 
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To illustrate the structural deadlocks that arise when we attempt 
to totalize the symbolic order, Lacan resorts to the resources of 
symbolic logic:267
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The upper portions of the graph filled with equations refers to the 
structural deadlocks that inhabit the symbolic. The left side is the masculine 
side, whereas the right side is the feminine side. These refer to logics 
of exception and the “not-all” respectively. The symbols that appear in 
the lower portion of the graph refer to the sorts of jouissance available to 
subjects depending on whether they fall under the left or right-hand side 
of the graph. Within symbolic logic, “∃” is what is known as an “existential 
quantifier”. Existential quantifiers refer to partial collections such as 
“some”, “many”, “one” and so on. Thus, for example, the proposition 
“some cats are black” would be written in symbolic logic as follows: ∃xCx 
& Bx. Translated back into ordinary language, this would read, “there 
exists at least one entity such that this entity is a cat and this entity is 
black”. The upper case letters are thus predicates qualifying a subject or 
entity, while the lower case letters are variables or arguments. Similarly, in 
symbolic logic, the symbol “∀” is what is known as a “universal quantifier”. 
Universal quantifiers refer to expressions such as “all” and “every”. Thus, 
the proposition “all humans are mortal” would be translated into symbolic 
logic as follows: ∀xHx → Mx. Translated into ordinary language, this would 
read, “for all entities, if x is human then x is mortal”. The arrow thus reads 
as a conditional or an “if/then” statement. Finally it will be noted that 
over some of the expressions in the upper portions of Lacan's graph a bar 
appears. This bar denotes negation. Within what follows, I will use the 
following symbol to denote negation: “~”. 
In all four of the propositions populating the upper portion of Lacan's 
graph of sexuation we notice the symbol “Φ” appearing as a predicate 
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qualifying “x”. Within the framework of the upper portion of the graphs, 
this symbol refers to the phallic function. Like many of Lacan's mathemes, 
Φ is highly polysemous depending on the context in which it appears. 
Within the present context, Φ does not refer to the phallus—at least 
in the upper portion of the graph—much less to the male organ of the 
penis. Rather, Φ refers to castration, our submission to language, or our 
submission to the Law. In other words, Φ refers to the manner in which we 
must pursue jouissance through language and therefore encounter a priori 
restrictions or limitations to jouissance. 
We are now in a position to read the propositions in the upper portion 
of Lacan's graphs of sexuation. The top and bottom propositions are to be 
read together or in relation to one another as embodying a sort of deadlock 
or contradiction. Thus, on the left or masculine side, the top proposition 
reads ∃x~Φx, while the bottom proposition reads ∀xΦx. Translated into 
ordinary language, the first proposition reads, “there exists an entity such 
that this entity is not subject to the phallic function”, while the second 
proposition reads, “for all entities, x is submitted to the phallic function”. 
When read together, the deadlock or contradiction embodied in these two 
propositions is that of a fantasy held by the subject in which complete 
enjoyment is possible, coupled with an existence where all jouissance comes 
up short by virtue of being subordinated to the phallic function. 
One of the great advantages of Lacan's abstraction in these formulations 
is that it allows us to discern a common structure in a number of diverse 
domains. Not only does Lacan's handful of symbols allow us to discern 
the basic structure of the Oedipus Complex and the myth of the Primal 
Father in Totem and Taboo, but we can also see it as articulating the basic 
relationship between a monarch and his subjects, God and his creatures, 
the Cartesian subject and other objects, a celebrity and his fans, and so 
on. In each of these cases, we have the fantasy of a subject that either has 
complete knowledge, complete power, or complete enjoyment coupled 
with a plurality of subjects or entities that are lacking in knowledge, 
power, or enjoyment. In the case of the Primal Father, for example, we 
have an entity that has no limitations on his jouissance. Not only does he 
possess all the women of the tribe, he is also able to enjoy incest with his 
mother and daughters. Similarly, in the case of the Oedipus, the subject 
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encounters a limit to his enjoyment in the incest prohibition. Likewise, in 
The Concept of the Political, Schmitt's monarch enjoys a strange status of 
exception, simultaneously being above and outside the law and therefore 
enjoying absolute power, while also being the origin of the law (castration/
limitation).268 What we thus get here is a logic of universality defined by 
exception. In order for the universal to establish itself in the form of the 
law, there must be a shadowy and phantasmatic exception that allows the 
boundary of the law to establish or ground itself. The sovereign need not 
truly have absolute power, nor must the Primal Father really have existed. 
All that is necessary is the unconscious belief in such exceptions to the 
failure of jouissance. If it proves impossible to totalize the symbolic order 
under this model, then this is because such totalization always requires 
an impossible exception outside that order, whereas the signifier is always 
differentially constituted without positive terms. 
On the feminine side of the graph of sexuation, we get not a logic of 
exception, but a logic of the “not-all”. The top proposition of the feminine 
side of the graph of sexuation reads, ~∃x~Φx, while the lower proposition 
reads, ~∀xΦx. Translated into ordinary language, the first proposition 
reads, “there does not exist an entity that is not submitted to the phallic 
function”. By contrast, the second proposition reads, “not all of x is 
submitted to the phallic function”. In other words, on the feminine side, 
something escapes from the law of language, castration, or the phallic 
function. It will be noted that whereas the masculine side constitutes a 
universal (the universality of the law) through an exception, we find no 
exception on the feminine side, nor do we find any universality. Instead 
of universality, what we find is the “not-all” or the “not-whole”. Two 
consequences follow from this: first, insofar as there is no constitutive 
exception within the structure of feminine sexuality, this structure can be 
described in terms of immanence. Where the structure of masculine sexuality 
presupposes a transcendent term outside the world or law in some way or 
another, within the field of feminine structure we find only a flat plane with 
no transcendent outside or exception. 
Second, the absence of a constitutive exception leads to Lacan's much 
maligned and misunderstood claim that the woman does not exist.269 Here 
we must attend to the role of the definite article in Lacan's formulation. 
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Lacan's thesis is that, in order for a class to constitute itself as existing or 
universal, there must be an exception that defines the rule. If, according 
to Lacan, we can say what a male is, then this is because all men share 
the common characteristic of being castrated or subordinated by the Law 
defined by the phallic function. This law is guaranteed by the constitutive 
exception that allows the law to be determined. There is no analogous 
instance on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation, therefore it is 
impossible to constitute a universal class of women. The upshot of this is 
not that women do not exist, but rather that woman, the woman, does not 
constitute a closed and defined class. Put in more positive terms, women 
belong to the set of the singular, the individual, the different. They form an 
open set without any shared or overarching predicate defining a universal 
identity, thereby undermining any pretension to essence or identity. 
In response to the failures of totalization found on both sides of the 
graph of sexuation, forms of jouissance appear as attempts to supplement 
and surmount this failure. On the masculine side we witness , the symbol 
for the barred subject, pointing at a, the matheme for objet a. It will be 
noted that the form of jouissance that appears on the masculine side of the 
graph of sexuation also has the structure of Lacan's formula for fantasy, ( 
<> a), read “barred subject punch objet a”. In chapter four, we already saw 
that objet a is the remainder produced as a result of the subject's entrance 
into language. As a consequence, objet a is not an empirical or existing 
object, but a sort of remainder, excess, or irreducible fractional quantity 
marking that which cannot be integrated into the symbolic. Lacan refers 
to the objet a not as the object of desire, but as the object-cause of desire. 
Objet a forever propels the masculine subject forward, seeking a lost object 
he never had to begin with. Nonetheless, within the framework of fantasy, 
while objet a is not the object of desire but the cause of desire, various 
objects come to function as surrogates or stand-ins for objet a. Within the 
domain of unconscious fantasy, these surrogates are thought as that which, 
if destroyed or gained, would complete the subject, allowing the subject to 
surmount the lack that characterizes his being. In this respect, all fantasies 
are dual, organized like a Möbius strip, containing both a hypothesis as to 
what must be gained in order to surmount lack and a hypothesis as to what 
caused the loss of that object which would complete him. For example, the 
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anti-Semite might believe that Jews are responsible for his economic woes 
and that money would provide the satisfaction that he seeks. This belief in 
the possibility of total jouissance arises from the upper proposition of the 
masculine side of the graph of sexuation, ∃x~Φx, and the unconscious 
belief that either an uncastrated subject exists or is possible. 
Lacan often refers to phallic jouissance or the sort of jouissance found 
in objet a as deferred jouissance. As Bruce Fink puts it, “Lacan associates 
phallic jouissance with organ pleasure, the pleasure of the genitalia [...]; 
the idea here is that one must endlessly defer or altogether give up organ 
pleasure to obtain another kind of pleasure”.270 Part of the reason for this 
deferral is that, were the subject to actually reunite with the semblance 
of objet a, he would discover that the semblance of objet a is not “it”. 
Thus, for example, Lacan argues that obsessionals, which are associated 
with masculine sexuation, have a desire for an impossible desire.271 
Through a fantasy structure organized around an impossible desire, the 
masculine subject can thereby sustain his desire and protect against the 
disappointment of jouissance coming up short. 
In many respects, masculine jouissance can be described as solipsistic 
and masturbatory. In Encore, Lacan notoriously claims that there is no 
sexual relationship.272 In the case of the masculine sexuated subject, 
whether biologically male or female and whether one's partner is male or 
female, we can see how this is the case. The masculine sexuated subject 
relates not to his partner qua subject, but rather to objet a. Returning to 
our discussion of the Lacanian clinic in chapter 4, the masculine sexuated 
subject attempts to reduce or abolish the subject as Other, as autopoietically 
closed, relating only to the Other's demand and objet a. I refer to this way 
of relating to the Other and the world as “Malkovichism”. In Spike Jonze's 
Being John Malkovich, we are told the strange tale of a passage in an office 
building that allows you to enter John Malkovich's mind and experience 
what it is like to be John Malkovich for fifteen minutes. At a certain point 
in the film, John Malkovich becomes wise to what is going on and himself 
goes through the passage. When Malkovich goes through the tunnel and 
experiences his own experience, he has the harrowing experience of seeing 
everyone else, male and female, with his own head, speaking not ordinary 
language, but endlessly repeating his name: “Malkovich! Malkovich! 
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Malkovich!” In short, Malkovich is forcibly confronted with his own 
narcissism and phallic economy of jouissance. What we encounter here is 
correlationism in its purest form. Within the correlationist frame of thought, 
the world is reduced to a passive screen that merely reflects our intentions, 
meanings, signs, narratives, and discourses. Within the masculine economy 
of jouissance, one relates not to the partner but to Žižek's ticklish object 
which functions like a strange attractor bringing the subject into existence. 
In this connection, Lacan makes the joke that masculine jouissance is 
“hommosexual”. Here Lacan is punning on the French “homme” or “male”, 
and “homosexuality”. His point is not that all men are homosexuals, but 
rather that masculinely sexuated subjects desire the same or identity and 
therefore strive to banish the alterity encountered in desire. Lacan's point is 
not that men only desire other men, but rather that masculine desire desires 
the same in the form of objet a or the fetish object. 
On the feminine side of the graph of sexuation we encounter a very 
different form of jouissance. On the one hand, we see not one arrow, as in 
the case of masculine sexuation, but rather two arrows. On the other hand, 
we see not the barred subject, , but rather the barred “”.  refers to 
non-existent woman that cannot be totalized under a single category or 
identity. In the lower portion of the feminine side of the graph of sexuation, 
we see an arrow pointing at Φ. Here we encounter the polysemy of Lacan's 
mathemes. In this context, Φ does not seem to represent the phallic 
function or castration, but rather power, potency, or a master. Lacan's 
somewhat sexist thesis here seems to be that the feminine sexuated subject, 
whether biological male or female, can find jouissance by identifying with a 
partner that embodies Φ. Such a subject might be someone that possesses 
political power, knowledge, celebrity, prestige, physical strength, skill, 
and so on. The idea would thus be that the feminine sexuated subject, 
who can find no signifier within the symbolic to define or fix her identity, 
identifies with Φ so as to confer an identity upon herself. Whereas  
marks the inability for language to complete or totalize itself and therefore 
an inability to produce a fixed or stable identity within the symbolic, Φ 
creates the illusion of a fixed or stable identity. In this regard we can see the 
impossibility of the sexual relation in terms of feminine sexuation, insofar as 
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the femine sexuated subject relates to his partner not as a subject but as a 
semblance of Φ. 
This reading of  as it relates to Φ seems to recommend itself as a 
consequence of Lacan's discourse of the hysteric, which Lacan associates 
with the feminine. In the discourse of the hysteric, we have the barred 
subject addressing itself to the master or master-signifier, demanding to be 
told what it is: 
//

a
In the discourse of the hysteric, the subject addresses the Other or 
master from the standpoint of his split. This split results from the inability 
of the symbolic or language to provide the subject with a signifier that 
would fix or name his identity within the symbolic. In short, the hysterical 
subject calls on the other to tell him what he is. This inability of language 
to provide a signifier that would found the subject arises from the essence 
of language itself. As Lacan remarks in The Logic of Fantasy, “it is of the 
nature of each and every signifier that it cannot signify itself”.273 Insofar 
as the signifier cannot signify itself, it always requires another signifier to 
produce effects of signification. In this respect, signifiers have the structure 
of sets that do not include themselves, and Lacan does not hesitate to draw 
a parallel with Russell's paradox pertaining to the impossibility of a set of 
all sets that do not include themselves. The net result of this is that there 
cannot be a “universe of discourse” or totality of language because it will 
always be beset by paradox from within.274 The consequence of this is that 
there can be no stable signifier that could ground the subject's identity, 
for each signifier will necessarily refer to another signifier without any 
possibility of completeness. It is this structure of language that accounts 
for the divided structure of the subject. Moreover, in the position of truth 
in the discourse of the hysteric, we encounter objet a as that remainder 
that is always lost within language. It is this remainder that literally drives 
the subject forward, forever looking for that signifier that would ground 
identity, and further alienating himself through his speech. The product 
of this discourse, we note, is knowledge, S
2
, produced as a result of the 
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hysteric's demand. Indeed, Lacan claims that the discourse of the hysteric 
is the only discourse that produces knowledge.275 In this connection, we 
can treat Φ and the master or S
1
 to which the hysteric addresses himself as 
equivalent. 
At this point, there are a couple of points worth noting. Attentive 
readers will have noted that I have been referring to the hysterical subject in 
masculine terms. First, while Lacan associates hysteria with the feminine, 
any neurotic subject that undergoes analysis must enter into the discourse 
of the hysteric or begin asking the question “what am I for the Other?” 
Second, and more fundamentally, however, both Lacan and Freud argue 
that the subject is, at root, a hysterical subject. As Žižek puts it, “the status 
of the subject as such is hysterical. The subject is constituted through his 
own division, splitting, as to the object in him; this object, this traumatic 
kernel, is the dimension that we have already named as that of 'death drive', 
of a traumatic imbalance, a rooting out”.276 If the subject is hysterical at its 
core, then this is because both masculine and feminine neurotic subjects 
undergo the same alienation in language and therefore encounter the same 
paradoxical structure of language with respect to its inability to totalize or 
complete itself. In this vein, Žižek goes on to remark that, 
hysteria and obsessional neurosis are not two species of 
neurosis as a neutral-universal genus; their relation is 
a dialectical one—it was Freud himself who noted that 
obsessional neurosis is a kind of “dialectic of hysteria”: 
hysteria as a fundamental determination of a neurotic 
position contains two species, obsessional neurosis and itself as 
its own species.277
At root, at the most fundamental level, the subject is hysterical in its 
structure such that obsessional neurosis is a subspecies of hysteria. 
The importance of this observation is not to be underestimated. If it 
is true that subjectivity is at root hysterical, if it is true that obsession is 
a subspecies of hysteria, and if it is true that hysteria is associated with 
feminine sexuation and obsessional neurosis is associated with masculine 
sexuation, we find that we are able to invert a fundamental characterization 
of woman throughout Western history. Generally we hear that woman is 
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characterized by masquerade, deception, semblance, inconsistency, and so 
on. However, in light of the foregoing, it would appear that in point of fact 
it is masculinity that is a charade, a semblance, a masquerade. And indeed, 
this is clearly visible in Lacan's discourse of the master. 
//



a
Lacan associates the discourse of the master with obsessional neurosis 
and therefore with masculine sexuation. In the position of truth in the 
lower left-hand corner of this discourse, we witness the barred subject, , 
which is nothing other than the hysterical subject. As a consequence, the 
master-signifier that appears in the position of the agent in the upper left-
hand corner must be a charade, a semblance, or a masquerade. What the 
foregoing entitles us to claim is thus that the feminine side of the graph of 
sexuation is the structure of truth, whereas the masculine side of the graph 
of sexuation is the side of semblance. Moreover, we can now say that the 
totalization that masculine sexuation attempts to effect through the logic of 
exception is a semblance that strives to erase and cover over the constitutive 
split of being.
The second arrow on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation 
points not to Φ, but rather to S(). S() refers to what Lacan calls “Other 
jouissance”, which is a form of jouissance outside the symbolic that Lacan 
associates with the experience of mystics.278 Because not-all of woman is 
subject to the phallic function, the feminine sexuated subject, whether male 
or female, is capable of a jouissance outside the symbolic. Echoing Lacan's 
thesis that masculine sexuated subjects are “hommosexual”, we could say 
that in light of Other jouissance, S(), feminine sexuated subjects are the 
true “hetero-sexuals”. Here the “hetero” of hetero-sexual should not be 
read as claiming that women only desire men, but rather that feminine 
sexuality is structured in such a way that it is capable of desiring alterity or 
the Other qua Other, regardless of whether the other subject is biologically 
male or female. 
Having made this detour through Lacan's graphs of sexuation in 
terms of desire and jouissance, I now turn to the question of how these 
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structures relate to flat ontology. We have already seen that Lacan's graphs 
of sexuation have no clear or unambiguous link to biological sex or gender. 
Biologically male subjects can occupy the feminine side, just as biologically 
feminine subjects can occupy the masculine side. Moreover, we have seen 
that, as structures, these graphs are able to represent a wide variety of 
diverse formations. Likewise we have seen that the graphs represent failures 
of totalization. Finally, we have seen that the masculine side of the graph 
of sexuation refers to semblance, whereas the feminine side of the graph of 
sexuation refers to truth. 
Without excluding the reading of Lacan's graphs in terms of sexuation, 
desire, and jouissance, I propose to read these graphs in terms of ontological 
discourse and, in particular, in terms of withdrawal. This reading is not 
designed to have any argumentative or demonstrative force, but rather is 
designed to outline how the discourse of onticology and object-oriented 
ontology differ from other ontological discourses. Moreover, this treatment 
of onticology in terms of the graphs of sexuation will, I hope, allow us to 
see more clearly what is entailed by a flat ontology. Under this reading, 
the phallic function or Φ is no longer treated as the phallic function or 
castration, but rather as the ontological function of withdrawal. In the 
foregoing, we have already seen how objects are constitutively withdrawn 
from other objects. This withdrawal takes two forms: on the one hand, 
objects are withdrawn in the sense that they are always in excess of any 
of their local manifestations. Objects always have a virtual domain that is 
never exhausted by any of their local manifestations. On the other hand, 
objects are withdrawn in the sense that they are never directly perturbed 
or “irritated” by other objects, but rather always translate perturbations 
into information according to their own endo-structure, organization, or 
distinctions. Φ refers to this constitutive withdrawal of objects. 
In this respect, the two sides of Lacan's graphs of sexuation refer to 
the manner in which different ontological discourses handle or treat this 
dimension of withdrawal within objects. Rather than referring to these 
structures as “masculine” and “feminine”, I now refer to the two sides 
of Lacan's graphs as ontologies of presence and ontologies of withdrawal 
respectively. Likewise, ontologies of presence can be referred to as 
ontologies of transcendence, whereas ontologies of withdrawal can be 
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referred to as ontologies of immanence. Ontologies of transcendence refer 
to ontologies where some being or term stands apart from the world, 
thereby immunized from withdrawal. Such ontologies are organized around 
the logic of exception outlined in the foregoing. By contrast, ontologies of 
immanence refuse any such term, treating all of being as composed of a 
single flat plane in which all beings are subject to withdrawal. Both forms 
that ontology takes relate to withdrawal but do so in very different ways. 
On the side of ontologies of transcendence, we encounter the following 
propositions: ∃x~Φx and ∀xΦx. The first proposition now reads, “there 
exists an entity such that that entity is not withdrawn”. The second 
proposition now reads, “for all entities, these entities are withdrawn”. As 
abstract as this formulation is, it allows us, I believe, to capture the core 
hypothesis of philosophies of presence or ontotheology. On the one hand, 
whether we're speaking of the God of ontotheology or the traditional 
subject of philosophy embodied in Descartes' thought, we encounter a 
term that is not itself withdrawn, but which is fully present to itself. This is 
true even of Hume's mind or Kant's structure of experience, where their 
critiques of metaphysics are premised on some form of consciousness or 
experience that is present to itself, but where there is no direct access to 
other objects. Hume, for example, is able to advance his critique of causality 
and the notion that objects are inhabited by “hidden powers” while arguing 
that cause and effect relations are associations drawn by mind on the 
grounds that mind is present to itself, whereas causal relations and powers 
are withdrawn from mind. Likewise, Kant is able to argue that substance, 
for example, is a category imposed by mind on the manifold of intuition 
producing phenomena, while also arguing that things-in-themselves are 
unknowable on the grounds that mind is present to itself, while objects are 
withdrawn. A good deal of philosophy influenced by the linguistic turn has 
this structure as well. Language here is treated as what is present, whereas 
objects are withdrawn. Finally, in theology, within this framework God is 
treated as a fully self-present term, while all of God's creatures are treated 
as finite, imperfect, and incomplete. 
What we find in all variants of the ontologies of presence and 
transcendence is thus a term that is treated as present or immune to the 
function of withdrawal. As a consequence of this structure, withdrawal 
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comes to appear as accidental rather than as an essential feature of all 
objects. Withdrawal is treated as something to be overcome, rather than 
as a structural feature of being. Here we encounter the function of objet 
a in ontologies of presence. Objet a is that remainder or leftover within 
representation that eludes complete presence. However, the premise here 
is that this remainder is not a constitutive feature of the being itself, but 
rather is an accidental feature of the relativity of our representations. Put 
a bit differently, objects are seen as withdrawn for-us and fully present in-
themselves. In this regard, withdrawal is a sort of “optical effect” produced 
as a result of how our representations hook on to the world, rather than as a 
structural feature of objects themselves. This is true even of skeptical variants 
of ontologies of presence such as Hume's where the thesis is not that 
entities are in-themselves withdrawn, but rather where the thesis is that we 
have no direct access to entities by virtue of how we represent entities. 
This discussion of ontologies of transcendence provides me with the 
opportunity to distinguish between epistemological realism and ontological 
realism, the latter of which is advocated by onticology and object-oriented 
philosophy. Any confusion of the ontological realism advocated by 
onticology and object-oriented philosophy and epistemological realism is 
doomed to be disastrous, as these two forms of realism belong to entirely 
different registers. Epistemological realism is a variant of the ontologies 
of presence that strives to bring objects or the world to presence in an 
adequate representation. The concern of epistemological realism is to 
represent the world and objects as they are and to sort between true 
representations, illusions, and superstitions. As such, epistemological 
realism treats the withdrawal of objects as an accident that can, in 
principle, be overcome by the proper form of inquiry. It is for this reason 
that epistemological realisms remain within the domain of ontologies of 
presence or ontotheology. 
The ontological realism advocated by onticology and object-
oriented philosophy, by contrast, is what Graham Harman has called 
a weird realism.279 The realism advocated by object-oriented ontology 
and onticology is not an epistemological thesis, but an ontological thesis. 
This realism is not a thesis about how we know things, but rather about 
how things are. On the one hand, onticology refuses to reduce entities 
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to constructions by other entities. To be sure, every entity translates the 
other entities to which it relates, yet these translations must be rigorously 
distinguished from the entities that are translated. In this regard, every 
entity is an irreducible entity in its own right. On the other hand, onticology 
and object-oriented philosophy are the thesis that entities are constitutively 
withdrawn from one another. In other words, withdrawal is not an 
accidental feature of how mind represents entities, but is rather a structural 
feature of what beings or entities are as such. In this regard, onticology 
and object-oriented philosophy are able to retain many of the insights 
of anti-realism, while situating them in ontological terms. Here, following 
Žižek, onticology and object-oriented philosophy can proclaim that we are 
healed by the spear that smote us.280 Withdrawal, far from being an accident 
of how mind, representation, or language hooks on to being, is instead a 
constitutive feature of all beings. 
Turning to the ontologies of immanence, we now encounter two 
very different propositions: ~∃x~Φx and ~∀xΦx. If these propositions 
characterize an ontology of immanence, then this is because there is no 
longer a transcendental term that is exempted from withdrawal. Rather, as 
the first proposition reads, there does not exist an entity that is not subject 
to withdrawal. If, for example, God exists, God is necessarily withdrawn 
with respect to itself and God's creatures are withdrawn from God. In 
short, even God has no privileged or omniscient access to its creatures, nor 
even to himself. Likewise, subjects are both withdrawn from themselves 
and other beings are withdrawn from subjects. Withdrawal is thus not an 
accidental feature of beings, but is rather a constitutive feature of beings. 
Moreover, withdrawal is not simply a relation between one entity and 
another, but is the core of each entity itself. In this regard, every entity, up 
to and including God if God exists, is like a Lacanian divided or barred 
subject, , such that, regardless of whether or not it is related to another 
entity, each entity is withdrawn with respect to itself. Put differently, 
no entity is fully self-present to itself, but rather every entity necessarily 
contains blind spots or is opaque to itself. Withdrawal here is the very 
structure of entities, not an accidental relation of how one entity relates to 
another entity. In short, such ontologies are ontologies of immanence in 
that no entity escapes withdrawal either for-itself or in-itself. 
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However, while there is no entity that is not subject to withdrawal, the 
side of the graph pertaining to ontologies of immanence also indicates 
that not all of entities are withdrawn. This thesis is expressed by the lower 
proposition on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation. Here something 
of the entity manifests or presents itself in the world through actualization 
or local manifestation. In short, withdrawal is never so thorough, never so 
complete, that local manifestation in one form or another is impossible. 
Returning to the themes of chapter two, we thus encounter the basic 
structure of objects in the relation between the top and bottom propositions 
on the feminine side of Lacan's graph of sexuation. There we saw that the 
basic structure of objects is to simultaneously be withdrawn and self-
othering. No object directly relates to another object and every object is in 
excess of any of its actualizations, yet objects undergo self-othering through 
their local manifestations. Something of the object presents itself to the 
world. However, here we must be careful to note that this presentation or 
local manifestation is not a presentation to the gaze of a subject, but rather 
is an event that takes place in the world regardless of whether any entity is 
present to register this local manifestation. 
The difference between ontologies of transcendence and ontologies 
of immanence is thus evident. In the case of ontologies of transcendence, 
withdrawal is an accidental feature of objects. Here, while objects might 
indeed be withdrawn from us, objects are entirely present to themselves. 
Moreover, subject, mind, and language are invariably treated as present or 
immune to withdrawal within these ontologies. In the case of ontologies of 
immanence, by contrast, withdrawal is not an accident, but a constitutive 
feature of all objects. Withdrawal constitutes the very structure or being 
of their being. Here objects are not only withdrawn from themselves such 
that every object is akin to a Lacanian divided subject, , but objects are 
always withdrawn from one another. In this regard, local manifestation 
is not a presentation of an object that presents “part” of the withdrawn 
object such that, were there enough local manifestations, the object would 
be completely presented and withdrawal would be overcome. Rather, local 
manifestation is always the production or creation of a new quality that 
actualizes powers of the virtual proper being of the object without rendering 
virtual proper being itself present. Virtual proper being is necessarily abyssal 
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such that it never comes to presence. In this respect, the agency of virtual 
proper being can only ever be inferred through the variety of qualities an 
object produces in its local manifestation. It can never itself be directly 
encountered for, as we saw in chapter 3, virtual proper being is structured 
without being qualitative. 
Within discourses organized around ontologies of immanence, the 
mathemes populating the lower portion of the feminine side of Lacan's 
graphs of sexuation now take on a new valence. S() continues to signify 
Other jouissance, yet Other jouissance is no longer an ineffable jouissance 
outside the symbolic, but rather is an attentiveness to what Timothy 
Morton has called “the strange stranger”. Describing the strange stranger, 
Morton writes, 
[t]he strange stranger [...] is something or someone whose 
existence we cannot anticipate. Even when strange strangers 
showed up, even if they lived with us for a thousand years, 
we might never know them fully—and we would never know 
whether we had exhausted our getting-to-know process.281
Indeed, the strange strangers can never be exhausted precisely because 
withdrawal is a constitutive feature of being. However, it would be a 
mistake to suppose that the strange strangers are objects other than us. To 
think the strange strangers in these terms would be to think them in terms 
of a binary based on identity. On the one hand, there would be the familiar, 
the heimlich, while on the other hand there would be the strange stranger, 
the unfamiliar, the unheimlich. The strange stranger would constitute itself 
as the strange stranger by virtue of its lack of proximity to the heimlich or 
the familiar. It would be that which is different from. And in being different 
from, it would be a difference based on identity or the same. 
The concept of the strange stranger, however, is a concept without 
a binary. Rather the multiple-composition of being consists of strange 
strangers all the way down. And in this regard, we ourselves are strange 
strangers not only to other entities, but above all to ourselves insofar as 
withdrawal is not merely a relation of one entity to another, but also a 
relation of entities to themselves. Ontological discourses premised on 
immanence thus relate both to themselves and other objects qua strange 
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strangers. Such discourses welcome the other as a strange stranger and 
acknowledge the strange stranger within themselves or their constitutive 
being as self-othering. In this regard, discourses of immanence are not 
unlike the ethics Lacan ascribes to the analyst. As Lacan remarks, 
[t]he analyst's desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to 
obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, 
confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the 
first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only 
may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is 
outside the limits of the law, where alone it may live.282
Ontologies of immanence strive to relate to themselves and others 
as strange strangers, in and through their differences. They welcome 
that difference, remaining open to the possibility of surprise, refusing to 
reduce strange strangers to fixed identities. In this regard, they practice 
the difference between local manifestation and virtual proper being. In 
other words, philosophies of immanence recognize the locality of local 
manifestation and the openness and excess of virtual proper being, refusing 
any reduction of the being of beings to their local manifestations. It is this 
excess that accounts for the strangeness of the strange stranger. Strange 
strangers always harbor an excess within them that refuses any reduction to 
local manifestation. 
The difference between how ontologies of transcendence and how 
ontologies of immanence relate to objects can be illustrated in terms of 
Lacan's discourse of the master. 
//



a
One way of thinking about Lacan's discourses are as little machines that 
propel a certain discourse forward. Here the product of each discourse (the 
lower right-hand corner of the discourse) has a paradoxical status in that 
it is simultaneously something produced by the discourse and something 
that contributes to the continuation of the discourse. In the discourse of the 
master, associated with discourses of transcendence, the discourse attempts 
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to identify and define objects, yet there is always a remainder, objet a, that 
evades identification. Like a Markov chain, this remainder, in its turn, 
generates a next round of discourse attempting to capture and integrate the 
remainder. In short, the discourse of the master treats the remainder not 
as a constitutive feature of all objects, as the mark of their being as strange 
strangers, but rather as an accident to be surmounted and overcome. In 
other words, ontologies of transcendence are governed by a telos, even if 
impossible, of attaining full presence. 
In the case of the graphs of sexuation, we have already seen how 
masculine sexuation is a structure of semblance whereas feminine sexuation 
is a structure of truth. Masculine sexuation is a reaction to the fundamental 
split of being that attempts to surmount this split and cover it over through 
the enaction of an exception. This carries over into the difference between 
ontologies of presence and transcendence and ontologies of immanence 
and withdrawal. However, the seeds of this erasure of withdrawal can 
already be detected within ontological discourses organized around 
withdrawal. Within ontological discourses organized around immanence, Φ 
marks that tendency within ontologies of immanence to erase withdrawal. 
Φ marks the yearning or desire for full plenitude or actuality that erases 
the strange stranger. As such, Φ is the seed within immanence upon which 
the semblance of an exception is constructed. However, as we will recall 
from the discourse of the master, any exception, S
1
, veils , the barred 
subject, in the position of truth. In other words, S
1
, whether in the form of 
a master-signifier, a transcendental subject, God, consciousness or mind is 
a semblance or masquerade that cloaks and disguises its own withdrawal, 
parading itself as fully present or actual. 
Lacan's graphs of sexuation allow us to make our first pass at what 
constitutes a flat ontology. In the first approximation, flat ontology consists 
in the thesis that there are no transcendent terms, no exceptions, no 
positions “out-of-field”, with respect to withdrawal. Here being is flat in 
the precise sense that all beings are characterized by withdrawal and self-
othering. In this regard, all beings that populate the multiple-composition 
of being are strange strangers. The consequence of this is a democracy of 
strange strangers. Where there is no hegemon that stands above and outside 
withdrawal as a full actuality, there is only a flat plane composed of strange 
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strangers. As Morton puts it, “[d]emocracy implies coexistence; coexistence 
implies encounters between strange strangers”.283
6.2. The World Does Not Exist 
Crucial to the flat ontology proposed by onticology is the thesis that the 
world does not exist. Alternatively, we could say that the whole does not 
exist. Here I am deeply indebted to Alain Badiou's Logics of Worlds and 
Timothy Morton's dark ecology proposed in Ecology Without Nature. In 
Logics of Worlds, Badiou demonstrates that every concept of the Whole 
is beset by inconsistency.284 In Ecology Without Nature, Morton argues 
that we must abandon the concept of nature as a unified whole or milieu 
within which beings reside and with respect to which humans and culture 
constitute an outside such that nature is always “over there”.285 To my 
thinking, Morton's conception of being without nature shares a great deal 
of affinity to Latour's concept of “collectives”. In Pandora's Hope, Latour 
writes that, 
[u]nlike society, which is an artifact imposed by the modernist 
settlement, [the concept of collectives] refers to associations 
of humans and nonhumans. While a division between nature 
and society renders invisible the political process by which the 
cosmos is collected in one livable whole, the word “collective” 
makes this process central.286
Setting aside Latour's reference to politics, the concept of “society” 
is, according to Latour, based on a distribution or enclosure of beings 
where nature and society are treated as two already collected wholes that 
are somehow supposed to relate to one another while remaining entirely 
distinct. Society is treated as the domain of all that pertains to the human 
in the form of freedom, agency, meaning, signs, and so on, while nature is 
treated as the domain of brute causality and mechanism without agency. 
As a distinction, the concept of society thus encourages us to focus on 
content and agency, ignoring the role that nonhuman actors or objects play 
in collectives involving human beings. Within the distinction pertaining 
to nature, nature is treated as already gathered and unified and we are 
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encouraged to focus on causality and mechanism alone. By contrast, 
in proposing that we replace the concept of society with the concept of 
collectives, Latour encourages us to attend to how associations between 
humans and nonhumans are formed. 
In arguing that nature does not exist, Morton challenges the notion 
that there is an outside to nature or that nature is something other, outside 
the domain of society. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, [t]here is no such 
thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one 
within the other and couples the machines together”.287 Neither nature nor 
being is an outside that we must stretch to reach or that is encountered 
when taking a stroll on Black Forest woodland paths, but rather being an 
immanent field without outside or other. And here, when Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to machines, I see no reason not to treat these machines as 
objects. In short, a collective is an entanglement of human and nonhuman 
actors or objects. However, here it is important to be cautious, for while 
there are indeed collectives of human and nonhuman objects or actors, we 
must not conclude that collectives as such are composed of human and 
nonhuman actors. Collectives can just as easily be collectives of tardigrades 
and other objects, collectives of planets and asteroids, and so on without 
any human involvement whatsoever. In short, what's important about the 
concept of collectives is that they mark, like the concept of regimes of 
attraction, entanglements of objects in a network or mesh. If Morton is so 
eager to abandon the concept of nature within ecological thought, then 
this is not, I take it, because he wishes to reduce all of being to culture, 
but because in order to properly think ecologically we must overcome the 
notion that nature is a closed whole or totality “over there” or outside of 
human relations. 
If it is so vital for flat ontology to establish that the world does not 
exist, then this is because the world must not be treated as a milieu in 
which beings or objects are contained as parts to a whole. In short, if flat 
ontology is to truly be flat, then it is necessary to establish that the world 
is not a container within which beings are found. Alternatively, it must be 
shown that the world is not a super-object composed of all other objects 
as sub-multiples that form a harmonious whole consisting of beings as 
complementary and inter-locking parts. As such, following Badiou, there 
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is not world, but rather worlds. The universe, which is really only a manner 
of speaking, is a pluriverse or multiplicity of universes. Here, then, it is 
important to observe the role of the definite article in the thesis that “the 
world does not exist”. Generally when we speak of “the world” we mean 
this as shorthand for the totality of all that exists. The thesis that the world 
does not exist is the thesis that no such totality exists nor is it possible for 
such a totality to be formed. Rather being consists entirely of objects and 
collectives. 
There are two ways of arguing that the world doesn't exist, the first 
of which has already been hinted at in chapter five in the context of 
mereology. Within the domain of formal reasoning, Z-F set theory shows 
the inconsistency of any attempt to form a totality or whole. Set theory 
provides a variety of resources for contesting the consistency of any totality 
or whole, however, here I'll focus on the power set axiom. As we've already 
seen, the power set axiom allows one to take the set of all subsets of an 
initial set. Thus, if we have a set composed of elements {a, b, c}, the power 
set of this set would be {{a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}. At the 
level of formal reasoning, if the power set axiom spells the ruin of any whole 
or totality, then this is because it reveals the existence of a bubbling excess 
within any whole or collection. 
This is a variation of Cantor's Paradox. Cantor's paradox demonstrates 
that there can be no greatest cardinal number precisely because the power 
set of any cardinal number will necessarily be larger than the cardinal 
number itself. In a stunning inversion of the ancient thesis that the whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts, the power set axiom reveals, to the 
contrary, that the parts are always greater than the whole. As I argued in the 
last chapter, from a certain perspective each object is a crowd, containing 
within itself a plurality of other autonomous objects that very likely “know” 
nothing of the object of which they are parts. Any whole that does manage 
to establish itself is, as Deleuze has put it, a “One or Whole so special that 
it results from the parts without altering the fragmentation or disparity of 
those parts, and, like the dragons of Balbec or Vinteuil's phrase, is itself 
valid as a part alongside others, adjacent to others”.288 What the power 
set reveals is the bubbling pluralism of “the” world beneath any unity or 
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totality. Any totality or whole, in its turn, is itself an object or One alongside 
all sorts of other ones. 
At the formal level, the real force of the power set axiom lies in the 
manner in which it reveals the possibility of a multiplicity of relations 
and objects within any collective. It will be recalled that any exo-relation 
between objects is potentially itself also an object. If we ask the strange 
question, “when is an object?” we can answer this question with the 
hypothesis that an object is when exo-relations among other objects 
manage to attain operational closure such that their aggregate or multiple-
composition becomes capable of encountering perturbations as information 
in terms of their own endo-consistency. On the one hand, the power 
set axiom reveals the possibility of a plurality of other objects within any 
collective. On the other hand, the power set axiom discloses the possibility 
of alternative exo-relations among objects, not present in the whole from 
which the subsets are drawn. Finally, the power set axiom reveals the 
possibility of withdrawing objects from their relations to collectives so 
that they might function as autonomous actors, either entering into other 
collectives, subsystems, or going it alone within the order of being. 
If, from the standpoint of formal reasoning, the Whole is not, the One is 
not, or the world does not exist, then this is precisely because these subsets, 
these other possible objects and relations populating the power set of the 
Whole or alleged One are neither counted nor countable within the Whole 
or One. In short, every Whole or One contains an excess within it that is not 
itself treated as a part of the Whole or One. Put differently, such subsets are 
included in the set from which they are drawn, without belonging to it. Yet 
it is precisely this absence of belonging or membership that spells the ruin 
of the Whole, One, or World. 
However, while the formal reasoning of set theory provides us the 
resources for thinking the nonexistence of the world, it does not establish 
the nonexistence of the world. Confronted with the formal demonstration 
of excess bubbling within any Whole or totality, one can easily respond by 
pointing out that, as provocative as these formal demonstrations are, the 
concept of World pertains not to what is possible, but to what actually exists. 
In this regard, the demonstration that any collection could contain other 
objects and relations does not establish that the World does contain other 
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objects and relations not counted within that totality. Since the concept 
of World pertains to those relations and objects that do actually exist, the 
formal demonstration of the inexistence of the World has no purchase on 
the thesis that the World exists. 
If it is to be established that the World does not exist, then what is 
required is not a demonstration of the possibility of the ruin of any Whole, 
but rather the demonstration that in fact the World does not exist. The 
resources for this second argument have already been developed in my 
discussion of operational closure in chapter four. There we saw that every 
object is operationally closed such that it constitutes its own system/
environment distinction. The paradox of this distinction is that, while it is 
a distinction between system and environment, the distinction itself falls 
on one side of what it distinguishes: the system. In short, the environment/
system distinction refers not to two present-at-hand entities, systems 
and environments, but is rather constituted by systems themselves. This 
distinction, in its turn, constitutes the entity's openness to its environment, 
and that openness is always of a selective nature. However, here we must 
be careful to distinguish between the environment of a system and systems 
in the environment of a system. While an object does indeed constitute its 
environment in the sense of constituting those sorts of perturbations to 
which it is open, objects do not constitute other objects or systems in their 
environment. At best, working on the premise that an object is open to 
some other systems in its environment, an object translates perturbations it 
receives from these other objects. 
Two points follow from these observations. First, insofar as environment 
is constituted by the object “drawing” the distinction between system and 
environment, it cannot be said that environments are a present-at-hand 
milieu in which objects exist. As we saw in chapter five in connection 
with our discussion of developmental systems theory, objects construct 
their environment even as they are often buffeted by perturbations from 
systems in their environment. Second, and in a closely related vein, because 
objects are only selectively open to their environments, it follows that 
objects are not open to all systems in their environment. The tardigrade 
does not belong to the environment of a tree, nor does the tree belong to 
the environment of a tardigrade. Likewise, my three-year-old daughter, 
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qua social subject, does not belong to the environment of her toy box. 
No matter how much my daughter yells at the lid of her toy box when it 
accidentally falls down upon her head—and she does, indeed, yell and 
curse, in her own way, the toy box—the toy box does not respond or bow to 
her will. While she might address her toy box as “little brother” for reasons 
that thoroughly baffle me, the toy box is indifferent to her designations 
and scoldings. One might object that certainly the acoustic resonances of 
her scolding voice perturb the toy box and such an objection would not be 
mistaken. However, the manner in which the vibrations of this tiny voice 
affect the polished oak wood of the toy chest do not entail that that oaken 
toy box transforms these perturbations into information qua voice. Sadly, 
for my daughter, that toy box is as dense as wood. 
With Leibniz, perhaps, we can say that there are as many worlds as there 
are objects. What we cannot say, however, is that the World forms any sort 
of organic unity or whole in which all objects interrelate with one another 
as a compossible system. There is no world-system precisely because there 
is no World. On the one hand, contrary to Whitehead, it simply isn't the case 
that every entity relates to every other entity. Many entities fall completely 
outside local collectives such that they are both entirely oblivious to these 
collectives and such that these collectives are entirely oblivious to them. Put 
differently, there are a number of instances in which there is absolutely no 
resonance between entities. Quite literally, they belong to entirely different 
universes. As in the case of neutrinos that are unable to relate to most 
other particles due to their neutral charge, scientists have to painstakingly 
create apparatuses capable of bringing these entities into relation with the 
entities of our world. On the other hand, even in those instances where 
entities do relate, each entity relates to other entities on its own terms as a 
function of the distinctions it draws and its own peculiar organization. As 
a consequence, there is no whole or totality that can be formed out of the 
entities that populate the world. 
The thesis that the World forms an organic totality where no such 
totality exists surreptitiously treats the collective as already formed, as 
already being there, without attending to any of the work and translations 
required for collectives to come into being. It treats collectives as 
accomplished, while ignoring the arduous work required for any collective 
to form itself. As such, it ignores the antagonisms that populate being as 
well as the lack of resonance between all sorts of objects. While the idea 
of the World as an organic and harmonious unity might prove comforting 
and reassuring, providing us with the sense that we belong to a Whole in 
which each entity has its proper place, such a conception of being does a 
profound injustice to the entities that populate the multiple-composition 
of being and ends up recapitulating the discourse of the master and the 
logic of ontologies of transcendence. Put differently, concepts of World as 
an organic Whole or totality foreclose the strange stranger. Each entity, the 
story runs, has its proper place within the organic totality and is defined 
by its relation to all others. What is thereby abolished is the non-relation of 
each and every relation and the recognition of that which is entirely non-
relational with respect to any particular collective or entity. 
If conceptualizations of the World premised on the organic unity of the 
Whole recapitulate the logic of the discourse of the master and ontologies 
of transcendence, then this is because such discourses inevitably must have 
recourse to some entity that perturbs the “natural” order, preventing it 
from existing harmoniously as ontologies of the World dictate. It is always 
Man, technology, the foreigner and so on that perturbs the “natural” 
order. In other words, within the conception of Nature as an organic whole 
or totality, there is always recourse to some uncanny agency generating 
disharmony that upsets the harmonic natural order. Such conceptions of 
being necessarily have recourse to objet a as a disruptive agency that upsets 
the “natural” order. Moreover, this disruptive agency, this trickster, to use 
Lévi-Strauss's memorable term, is treated as an accident that could return 
the natural order to harmony were it eradicated. As such, discourses about 
the existence of the World and the intrinsic harmony of nature end up 
repeating the friend/enemy logic analyzed so attentively by Schmitt. 
Yet it is not simply that the idea of the World as an organic and 
harmonic Whole producing objet a as a remainder that is problematic. 
Rather, in declaring that the World exists, that the world forms an organic 
Whole, all objects are subordinated to the World as parts of the Whole. As 
such, their only value and being arises from what they contribute to the 
World or the Whole as elements in this massive machine that swallows them 
all up in a total system in which they're integrated. The consequence here is 
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that the being of the part is completely effaced, such that the part becomes 
merely a functional element providing perturbations that the Whole can 
draw on in producing information in its own ongoing autopoiesis. Objects 
themselves therefore have no autonomy apart from the Whole and simply 
are what they are as elements of the Whole. Gaia, it turns out, is either a 
fascist or a totalitarian. 
The point here is not that collectives can't be pushed into chaotic basins 
of attraction that spell their destruction, or, at least, bifurcation, down the 
road, but rather that these strange strangers are not, to put it in Aristotelian/
Scholastic terms, accidents. Put more precisely, these strange strangers are 
not outside of worlds, but rather are themselves elements of worlds. The 
Luddite thesis that Man, technology, and media are unnatural imposters 
that unbalance the natural order of the World is premised on the existence 
of a World that never existed to begin with. They treat as ontological what 
is, in reality, a covert normative judgment. And again, here the point is not 
that normative judgments shouldn't be made, but that these judgments 
are made from the standpoint of a particular system or object and do not 
themselves determine what is or is not. But more fundamentally, from 
the standpoint of worlds, the harmonic has never existed. It has never 
been the case that it is merely Man, Technology, or Media that perturbs 
Nature. The odds are that at this very moment, somewhere in the universe 
or the multiverse, there is a massive black hole devouring a solar system 
with a rich and complex ecosystem supporting sentient and intelligent 
life. The Black Plague swept across Europe and Asia for decades and 
centuries, wiping out massive populations of humans and other creatures. 
Precambrian organisms caused the extinction of many of their species 
by saturating their environment with oxygen, diluting the carbon dioxide 
they needed to thrive. The dinosaurs very likely became extinct as a result 
of an asteroid. It is worlds themselves that are out of kilter and lacking in 
harmony. While we should make the case for certain forms of equilibrium, 
balance, or harmony, we should refuse to ontologize such claims, treating 
them as reflective of a “Goddess Earth”, and be upfront in the declaration 
that these are normative judgments made from the standpoint of a 
particular object or system. From the standpoint of the bubonic plague, 
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sickness is merely a convenient way of replicating itself. In other words, it is 
not sickness at all. 
The thesis that the world does not exist is crucial to flat ontology so 
as to avoid surreptitiously treating as collected that which is not collected. 
What the inexistence of the world teaches is that worlds are a work, that 
meshes must be produced, and that they cannot be said to exist in advance. 
There is, as Graham Harman has so aptly, beautifully, and poetically put 
it in Guerrilla Metaphysics, a “carpentry” of being. That is to say, collectives 
must be built by the objects that deign to enter into structural couplings 
with one another. In this regard, the inexistence of the world draws our 
attention to what Latour has called the “sociology of associations” as 
opposed to the “sociology of the social”.289 It seems that if he could, Latour 
would prefer to abandon the term “sociology” altogether given the manner 
in which it is thoroughly contaminated by what he calls “the modernist 
constitution”, where nature and society are treated as two entirely distinct 
domains. Yet if, contends Latour, the term “sociology” should be retained 
then it ought to be retained not as a theory of that peculiar domain of 
what is unique to the human, but rather as that domain that pertains to 
associations, relations, or what Harman calls “the carpentry of being”. 
Where the sociology of the social appeals to society, social forces, power, 
meaning, language, and a host of other nefarious human-related entities to 
explain why people behave as they do, the sociology of associations instead 
draws attention to how relations are forged in the creation of assemblages. 
The profound difference embodied in Latour's sociology of associations 
is not only that it draws attention to relations between humans and 
nonhumans and how these relations are forged and what impact they have, 
but that we can imagine a sociology of associations that does not involve 
humans at all. This would not simply be a matter of analyzing bee, ant, 
and gorilla societies after the fashion of Jane Goodall, but would involve 
the investigation of collectives involving no sentient beings whatsoever. 
For example, the sociologist of associations might investigate the impact 
various storms and winds have on strata and how they manage to maintain 
such remarkable chaotic consistency. In this regard, the molecular biologist 
and the chemist are sociologists of association, for they investigate how 
particular collectives are forged among particular actors. It just happens 
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that these collectives are composed not of humans or animals, but of atoms 
of oxygen, hydrogen, and heavy metals. What is, above all, important to 
remember for the purposes of flat ontology is not simply that the World 
does not exist, but rather that collectives must be forged. Moreover, it 
must be remembered that not all entities relate to all other entities and 
that like the floating city of George Lucas's Empire Strikes Back, there 
are collectives that are unassociated with other collectives and that know 
nothing of other collectives. While the thesis that the World does not exist 
or that being does not form an organic harmonious totality might appear 
to be a grim hypothesis, denying us our oneness and unity with everything 
else, this thesis also embodies the freedom and hope of collectives; for it 
entails that we can set about the arduous work of building new collectives 
and welcoming unheard of strange strangers, building what are as of yet 
unheard of collectives. In other words, the theory that the Whole and World 
do not exist both promises to free us from a tyrannical collective gone mad 
and offers the possibility of building other collectives. Rather than critique, 
which is, in its own way and from its own point of view indispensable, the 
thesis that the world does not exist offers us the activity of composition. 
6.3. Being is Flat 
The foregoing chapters and sections lead to the conclusion that being is 
flat. The flatness of being is embodied in two fundamental claims. First, 
in light of our exploration of the interior of objects in chapter four, it 
becomes clear that ontologically the bland human-world gap or relationship 
possesses no metaphysical priority. As Harman puts it, “object-oriented 
philosophy holds that the relation of humans to pollen, oxygen, eagles, or 
windmills is no different in kind from the interaction of these objects with 
each other”.290 Second, onticology and object-oriented philosophy establish 
what might be called a heteroverse or pluriverse, where entities at all levels 
of scale, whether natural or cultural, physical or artificial, material or 
semiotic are on equal ontological footing. As Ian Bogost puts it, “all beings 
equally exist, yet they do not exist equally”.291 Onticology and object-oriented 
philosophy therefore democratizes being, asserting not one primary gap 
between subjects and objects, humans and world, mind and reality, but 
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rather an infinity of gaps or vacuums between objects regardless of whether 
humans are involved. Likewise, onticology and object-oriented philosophy 
democratize being by defending a plurality of types of objects, ranging from 
the semiotic to the natural. Rather than treating one type of object such as 
quantum particles as the really real upon which all else is grounded and 
to which all else ultimately reduces, flat ontology advocates a pluralism of 
types of objects at all levels of scale that are irreducible to one another. In 
other words, objects of different types and at different levels of scale are 
what Aristotle referred to as genuine primary substances. 
As Harman has compellingly argued, philosophy, for the last two 
hundred or so years, has been obsessed with a single gap between the 
human and the world, treating this gap as metaphysically privileged or 
special, unlike all other relations with objects. Within the framework of 
onticology and object-oriented philosophy, however, the human-object gap 
possesses no privileged status, but is one among many gaps populating a 
heteroverse. As Harman remarks, 
[w]hen the things withdraw from presence into their dark 
subterranean reality, they distance themselves not only from 
human beings, but from each other as well. If the human 
perception of a house or tree is forever haunted by some 
hidden surplus in the things that never become present, the 
same is true of the sheer causal interaction between rocks or 
raindrops.292
From this Harman concludes that, “contrary to the dominant 
assumption of philosophy since Kant, the true chasm in ontology lies not 
between humans and world, but between objects and relations”.293 Far from 
the gap between humans and objects constituting a unique form of relation, 
withdrawal is a perfectly ubiquitous relation within being characteristic 
of all relations between objects. All objects are strange strangers with 
respect to one another regardless of whether or not humans are involved in 
these relations. Moreover, all objects are strange strangers with respect to 
themselves. 
Within the framework of onticology, the ubiquity of withdrawal 
characteristic of all objects is theorized in terms of the operational closure 
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of objects analyzed in chapter four and the split within objects between 
virtual proper being and local manifestation analyzed in chapter three. With 
respect to the operational closure of objects, the relation between objects 
whether human, social, biological, or inanimate is a non-relation between 
objects in which objects never directly touch or encounter one another. Like 
Leibniz's windowless monads, each object is a discrete substance or unit 
of its own, withdrawn from all other objects without any direct relation or 
contact. Objects never directly encounter one another, but rather only relate 
to one another as translations or information. And information is never 
something transmitted or exchanged by objects, but rather is constituted by 
each object as a function of its own internal organization and distinctions. 
With respect to the split nature of objects embodied in the split 
between virtual proper being and local manifestation, a similar ubiquity of 
withdrawal is encountered. The virtual proper being of objects is abyssal 
and subterranean, such that it itself never comes to presence. Virtual proper 
being is structured without being qualitative and refers to that domain of 
powers and attractors presiding over the actualization of qualities or local 
manifestations. Insofar as virtual proper being is thoroughly withdrawn and 
never itself becomes present, it can only be inferred through the actual. 
It is only through tracking local manifestations and their variations that 
we get any sense of the dark volcanic powers harbored within objects. In 
other words, through second-order observation or the observation of how 
an object relates to the world in its non-relation, we form a hypothetical 
diagram of objects or a map of their attractors or powers. However, insofar 
as all local manifestations create something new in the form of qualities, 
this diagram can only ever be partial, hypothetical, and incomplete 
for, as Spinoza so nicely put it, we don't ever completely know what 
objects can do. 
Nor is the withdrawal of objects ever merely a withdrawal of objects 
with respect to one another. Withdrawal is a form of non-relation so 
thorough that objects aren't simply withdrawn from one another, but are 
withdrawn even from themselves. As we have seen, all objects are akin to 
Lacanian divided subjects, . On the one hand, no object ever actualizes 
the subterranean volcanic core with which its virtual proper being is 
haunted. This virtual domain is like a reserve or excess that never comes 
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to presence. It is not simply that objects are, in themselves, fully actual 
and only withdrawn for other objects relating to them, but rather that 
objects are withdrawn in themselves. On the other hand, the distinctions 
or organization by which objects produce information for themselves 
are themselves withdrawn or invisible to the object that deploys them. 
As we have seen, every distinction necessarily contains two blind spots. 
Distinctions are blind to the unmarked space produced as a result of 
the distinction. As Luhmann puts it, objects can only see what they can 
see and cannot see what they cannot see. Moreover, they do not see that 
they do not see this. Yet in addition to this, objects are blind to their own 
operative distinctions. Distinctions can only be observed or used, but 
never observed and used. In making indications or interacting with other 
objects, the distinctions that render these indications possible become 
thoroughly invisible. 
Insofar as withdrawal is ubiquitous, there is no reason to treat the 
human-object relation as metaphysically privileged. The human-object 
relation is not a special relation, not a unique relation, but a subset of a far 
more pervasive ontological truth that pertains to objects of all types. The 
point here is not that we should exclude inquiry into human/object relations 
or social/object relations, but rather that these analyses are analyses for 
regional ontology, for a particular domain of being, not privileged grounds 
of ontology as such. The issue here is thus very subtle. It is not a question 
of excluding the human and the social, but of decentering them from the 
place of ontological privilege they currently enjoy within contemporary 
philosophy and theory. Nor does this entail that all objects relate to other 
objects in exactly the same way. There are as many forms of translation as 
there are types of objects. Indeed, there are as many forms of translation as 
there are objects. Moreover, new forms of translation come into being all 
the time with the emergence of new objects and with the development of 
objects as analyzed in chapters four and five. 
What onticology and, I believe, object-oriented philosophy propose 
is therefore a subtle shift in the distinctions governing the marked space 
of what philosophy and theory indicates. Far from seeking to exclude or 
eradicate phenomenology and bodies of cultural theory in the name of, for 
example, a naturalism or a scientistic materialism, object-oriented ontology 
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aims to expand what can be indicated within the domain of philosophy and 
theory. Onticology and object-oriented philosophy thus find themselves in 
the position of receiving opposite and opposed objections from all sides. 
From the culturalists, we receive criticisms declaring that we are rejecting 
the human, the subject, meaning, signs, and the social. From the naturalists, 
we are accused of wooly-headed thinking that treats social entities, semiotic 
entities, texts, films, fictions and so on as real and autonomous entities 
within being. 
In both cases, however, the rejoinder of object-oriented ontology is the 
same. What is objected to with respect to the culturalists is not the thesis 
that humans and social entities translate other entities in their own way, 
nor the thesis that humans and social entities are not genuine entities, but 
rather the Malkovichism that arises from privileging the human/world or 
social/world gap. As we saw in 6.1, Malkovichism consists in treating all 
other objects as blank screens upon which humans project their meanings, 
intentions, signs, and signifiers. Malkovich, like Narcissus, sees only 
himself in other objects, denying objects their own autonomy and dignity. 
The trick of cultural analysis thus lies in demonstrating that what we take 
to be the object is rather our own alienated image. What object-oriented 
ontology opposes is not the thesis that humans and society translate other 
objects, nor the thesis that humans and societies only encounter objects in 
“distorted” form in their own interior, but rather the culturalist tendency 
to reduce objects to alienated human reflections. To be sure we can, and 
should, investigate the manner in which humans and societies translate 
objects. Put in more technical terms, we should engage in reflexive second-
order observations of our own distinctions and how they organize our 
experience of the world. Yet having made this concession, we must also 
redraw our distinctions in such a way as to make room for nonhuman 
objects as autonomous actors in their own right, such that these objects 
are not treated as merely passive screens for human projections and such 
that they are treated as perturbing the world in their own way. In other 
words, the point is to expand the domain of what can be investigated, 
not to limit it. However, this requires placing objects in the marked space 
of our distinctions and treating humans and societies as entities among 
other entities. 
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From the naturalists, by contrast, object-oriented ontologists are 
accused of treating a variety of psychic and cultural entities as real entities, 
ignoring the truth that the only real reality is the material and physical 
world. Put crudely, the naturalist accuses object-oriented ontology of 
treating as real what is merely an illusion or derivative. To the ears of 
the naturalist, object-oriented ontology thus looks like a form of arch-
culturalism insofar as it treats entities like nations, groups, chairs, films, 
and so on as genuinely real entities. To make matters worse, the naturalist 
is appalled by the object-oriented thesis that these entities are irreducible 
to the physical, material, or natural domain. This ends up getting translated 
into the thesis that object-oriented ontology rejects neurology, biology, 
chemistry, physics and a host of other “hard sciences”. 
However, once again, the point is the same. The aim is not to exclude 
or reject the entities explored by the “hard sciences”, but to refuse a 
hierarchical conception of being where these entities are treated as the 
“really real” beings and all the others are treated as derivative illusions or 
mere effects. Here, again, the aim is not to limit inquiry, but to expand 
the domain of what can be investigated. With the naturalists, object-
oriented ontology agrees that the culturalists or social constructivists have 
illicitly reduced nonhuman beings to cultural constructs. With the social 
constructivists or culturalists, however, object-oriented ontology refuses to 
treat social and cultural entities as mere effects of the material and physical. 
Rather, object-oriented ontology argues that these entities are genuinely 
real entities in their own right. What object-oriented ontology thus objects 
to is the reductivism of many naturalist approaches. 
However here we must proceed with care. Object-oriented ontology 
can readily agree that Supreme Court justices are impossible without 
brains, even if often it appears that they don't use their brains. The point 
is that brains are one thing and Supreme Court justices are another thing. 
Being a Supreme Court justice is irreducible to being a brain. Here we 
encounter considerations of both mereology and operational closure. In 
a rather bizarre formulation, we can ask ourselves whether Antonin Scalia 
is a Supreme Court justice. Initially the answer would appear to be an 
obvious yes, unless, somehow, Scalia is an imposter. However, within the 
framework of onticology, matters are not so simple. Supreme Court justices 
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are elements within a particular object, namely, the United States. Like all 
other objects, this object is operationally closed, relating only to itself. As 
such, Scalia, the individual psychic system, belongs not to that object that 
contains Justice Scalia as an element, but rather to the environment of that 
object. Put differently, Scalia the individual psychic system belongs to the 
environment of Justice Scalia the element within a particular larger scale 
object. Moreover, insofar as the individual psychic system Scalia is itself 
an operationally closed object, it follows that Scalia's brain belongs to the 
environment of Scalia the individual psychic system. Insofar as Scalia's brain, 
such as it is, belongs to the environment of the individual psychic system 
Scalia, and insofar as Scalia belongs to the environment of that object that 
contains Justice Scalia as a member, it follows that Scalia's brain can only 
perturb Scalia the individual psychic system, and that Scalia the psychic 
system can only perturb the social-system or object that contains Justice 
Scalia as an element. In other words, each of these objects is withdrawn 
from the other such that each operates in terms of its own operational 
closure translating perturbations from one another into information. 
In this regard, Scalia's brain has little to tell us about Justice Scalia. 
Put differently, Justice Scalia is irreducible to the individual psychic 
system Scalia, and the individual psychic system Scalia is irreducible to 
Scalia's brain. Instead, what we get is something akin to a high voltage 
Jacob's Ladder where sparks leap from non-communicating object to non-
communicating object with each of these objects being irreducible to one 
another. At this point, I imagine the naturalist protesting that I'm proposing 
a thoroughly obscurantist universe populated by all sorts of occult 
substances like so many ghosts. Am I not here suggesting that Scalia is an 
immaterial soul and, were it not problematic enough to posit immaterial 
souls for individuals, have I not now multiplied the sorts of souls that exist 
through the postulation of even stranger objects like groups, societies, roles, 
and so on? Is not Ockham spinning in his grave in response to my lack of 
ontological parsimony? 
However, I have already developed the resources for responding to this 
criticism in section 5.3 where I addressed the ontology of structure. While 
emergent entities are indeed irreducible to smaller scale entities, this does 
not entail that they violate any laws of physics or material reality. As we saw 
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in 5.3, the defining feature of structure lies in the manner in which relations 
among elements making up the endo-structure of an entity or system are 
constrained. Nothing about these constraints violates the laws of physics 
or the findings of neurology, however the laws of physics and the findings 
of neurology cannot themselves account for why relations among elements 
are constrained or structured in this particular way. It is this nature of 
constraints or structures that accounts for the irreducibility of larger-scale 
objects. In a fine discussion of causality and emergence, Protevi writes, 
[t]he concept of emergence entails reciprocal or circular 
causality. Upward causality is the emergence of systematic 
focused capacities (the parts of a system function in such 
a way as to provide for capacities of the system that the 
individual parts do not possess), and downward causality 
is the constraint on the behavior of component parts that 
enables systematic-capacities (the whole exerts an influence 
on the parts that now have a reduced field of action).294
With emergence, higher scale objects take on a life of their own that 
can only be accounted for in terms of their own organization. Such objects 
begin to constitute their own elements through their own elements. Here 
upward causality refers to the manner in which elements of the object 
produce the object, whereas downward causality refers to the manner in 
which the object constrains and structures its elements. What we get here is 
a system-specific causality, unique to each object, that while dependent on 
lower-scale objects is not accounted for by these objects. 
With these observations, we now encounter the heteroverse 
characteristic of the flat ontology advocated by onticology and object-
oriented ontology. Rather than one type of object, such as subatomic 
particles, that constitutes the really real, we instead get a heteroverse of 
different types of autonomous and irreducible objects ranging from quarks 
to tardigrades to ecosystems, groups, institutions, societies, humans, 
burritos and so on. An awl is no less real than a cane toad by virtue of being 
fabricated by humans, nor is an institution or group any less real than an 
awl by virtue of being immaterial. It might be argued that an awl is only an 
awl so long as it exists within the framework of society. Perhaps this is true, 
Chapter 6: The Four Theses of Flat Ontology  287
but how is this any different from the other regimes of attraction we explore 
in 5.1 where we saw that the particular form a local manifestation takes is 
in part dependent on structural couplings and regimes of attraction? When 
a sadistic scientist places a cane toad within a glass box without oxygen, 
that cane toad very quickly loses the capacity to locally manifest qualities 
pertaining to life. When the awl is detached from society, it is no longer able 
to locally manifest powers of punching holes in wood or leather. In these 
instances, what has been abolished is not the entity itself, but rather the 
ability of the entity to locally manifest itself in a particular way. Of course, 
in the case of the frog, entropy begins to set in rather quickly. Then again, it 
appears that this particular limitation on local manifestations arising from 
the absence of particular structural couplings is not necessarily irreversible 
in that it appears there are many instances where frogs can be brought 
back to life. 
With this heteroverse of varied objects, we begin to see just how much 
the concept of society and the concept of collectives discussed in 6.2 differ 
from one another. The distinctions organizing the concept of society draw 
attention to subjectivity, signs, meanings, narratives, texts, discourses, 
power, social forces and so on. By contrast, the concept of collectives draws 
our attention to a variety of very different actors, human and nonhuman, 
perturbing and translating each other in particular ways within networks or 
assemblages. No doubt, it is something like this that Guattari was after in 
Chaosmosis. As Guattari writes, 
[s]hould we keep the semiotic productions of the mass 
media, informatics, telematics and robotics separate from 
psychological subjectivity? I don't think so. Just as social 
machines can be grouped under the general title of Collective 
Equipment, technological machines of information and 
communication operate at the heart of human subjectivity, 
not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its 
sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms. Recognition of 
these machinic dimensions of subjectivation leads us to insist, 
in our attempt at redefinition, on the heterogeneity of the 
components leading to the production of subjectivity. Thus 
one finds in it: 1. Signifying semiological components which 
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appear in the family, education, the environment, religion, art, 
sport [...]. 2. Elements constructed by the media industry, 
the cinema, etc., 3. A-signifying semiological dimensions 
that trigger informational sign machines, and that function 
in parallel or independent of the fact that they produce and 
convey significations and denotations, and thus escape from 
strictly linguistic axiomatics.295
Guattari appears to envision the analysis of collectives where a variety 
of different actors or objects ranging from subjects to signs to technologies 
and groups and institutions interact with one another in a highly complex 
fashion. To Guattari's list, of course, we could add the presence or absence 
of roads, power lines, internet connections, weather patterns, cane toads, 
ocean-going ships and canoes, H1N1 viruses and a host of other objects. 
Guattari's ontology is flat in the precise sense that all of these entities are 
full-blown actors rather than mere screens for human signs and intentions. 
And, of course, collectives need not involve signs or humans at all, but can 
be purely inhuman as in the case of the atmosphere of Saturn. 
At this point, it is not unusual to hear humanist correlationists cry foul, 
accusing object-oriented ontologists of technological and environmental 
determinism. In my view, this is an unfair criticism. Somehow pointing out 
that it is impossible to fry eggs without a frying pan or some similar cooking 
surface becomes equivalent to the thesis that frying pans determine people 
to fry eggs. Somehow pointing out how the inland remoteness of China's 
abundant coal reserves played a role in China not kicking off the industrial 
revolution is transformed into the claim that this remoteness determined 
the form that Chinese culture took. In this regard, any qualification of 
human freedom, any evocation of actors other than meaning, narratives, 
signifiers, and discourses is responded to with incredulity at the suggestion 
that humans are merely among other beings rather than at the center of 
beings such that nonhuman beings are merely their screen, passive things 
upon which they impose form through their intentions and techniques, and 
where the world is merely our own alienated reflection. Such is the height 
of Malkovichism. 
Faced with decades of content-based cultural criticism that implicitly, 
at least, adheres to Marx's formula that the aim of philosophy is not to 
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represent the world, but rather to change it, it is peculiar that such theory 
doesn't seem to recognize that such cultural critiques seem to be fairly 
unsuccessful in producing their desired change. Here one would think 
that social and political theorists would become aware that this absence 
of change suggests that perhaps meanings, signifiers, signs, narratives, and 
discourses are not the entire story. One would think that in addition to these 
semiotic actors that play a role in collectives of humans and nonhumans, 
greater attention would be directed at the role of nonhuman actors in 
human collectives and the role they play in constraining the possibilities of 
existence. Such an attentiveness to these nonhuman actors would provide 
us with the resources for thinking strategies of composition that might push 
collectives into new basins of attraction. Whether or not a village has a well, 
a city has roads that provide access to other cities, and whether people have 
alternative forms of occupation and transportation can play a dramatic role 
in the form collectives take. However, in much of contemporary cultural 
theory, these sorts of actors are almost entirely invisible because the marked 
space of theory revolves around the semiotic, placing nonhuman actors in 
the unmarked space of thought and social engagement. 
However, setting aside these criticisms, the more basic ontological 
point is that there can be no question of technological or environmental 
determinism precisely because objects cannot be determined by other 
objects. Insofar as all objects are withdrawn from one another, insofar 
as objects only relate to their environment selectively and through their 
own distinctions or organization, there can be no question of objects 
determining one another. This holds for humans as well. The most one 
object can do to another is perturb it, and even this is not always the case as 
objects are only selectively related to their environment such that there are 
many things towards which they are completely blind. In this regard, the 
manner in which one object responds to another always embodies a high 
degree of creativity. 
In many respects, all of onticology culminates in the four theses of 
flat ontology. It is flat ontology that constitutes the democracy of objects. 
However, this democracy of objects does not amount to the thesis that all 
objects contribute equally to all other objects or to all collectives. Clearly 
tardigrades contribute little or nothing to collectives involving human 
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beings. Here, then, I return to Ian Bogost's thesis that all objects equally 
exist, but not all objects exist equally. Entities perturb other objects more 
and less. Entities play greater and smaller roles in various collectives. Some 
entities, no doubt, do not perturb other objects at all, and as we saw in the 
case of Roy Bhasker in the first chapter, other objects are dormant. Flat 
ontology is not the thesis that all objects contribute equally, but that all 
objects equally exist. In its ontological egalitarianism, what flat ontology 
thus refuses is the erasure of any object as the mere construction of 
another object. 
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